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This thesis is a commentary on G.' s extant works and fragments 
which consists in three main parts: an Introduction, the Greek text, 
and notes on the text and fragments. a) The Introduction offers an 
account of G. 's life which is based on the infonnation provided by 
ancient authors, a discussion of the stylistic features of his prose -
along with a presentation of the criticism of his style by ancient 
authorities - and an analysis of the recurring argumentative 
schemata that underlie G.'s extant work. b) The Greek text, as it 
stands, embodies the readings that I adopt. c) The commentary on 
the extant texts and fragments is nonnally preceded by short 
Introductions, which are pertinent to the main problems of 
interpretation posed by the individual texts. The notes themselves 
nonnally include: i) a presentation of the textual problems and the 
possible solutions which have been proposed by previous scholars, 
together with the arguments that support the readings adopted in the 
text, ii) explanation of the text and its stylistic characteristics, iii) 
discussion of the individual arguments, and their role in the 
reasoning as a whole, and iv) where appropriate an analysis of the 
philosophical issues raised by the texts themselves. 
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PREFACE 
This is the first commentary on Gorgias' work in English, and the 
first detailed one in any language; more importantly perhaps this 
thesis deals independently with an author who is most frequently 
referred to in footnotes. I think that I am justified in believing that 
this neglect does not accurately represent the gravity of G. 's work, 
and the scholarly work that has been done in the last few years 
makes me feel less lonely. 
The emphasis in this thesis is mainly placed on the interpretation 
of G.' s own preserved speeches, and this explains the order in which 
I have presented the texts. It was for this reason also that I did not 
see fit to comment on the text of Sextus' summary ofG.'s work On 
not Being; yet, it would have been impossible to avoid textual notes 
on the De Melissa Xenophane Gorgia, because the readings one 
adopts there affect one's own interpretation. Writing a commentary 
requires a certain economy of expression; several points could have 
been discussed in more detail, but my aim has been to present the 
whole of G.'s work. It was also for the sake of economy that I did 
not include the Testimonia (section A in Diels-Kranz); 1 it was upon 
those, however, that I based my Introduction. In complying with the 
instructions, the Bibliography includes only the titles of books and 
articles that I refer to in my thesis, and consequently I only 
reluctantly dropped works that contributed decisively to my 
understanding of G. 
Commenting on G. is not the same as commenting on a single 
work of an individual orator which purports to be cohesive in itself; 
like the Sophists' intellectual activity in general, G.'s individual 
works touch on a great range of themes. Numerous scholars make 
G.'s works appear coherent by systematising the available material 
and thus detecting in them theories or doctrines that recur in various 
forms. I frequently challenge this view, mainly on the basis of 
1 The numbering of the Testimonia in my text follows Buchheim's edition. 
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evidence provided by the texts themselves. I hope that my difficulty 
in detecting theories in G.' s work will not be construed as a 
difficulty in appreciating his pioneering contribution to the 
development of rhetoric and the examination of logos, the two fields 
in which his influence was particularly felt. 
I am indebted to many people. The first to initiate me into G. was 
Mairi Y ossi; it was in her undergraduate seminar on "Prepaltonic 
and Platonic Poetics" that I first became acquainted with G. Mairi's 
logos echoed ever since in my ears, and when I completed the 
writing of my thesis she generously commented on my text in the 
penetrating way that she always does. I am very indebted to my 
parents; they have been encouraging for years all my educational 
undertakings. I am grateful to Georgia Petridou for all her patience, 
and for lifting my spirits when I reached the point of posing 
metaphysical questions pertinent to the relation between classics and 
'real life'. She could not have been more caring. She was also kind 
enough to read my work and discuss with me aspects of it which 
were closer to her interests. lowe much to Thomas McGrory; he 
read carefully my typescript and corrected my English. As if this 
were not enough, he was certainly the person who made me feel that 
Glasgow was my second home. Special thanks lowe to Prof. 
Garvie. In the first year of my studies in Glasgow he gave me the 
opportunity to attend his postgraduate seminars on Greek tragedy; 
especially his teaching of the Persae made G.' s contention €1T' 
d/../..OTpiwll TE 1TpaYILaTWIl Kat. a-WILaTWIl EV'TUXLaLS" Kat. OV(J"1Tpayc.aLS" 
tOLOll n 1TCi8TfILa OLd. TWll /"0YWll bra8ev '" ljmxfJ more tangible. I 
also have to thank him for reading my essay on the relation between 
G. and Euripides' Troades. Dr Costas Panayotakis has always been 
ready to offer good advice. I am also grateful to :Mr Graham 
Whitaker, the classics librarian; Glasgow University Library is an 
ideal place to do work in Classics. Many thanks to :Mrs Jennifer 
Murray; she is a genuinely kind person. I now feel the need to 
express my warmest thanks to my examiners, Dr S. Usher and Dr. 
D. L. Cairns: they saved me from serious mistakes and in many 
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cases they offered alternative interpretations which now seem to me 
more plausible than the ones that I had originally put forward. 
My deepest gratitude lowe to my supervisor, Professor 
MacDowell. Without his support this thesis would have been a 'not-
being'. I may be the least appropriate person to praise his erudition 
and his expertise in the fields of Greek oratory, comedy, and 
Athenian law. However, I feel confident in saying that his scholarly 




Aiskh. = Aiskhylos 
Aiskhin: = Aiskhines 
And. = Andokides 
Arist. = Aristotle 
Ar. = Aristophanes 
Dem. = Demosthenes 
Eur. = Euripides 
Hdt. = Herodotos 
Hom. = Homer 
Is. = Isaios 
Isok. = Isokrates 
Lys. = Lysias 
PI. = Plato 
Plout. = Ploutarkhos 
Soph. = Sophokles 
Theophr. = Theophrastos 
Thuc. = Thucydides 
Xen. = Xenophon 
Frequently abbreviated words and titles 
DK = H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn., rev. 
and ed. W. Kranz, vols. 1-3, Berlin, 1951-2. 
fro = G. 's Texts and Fragments (section BinD K) 
G. = Gorgias 
Hef. = G.'s Encomium of Helen 
Loeb = Loeb Classical Library 
LSJ = A Greek- English Lexicon, H. G. Liddell-R. Scott, 9th ed. 
Rev. H. S. Jones, R. McKenzie, Oxford, 1940. 
MXG = [Aristotle] De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia. 
ON B = G.'s On not Being (as represented either in the MXG or 
in Sextus) 
Pal. = G.'s The Defence ofPalamedes 
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Test. = Testimonia (section A in DK; in the present thesis I 
employ Buchheim's edition) 
Abbreviations of the titles of periodicals in the Bibliography are 





G. was the son of Charmantides of whom nothing is known; his 
brother was the physician Herodikos. 1 G.' s sister was married to 
Deicrates, and she gave birth to a certain Hippokrates, whose son 
Eumolpos dedicated a statue of G. at Olympia.2 Ploutarkhos (iT.8a) 
says that when G. delivered his Olympic Oration, a certain 
Melanthios complained that G. advised the Greeks to unite, when he 
was himself unable to secure unity in his own house, because he had 
fallen in love with his female servant and this caused the jealousy of 
his wife; but Isokrates belies this information (Test.I8), and there is 
every reason to believe him, not the anecdotal testimony given by 
Ploutarkhos. G.'s life lasted for more than 105 years, and thus he 
had a personal experience of the fascinating events that took place 
during the fifth, and the beginning of the fourth centuries: though at 
a very young age, it is possible that he had firsthand knowledge of 
events that took place during the Persian wars, and he was an old 
I For Herodikos see PI. Grg. 448b (=Test.2a); at 456bff. Plato puts in G.'s mouth 
a comparison of rhetoric with medicine, which shows that the former is by all 
means superior to the latter and to any other existing art (-rEXV77). G. there says that 
the physician, ifhe is to be compared with a rhetor, "would be left at the post" (as 
Dodds translates otlOUf.Lou av c/>avfjvuL -rov lu-rpov, p.2l1), which is certainly a 
reductive colloquialism. But there is no way of confIrming that the historical G. 
considered the 'art' of his brother inferior to his own one, although we may 
speculate that this was so. Yet, it is certainly possible that Plato exploits and gives 
a new meaning to the comparison of rhetoric with medicine which was probably 
inaugurated by G. himself (see Hel. 14). From Aristotle (Rhet.1400b19) we learn 
that Herodikos attempted a word-play with the names of Thrasymakhos and 
Palos. We should also say that Herodikos, G.'s brother, should be distinguished 
(see Olympiodoros on 448b) from 'HpOO\'KOS b 2:llAlJ\L~P\.uvos, -ro OE apxa'iov 
Meyapeu, (PI. Prot.316el), of whom we learn from Suida s. v:I'!M1"oKpa.TI]S that he 
was, along with G., a teacher of Hippokrates. 
2 We possess this information thanks to the fact that the base of the statue with the 
inscription (Test.8) was discovered in 1876, by German archaeologists very close 
to the temple of Zeus at Olympia, and it dates from the flrst half of the fourth 
century. 
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man at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; he contributed to and 
witnessed the evolution of Greek science; he was still active in his 
eighties 1 when Solcrates (399) defended himself, and he was in his 
early sixties when Plato, the person who later wrote a dialogue 
under his name, was born; if we accept Athenaios' otherwise 
anecdotal testimony (see Deipn. xi 505d-e=Test.15a) he also read it 
and refuted its accuracy, as far as his own theses were concerned. In 
the field in which his influence was particularly felt, he had plenty 
of time to identify the features of his own prose in the works of 
Antiphon, Andokides, Isolcrates, and to read some of the narratives 
of Lysias, for which the latter was so much admired by critics in 
antiquity. 
Although there is no reason to doubt that G.' s life spanned more 
than a century/ the exact dates of his birth and his death cannot be 
specified with any certainty. The main infonnation is given by 
pseudo-Ploutarkhos (Test.6) who says that G. was older than 
Antiphon, who was born around 480; Porphyrios now places G.'s 
acme in the 80th Olympiad, that is in the years 460-457, and 
according to Pausanias (Test.7) he was invited to Pherai by its 
tyrant, lason, which provides us with a tenninus post quem, as lason 
became tyrant in 380. On the basis of this infonnation, in 
combination with the fact that most of the sources give him 107-109 
years of life one should consider the years around 485 as a possible 
date for his birth and 378 or later for his death. But these 
1 See PI. Ap.1ge (=Test.8a). 
2 The most reliable sources do not specify the exact number of years; these 
sources are Isokrates Antid.155 (1T.1eiarov xpovov j3LOUS') and Plato (Phdr.261b) 
who compares G. with Nestor, the proverbially old wise man of the Iliad. The 
scholiast writes: d1TEI.KC£~EI. IlE roy TOfYYLa.V rqi Nearopl.. E1TEI.Il-iJ Ka.t. a.i.llfJfLWV Ka.t. 
1TO.1UEr7Js EyevEro. Other sources include: Suidas s.Y. Topyia.S' (=Test. 2), 
Apollodoros (=Test.lO), and Olympiodoros (Test.lO) 109; Philostratos (=Test.l), 
Pliny (=Test.l3), Loucianos (Test.l3), and Censorinus (TEst.l3) 108; Cicero 
(=Test.12) 107; Pausanias (=Test.7) 105. Athenaios (Test.ll) 80 is certainly 
wrong; as Skouteropoulos suggests (p.155), by 7T Apoll. probably refers to the 
years that G. was professionally active; Diels suggests pI.' . 
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conclusions are merely based on the available sources; although 
there is no serious reason to object to the placing ofG.'s birth in the 
years before the birth of Antiphon, common experience shows that it 
is hardly possible for a person who is 107 years of age to travel from 
wherever he was situated in the Greek world to Pherai, in order to 
exhibit or teach his art. 1 At this age - normally much earlier -
human ambition expires. 
Nothing is known about G.' s life before his arrival in Athens in 
427; some sources make him a pupil of Empedokles,2 but this 
information should preferably be considered with caution, because 
as a leading scholar in the field of the history of ancient philosophy 
has recently c1aime~ "retrospecively, such lines of succession were 
also constructed for the Prep 1 atonic period, and these successions of 
Preplatonics were in various ways linked with the later 
philosophical schools".3 Apart from specific affinities of G.'s works 
with Empedokles' life (mainly his reputation as a magos; notice that 
Diogenes (Test.3), says that he found in Satyros the information that 
G. witnessed Empedokles' practice of magic) and premises (for 
instance the theory of a7roppoaL; see also notes on He!. 4), it was also 
Aristotle's otherwise opaque statement that Empedokles was the one 
who inaugurated rhetoric that probably served as the ground for the 
invention of a smooth and (even geographically)4 'reasonable' 
succession. 5 
The first (and probably the only) important incident that we 
know with some certainty is that G. arrived in Athens in 427, as the 
I To this commonsensical observation, we may add Kerferd's remark (1981, p.44) 
that "the inference [sc. that 380 is a tenninus post quem] is quite unjustified since 
the story merely relates a comparison between G.'s brand of rhetoric with that of 
his pupil Polykrates". 
2 See mainly Diog. Laert. 3.58,9 (=Test.3); see also frs. Test.3, 10, 14. 
3 Mansfeld (1999), p.32 . 
.\ Dodds (1959), p.7, contends that "late writers make him a 'pupil' of 
Empedoc1es ... perhaps merely because they were both Sicilians". 
5 For G. and Empedokles see Buchheim 1985,417-29. 
11 
leader of an embassy whose task was to seek Athenian assistance on 
behalf of the city of Leontini against the threat of Syracuse. This 
information is safe, because it is provided by Plato (Hip.Maj.282b; 
it is surprising that Diels did not include this passage in his edition), 
and there are at least two more authors to reiterate it (see TestA); 
but the chronology of the embassy we owe to Thucydides (3.86.2), 
who does not mention G.'s name. Yet, that this was G.'s first visit to 
Athens, as most of the scholars suggest, I is in itself doubtful. None 
of the above mentioned sources says that it was, and it is equally 
feasible to speculate that it was not: in 427, G. was already 60 years 
old, and it is possible that there may have been more opportunities 
for him to visit Athens before this date. 
The duration of his stay there is unknown, and we know 
nothing of any subsequent visits to it, but according to Plato 
(Hip.Ma.282b4=TestA), G. taught in Athens for money. Like most 
of the sophists2 he moved from the one city to the other teaching 
people for fees. Weare told that he was treated with animosity by 
the citizens of Argos and that a penalty was imposed on those who 
attended his teaching (Test.22a); he spent some time in Thessaly at 
the court of Aleuadae (as Plato and Isokrates confirm; see Test.1S, 
19); he travelled to Elis, where he delivered his encomiastic speech 
for the city; we also know (see fr.S) that he taught Proxenos of 
Boiotia, and it has been inferred that G. went to Boiotia as well;3 
1 Untersteiner (1954, p.93) writes "he then traveled from city to city"; but 
probably this is what he did before his arrival in Athens; similarly, Dodds, in 
discussing the dramatic date of Grg. is certain that 427 "is Gorgias' first (and only 
attested) visit to Athens" (1959, p.17). But that it is the 'only attested' one does 
not mean that this was the only one as welL 
2 In PI. Ap.1ge Sokrates mentions G., Prodikos, and Hippias; in PI. Prot. 316c6 we 
learn that Protagoras did the same thing (earlier in this dialogue we are told that 
Protagoras was accompanied by some ofhis pupils 315b). 
3 See Untersteiner (1954), p.98 n.21. 
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and he also appeared before the audiences gathered in Delphi and 
Olympia. I 
Several prominent figures are mentioned by ancient authors as 
being G.' s students, but their common practice of creating 
successions and contextualising individual intellectuals is once more 
discernible. This is obvious in Suidas (s.v. fop'YLoS=Test.2) where 
Alkidamas is presented as the leader who succeeded G. in his school 
(axOA7JV), although we know that no such school was established by 
G. Others, like Agathon, were simply imitators of G.'s style, and in 
the absence of any further positive indications it would be wrong to 
assume that they were his students in the sense that they 
systematically attended his lectures. 
A number of G.'s pupils are mentioned by several authors; 
Menon of Thessalia and his friend Ari stipp os (plMen.70a-
b=Test.19). Plato also presents Polus, one of the interlocutors in his 
dialogue Gorgias, as one of G.'s pupils. Isokrates, the rhetor who 
established a school in Athens, is also listed by some authorities 
among G.' s pupils; but as this is information given by authors of 
late antiquity, mostly Roman times, we should not be too ready to 
accept it.2 A certain Philippos appears in all the instances where 
1 Blass (1887), p.25 suggested that he returned to Leontini in 424, due to the 
political situation there; but no source COnImns such an hypothesis. That he went 
back to Athens "at the time of his Funeral Oration" as Untersteiner claims (1954, 
p.94) is speculation which in its turn is based on the speculative view that this 
speech was composed in 421. The Epitaphios is void of references to particular 
historical events, and there is no good reason to suppose that G. needed to be in 
Athens at the time of its composition. 
1 All the sources are cited by Too 1995, p.235, who devotes an Appendix of her 
book to this subject; she rightly casts doubt on the sources making Isokrates a 
pupil of G. Her argumentation is twofold: a) she refutes the reliability of later 
biographers and writers, and b) she claims that all the direct references to G. are 
pejorative, and that in the cases where G.'s name is not mentioned we should not 
associate Isokrates with him. More particularly, she maintains that in Antidosis 
155 f. (=Test.18) "Isokrates implicitly underscores a contrast with his predecessor" 
(p.238); but in this context Isokrates uses G.'s case as an example, in order to 
show that the Sophists did not make a fortune out of their profession, and 
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Aristophanes refers to G., and it has been suggested that he probably 
was one of his students (Test.Sa).! Eumolpos, the grandson of his 
sister might also be included, if the phrase 1TULQE[US- KuL qnAius-
EVEKU in the inscription on the base of the statue that he dedicated in 
Olympia means: 'because of the education (that he [sc.Eumolpos] 
has received). A certain Proxenos ofBoiotia is also presented by his 
friend Xenophon in the Anabasis (Test.S) as a pupil of G.2 
Pausanias (Test.7) saw at Delphi a golden statue of G. which he 
dedicated himself, whereas Cicero (Test. 7) claims that the golden 
statue was dedicated by the Greeks in order to honour him. 
Athenaios (T est. IS a) embellishes this dedication by saying that 
when G. came back to Athens, Plato welcomed him with these 
words: 'the elegant and golden G. has arrived'! Pliny, in referring to 
the same incident, gives a date which is conspicuously wrong: he 
writes 'LXX circiter olympiade' (Test.7), which means that the 
dedication took place between SOO and 497. Diels3 has maintained 
that Pliny misread 1>' in his Greek source, and took it to be an 0 " 
from which it should be deduced that G. dedicated the statue in 420-
417. This is a reasonable but not conclusive explanation. More can 
perhaps be said about G.'s statue in Olympia; this statue was 
dedicated by Eumolpos, the grandson of G.' s sister, and it dates 
from the first half of the fourth century.4 It should be taken for 
Skouteropoulos (1991) is probably right in saying that "a7'O a.7ToO'1TaO'fLa 
otacpa£veTat ... Eva (Jepp.a O'lJva£a87]p.a yt' aUTov" (p.161). She also doubts that 
when Isokrates says that "his work serves to correct the attempts of an unnamed 
author who composed a defence of Helen while intending to write an encomium 
of her" (p.138); Too has not probably read carefully enough G.'s He!. to see its 
intertextual affInities with Isokrates' own Helen. 
I See Dunbar 1995, note on 1700-1. 
2 For more names see Untersteiner (1954), p.94 with notes. 
3 1876, p.SO. 
4 This can be inferred from the letters on the inscription; it is reasonable to assume 
that the statue was dedicated some time after G.'s death (which probably occurred 
some time after 380; I deduce that simply on the basis of his long life, not on the 
information concerning Iason), and if this is true the statue was dedicated there 
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granted that this statue is later than the one in Delphi (see Test. 8), 
because the inscription clearly refers to the latter. It seems that the 
dedication of a golden statue had caused negative comments, 
because Eumolpos thought it wise to mention that by the dedication 
he did not mean to show offwealth, but to pay tribute to G. l 
A good deal of the sources provide us mostly with anecdotal 
material about G. Ailianos (Test.9) tells us that he, and Hippias, 
used to wear purple clothes, "as though to emphasise their 
continuation of the functions of poets in earlier days,,;2 if this 
information is true, it may also be an indication of the emphasis that 
G. placed on the external appearance and the ritualistic gestures that 
perhaps accompanied his displays.3 
Athenaios (Test.ll) says that when G. was asked how he 
achieved such a long life, he responded that he never did something 
for his own pleasure, although he says that Demetrios records a 
either at the end of the first or at the beginning of the second quarter of the fourth 
century. 
I Both dedications have ingeniously been discussed by Morgan (1994, p.375-386), 
in relation to Plato's Phaidros 235d6-236b4, where Phaidros promises Sokrates 
that he will dedicate a golden statue of him, if the latter will manage to deliver a 
speech on the subject of love which will be better than Lysias' one. Morgan 
believes, and convincingly shows, that the reference is to the statues of G., and 
that it serves as "an implicit critique of Gorgias' dedicatory practice" which "is 
not merely a passing blow at the sophist, but is integrated with the major themes 
of the dialogue: the quality of the virtuous life, the practice of writing, and the 
kind of immortality that one should aim for" (p.386). 
2 Kerferd (1981), p.29. 
3 It is well known that in his Clouds Aristophanes caricatures the Sophists for 
being particularly poor; they have an empty stomach, they walk barefoot, they 
have to go through numerous hardships etc. In three cases they are presented as 
securing their clothing by smuggling people's clothes (179, 497, 859). It is 
evident that Aristophanes does not have fifth-century Sophists in mind; notice that 
Plato (Hipp.mi. 368bff.) depicts Hippias - who is mentioned by Ailianos - skilful 
enough to make his own rings, sandals, clothes and belts of the 'Persian' type, 
which are 1TOAUTEAWV (they cost a fortune). Dover, in his edition of the play, 
p.xxxix-xl suggests that Aristophanes attributes asceticism to the Sophists 
probably by generalizing a typical characteristic of the Pythagoreans. 
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different answer: 'r did nothing for someone else', which may 
probably be related to the fact that G. was a bachelor; 1 a very similar 
answer is provided by Stobaios (fr.ll). Cicero (Test.12) gives a 
different version: G. was asked why he wanted to be alive for so 
many years; his answer was, that he did not have any complaints 
against being elderly. When death was about to come he said to 
someone who came to see him: 'Sleep is now about to hand me to 
his brother [namely Death],.2 
1 Buchheim (1989), p.203 adopts a different view, but the dictum is so enigmatic 
that nothing can be said with certainty. 
2 Cp.Test.15. 
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II. GORGIAS' STYLE 
i. Stylistic features 
a) epanalepsis 
1. repetition of units of utterance 
No other known prose author makes such a great use of repetition as 
G. l The effect of this device becomes even more spectacular by 
virtue of the fact that the elements repeated are placed very close to 
each other. Sometimes no other units intervene between two similar 
words, and frequently there are just one or two.2 
epanalepsis in G. either coexists with other stylistic devices, or 
else it results directly from them. As will be shown later, repetition 
and balanced antithesis are interrelated, but an equally important 
device that produces repetition is the polyptoton. Some examples 
include: Hel. 4 €V~ O€ (J'wf-Lan 7Toi\Aa (J'wf-LaTa O'Vv?jyay€v dvopwv, 
Hel. 18 7ToAAa O€ 7ToAAoZs 7ToAAwv, Pal. 8 €f-LoL T€ 7Tap' , I EKELVOV 
€KEl.VqJ TE 1Tap' €f-Lov (notice the chiasm as well). Other less 
complicated epanalepses, very common ill Pal., involve 
anadiplosis, as in 36 EVEpYE:rTJv rijs 'E>..Aaoos, "E>..A.7JV€S "EAA7Jva or 
"B.A7Jvas 'B.A?jvwv in 37. The schema etymologicum also makes its 
presence, as in Pal. l3, TOUS f-LEYl.U'TOVS KLvovvovs KLVOVVEVELV. To 
these features one should add the climax attempted in Pal. 23: 1TEpL 
OE -rWV YEVOf-L€VWV ou f-Lovov OUK dovvaTov, di\Aa KaL pq.owv, OUOE 
f-LOVOV pq.owv, di\Aa .... 
I See Dover (1997), p. 136ff. 
z Dover (1997), p.136-7 evinces statistically that G. "must have sought close 
recurrence deliberately" (see Table 7.2), but he also claims that "whatever praise 
or blame is deserved for the 'invention' of close recurrence should be attached not 
to him but to moralizing aphorisms", such as the passage from Hesiod's Works 
and Days (352-5) that he cites. 
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Anthypophora and questions are sometimes followed by 
recurrences; so in Pal. 7, the hero asks Tivl. Tis wV ••• 'lTOTEpa /LOVOS 
/LOVqJ; Anthypophora (a string of questions answered by the speaker) 
plays an important role in the section of Pal. where G. seeks to 
show that the act of treason was impossible; so in 9, P. says that one 
may allege that he made a pledge with Priam by means of money, 
and he poses the question: 'lTOTEPOV Ol)v oALyol.s; He immediately 
retorts, aM' OUK ElKC)s aVTL /LEYcLAwv tJ'lTOVPYTl/LcLTWV oAiya XPTJ/LaTa 
Aa/Lf36.vEI.V. He then refutes the possibility that he got a large amount 
of money by asking how was it possible to transfer the money, and 
he goes on: Tis otYv ~v T] KO/LI.0TJ; mlk 0' uv <7} Eis> €.Ko/Ll.aEV 7} 
'lTOAAoi; 'lTOAAWV yap KO/LL~OVTWV 'lTOAAO~ UV ~aav /LcLproPES rils 
€'1TI.{3ovMjs, EVos oE KO/LL'oVTOS OUK UV 'lTOAU TL TO cPEPO/LEVOV ~v. As 
this example shows it is practically impossible to track down a 
passage where stylistic devices will not include antithesis. 
There are some cases where the elements repeated are not very 
close to each other, as in Pal. 11 ('lTpcLTTEI.V) and 16, with the dazzling 
recurrence of TL/LTJ and its products, but they are admittedly very 
few. Parallelism, a very important feature in Go's prose unavoidably 
results in repetitions as welL So, in Hel. 11 we find: T] oE ooga 
'lTEpl.f3cLAAEL TOUS aury XPW/LEVOV<; . 
Pleonasm, redundant repetition, stresses important points, as the 
one made in Pal. 29 concerning his previous life: a'lT' apxfjs Els 
UlTius or in He!. where G. becomes very analytical about the laws as 
they are dictated by nature: 'lTEcPVKE yap OU TO KpELaaov tJ'lTO TOU 
iJaaovos '" KUi. TO /LEV KpELaaov T]y€LofJaL, TO OE -ryaaov E'lTEafJal. (6). 
We may now discuss some of the repetitions that G. seems to be 
fond of. He shows a preference for 'lTaVT- derivatives, and this may 
belong to the style of the prose composed by the Sophists, because 
Plato pokes fun at it in his Menexenos (247e). So in Pal. 12 we find a 
striking polyptoton with 'lTcLVT€S, after a lower-scale repetition of 
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a.7TaS" (notice that the next paragraph starts with one more 7TClV7"-); 
later, in 19, we read 7TC1V7"Es" 7Ta.V7"a 7Tpa.7"7"OUaL (the parechesis of /p/ 
in 7TaV7"- repetition is very common), and 7TiiaL 7TEPt. 7TaV7"oS" Ean. In 
24 we find KOLVOV a.7TaaL 7TEPI. 7Ta.V7"WV. Apart from that, there is a 
specific kind of repetition which G. uses when he wants to produce 
strong correspondences. So, when in He!. G. claims that Paris 
deserves an eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-tooth punishment, he 
writes: a~wS" ovv 0 J.LEV E7TLXELpfpaS" {3a.p{3apoS" {3a.p{3apov E7TLXELp7JJ.La 
KaL AOYlf! Kat VOJ.Llf! Kat epYlf! AOYlf! J.LEV al7"iaS", VOJ.Llf! DE anJ.LiaS", 
ePYlf! DE '7JJ.LLaS" 7"tJXE'iv (8). A similar example, accentuated with a 
question, can be tracked down in Pa!.22: cPpa.aov 7"OU7"OLS" <7"OV 
7"P07TOV>, 7"OV 7"07TOV, 7"OV xpovov, 7T07"E, 7TOV, 7TWs- ElDES";. Finally, 
one should mention the passage from active to passive voice (0 J.LEV 
ovv 7TELaaS" Ws- dvaYKa.aaS" dDLKE'i, i] DE 7TELa6ELaa Ws- avaYKaa6E'iaa 
J.La.7"7Jv aKouEL KaKWs- 12, or E7"apa.x87J KaL ha.pagE rTjv tjroxilv He!. 
16). 
To these types of repetition we should add the recurrences of 
elements (mainly in He!.) which are significantly distanced from 
each other, or even repeated in different texts. In He!. 6, G. gives the 
four possible reasons that made the heroine travel to Troy. The same 
words - along with the statement of the author's reassurance that he 
has completed the task that he had programmatically stated in the 
prologue - are used in the epilogue of this text in the reverse order. 
Another interesting example is the repetition of the derivatives of 
7TOPLJ.LOS" in Pa!., which is undoubtedly intended to bring out the 
situation Palamedes is in (e.g. DLDaaKa.Awv E7TLKLVDUV07"EPWV :r, 
7TOpLJ.LW7"EpWV 7"tJXE'iv 4), as opposed to his proverbially resourceful 
personality (see 30 7"iS" yelp UV E7Toi7JaE 7"OV avep0J.rTLVOV {3Lov 
7TOpLJ.LOV €~ d:1TOpOU ... ). Some expressions can also be found in both 
Hel. and Pal. The Aa{30vaa Kat. OU Aaeovaa in Hel. 4, becomes 
eAa{3ov, eAaeov Aa{3wv (Pa!.ll). Similarly, the description of the 
function of cjJa.pJ.LaKa as lethal substances in He!. 14 (Kat. 7"<:1. J.LEV 
19 
voaov rei De f3Lov 1TaV€~), is altered in PaL to define death and a bad 
reputation (ro j-Lev yeip rov f3LOV reAoS", i] De rep f3£qJ voaoS") 
2. epanaleDsis in sound 
It is natural that the repetItIons of words or phrases produce 
similarities in sound. But G. does not confine himself to that, as his 
preserved texts are marked by a manifestly deliberate recurrence of 
similar sounds. Traditionally, such devices as hornoeoteleuton and 
paronornasia are not analysed under the heading of epanalepsis. 
However, it is primarily through repetition of phonemes that these 
devices are achieved, and this is why I discuss them in connection 
with epanalepsis. 
Critics imputed to G. redundant sound play; independently 
of how annoying or gracious the frequency of sound-plays may be, 
we should bear in mind that form is not simply the robe of content. 
Similarity in sound is in most of the cases inextricably interwoven 
with meaning; for example, when G. says ra7] yeip uj-Lupr£u KUL 
clearly intends to stress the opposition between €1TU~V€rcl. and 
j-Lwj-L7J7"a. In other words, the similarity in sound serves to transfer the 
meaning of the one element to the meaning of the other, in a way 
which resembles very much the 'metaphor' of meaning attempted in 
rhyming poetry. The devices I shall discuss are the following: (i) 
isocolon, (ii) homoeoteleuton, l (iii) parison, (iv) paronornasia, and 
(v) parechesis.2 
All the first three devices are very frequently combined; so 
m the Epitaphios we read L1~0S" j-Lev dyaAj-Luru, euvrwv oe 
dvu87jj-Luru. Several striking combinations of them in He!. are also 
I Sometimes G. transposes the similarity of sound from the end to the beginning 
of sentences (see Smith 1921, p.351, and Dover 1997, p.152); the technical term 
for this device is homoikatarkton. 
2 For reasons of a more economical presentation of examples under the heading 
parechesis I include invariably alliteration and assonance. 
20 
worth noticing. In 2 we read EJ-€fUPeaeui -re -ra E1TUt.ve-ra KU~ 
E1Tut.ve'iv -ra ~wp:rrra, and later ei. oe f3£q. ilfnni.a87J KU~ dvop.WS' 
Ef3t.6.a87J KU~ dOI.KWS' uf3pl.a87J. A perfectly balanced construction 
ending with homoeoteleuton I is the one closing the examination of 
the first cause in He!.: ei ovv rij Tux:rJ KU~ -reP eeeP -rT]v Ul-rLUV 
ci.vuee,EolI, ~ -rT]1I '£).ev7Jv rijs 8uaKAeLuS" d1ToAu-reoll. Pal.offers 
several examples as well; P. expresses the cornerstones of his 
argumentation as follows: ou-re yap f3ouA7J8eis EOullap.7Jv ou-re 
oUlla~evoS" Ef3oUAf/J7JV epyot.S" E7nXEl.pe'Zv -rOl.ou-rOl.S" (5). Epitaphios is 
no less marked by such constructions, as 8epa1Tov-reS" ~Ev -rWII ci.8I.KWS' 
Homoeoenarcton, epanalepsis of initial syllables, is again a 
field in which G. is at home. Some examples: 4£Up-rLU KU~ duu8l.u, 
KU~ 
d1ToAoyrjaua8ut. ... d1ToAucmaeUt., (Hef. 1, 2, 4, 8); f3l.oS" OE OU f3t.WTOS" 
(which is also an oxymoron), dva;wS" dva;w, rO"WS" raOIl, 
dOl.KW ••• doLK7]8fjVUt., Ci8€OIl, CiOt.KOV, Civop.ov, Ci;wv d;uIJom (Paf.21, 
22, 23. 33, 36, 37). In Epitaphios we find -ro oeov EV -reP oeovn, 
~a " ,rlJ ' " ,,~ U)-,pt.aTUt. el.S" -rOUS" U)-'pt.aTUS" ... , epWTWV ... €PWOS-. 
Paronomasia is the word-play which involves sound 
assimilation between signifiers that are semantically related to each 
other in various ways. In Pal. for example G. plays with the 
antonyms KpanaToS" and KaKt.aTOS- twice: in 2 (WO"1T€P ot.' EK€'iIlU 
KDanaTOC; av ~v dvfJp, ou-rw 8Le!. -ruihu KaKl.aTOC; av er7J) and in 14 
(ci.II-r~ TOU KPU-rLaTOU TO KaKt.aTOv). Another word-play G. seems to 
enjoy is the one with GUll-compound verbs denoting knowledge, 
which are combined with similar compound verbs used of existence. 
In Pal. 11, we find TWII GU110 II-rWII , aVlI€l.~t., ~1I0t.0€ and later in 15 
aVlIEaTe yap ~OL, 81.0 aVllt.aT€ TaUTU. But playing with words 
denoting knowledge does not stop here. In 22, P. will contend that 
'if you know (doWs-), you do lmow (oia8u) because you saw ([OeVlI), 
1 Dover's (1997), p.1S3 comparison of the frequency of homoeoceleuton in G. 
with other authors proves that "again. G. leads the field". 
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or because ... '. The unreliability of Saga is later expressed as 
fo llows: oofry mcrrEvous a.1TLa-ro-rciTqJ -rrpciyfLan (24) 1. To these 
examples we may add the ironical use of KaLvos- in (26), used of 
'\01'05', probably alluding to KEVOS-, that is 'empty', 'meaningless' 
(although these words were not homophones, as they are in modem 
Greek) . 
We may now pass to parechesis. G.'s play with sounds within 
phrases or sentences is extremely complicated, undoubtedly the fruit 
of meticulous composition. Apart from the repetition of a single 
consonant known as alliteration (see Hel. 4 1T'\eLcrras- ... dvSpwv, with 
the insisting Is!), he very regularly pursues assonance, that is the 
repetition of combinations of vowels with consonants, arranged in 
various manners (i.e. in some cases we find the same consonant 
followed or preceded by the same consonant, in some others it is the 
vowel that remains the same etc.). In Hel. 3 we read 1TEpL i]s- DOE 0 
'\01'05', OUK c1S7J,\ov, ouoe d,\£yOts. o7j'\OV yap cOs- fL7JTP05' fLev A-ryoa5', 
with the combinations de - del - ude - del - led. In Pal. we find 
e'\a{3ov, e'\a8ov '\a{3wv with elab - elath - lab (11) and 
-rrapaocOOovow, fLt.a8Ov rijs- -rrpoooaLas- dvnot.SovTES- (21); a reversal of 
the order of the phonemes is traced in d1To{3a,\6vTa ... a.va,\ci{3ot. TLS-
(21). Other examples from Hel. would include -rrpoY:JilLq. / -rrP08V(.LLq. 




Probably no other author in antiquity used symmetrical antithesis as 
much as G. did;2 it has been remarked that in some cases G. 
I For more examples, see Schiappa 1999, p.90-I. 
1 Dover's calculations (1997), p.lS1 reassure me in making this point (see his 
Table 7.4). As he says "Gorgias' use of symmetry is prodigious". 
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conjoins antithetical words or notions even in places where they are 
useless (e.g. EKELVOS' }Lev OLOOUS, EYW oe it.ap.{3a.vwv Pal. 9). This 
may well be true but the frequency of contrasted items in his prose 
is not simply the product of his general tendency for polished 
symmetry. Closer reading of the techniques of reasoning employed 
by him clearly shows that G. bases a good deal of his argumentation 
on polarities. One cannot be far from truth if one concludes that the 
distinctly antithetical form of his prose coincides \Vith rhetorical 
tactics that rely on antinomical syllogisms. 
The most recurrent type of argument from antinomy is the one in 
which G. proposes two possible options which contradict each 
other, in which case he does very little to vary his diction. In HeL 6 
he repeats the antithetical pair KpEl.aaOV / ~aaov three times, he then 
picks up KpELaaov once more in comparing the gods to men; another 
example is found in PaL2: 7TorEpa. }LE XPi? OLKU£WS' a.7To8uVELV :r, fl-Er' 
bVELawv fl-EYLO'TWV KUi. rijs- uLax.f.aT7'JS' ulrius {3I.U£WS' a.7To8uVELV 18 
(an instance where he varies his wording is PaL 18 where he uses 
(3it.a.11TELV and KUKWs E7TOLouv; but the second alternative comes a few 
lines later in the paragraph), so as the one member of the antithesis 
to counterbalance the other both in fonn and content {p.ep-</JEa8uL 
-rE ... fLWfL7JTa. 1; in Pal., OU-rE yap (30Vit.7Jf7EI.S .•. E{30Vit.fj1TJv 5, a.X\d. 
xp-ryp-a-ru fL€V ... K-rfia8al. 15). The symmetrical construction of the 
antitheses is even more emphasised by the coexistence of other 
stylistic devices, such as the paromoiosis CilYELaeaL / aYEaeUL, BEau 
yap 1Tpa8ufLLav .•. a.v8pW7TC.V7j 7TP0fl-7Jf7t.q. HeL 6, and E7TUywyoL / 
d1TUywyoL 10), complicated chiasms (-rov -rorE ... a.pxiJv -rou p-eX\ov-roS" 
He!. 5), questions and hypophora (see Pal. 9, 10,), isoeolon, parison 
and homoeoteleuton (e.g. -ra.U-ru yap 7Tp 0 vo-ryaaaL fL€V ovva-ra., 
fLE-ruva-ryaaaL oE a.vLu-ru PaL34) and sound-plays which to a certain 
degree are unavoidable due to the abundance of repetitions of the 
same words. 
There are very few paragraphs in G.' s texts in which antithesis is 
absent. With great care he opposes words to words, phrases to 
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phrases, clauses to clauses. Some examples: ill He!. 
'c' , , " ' eve" ~av ... e7TLKTIJTOV ovvap.l.v 4 r , ~ I ,~ ~ , 0 J.L€V ap-rraaus ..• eovarrrxrJa€v (with 
the stressed antithesis between passive and active voice; cpo 7Tf:£cm<; -
cl.VaYKa.aa<; /7TeLa8€Zaa - dvaYKa.a8eZaa 12), and 0 J.L€V Ecpaae OeLVa, 
1] O€ E7Ta8e 7, ovvao-r-rr; J.L€.ya<; .•. aJ.LI.Kp07"a7"qJ aWf-I.an 8, T€XV7J ypacpelS, 
OUK d). .. rf3er.~ I..exfje£<; 13, I..v7Tel:v / 7T08eZv 18. In Pal. 7] aacp&; 
3, yo.p 
e8vvaJ.L7Jv ... e~ov/l..fJ87Jv 5, "EM7JV fJapfJapqJ 7, 7Tel.aa<; 7J ~l.aaaJ.L€vo<; 
(although for G. persuasion is violence) 14, eL. J.L€V otiv el.p.1. 
aocp(J<;. .• el.f-I.l. 26, ou8' trrro .•• a.PXova'l.V 32. It would be useless to bring 
in examples from the Epitaphios, because almost every single line 
of this text includes an antithesis. 
It would be more interesting, however, to cite some recurrent 
antitheses. G. opposes one to many three times (He!. 4, 13; Pal.9), 
and the word fJapfJapo<; to "E/VI.7JV twice in Pal. (7 and 14): in both 
cases the two words are juxtaposed. €1Tl.a-riJ.L7J and €i.oWs- are opposed 
to 86;a in Pal. 3,22,24. It is also remarkable how G. plays with the 
pronouns to distinguish the situation Palamedes is in from that of 
the prosecutor (€yw / vp.a<;, ae Y€ ..• €P.e). 
The most frequent conjunction in his antitheses is the f-I.ev ... a€., 
but 7] has a significant presence as well. A notable example of the 
f-I.€v ... 8€ conjunction is in He!. 3: J.L7J7"Po<; {J.€V A7joa<;, 7TaTpo<; O€ 7"OU 
elval. Eco;ev, a O€ 01.0. 7"0 cpavat. -ryMrx.87J. For 7] in antithetical 
constructions one may compare Pa1.l8: cl.Mo. 0,." 4>[) .. ovc; wcpe/l..eZv 7] 
7Tol..ef-l.I.Ov<; j3l..a7T7"eLv. It should be pointed out that 7] appears more 
frequently in Pa!., where disjunctive questions playa prevalent role 
in the reasoning. 
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2. svmmetrv in construction 
Much attention has been paid to the absence of variation in the 
diction and to the symmetry in sound; yet, an equally important 
feature of G.' s prose is the symmetry in the construction of his 
sentences. Words or phrases are very commonly arranged so as to 
match other units of utterance with the same syntactical function, 
and in this way there is a remarkable parallelism in the surface 
structure of his sentences. As in most cases, symmetry in 
construction coexists with acoustic similarities. 
This phenomenon is so frequent that only some examples can be 
presented here; for a better depiction of the phenomenon I intend to 
reproduce longer units of utterance, such as the first paragraph of 
He!., Pa!.30 (7TOPLP.OV E~ G.7Topou ... 8La-rpLf3f]v) and Epitaphios 
(jJ.aprupLa 8€ ... 7Tic:rr€I.) (Key: A= article N=noun or pronoun, P-
participle, n= nominative, g=genitive etc; p=particle, p*=the same 
particle as the previous one, Adj.= Adjective, Adv.=Adverb, c= 
conjunction, c* as p*, Pr=preposition, V=verb, Inf=infinitive, 
Part.=participle; when a participle functions as an Adjective I write 
Adj.) 
Helen 1: Nn Ndp Nn NdpNn Ndp*Nn Ndp* Nn Ndp*Nn 
An p* Adjn. Ng Nn 
Na pc Na c* Na c* Na c* Na c* Na 
V 
Aa p Adja. Ng Nd Inf Ad p Adjd Na Inf. 
Adjn p Nn c Nn 
Inf c Aa Adja c Inf Aa Adja 
Palamedes 30: Adja Pr Adjg 
c 
Adja pr* Adjg 
Na c Adja Part. Adja Pro Na 
Na c* Adja Na Ag Ng 
Nac* NgNa 





Na c* Adja c Adja Na 








Adjn Pr Aa Na Ad Nd 
Adjn p Pr Aa Na Ad Nd 
Adjn p* Pr Aa Na Ad Nd 
Adjn p* Pr Aa Na Ad Nd 
There is a remarkable disparity in the distribution of asyndeton 
between He!. and Pal.; in the former, asyndeton is rare, whereas in 
the latter one it is more regular. In Hel. there is just one example 
which is worth mentioning, located in the last paragraph: acp€l./..ov T0 
\/ ~/ \ / 1 / ~ / 1 /\oyep OVGKI\€W,V yvvaI.KO~, €v€f.1-El.va Tep vOfJ-lp ... 
In Pal. there are numerous asyndeta with nouns, adjectives and 
participles as in 3 1TaTp{.oa, TOKea~ , •• , 13 1TPOYovwv ap€TUL, XP7JfJ-a.TWV 
1TA718os (notice the sequence: nN, nN, N, Nn, Nn, where n=noun 
gen, and N=noun nom.), "EV..7Jv f3apf3a.povs, €is WV 1TO/"/"OV~ 14, 
80V/..€LUV a.VT!. f3aGI./"€Lu~, aVTi. TOU KpaTr.aTOV TO Ka.KLaTOV 14, the 
remarkable T0 vop.qJ, rij 8LK7J".in 17, EfJ-aVTov, TOKEUS ... 19, 
1Tupup.€/...ryaUVTa •.. EaT€P7Jp.evov ... o l.a.yovTa ... a1Topp£zj;avTa 20, 
1T€1TOI.7JKOn .. ,1TapaO€QWKOn 21, the symmetrical <;-av TP01TOV>, Tav 
I Schiappa (1999, p.89 n.S) observes that "the use of asyndeton at or near the end 
of a speech can be found also in Isaeus (6.62, 9.37), Aiskhines (1.196, 2.182), and 
Demosthenes (8.76, 21.226)", 
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ro-rrov ... -rrWs- eloes 22, douvaroLS. alaxpoLs ... 25, a.8eov, a.CILKOV ..• 36. 
There are fewer asyndeta with verbs as ill the climax 
auvfJileop.ev .. , EKpUlpa 11, and in the intense challenging at 22 €ileErw. 
cpav-frrw. p.ap-rvp7J0-a-rw ... , which is the second strong asyndeton m 
the same paragraph. 
In Epitaphios the asyndeton is employed in the accumulation of 
the virtues of the dead and by employing it G. encourages a faster 
reading of the text, which suggests that the dead did not lack any 
possible praiseworthy virtue and that these virtues are in fact so 
many that it is tiring even to enumerate them. This is further 
stressed by the fact that the phrasing immediately preceding the 
asyndeton is marked by the abundance of particles: Kal. MYEI.V Kal. 
(TLyav Kal. -rrol.e'iv ... KaL.yvwp.7]V <Kal. pwp.7Jv> , TiJv P.EV ... TiJV 
(5 ' ••• p.€V ... oE ... aVeaOEI.S 1TPas TO auP.CPEpOV, evopyrrroL 1TpOS TO 
, ~ A.. , 'R " "R ' ~ " ~ 1Tpe1TOV, rep 'f'pOVLP.ep ..• Vf'Jpl.a-raL el.S rous Vf'JPLa-ras ... oeLVOL ev TOLS 
d) hyperbaton 
There is no significant difference in the frequency of hyperbaton in 
Hel. and Pal. Apart from the separation of the article from a noun, 
an adjective or a participle, which are common hyperbata in Greek 
language (at any rate 'correct' word order exists only in the teaching 
of Greek composition), it is worth our attention that G. often uses 
hyperbata in order to bring together two similar or antinomical 
elements. So, in rov xpovov OE r0 .\oyep rov rOTe vuv u-rrepf3cis (Hel. 
5; is it a coincidence that lJ'1Tepf3as appears here?) the hyperbaton has 
as a result the emphasis on the antithesis betvveen 'time past' and 
'time present' and a chiasm as well (see also , ~ a1TOK7e I. val. yap 
p.e ... paol.WS", where {3ovilop.evoL and ovv-ryoea8e 2; the words 
expressing the cornerstones of his argumentation in this text are 
brought together. Ws dva~ws dva~l.a 22, OTav o.vopes o.vopa ... 34, 
rous OE 1TptfrrovS rwv 1TPW-rWV "EM.7Jvas 'EM.-ryvwv 37). An excellent 
hyperbaton - to the extent that it can also be adduced as an 
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argument against those who impute to G. that he sacrifices the 
content for the sake of the form - is found in Hel. 15 au XaJ\e'lTC.uS" 
8~arPeV~E70.~ rr,v rijs AeyO{kEv7]S yeyovEVUI. a.{kup-riaS" al r[uv. With 
this wording G. can be assured that no one takes the charges against 
Helen seriously. What I read as an hyperbaton (see note ad lac.) can 
be found in the last line of the preserved passage from Epitaphios, 
because I believe that the best possible reading of the text emerges if 
we take 0 -rr6eoS" to govern au ~wvrwv. The fact that G.'s other 
hyperbata are not as long as this one should not prevent us from 
reading this sentence in the way I do for two reasons: first, because 
in Hel. 16 the verb is distanced from orav that introduces the clause, 
secondly because G.' s period normally consists in smaller clauses 
and phrases, and thirdly because conclusions based on statistics are 
not always safe: if a stylistic device appears once, it is 100% this 
device. 
e) hiatus 
There is a great discrepancy in the distribution of hiatus between 
Hel. and Pal.; according to my calculation there are 94(+3)1 in Hel., 
56 (+3) in Pal. and 19 (+1) in Epitaphios.z This discrepancy, along 
with other stylistic features, has been used by Schmidt as an 
argumene for the later dating of Pal. I believe though that such an 
argument is too shaky, and I would prefer to see in this discrepancy 
a depiction of the different character of these two speeches. It is 
possible that, as he intended his Pal. to be a speech for oral 
presentation before an imaginary courtroom, G. took care to 
compose a smoother speech. It is for the same reason that there is a 
1 I exclude from my calculation Hel. 12, because the text is too conupt; (-+-3) 
me:ms that there are three hiatuses in places where the text is not well preserved. 
2 One should note that Pal. is a considerably longer text than Hei., and this points 
even more to Go's carelessness to avoid hiatus in the latter. No conclusions can be 
drawn from the Epitaphios, because in all likelihood it is fragmentarily preserved. 
3 Schmidt (1940 vol. iii), p.71. For a SlllIllIlaIY of views see Orsini 1956, 82-83, 87 
n.l, and my discussion of the relation between the Troades and G.'s Hel. below. 
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significant decrease in 'poetic' diction and an increase in more 
dramatic expression (questions, apostrophes to the litigant and the 
judges etc.) in this text. 
f) Transition 
Every reader of G.'s works will prima facie discern that the author 
takes pains to signpost his passing from the one section of his 
speeches to the other.l This process, evident in both He!. and Pa!., 
attests the didactic nature of his prose, as it makes possible the 
memorisation of how a speech should be structured. Instead of 
learning general rules about the structure of a speech, G.'s students 
were provided with ready-made expressions of general applicability. 
As may be expected this applicability is more overt in Pa!' than in 
He!', because of the markedly forensic character of the former. It is 
to this text that we will tum our attention. 
(1), H /LEV KaT7]YopLa Kai. -r, d7ToiloyLa Kai. -r, KPL(JL<; ou 7Tepi. Ba.va:Tou 
yLYVeTa.L. 
(4) 7Tepi. TOUTWV Mywv De 7To8ev a.P~W/La.L 
(5) DLa DL(J(JWV up.Zv €7TLDel~W TP07TWV- OUTe yap f30UA.:ry8ei.<; ••• 
(6) €7Ti. TOUTOV De TOV ilOyov er/Ll. 7TpWTOV ..• 
(12) 7TCJ.VTW<; a.pa. Ka.i. 7TavT7] 7TaVTa 7TpaTT€LV dSUVa.TOV ~v /LOL. 
(13) (JKet/;a.a8a.L KOLVfj Ka.1. TODe. 
(21) on /LEV ";" v'''' OUV OUT av <€DUva/L~v f30UilO/LeVO<; OUT' aV 
ouva/L€Vo<; > €f3ouil6/L~V .•. DLa TWV 7TPO€r.P~/L€vWV oeDeLKTa.L. 
(22) f30VilO/La.L De /LETa Ta.UTa 7TPO<; TOV Ka.rf]yOpOV OLa.A€x8f]va.L. 
(27) 7TpO<; /LEV ouv (],E TaUTa. (of general applicability as a transition is the 
whole of 27) 
(28) 7TpO<; 0' v/La<; cO a.VOP€<; KpLTa.i. 7T€pi. ep.ou ... 
(32) d)."\a yap OUK E/LOV €j.La.UTOV E7Ta.LV€'iV- 6 oE 7Ta.pWV Ka.LPO<; 
~vaYKa.(J€. Kal. Ta.UTa KarrrrOpOVj.L€VOV, 7TavTW<; d7TO/l.oyr](Jaa8a.L. 
I See MacDowell (1982), pp.18-l9, who righdy observes that this fearure did not 
originate with G., as "Herodotos too sometimes announces what he is going to 
say, and later points out that he has said it". 
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(33) AOL.1TOV S€ 1T'EpL ufJ-Wv 1T'pOS up.Us €(1"j£ pm. AOI'OS, 
1T'au(]'op.al. rijs ci.1T'oA.oyias. 
(37) ELp7JTal. Tet 1T'ap' e[J-Ou Kal. 1T'auop.al. ... €XEI. AOyOV. 
g) Diction 
1. Dialect 
" " OV EI.1T'WV 
G. writes in Attic dialect, and his texts are among the oldest extant 
examples of Attic prose. I Before his time, prose was written in Ionic 
dialect, and Herodotos and the medical texts are the main exponents 
of this prose. The reason why G. chose Attic for his teaching of 
rhetoric and for the exhibition of his potential in public speaking is 
eloquently explained by Dover: "[Athens] was the powerhouse of 
oratory, the meeting place of philosophers, and that is why Zeno 
(from Elea) and G. (an Ionic-speaker from Sicily) wrote in Attic,.2. 
Apart from this obvious reason, G., as a vagabond professional 
teacher of rhetoric must have had every reason to express himself in 
the predominant dialect of the day, and this was undoubtedly the 
Attic dialect. 
But if the choice of Attic dialect by G. is relatively simple to 
explain, the concomitant problems arising from this choice are 
1 We have no knowledge about Attic prose before G. (see Blass, 1887, p.55). 
Finley (1939) has given strong arguments that favour the view that the style of the 
speakers in Thucydides is the one that they used, and that he remained 
independent of G.' s influence. In any case, almost nothing has survived from their 
speeches, for the practice of publishing speeches originates with Antiphon. 
Gagarin (1997, p.9) claims that Antiphon's Tetralogies are "perhaps the earliest 
works of Attic prose", but I am vr::ry reluctant to accept this both because we do 
not possess the whole of G.' s works and most importantly because the extant ones 
do not include any internal evidence (the case of Aiskhylos' Suppliants should 
make scholars more cautious, when they draw conclusions about dates on the 
basis of stylistic analysis). The information that he came to Athens in 427 does 
not necessarily mean that nothing was written by him in Attic dialect before this 
date (according to Gagarin 1997, pA, Antiphon wrote his fIrst speech around 
430), because if it is true that he amazed the assembly, we may infer that he was 
at least fluent enough to make himself understood. 
2 Dover (1997), p.85. 
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rather intriguing. We may, however, start from a less complicated 
point It is well known that G. came from Sicily, a place where 
people did not speak the language spoken and written in Athens. 
Was it then possible for him to produce such a polished prose? The 
answer to this question is clearly yes. One should not confuse a 
literary dialect with a local one; the Doric of Pindar is not the Doric 
spoken in Sparta or elsewhere.! 
We may now pass to the most puzzling problem concerning G.' s 
decision to use the Attic dialect. We have already mentioned that the 
language of prose before our Sophist's time was the Ionic dialect, 
and that the earliest datable speech composed in Attic prose is 
placed around 430. However, there is little doubt that some Attic 
prose was in use as well; people always wrote letters, and the 
administration of the city included the issuing of decrees and laws. 
But before the emergence of early rhetoric, the only literary genre 
composed in the dialect which later became the language of science, 
history, philosophy, and oratory was tragedy.2 And it is perhaps to 
this incomparably appealing literary genre that one should primarily 
turn, if one wishes to locate the linguistic paradigm of G .. 
From a morphologic point of view, G. employs, as most of his 
contemporaries do (mainly Antiphon and Thucydides) Ionic types, 
such as -{JO'- (He!.: KPEL.O'O'OV, ~O'O'ov 4, 19, 8~aaaL 10; Pal.: 8~0'0'wv 2, 
5, 19, 1TEO'O'OVS" 30, raaO'OJ.LEvoV 32, Epitaphios 8~aO'a.), but like other 
current authors he is not consistent (Pa!.: 1Tpa.rrEI.V 6, 11, 13, 
1Tpa.rrwv 19, KpE£rrovaS" 12). He uses 8a.pO'oS" (He!. 14; pO' is the nonn 
in tragedy) and 1TUpaovS" (Pa!. 30), rTJ.L~Kpora.rCfJ (He!. 8, probably to 
intensify the parechesis of Is/), rEl.xEWV (instead of rEI.XWV, Pa!' 12), 
and he has ~VO~8E instead of aVVO~8E in Pa!' 11 (so cornmon in 
Thucydides), but he totally avoids EO'- instead of ELa-. It is not safe 
1 See Dover (1997), pp.83-4. 
1 Comedy as well; but the language of this genre is frequently colloquial and it 
may have been oflitde use as a paradigm. 
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to say that all the above mentioned words are Ionic forms,l because 
as inscriptions show Attic dialect at the time of G. indifferently 
includes both -(j(j- and --ri-. Furthermore, it is hardly possible to 
attribute the preference to --cr(j- or - pa- to echoes from poetry;2 G. 
taught rhetoric in more places than Athens, and probably he had 
good reason to avoid forms that would mark his texts with the local 
Attic idiom.3 
2. Poetic diction 
The choice of words by G. contributes significantly to the overall 
result of his poetic style; but it should be made clear that the 
investigation of poetic words in G. differs significantly from that in 
other prose authors, because there is nothing to be compared to the 
systematic embedding of poetical techniques attempted in his prose. 
Where in other authors poetic vocabulary or other distinguishable 
deviations from the linguistic norm can be isolated., in G. elements 
from poetry haunt the entirety of his preserved texts. In other words, 
'poetic language' as such ought to be taken to mean something 
different from poetic style, for the former is only one among other 
elements that contribute to the formation of the latter. 
Such words as JLwJLo~ (in Helen 1 we find JLwJLov €7n8el.vul., where 
later orators would have probably written €7TI.'nJLav), dAK~V, 
d7T€7TA7](je, OL(j(j6~ 4 (for which see my discussion on the dialect), 
and Pal., or Eu6pyrrro~ and €V07TAI.O~ in Epitaphios - to mention some 
examples - are not very frequent in prose. But it is with great 
1 Schiappa (1999, p.102 n.l7) too hastily concludes that "his Attic was not 
'pure"'; but is there such a thing as 'pure' Attic? 
2 Sometimes the presence of the one rather than the other alternative may be due 
to sound-plays; this is confIrmed by the use of 7Tpcfaaov-rrx (instead of 7Tpar;-ov-rcx) 
in Pal. 27. However, this explanation should be resnicted only in cases where the 
context clearly shows that the writer attempts parechesis. 
3 See Dover (1997), p.83. 
~ See Diets 1884, p.367 n.2. 
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reluctance that we quote these words, because defining an isolated 
word as poetic is in itself problematic. Poetic words become poetic 
in virtue of the context they are in or as a result of their combination 
with other words. Things become even worse if we consider that our 
knowledge of the language used by speakers that preceded G. does 
not amount to much. Aristotle, for instance, implies that, in general, 
early prose writers adopted a poetic style, because of its 
acceptability,l and brings in G.'s name as an example. If the norm 
was a style similar to that of G., then what is poetic for us (or for 
ancient critics) was not poetic at all to the ear ofms audience. 2 
3. compound words 
G. was fond of compound words and Aristotle gIves us two 
examples (see fr.lS): 7M"wxop.ovaoK6AuKU~, €1TLOpKT]auvru<; KUi. 
KurEvopKT]auvru<;; no such long compound word can be traced in the 
preserved texts, but numerous less ostentatious examples would 
confirm Aristotle. In Hel. we find op.orpwvo<; KUi. op.6!f;vxo~ 2, 
rpI.AOVLKOV-rpI.AOTtP.LU 4, 7TEpLrp0{30<;, 7TOAVOUKPV<;, rpI.A07TEV8T]<; 9, 
7TUP0I.X0p.€VWV 11, €geyoT]rEvauv 14; in Pal. compound words are 
I Schiappa maintains that, "Aristotle repeatedly calls Gorgias' prose excessively 
poetic". But I cannot find anything disparaging in the passages he refers to. 
Especially in Rher.1404a 24-27, G.'s style is used as an example, as Aristotle 
takes care to make a clear distinction between what happened when G. composed 
his prose, and the present situation (Ka.i. VVy). In addition.. the ,OLOUTOU, suggests 
the imitators of G.' s style, rather than the creators of it themselves (see Buchheim 
(1989), p.206 andSkouteropoulos (1991), p.17S) 
: Perikles' Epiraphios in Thucydides does not differ very much in style from a 
piece of G.'s prose, and if Finley (1939) is correct in maintaining that the 
historian remained uninfluenced by the manners of G.'s prose, the suggestion that 
G.'s prose was not construed as poetic is strengthened (see also MacDowell 
(1982), p.17 and Gagarin (1997), p.25). 
33 
considerably fewer, and in any case they do not seem to be favoured 
at the expense of simple words. 1 
It comes as no surprise that compound words provide G. with the 
opportunity to embellish his speeches with more sound-plays. For 
one can regularly find in his texts a juxtaposition of two compound 
words with either the first or the second element changed. In Hel. 
one can trace the following instances: 6p.6~wvo-; Ka~ 6p.at/;uxo-; 2, U1T' 
iiplJffoc; 'IE r/nAOVLKOU r/nAoTLp.f.a-; 'IE dVLK-r]-rOU (notice that G. avoids 
the 7E .. KaL conjunction to bring the ~LAO- words together); in Pal. <5 
De 1Tapaooowv TLC; •.. k.yw De 1Toiq. ouvap.EI. 1Tapa.J\i]t/;op.al. 14, 
TaUTa 15. In Epitaphios, admittedly not marked by compound 
words, we find €P.~VTOU vApEO-; ... €V01TALOU €PLOO-;, d1T08avovTwv <5 
1T080c; ou O1Jva1T€8avEv. 
It is also interesting to mention some cases where G. uses the 
above-mentioned technique to express or emphasise antithesis. So in 
Hel. 8 one finds KaL AV1T7]V dchEAELV KaL xapav €VEpyaaaa6al., in 10 
€1Taywyoi. ",Sovfj-;, d1Taywyoi. AV1T7JS 10; in Pal. 34 1Tpovoi]aaaL p.€v 
ouvaTa, fLETa.Voi]aaaL De dviaTa. 
ii. The cn"tics of Gorgtas ' prose 
a) Aristophanes. Plato and Xenophon 
Unfortunately, all the critics who have something to say about G.' s 
prose belong to later generations, and their criticisms are mostly 
short comments made en passant, either in comparing the author 
they discuss with G. or using him as an example of a certain stylistic 
fearure. It is also more than clear that a significant portion of these 
1 This probably reflects the different purpose of G.' s two preserved speeches; 
Pal., as a paradeigma of forensic argument, tends to be closer to what would be 
expected to be herd in a real courtroom (see also below my discussion of hiatus). 
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criticisms are not independent assessments put forward by 
individual authors: Aristotle's influence is overt .1 
The earliest author who has some words to say about G. is 
Aristophanes; in both cases G.' s name appears along with that of 
Philippos, presumably one of his students. In his Birds (1694ff= 
Test.Sa) he calls orators eOYy/\u.rrToyci.a-rOpES", that is people making 
their living from what they produce with their tongue (a metonymy 
for language), and in the Wasps (420=Test.Sa) we are told that the 
judges destroyed G.' s pupil Philippos. Yet, there is a passage in the 
Frogs where it is possible that Aristophanes caricatures a feature of 
G.'s style that we have already discussed, that is the formulas of 
transition. In 907-908, Euripides says: KU~ J.L7Jv €J.LUV1"OV J.L€V "IE, -ri]v 
JMygw .... It is perhaps safe to assume that it is G. that Aristophanes 
parodies here, and that the practice of explaining how one will 
proceed to structure one's speech must have been recognised as 
typically Gorgian. For it cannot be a coincidence that Agathon's 
speech in Plato's Symposium, deliberately designed to resemble G.'s 
style (see below), starts with these words: eyw De f3ov/\OJ.LU~ 1Tp&rOV 
coincidence at all that we later find sentences like those in 196d 
e/\/\EL1TE~V; for a pedestrian mimesis see Isokrates 10.8 -ri]v J.L€V 
dpxiJv 1"OU /\oyov 1To~i]aOJ.Lu~ TI]v dpxiJv 1"OU y€vovS" ul.h7]S"). 
.,. 
ovv 
We then have to move to Plato and Xenophon, who once more 
have not much to tell us about G.' s style. We have already pointed 
out that Agathon's speech should be construed as a parody of G.'s 
style. This at least seems to be Plato's explicit intention, voiced by 
Sokrates when Agathon completes his speech (Ka.t. yap J.LE TOPYLOV 
I Aristotle's views on Sophistic rhetoric are distorted even by modem scholars; 
Gagarin (1994) has shown that Kennedy (a foremost authority on ancient oratory), 
by quoting Aristotle in a fragmentary manner, reaches the conclusion that the 
Sophists relied solely upon probabilities (eLK6ra), and he thus makes the student 
of Plato agree with his master's thesis, as it is expressed in Phaidros 267a. 
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E7rE7rov87J .•• 198c). Another characteristic noted by Plato (Gorg. 
449b9ff. and Phdr. 267a-b) is that G. (like Protagoras, see Pro tag. 
334e, 335b) was able to make a speech as long or as short as he 
wanted to. Dodds says that "Plato's language seems to imply that 
the avv-rop.£a of Protagoras and G. was simply a laconic style, 
'putting a thing in the fewest possible words",.1 Apart from these 
sporadic remarks, and some more parodying of G.'s style in the 
Apology and the lvfenexenos, Plato has nothing more specific to say. 
At any rate, Plato was not primarily concerned about how G. or 
other orators spoke, but about the fact that rhetoric departed from 
truth. When he is interested in making points about the style of 
orators he uses his excellent rhetorical talent to mimic and thus 
parody them,2 by using their own tools. 
Xenophon does not have much to say; he simply puts in the 
mouth of one of the interlocutors in his Symposium a phrase (p.I.Kpa7s 
KVAl.ql. P.I.KPa. E7rI.if;€Kr5.~lJ.J(j1. 2,26), which is rOpYI.E£OUI/. pTjp.aal. 
expressed; this, we may infer, is probably because of the compound 
verb E7rLif;EKr5.~lJ.J(j1. and the repetition of P.I.Kp-. The only value of this 
short reference is probably that G.'s diction had become a synonym 
of' grandiloquent speaking' . 
b) Aristotle 
The first author who has more specific points to make is Aristotle, 
who is anyway the first to attempt a systematic approach to rhetoric; 
yet, as it is well known, Aristotle is not interested in individual 
orators, and for this reason we should bear in mind that most of the 
times G.'s writings are used by Aristotle as examples. We have 
already said that it is in his Rhetoric that he contends that G.'s style 
is poetic (1404a24-27; see the discussion of poetic diction and n.lO). 
I Dodds (1959), p.195; in the same place in Phaidros Plato also says that through 
the power of speech, G. along with Teisias, managed to make unimportant things 
seem important, and also old issues seem new. 
2 See North 1991, pp. 201-219. 
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He elsewhere quotes G. to show how TO ifroxpov results from 
compound words and metaphors (Rhet. 140Sb 38, 1418a34-6; see 
notes on fr.15, 16), and that G. did not have any difficulty in 
developing epideictic speeches, as he included a good deal of 
material which was not directly related to them (see fr.17). He also 
says (Rhet. 1415b32-1416a3=fr.10) that the beginning of his praise 
of the citizens of Elis is too abrupt, but again, this should not be 
taken as a hostile comment, because the quotation from the 
beginning of this speech (it is thanks to Aristotle that we possess the 
three first words of it) is used to show that Ta. o€ TOU 
OTfP.TTYOP~KOU .•• cPVUEI. O€ 7]KI.UT'U EXEI. [sc. 1TpOO[P.~uJ. However, none 
of these quotations comes from a preserved speech, and it is thus 
impossible to lmow in what context they were actually placed by G. 
But even the examples Aristotle cites do not always find their 
stylistic parallels in the preserved texts. There is not an equally 
clumsy metaphor, such as the one of fr.16, or such a dull word, as 
7TTWX0P.OVUOKOliuKUS- (fr.15). 
c) Cicero 
Cicero pays much attention to the symmetrical construction of G.'s 
sentences; in the Orator 38 (ut crebro conferantur pugnantia 
comparenturque contraria) he remarks that some people maintain 
that symmetrical antithesis, along with parison and homoeoteleuton 
were firstly used by Tbrasymakhos and G. He later rightly suggests 
that balanced clauses prompt rhythm (167), but he seems 
inconsistent, for at 175 he attributes the invention of symmetry 
solely to G.! Although he does not name G., it is clear that Cicero in 
Orator 84 has him in mind when he maintains that the author of 
'plain' style will avoid similar endings, symmetry etc. 
We may now pass to the more general points that Cicero makes 
about G.'s style; in Orator 39, he refers to Plato's Phaidros 266e, 
where the word lioyooul.oclAOVS- is used to stigmatise G., 
1 See also Diodoros xn 53,2 (=TestA). 
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Thrasymakhos and Theodoros. His exact words, by which he 
finishes his list of Aoyooa£OaAo," runs as follows: Theodorum inde 
Byzantium multosque alios quos AoyoOaL.oc:f,\ovs- appellat in Phaedro 
Socrates. But if we tum to Phaidros 266e4 we find out that Plato 
refers to rov ye {3eA-n(]'7"'OV ,\oyooaLOa.1.0V Bv~c£v-nov rivopa, and he 
has not yet mentioned G .. It seems thus that Cicero generalises, so 
as to prepare the transition to a comparison of these rhetoricians 
with the mirabiles Herodotos and Thucydides. These orators, one of 
whom is G. himself, saris arguta multa sed ut modo primumque 
nascentia minuta et versiculorum similia qaedam nimiumque 
depicta ('they show many clever phrases but these are like a new 
and immature product, choppy, resembling verselets, and sometimes 
over-ornamented', Loeb translation). But not many critics, modem 
or ancient, would agree that Thucydides primarily, and Herodotos 
probably, longissime tamen ipsi a talibus deliciis vel potius ineptiis 
afuerunt. In 175-6, Cicero talks solely about G. and he there 
provides us with a piece of information which we cannot con:finn: 
he says that G. overuses metaphor and embroideries that make the 
speech more joyful (this is what festivitatibus must mean), as he 
himself [sc. G.] calls them (et his festivitatibus - sic enim ipse 
censet - insolentius abutitur). Unfortunately, Cicero - if what he 
says is accurate - tantalises us here, as he does not give the Greek 
word for festivitatibus. We may speculate, and only speculate, that 
what he attributes to G. is perhaps associated with pleasure (rep¥JL.s-), 
which, according to our Sophist, has a pivotal role in persuasion 
(see Hel. 5, 13). 
d) Poetic style and Gonrias as the EVOErr7s- of stylistic of devices 
Most of the critics of later antiquity who refer to G.' s style seem 
to focus their attention on the poetical features and the use of 
stylistic devices in his prose. As we have already seen, numerous 
critics have been particularly ready to adopt Aristotle's view that 
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G. ' s prose is poetic. Y e~ it is perhaps more interesting that each one 
of them gives different reasons to explain why this is so. 
Philostratos (who came to Rome when Septimus Severus was 
emperor), has more to say in the Bf.ot.. IOcPurrwv, at the beginning of 
which emphasis is given to the Sophists, and particularly to G. (see 
Test. 1); he first compares him to Aiskhylos, because each of them 
contributed significantly to his own individual art. After this general 
point, Philostratos passes to more specific details; he says that G. 
was the first to introduce unexpected expression (7Tapa8o~oil.oy[a~), 
grandiloquence for important issues, d7Toa-rciaeL~ and 7Tpoa{3oil.ci~, that 
is abrupt pauses and passing to different subjects, and finally he 
comes to poetic words, which aim at ornamentation and grandeur. 
Among these attributes, only a few can be confirmed by the extant 
texts. No one would doubt that G.'s style is pompous and abrupt 
(ancient critics would call it 'austere'), but d7Toa-rciaeL~ and 
1Tpoa{3oil.aL are certainly not the most typical features of his style. His 
explanation of the function of poetic names does not present any 
originality to be discussed (he merely says that they function as 
embroideries and they add to the seriousness of the speech). Finally, 
Epistle 73, probably by the same Philostratos, addressed to Julia 
Domna, does not add much (see Test.35). Philostratos there 
reiterates that G. employed d7Toa-rciaeL~ and 7Tpoa{3oil.ci~, which 
abound in Epic poetry. 
A nwnber of critics have derogatory points to make about the use 
of stylistic devices in G.; the great critic of the Attic orators, 
Dionysios of Halicarnassos, frequently mentions G. as a 
representative of the pompous and grandiose style adopted by early 
rhetoricians. Syrianus records Dionysios' suggestion (Test.29) that 
G., unlike Lysias, adopted the poetical style (epp.TJveiav) in prose, 
because he thought that orators should differentiate their speech 
from that of the average citizen. But if one considers the fact that 
Lysias wrote forensic speeches for a great range of people, whereas 
G. composed model-speeches which did not have to be in 
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correspondence with the personality of any historical person, one 
understands that Dionysios' explanation is not satisfactory. In other 
places Dionysios becomes more hostile; in Isaias 19.2 (=Test.32), 
he contends that G. was less competent in his use of poetical style 
and grandiloquence than Isokrates, because he lacked the self-
constraint that this style requires, and he also characterises G.' s 
expression as 'childish' (-rraLOapl.(;;)'T]). 
In addition, it would be interesting to observe that in Lys.3 
Dionysios quotes a phrase that Sokrates (PI. Phdr.238d) utters to 
warn Phaidros that the rest of his speech about love will be 
expressed ou -rroppw oLeUp~f3Wv nvwv; with this quotation, 
Dionysios becomes more specific: G.'s style is not only poetic, but 
it also adheres to a genre whose style is manifestly high-flown. 
Some features of this bombastic style are brought out in 
Aristophanes' Birds 1372-1409: it was characterised by a fondness 
for rare, compound words which have a significant presence in G.' s 
work (cp. Aristotle's criticisms ofG.'s style above). 
Dionysios, like many ancient critics, readily names such stylistic 
devices as parisosis, antithesis, paronomasia etc as Topy£ELa 
('Gorgian'), a blanket-term which is meant to cover the combined 
use of these stylistic features; it was the excessive accumulation of 
these devices in his prose that made G. appear as their EVPErfJ<; (cp. 
for instance Dionysios Dem.2S.23). 
Hermogenes, an author of the imperial era, claims that rhetors 
like G. were driven away (€:K'rpaXTJII.£~ouaL) by the tragedians, and by 
poets like Pindar, who elaborate a T'paYLKov style (meaning here a 
pompous, majestic style, fr.Sa). That he refers to G. is confirmed by 
the fact that he cites as an example of r/roxpov style the phrase 
E/-LzPUXOU, T'(lq;ou" yV-rra, from the Epitaphios. His language is 
particularly vitriolic, for he describes 'sophists' as V-rrO,;vIl.OL<;, 
meaning 'faked', and he goes on to say that it is they whom we 
should truly call Efl-z/iUXOU, yV1Tas. Hermogenes also comments on 
the disproportion of what G. and his students Meno and Polus say 
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with the way they say it (Test.29). He stigmatises their use of 
grandiloquent style for unimportant, common ideas, which IS 
especially apparent when they employ devices, and all or some of 
the things that are embroidered, exaggerated, and finally pompous. 
There is little doubt that Hermogenes is one among the most hostile 
critics of G. 
Diodoros of Sicily is the author who informs us that that G. 
arrived in Athens in 427. He attributes to him the invention of 
rhetoric devices, and he claims that G. amazed the Athenians, who 
were anyway taken in by nice words. He then specifies the stylistic 
devices that G. was the first to use: antithesis, parisa, 
homoeoteleuton; this information is, of course, inaccurate because 
we know that these features had a long history before 427, since 
they were developed by the Presocratics and the poets. It is perhaps 
more interesting to observe that Diodoros explains the plausibility 
of these devices on the basis of the difference in individual taste 
when G. used them from the taste of his contemporaries. 
Athanasios Alexandrinos, in his Prolegomena on Hermogenes' 
IIep~ 'zTr1.aeWV (see fr.5a) refers to Thrasymakhos' and G.'s students, 
who used parison without any restraint, but he also says that G. 
himself was unwise in employing it (Kov~6Ta.TO~), and he then 
ridicules him for using the well-known metaphor of yV7TGS as 'living 
tombs'. It is the same metaphor that irritated the author of IIep~ 
"Y<pov~ as well. Yet, no matter how silly this metaphor may have 
appeared to critics, it proved to be an influential one (see comments 
on Epitaphios). 
Another important critic of antiquity is Demetrios (the date of his 
work is unknown to us); the points he makes about G. concern 
primarily the period of his prose. Demetrios (LI2) calls G.' s, like 
Isolaates' and Alkidamas' epp.7]ve£a. (his word for 'style') 
Ka.TEGTpa.P.P.€717], with tightly connected shorter periods, to which he 
opposes epp.7JVe[a. OI.7JP7]p.€717] (that is periods loosely connected to 
each other). He later contends (LIS) that a good speech should be a 
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mixture of both these two styles, because if it consists merely in 
dense periods, 'the audience cannot keep their heads on their 
shoulders, as if they are drunk, and they suffer from headaches 
(vuv'w.lxn) because of the oddity of what they hear, and they 
sometimes shout the end of a period because they know it in 
advance', The last disclaimer must primarily concern symmetrical 
constructions, because, as we have already mentioned, G. does very 
little in them to vary his diction. There is one more word that 
Demetrios has to say about G., and this is that his (along with 
Isokrates') symmetrical KlVf...U expressing antithesis contribute to 






version of the myth followed by G., I Palamedes was falsely accused 
by Odysseus that he betrayed Greece to the Troj ans. In order to 
support this accusation, he forged a letter ostensibly sent by Priam 
to Palamedes and placed it in the tents of the latter along with a 
quantity of gold. When Odysseus 'found' the gold and the letter, he 
accused Palamedes of treason, and after a trial heard by the Greek 
leaders the wise hero was condemned to death. G. divides his 
defence into two major parts: a) if I had wanted to betray the Greeks 
to the barbarians I would not have been able to do so (6-12), and b) 
if I had been able to do it I would not have wanted to do it (13-21).2 
The development of the argumentation in both parts makes abundant 
use of probabilities: in the first part, Palamedes proves that all the 
necessary stages for the preparation of the betrayal (communication 
with Priam, a pledge, the transfer of money etc.) were all 
impossible. His argumentation proceeds by conceding each step: in 
order to betray Greece I had to do A which was impossible; but even 
if A had been possible B would have been necessary; but B was 
impossible; even if B had been possible, and so on.3 This first part 
is, basically, a presentation of probabilities which are proved to be 
invalid, due to practical reasons. In the second part, probabilities are 
employed in relation to motives. It is an exhaustive examination of 
possible reasons for which one might have been tempted to commit 
the crime of treason (money, power, helping friends etc.); each one 
of these motives is dealt with separately and much of the 
persuasiveness lies both in the conformity of the hero with generally 
accepted moral standards and in the detailed discussion of 
practically every possible motive. 
I For the myth ofPalamedes see Introduction. 
2 Note that when probability arguments are employed, hypothetical clauses are 
very likely to appear; an ELKelS" must have as its starting point a hypothesis, which 
is either confmned or rejected; in Pal., the two hypotheses are rejected, whereas 
in He!. the validity of the four hypothetical reasons for which Helen deserted her 
home is confmned (see also Anastassiou 1982, p.244). 
3 See below, 'the Russian doll' argumentation. 
45 
The Encomium of Helen is not marked by the use of 
probabilities; the mythological version adopted here is the Homeric 
one, according to which Helen did travel to Troy with Paris (cp. 5 
ETTpaqEv a. ETTp~EV); what is questioned in this speech is the 
responsibility of Helen. I The invention of the reasons which made it 
possible for Helen to travel to Troy is the only trace of probabilities 
in this speech (cp. 6 TCl, alTiac;, 01.' a.c; ElKOC; -ryv YEveafJal. TOV rijS' 
'£).EV7!S' Elc; ""V TpoLav 0'7"6"ov). These reasons are the following: a) 
the wish of the gods, b) natural violence, c) speech-persuasion,. and 
d) love. Each reason is dealt with separately (as are the motives in 
Pal.),2 and they are not mutually exclusive. At any rate, Helen is 
innocent; but her innocence, in this case, does not mean that she did 
not desert her husband, or that she did not travel to Troy with 
another man: it means lack of personal responsibility. 
The absence of probability-arguments in Hel., and the ample use 
of them in Pal. is a first indication that G. did not actually prefer 
probabilities to truth, and that the use of this type of argumentation 
is not a matter of choice, but a matter of necessity.3 In the case of 
1 Cole 1991, p.76 claims that Hel. "is an illustration of what later rhetoricians (for 
example, Qu:int. 7.41) would call the status qualitativus", whereas "Palamedes' 
defense ... provides a model for the status coniecturalis - the type of argument 
concerned with detennining what actually occurred (cf. Cicero, De inv. 1.8.10)". 
Gagarin 1997, p.122 saw both in G.'s He!. and Pal. and in Antiphon's Tetralogies 
"a foreshadowing of stasis-theory in Aristotle (Rhet. 1.13.9-10, 1373b38-74a17), 
who distinguishes cases where the facts are in dispute from those where the facts 
are admitted but the defendant denies there is a crime". At any rate, G. is aware of 
the fact that the two cases differ to this respect, and this awareness is depicted in 
both texts: He!. eyw oe ,BouAop.a.L •.• dp.a8[a, 2, 7Tp08-fpOfLUL Td, a.i.Tia" OL' a, €i.KO, 
7}v Y€Vea8aL TOV rii>' £l..evTJ> €i., Tpoiav o-rOAOV 5, and Pal. ouoe OLO' iYrrw;; av 
Eio€i7J 1'L, OV TO j.L-lJ Y€VOf.L€vov 5. 
~ See below, 'apagogic' argumentation. 
J Gagarin 1994, p.54 rightly observes that Helen's "case seems well suited for 
giving probability a higher value than truth, since many different versions of 
Helen's actions existed~ .. in which she did not go to Troy", and concludes "G. has 
no reason to resort to probability arguments, since the basic facts are known and 
accepted", though it is not certain if Euripides' Helen (included by Gagarin in 
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Pal., G. undertakes the defence of a man accused falsely. At the 
very beginning of the speech (4), he has Palamedes claim that he is 
in a situation of a:rrop[a. (although he is 11'OPI-?LoS" par excellence 25, 
and indeed the hero who made human life 11'OPL?LOV E:q d11'opoU 30) 
due to EK7rIl:TJ§r.s created by groundless accusation. The only thing 
Palamedes can do is trust 'truth' (dA.,p€£,a.), and 'compulsion' 
(ciVa:YK7J) , which (or who) are dangerous rather than resourceful 
teachers (a,aa.<TKciI\.wv E:7rLKl.VaUlIO'iepWV :r, 7r0pL?Lwrepwv). %y is truth 
a dangerous teacher? Because in his case, the truth is that he has not 
committed the crime which he is accused of - a disclaimer which 
admittedly is not of much convincing value - especially in the 
absence of witnesses. G. certainly knows that judges are not 
persuaded by mere statements of innocence, which entails that an 
approximation of truth through arguments should be employed 
instead. This is exactly what probabilities serve for. In the case of 
He!., the defence does not refute the facts; G., neglecting the moral 
of Stesichoros' suffering, seems confident enough to adopt the 
Homeric version of the myth: Helen did go to Troy. By doing so, he 
does not need probabilities. What is at stake in He!. is the removal 
of her infamy on the grounds of reasonable excuses; the notorious 
trouble-maker has been the victim of uncontrolled powers. 
It seems thus that probabilities appear when facts are disputed 
and that they are more of a necessity than mere choice; but even in 
the discussion of factual reality, G. does not always prefer 
probabilities. He must have realised that other means of persuasion 
are sometimes equally effective and convenient. In He!. 13, he 
claims that a speech written with skill (reXVT/) persuades an audience 
without necessarily telling the truth. The fonn of a speech is there 
considered as a detenninant factor of persuasiveness; if the admirers 
of truth may now feel ready to argue that this is a further proof of 
these versions) existed before G.'s He!. The dates of both Pal. and He!. are 
uncenain; for some conjecrures see Orsini 1956, p.82-88 with summary, and 
Introduction. 
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the (conscious) sacrifice of real facts for the sake of persuasion. 
there is the counter-argument that in cases like the one of 
Palamedes, the truth is that he is an innocent person, who has the 
serious task of defending his own honour and life. Who, in other 
words, would today accuse an advocate defending a victim of 
conspiracy on the grounds of his / her eloquence, especially in a 
case where the evidence is lacking? 
Another vehicle of persuasion is, of course, direct evidence given 
by witnesses. In Pal. 22, the defendant holds that an accusation is 
stronger when it is accompanied by witnesses (-rncrro-repov yap 
ou-rWS' -ro Ka.T"1n'OP7JJ1-U J1-ufYT1JfYT'IJev).1 In the following paragraph (23) 
the hero addresses Odysseus with the following words: 
cL\i\a ao~ P.€V , " .,./ OUK TJV OLOV <-re> p.ovov p.a.prupuc; cii\i\a 
1fevoop.a.prupuc; evpe£.v, €p.o~ o€ ovoe-repov evpeLv -rov-rwv ouvu-rov. 
The point is that Palamedes, being innocent, could not find any 
witnesses of a crime which has never been committed; but 
Odysseus, on the contrary, was able to present both witnesses - in 
case Palamedes has committed the crime - and falsewitnesses2 - as, 
of course, he has not committed the crime. The reference to 
witnesses, that is to say people with personal knowledge, shows that 
G. was aware of and able to use means which nonnally furnish 
direct evidence. This point becomes more interesting, when G. 
I The false accusation of Odysseus is implied in Pal. 7, where the defendant, for 
the argument's sake, concedes the possibility of communication with Priam.. 
which entails that an interpreter should have been used. If this had occurred. the 
laner would have been a wimess of the transaction. The failure of the opponent to 
provide wimesses or to accept evidence by means of f3d.aavOS" (cp. Pal. 11) is a 
topos; see .A.ntiphon 1.6.13,23 and 29-30. Most recendy Plant 1999, p.66-67, 71. 
Z For tfEUOO(.UIp-rupf.a see for example Antiphon 2.4.7, .A.ndokides 1.7, Lysias 19. ·t 
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attempts to transform Odysseus from an accuser into a witness or 
even an accomplice (22): 
1TVeOP.EJlOS". El p.EJI OUV lawv, ~p6..aov TOUTOI.S" <,071 ,P07TOV> , ,071 
- ~ - ,/ 
'al.S" aUTal.S" 0.1. Tl.al.S" ••• 
To sum up, although probabilities are an important vehicle of 
argumentation, G. does not value them ahead of truth; ElxOTa are 
necessary in cases where real facts are disputed and where evidence 
is lacking. 1 Pleasure invoked in the audience by a skilled speech is 
also regarded by G. as a factor which plays an important role in its 
persuasiveness, so that a good rhetor should take this parameter into 
account. Lastly, it is clear that direct evidence presented by 
witnesses is known to G., and, what is more, he seems to be aware 
of the function of this type of evidence, so that he can argue by 
using it. 
b) Argument from antinomy 
This pattern of argumentation (Aristotle describes it as ,07TOS" EX ,llW 
Evav,iwv) is founded on the location of antinomic or contradictory 
properties attributed to one and the same entity.2 It occurs both in 
On not Being (ONB), where it is used for the refutation of 
philosophical arguments and in Pal., where it is integrated in the 
characterisation of the opponent. 
In ONB G. puts forward three major theses: a) nothing is, b) if it is 
it is unknowable, and c) if it is and it is knowable it cannot be 
communicated to others. A problem which has tantalised scholars is 
what exactly this 'it' refers to. Some scholars have said that it is the 
phenomenal world in general and some others that it is the 
I Cpo Aris!. Rher. 1376a17ff.: TTLcrrwfl.a:ra oe 7TepL f.Ulp-roPLIJiV p.a.p-ropa, p.€v !1-TJ 
exovn. on €K nuv eLKo-rwv oei: KpLveLv .•• KaL on OUK ecrrLv €qa7Tarr;aaL -rei eLKo-ra 
€7TL a.pyvpLtJ,J, KaL on oux ciAE.aKe-ral. -rei eLKo-ra .jJeu00iJ-UP-roPLWV. 
Z See Lloyd 1971, p.121 and Mansfeld 1990, p. 99-102 
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fundamental entities of the philosophers, abstract notions expressed 
by the term ovra. 
In the second part supporting the first major thesis (namely, 
'nothing is'), G., as the Anonymous author of De l\1elisso 
Xenophane Gorgia (MXG) informs us,· collected contradictory 
properties (-ravavria 979a15) attributed by philosophers to ovra; 
these contradictory properties, according to Anonymous, were 
discussed by G. after the 'original prooe (;.LeTa. ri]v r8wv aVTou 
ci7TOO€L~!.V 979a24), in which he sought to show that 'it is not either 
for being or for not-being'. In the version given by the author of 
MXG these properties are discussed in 979b20-980a9, were we learn 
that 'if anything is' (el oe EO'TLV), it must be either generated or 
ungenerated, one or many, in motion or at rest.! Each member of 
these pairs is proved impossible (with syllogisms which partly 
derive from axioms of the philosophers themselves), and from that it 
is inferred that 'being is not' . 
In Pal. 25-26, the hero addresses the litigant; it is interesting that 
he does not attack Odysseus on the grounds of personal 
characterisation (27, although numerous adjectives may have been 
used against Odysseus).2 The characterisation of the adversary is 
1 The list of properties attributed to OJl"7"!1 by philosophers is fuller in MXG979b20-
980a9, for Sextus does not include the pair in motion / at rest. This pair is absent 
in the 'doxographical' summary in MXG979al4-18, but it is traced m 
XenMem.1.1.l4. (Mansfeld 1990, 246-247 investigates the historiography of 
philosophy as a Sophistic activity and he shows how later doxographical accounts 
depend on it. G.'s ONB does not merely intend to record earlier ideas out of 
historical interest, but it clearly seeks to refute them on the basis of 'logical' 
antinomies. 
1 Cole 1991, p.73 classifies the lack of ethos as one among other characteristics of 
late fIfth-century rhetoric: "the absence of any attempt to give ethos to what is 
said by making it suggest the character of the person or class of person who is 
saying it...points to the demands of the practice and demonstration text" (p.79). 
There is no doubt, I tb:ink, that G.'s Hel. and Pal. are intended for practical 
didactic purposes, and a need for general applicability is also discernible; but this 
is rather different from saying that ethos is totally absent. In his self-
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built on two separate arguments: in the first one Palamedes explains 
. that Odysseus rests his accusation upon belief (S6gcr.), which is 
defined as an ci1TLO'Tarcr.Toll 1Tpcr.yP.cr.; serious accusations, we are tol<L 
should be based on finn knowledge.! The second part of the 
characterisation, Palamedes lists his inventions, which are presented as a great 
benefaction to the Greeks and humanity in general (30). Tnese are very unique 
virtues peculiar to this specific hero, and it is impossible to think of any of G.'s 
students who might have been in a position to claim that he was the inventor of 
letters. It is now true, that much of the self-dIaracterisation of Palamedes makes 
use of standard moral values (29-32): he has never been accused of anything 
before (29; notice that AOLoopia, an inaccurate accusation, OUK €XOVC7ClV 8\EJIXOV, is 
imputed to the opponent); he does not cause pain to the elderly, he helps the 
young, he does not envy prosperous people, he sympathizes with those who 
suffer ... (32): in short, Palamedes is in absolute conformity with moral standards 
and G. is thus teaching prospective rhetoricians how to use the stock of 
conventional morality. This does not, I am inclined to believe, imply the absence 
of ethos; it implies a twofold function of the self-cbaracterisation: a) to present an 
impeccable Palamedes for the purposes of The Defence of Palamedes, that is a 
Palamedes whose profile does not deviate from the mythical account, and b) to 
offer a paradigm of general applicability. If my reading is correct, then Cole's 
suggestion seems to be an unjustified generalisation (I acknowledge, of course, 
that Cole examines a greater range of texts; my point is simply that G. is not 
among those who neglect ethos). 
1 G.'s texts have regularly been interpreted under the light of a distinction 
between 'knowledge' and 'belief; the most eloquent representative of this line of 
inquiry has been Kerferd 1981, pp.81-82, who claims that "it is possible to discern 
a common conceptual modeL. .on the one hand is the real world, labelled truth or 
that which is true. The cognition of this real world is knowledge. But the 
commonest cognitive state is opinion, not knowledge, and logos ... operates upon 
opinion". Long 1982, p.240, has rightly explained that "this is an unjustified 
systematisation of Gorgias' principal preserved writings" (see also Schiappa 
1999, pp.125-126). The artificiality of this distinction cannot be shown here; it 
will suffice to say that it appears only in Pal. 3 and 24, in a context which does 
not allow for generalisations. Hel. 11 has also been taken to depict the prevalence 
of knowledge, but knowledge is not mentioned there at all. It is simply said that 
'belief (oo~a) is slippery (see MacDowell 1982, note ad loc.). I consider that this 
systematisation is partly the concomitant of considering ONE as a treatise in 
which G.' s own theoretical credo is embedded and explicitly put forward. 
However, this text is (and probably was intended to be) open to different readings; 
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apostrophe to the opponent makes use of an argument from 
antinomy; what is at issue here is the unreliability of a litigant who 
in referring to a person, attributes to this very person contradictory 
properties. 
In this context, Palamedes refers to the speech of accusation in 
which Odysseus had allegedly claimed that the defendant is both 
wise and mad; wise in respect to his resourcefulness, mad in respect 
to the fact that he betrayed the Greeks (25): 
,J../ \ ",. 'r" \', v e v crOyA .. av Kal.. jJ-av~av, I.IX17TEp aux a av TE TOV aUTOV av pW7TOV EXE I.. V. 
01TOU jJ-EV yap jJ-E </ri:p Elval.. TEXV17EvTa TE KaL OEL.VaV KaL 1TOpL.jJ-OV, 
cro<jJLav jJ-ou KaT7JYopEl..s, 01TOU OE AeYEL.S rk 7TpouoLoouv T7Jv'EL\aoa, 
jJ-avLav ..• 
What we have here is a game of chess played by a single player: G., 
in defending Palamedes, has the privilege of answering accusations 
made by himself, while it should be noticed that these accusations 
could reasonably have been put forward by one who might have 
wished to capitalise on the overwhelming potential of this hero; if 
Palamedes is so resourceful, then he has probably used his 
resourcefulness for malicious purposes. The argument from 
antinomy, though more simple here than in ONE, is obvious; the 
'two totally contradictory properties' (OUO Tel. €vavTLun-a-ra.) 
ostensibly ascribed to Palamedes by Odysseus make the latter's 
accusation contradictory itself, from which it is logically inferred 
far from putting forward new theories, it questions the validity of established 
ones. If the message of ONB is that philosophical systems claiming absolute 
approaches to truth are refutable, as I think it is, then it may turn out to be the 
worst source of information for G.' s own premises, if they existed at alL In my 
view, ONB should be read as a criticism on the process of philosophical 
reasoning, as a scrutiny of philosophical discourse. The fragility of philosophical 
reasoning recurs in He!. 13 as well. 
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that his accusation is unreliable (lTWs- x.piJ dvopl. TOLOVTqJ 1Tt.O'7"eVeLV, 
OO'7"t.S TOV ClVTOV AOYOV AEywv 7Tpes- TOVS ClVTOVS dVOpClS 7Tepi. TWV 
antithesis). The defendant concludes that Odysseus is a liar (at.' 
dfJ-~OTepCl av eL7JS rpeUO-ryS 26), by using the same argument. He asks 
him if he deems wise men as cppOVLfJ-Ot. or dvo7JTot.; if wise men are 
dvo7JT0I... Odysseus' claim is a flagrantly untrue novelty. If they are 
cppOVlfJ-(JI.. they do not prefer sufferings to goods they already 
possess. I The conclusion is: eL p.€v ovv eLfJ-1. aocpos, oux TJfJ-ClPTOV' e:l 
a' TJfJ-ClpTOV, ou aocpos eLfJ-I.; in either case Odysseus' accusations are 
proved to be false, the opponent is a liar. 
Logical argumentation is thus in G.' s hands a means of bringing 
out the ethos of the opponent; instead of a personal attack, we are 
provided with an analysis of the logical contradictions resulting 
from the opponent's charges. Two points should be made: a) the 
clarity with which this pattern of argumentation is presented serves 
as an example of G.'s teaching practices and the need for general 
applicability; having this example in min~ students of rhetoric can 
easily argue from antinomy. b) the ethos of the opponent (not that of 
the defendant) is not presented on the basis of personal attack; if one 
is reluctantly tempted to indulge in a discussion of the morality of 
Gorgian rhetoric by comparing the method of attack employed by G. 
with that used by fourth-century orators (say by Aiskhines in 
Against Timarkhos), where even false evidence is used against the 
personalities of the opponents2, then we may conclude that G. was 
almost naIve. 
c) Theorisation and examples 
This pattern is related to reasoning involving speculation, which is 
not directly relevant to the theses defended. Criticism has focused 
1 In the theory of rhetoric this type of argument is called dillema. 
2 On inaccurate personal attack. see Halliwell 1991, pp.292-294, Harding 1994, 
pp.196-22L 
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mainly on the discussion of AOyOS" by G. in Hel. 8-14; this part of the 
speech includes one of the earlier approaches to the function of 
speech and persuasion (1TeL8cfJ), especially in connection to its impact 
on the human soul: poetry, incantations, the perception of speech by 
audiences, persuasive speech are all employed to exemplify the 
omnipotence of ,1.oyoS". However, it is critical to bear in mind that G. 
does not support his argumentation by the means of theoretical 
discourse solely in this part of He!. The final reaso~ namely love, is 
from the very beginning of its analysis linked to oljJl.S" ('vision'), and 
what follows is a theoretical evaluation of the function of this sense 
in relation with the emotional world. 
The impact of ,1.0Y0S" upon the the emotional world of men has 
been admirably examined by Segal; 1 what I intend to do is to show 
a) the ways in which the combination of theoretical generalisation 
with the use of examples contributes to the argumentation in He!. 
and b) that the separate arguments included in the discussion of 
,1.oyoS" and love are underlined by a common pattern. of analysis. 
In 8, ,1.0Y0S" is defined as a great ruler with extreme powers (II.0Y0S" 
DVVcl.aT1}S" p.t€yas €G'Tl.v); the realm of His activity is chiefly the 
emotional world of men. In order to demonstrate the impact of II.0Y0S" 
upon our emotions G. brings in two examples corresponding to two 
different kinds of ,1.0YOL: poetry, defined as lI.oyov exovTa. fJ-€TPOV (9), 
and incantations, Ev8eOL Dui ,1.0Ywv €1TCpaa.i (10). Poetry awakens 
within the souls of audiences emotions for the sufferings of others 
(that is, with the 'suspension of disbelief' audiences partake in the 
reality of the literary event), and incantations - by means of magical 
charming (Y07J1"e£as Kul j.La.ye£a.s-) - make the soul act independently 
I Segal 1962, p.99-155; according to this scholar Hel. appeals more to the 
emotional aspect of persuasion., whereas Pal. makes use of logical reasoning. This 
distinction is somewhat elusive, because the rationaiistic approach to AOyOS'" is one 
thing, and the impact of AOyOS- upon the emotional world itself quite another (see 
Anasrassiou 1982, pp.246-247). 
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of its own will. In both examples, speech enters the soul physically, 
and the schema applied is common in both cases: 
poetry ~ soul ~ emotions 
incantations -+ soul -+ enchannnent 
Both poetical and verbal incantations (OLa. AOYWV) enter the soul 
(ELa7jA8E, avYYI.YVOf-LEV7J) and they affect it.! 
The same pattern recurs in the analysis of love (15-19); the 
logical discussion of a notoriously irrational emotion2 IS 
foreshadowed from the very beginning: G. links Jpws to i5l/JL~ and he 
remarks that 'the objects of our sight do not have the nature that we 
want them to have, but the one they happen to have' (15). The 
problem, now, seems to be that 'soul is moulded by vision' (OLa. O€ 
rij~ OrpEWS iJ rf;vx:iJ Kav -ro'i~ -rp01TOL~ 'T'V1Tov-raL). An example which 
supports this thesis is brought in:3 when soldiers face the weapon of 
the enemies, their soul is in panic, so that they fly without 
considering the detrimental consequences of their action (16). The 
function of OrpL~ is based on the same pattern of analysis already 
employed in the context of Aoyo~-arguments: 
vision -+ soul-+ flight (1TOAEf-LLU (]'wf-La-ra •.. -+ E-r6.pa~E -rryv ifrox:frv-+ 
<PEVYOV(]'LV EK1TAayEv-rE~). 
1 Mourelatos 1982, pp.229-230 righdy maintains that the discussion of logos in 
He!. is basically behavioural, but he fails to observe that the same holds for the 
discussion of vision as well. 
1 This is explicitly acknowledged by G. (d a' €OTi.v av8punnvov vOCJ77JUl. KcU. 
.Jmxi7> ayvo7JJ.U1., mix W, ci.~prT]JUl. jJoCP.r.rEOV aM' w, aruX7Jp.a VOfUOTEOV 19); the 
superiority oflove because of its divine narure (0, €i. p.ev Beo, B€wv BeLav oUva.p.Lv 
<€xwv>19) is not the cornerstone of G.'s reasoning (it is mentioned in passing), 
and it is worth noticing that it is rationalised in the way that divine powers are 
rationalized in 6. 
3 The examples adduced in 15-19 correspond to a distinction between negative 
(16, 17, mainly fear) and positive (18, mainly pleasure invoked by painting and 
sculprure) emotions. 
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Vision is again presented as coming physically (ElteoiJaa 16) into 
the soul, which is 'moulded' (nnroiJral. 15; notice also that the 
images of vision seen in the past are 'engraved', EV€:ypar/;ev 17). 
The generalisation about the function of vision is completed 
with a reference to emotions aroused by fine arts (19). It is assumed 
that the function of painting and sculpture is to provide vision with 
pleasant images, and, what is more, from the products of art 1TIJeO, 
and EpWS- can be generated. If one can possibly fall in love with a 
statue (the example of Pygmalion is telling), then Helen's falling in 
love with statuesque Paris is perfectly comprehensible. 
It has been made clear, I hope, that the reasoning In the 
discussion of both Itoyo, and love develops with a good deal of 
theorisation, which in some respects follows a common pattern of 
analysis concerning the relation of the stimuli to the emotions that 
they invoke in the souL But what is the value of this pattern in 
association with the development of the reasoning for the case of 
Helen? 
The answer is partly given by the text itself: at 12, Helen 1 is 
called a victim of persuasion, and at 19 we are told that we should 
not consider Helen's falling in love with Paris as a strange thing, 
simply because her eye (sic) happened to see his body. G. then uses 
theorisation because he relies on analogies: if Itoyo, is omnipotent, 
as it is shown that it is, in what manner could Helen escape his 
power? If objects of vision contaminate our souls, as it is shown that 
they do, how then could Helen's soul avoid contamination by the 
statuesque body of Paris? In the theoretical pattern of reasoning, the 
person defended is just another example that COnDnnS the theory. In 
addition, theorisation has the virtue of explaining, giving logical 
1 In spite of the texrual problems the meaning is clear, G. is clearly trying to 
present Helen as a victim of persuasion. That he intends us to consrrue Helen as 
another example corurrming the view that persuasion is as effective as violence 
and necessity is brought out by the wording itself (KcU. rirv' £)"EV'TJI')' 
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meamng to things otherwise self-evident. Everyone has perhaps 
fallen in love; G. is there to show (in his own way) why and how this 
occurs. From an excuse love is elevated to a very important reason. 
In conclusio~ the discussion of ,16yoS" in He!. 8-14, however 
interesting implications for the history of criticism in antiquity it 
may have, is intended as a separate argument of equal significance; 
theorisation is used both in the examination of logos and in that of 
love.;.visio~ where examples play an important role. The value of 
this pattern lies in that., by generalising, it is analogously applicable 
to individual cases (in this case, Helen). We also have to assume, 
that much of the persuasiveness of theorisation through examples 
may have been the product of €K7TII.7Jg~S" experienced by audiences 
(or readers) resulting from the impressive ability of the rhetor to 
apply elaborate 'lmowledge' to demanding intellectual issues. There 
is one more question: if ,16yoS" is able to deceive, why should we 
become the victims of the person who has just shown that lI.oyos 
deceives? This is a matter of a second-order reading of He!., and 
should be left open. 1 Personal answers are, of course, always 
available. 
d) Apagogic and the 'Russian doll' argumentation 
I include these two types in my classification reluctantly, for they 
concern fonnal schemata of reasoning. However, I hope that the 
investigation of their role in G.' s reasoning will be compensating. 
Apagogic reasoning is employed both in He!. and in the 
discussion of motives in Pal.; in the former, each reason is dealt 
with separately, and none of them results from or presupposes the 
preceding one.2 This is brought out from the text itself, because the 
I For the role of ci:rrci:rry in G., see Verdenius 1981, pp.116-128; although 
Verdenius' study is learned and still up-to-date, in my view the phrase 'doctrine 
of deception' clearly overstates our evidence. 
l However, Porter 1993, p.275, is certainly right in holding the view that "if G. is 
trying to keep his aitiai apart. he is trying no less hard to make that task next to 
impossible" . 
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transition from each reason to the following one is clearly marked (7j 
, 6 ' ~'R' 7 ,~ , \' • , 8'" , , yap... El. OE /"'Lq.... , El. OE I\OYOS- 0 -rrEL(]US... Kal. 07"t. fJ-El', El. 
AOyCP •. . 15, -rryv OE TEn1.prrJV aLTiav Tcii TEn1.p-rcp AOYCP OL€~El.P.1. 15). 
G. invents four reasons, each one of which is intended to show the 
same thing: Helen is not responsible. The same process is traced in 
Pal. 13-21. G. distinguishes between two types of motives (19): 
people commit crimes either in pursuit of a gain or in avoidance of a 
loss (7} KEp80~ Tl. f-LETl.OVTE~ 7j ~7Jp.£av cf;EvyovTE~) et tenium non 
datur. All the motives presented fall within those two categories; the 
arguments put forward show that if the defendant had committed the 
crime of treason., he would have had the opposite results. The 
apagogic reduction both in Hel. and in Pal. is used because each 
independent argument is meant to be perceived as being as strong as 
the rest of them. In other words, G. is not compelled to present each 
step in any particular order, because in these cases his material does 
not impose upon him such a process. 
On the contrary, the first major division of Pal. (6-12) proceeds 
with the 'Russian doll' schema, which I take it to be an indication of 
G.' s awareness that motives and actions corroborate the 
argumentation in a different manner. As each new smaller doll is 
brought out from a 'Russian doll', in the same manner each stage in 
the discussion of the actions preparing an alleged betrayal is 
presented as logically following the preceding one l . The more the 
arguments represent a logical string of acts, the more the 
argumentation is benefited; this is why the first argument deals with 
what should have normally been the starting point ofa betrayal (6): 
I In Long's words (1982), p.235 "the sequence of claims is assumed to be 
exhaustive, leaving the opponent no perch for any reply", and further (237) he 
points out that the elimination of the defendant's opportUnities "amount to ... a 
reconstruction of the alleged treachery from its beginning to its end". 
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eO€L yap nva 1tpw-rOV UpxT1v y€veaeal. rijs 1Tpooouias, -r, O€ ci.px-Tj 
AOYOS all €rTf -rrpo yap 'iWV l-LeAAOV'iWV epywv dvayK7] AOyOVS 
yf. yv€afJal. -rrpO'i€POV ••• 
That each argument concedes the preceding one is indicated by the 
introductory phrase of each new argument: dUd. o7J TOtiTO n!J AOyCp 
ovvaTOv y€veafJal. ... 7, dMd. o7J Ka~ TOUTO y€veafJw, Kai1T€p ou 
Y€VOf.l.€vov . .. 8, c/rfJU€L ns ... 9, Ka~ 0-iJ , TOI.VVV y€veafJw Kal. Td. /-L7J 
y€vO/-L€va .•. 11 etc. It is also worth our attention that the second major 
division is actually introduced by conceding the first one: 'if it were 
by all means possible (€l l-L6J\I.G'Ta. 1TaV'iWV €ovva/-L7]lI), for what 
reason would I have wished to do these things?' (6). The value of 
this type of argumentation lies in the fact that it presents a cohesive 
string of arguments, based on logical assumptions. It can be 
conceived as a representation of the crime, in which the defendant is 
ab le to show that what is presented by the accuser as a fact is 
nothing but assumption. 
The same pattern is followed in the philosophically oriented On 
not Being; each one of the three major theses concedes the previous 
one: nothing is (A), ifit is, it is not possible to have lmowledge of it 
(B), ifit is and it is possible to have lazowledge o/it, it is impossible 
to communicate it to others (C). Although the schema is the same, it 
is not used to the same extent in the individual arguments of this 
texts, as it happens in Pal. 6-12. 
In short, G. seems to arrange his arguments in accordance with 
the nature of the case he defends; actions, normally developing in a 
linear, consecutive order, suggest a similarly linear and exhaustive 
representation, which demands some logical participation of the 
audience. In the case of self-contained arguments on the other hand 
the argumentation is apagogic; different theses are supported by 
independent arguments: in Hel. each reason is argued separately, so 
that the refutation of her infamy is based on four equally strong 
reasons; analogously, in Pal. 13-22 each motive is dealt with 
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Separately as we1l, and it is shown that none of them could have led 
the hero to perform the act that he is accused of. 
G. 's argumentative process does not merely consist ill 
probabilities; Plato in his Phaidros (267a) simply singles out the 
type of argument which makes G. susceptible to criticism, in view 
of the fact that probabilities do not reproduce factual reality. A sober 
assessment of the argumentation used by this Sophist, which is 
based on a close reading of his own preserved texts, shows that 
various argumentative patterns are employed by G. and that he is 
wise enough not to ignore factual reality. G.'s reasoning is not as 
simple as it is usually taken to be. 
60 




(1) Koaf-Lo~ 1TOII.EL f-LEV EvuvopLu, aWf-Lun OE KaMo~, ifJuxfj OE a0cPLu, 
1TpaYf-LUn OE apET1" lI.oYlP OE all.1,8ELa· Ta. OE EVUVTLU TOVTWV 
aKoaf-LLu. avopu OE KuL yuvaZKU KuL lI.oyov KuL epyov KU~ 1TOII.Lv KU~ 
1TpaYf-Lu XPTJ TO f-LEV a;LOV E1TULvou E1TULVlP nf-Lav, TqJ OE avu;LlP 
f-LWf-LOV E1TLn8EVUI.· raT} yap af-LUpTtU KU~ af-Lu8Lu f-LEf-LcPEaeuL TE Ta 
E1TUI.VETa KuL E1TUI.VELV Ta f-Lwf-L-rrra. (2) TOU 0' UVTOU avopo~ M;ul. 
TE TO OEOV op8w~ KU~ EII.Ey;UI. TOV~ f-LEf-LcPOf-LEVou~tEAEV~V, YUVULKU 
1TEpL TJs (,f-LOcPWVO~ KuL (,f-LoifJuxo~ YEyOVEV 7j TE TWV 1TOI.7]TWV 
aKouaaVTWV 1T{aTl.~ 7j TE TOU OVOf-LUTO~ cP1,f-L7], 0 TWV auf-LcP0PWV 
f-LV1,f-L7] yEyOVEV. EYW OE {3ovII.Of-LUI. >..oYWf-LOv nvu TqJ >"0YlP OOV~ rTJV 
f-L€V KUKW~ aKovouauv 1TUUaUI. rijs UlTtU~, TOV~ O€ f-LEf-LcPOf-LEVOU~ 
ifJEuOOf-LEVOU~ E1TLOEL;UI. KUt. OEL;UI. Tall.7]8E~ <KuL> 1TUUaUI. rij~ 
af-LU8Lu~. 
(3) an f-L€V oov cPvaEI. KUt. "lEVEL Ta. 1Tp6JTU TWV 1TPWTWV avopwv KUt. 
YUVUI.KWV -r, yuvTJ 1TEPi. ~~ aOE (, >"oyo~, OVK a07]lI.ov ovoi:: OIl.Lyol.~. 
o7]lI.ov ya.p iUs f-L-rrrpo~ f-LEV A1,ou~, 1TUTpO~ DE TOU f-L€V YEVOf-LEVOU 
8EOU, TOU DE II.EY0f-LEVOU 8v-ryrou, TuvDapEw KUt. L1LO~, ilJv 0 f-LEV Ol.a. 
TO EIvul. EDo;Ev, 0 OE DLa. TO cPavul. ijIl.Erx8~. KUl. ~v 0 f-LEV avopwv 
KpanaTO~ (, DE 1TavTwv rVpuvvo~. (4) EK TOWVTWV DE YEVOf-LEV~ eOXE 
TO Lao8Eov Kall.lI.o~, 0 >..u{3ouau KUi. 013 lI.u80uau eOXE" 1TII.E£aTU~ OE 
1TII.E£aTOI.~ E1TL8uf-L£.u~ EPWTO~ EVEl.pyaauTo, €vi. DE aWf-Lun 1TOMa. 
aWf-LUTU auVT,yUYEV avopwv E1T/. f-LEyaIl.OI.~ f-LEYU cPPOVOVVTWV, ilJv oL 
f-LEV 1TII.OVTOU f-LEYE87], oL OE EVYEVE£U~ 1TuII.Ul.a~ EVOO;£uv, oL O€ 
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.!\ - ,~, , c/ ,~, -I.' , , ~, v [J./\.KTJS wt.US eves t.UV, ot. oe ao",t.US e1TLK'T"7JTOV OVVUP.LV eaxov- KUI. 
oans p.ev ODV KUI. 01.' on KUI. O1TWS G.1Te1TATJae T<JV epwru rryv 
'BevTJv Au{3wv, ou Aegw' TO yap TOtS ei06aLv a rauaL A€yeLv 1TLanv 
p.ev EXeL, Tep!f;Lv oe ou ~epeL. TOV xpovov oe T<fJ AOYCP TOV TOTe VUV 
tJ1Tep{3as €1Tl. rryv G.pxiJv TOU p.eMOVTOS AOYOU 1Tpo{3fJaop.UL, KUI. 
1TpOefJaop.UL Tas ulTLus, Ot.' as eiKcJs ~v yeveaeuL TOV rijs 'BevTf.> 
ei<; ryv TPOLUV a-rOAov. 
(6) 7} yap TvXTf.> {3ouAfJp.uat. KUI. eewv {3ovAevp.uat. KUC. ' AVa.YKTf.> 
!f;TJ~Lap.uat.v E1Tpugev a E1Tpa,gev, 7} {3~q. ap1Tuaee'iau, 7} AOyot.s 
1Tet.aee'iau, <7} EpwrL cL\ouau>. el p.ev ODV OLa TO 1TpclrrOV, agws 
ulnCiaeut. (, ulnwp.evos· 8eou yap 1TpOeUP.LUV G.V8pW1TLVT] 1Tpop.TJ8iq. 
,~, \' '-1. ' " - "-'-UOUVUTOV KWI\VeLV. 1Te",UKe yup OU TO KpeLaaov U1TO TOU TJaaovos 
G.AAa TO ~aaov " ~ U1TO TOU KpeLaaovos apXeaeUL KUI. 
ayeaeUL, KUi. TO p.ev Kpe'iaaov ir;e'iaeUL, TO oe ~aaov E1TeaeUL. eeo<; 
o ' G.VepW770U Kpe'iaaov KUi. {3[q. KUI. ao~[q. KUL TO'iS aAAOLS. el oJv rij 




MjAOV on (, <p.ev> ap1Ta.aus Ws u{3p[aus -ryoLKTJaev, i] oe ap1TUaeeZau 
Ws v{3pLaee1au €oua-nJXT]aev. agws ODV (, p.ev €1TLxeLpfJaus {3a.p{3upos 
{3a.p{3upov €1TLXeLpTJp.u KUL AOYCP KUi. vop.cP KUI. epycp AOYCP P.EV 
ulTiu<;, vop.cP OE G.np.£us, EPYCP OE 'TJP.LUS TUXe'iv- TJ oe {3waee1au 
KUL TfjS 1TUTpioo<; a-rep7]8eZau KUi. TWV ~£AWV Op~uvLaee'iau 1TW<; OUK 
aV eLKoTWS €Ae7]8eiTJ P.CiAAOV 7} KUKoAoy7]8eLTJ; (, P.EV yap Eopuae 
oeLVa, TJ OE E1Tu8e' O[KUWV ODV rryv P.EV olKTLpeLV, TOV OE p.urijauL. 
(8) el oe AOYOS (, 1Teiau<; KUI. rryv 1f;vxiJv G.1Tu-rf]au<;, ovoe 1TpOS TOUTO 
XUAe1Tov G.1ToAoyrJaUaeUL KUi. rryv UlTLUV G.1ToAvaUaeUL woe. AOyOS 
ouvua-rTJs p.eyu<; €a-rLV, os ap.LKponlTcp awp.un KUI. G.~uvea-ra.Tcp 
e€LOTUTU EPYu G.1ToTeAe'i· OVVUTUL yap KUI. cf>o{3ov 1TuUaut. KUI. AV1TTJV 
G.~eAe'iv KUI. xupav Evepya.aUaeUL KUI. EAeov E1Tuugfjaut.. TUUTU oe Ws 
OVTWS ExeL oeigw' (9) oe'i OE KUI. 06g7] oe'iguL TO'i<; aKovouaL' rryv 
1TOL TJat.v Q.1Tuauv KUL VOP.L'W KUC. ovop.a.,w AOYOV EXOVTU p.eTpov· ~<; 
TOU<; G.KOVOVTUS el~Aee KUC. cf>P~KTJ 1Tepicf>o{3o<; KUI. EAeo<; 1TOAVOUKPU<; 
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KUt. 7To8o~ <jJL)..07TEV8-!Js, E7T' dJV..OTpLWV Te 7TpUYP.a.TWV KUt. <JWP.a.TWV 
eUT'VXLUL~ KUt. OV(]'7"UX£UL~ tOLOV Tt 7Ta.8TJp.u OLa TWV AOYWV E7Tu8ev Tj 
ifrox!J· <jJepE 07J 7TpO~ ruov a7T' clMOV p.eTU<JTW AOyOV. (10) uL yap 
€V8eOL OLa )..oywv E7T<pOUL E7TUyWYOt. Tjoovfj~, a7Tuywyot. AV~ 
yLVOVTUL· <JVYYLyvop.evTJ yap rij oofv ~ ifrox:fjs Tj OVVUP.L~ Tfj~ 
E7T~Ofj~ E8e)..ge KUt E7TeL<JE KUt. p.ETea77J<Jev uUr7Jv y07JTei~. y07JTeiu~ 
OE KUt p.uyeiu~ OL<J<JUt. TexvuL eVPTJvTuL, uZ el<JL ifrox:fj~ ap.uprrjp.uTU 
KUt. oo~ a7Turrjp.uTU. (11) O<JOL OE o<Jovs 7Tept. O<JWV KUt E7TeL<JUV 
Kai. 7TEi8ov<JL oe tPEVOfj AOYOV 7TAa.<JuvTes. el P.EV yap 7Ta.vTes 7Tept. 
7TAei<JTwv oL 7T)..EL<JTOL r7Jv oogav <YVP.{30VAOV rij tPvx:fJ 7TupexovTuL. Tj 
OE 06gu <J<jJu)..Epa KUt. a{3e{3uLOS oV<Ju <J<jJuAepuLs KUt. a{3e{3uLoLS 
I ';" " TL~ ovv aLTLU 
€.KOU<JUV W<J7TEP el {31.q. TjP7Ta.<J8TJ; tJ7TO yap TfjS 7TeL8ou~ EgTJAa.8TJ TO 
VOTJP.U. KULTOL 7TEL8w ava.YK~ eloos ExeL P.EV OU, r7JV OE OVVUP.LV 
r7JV aUr7Jv EXeL. AOyo~ yap tPVx7JV 0 7TEL<JUS, 17V E7TeL<Jev, Tjva.YKa<JE 
KUt. 7TL8e<J8uL TOL~ AEyop.eVOL~ KUt. (JUVULve<JUL TOLS 7ToLOvp.eVOLS. 0 
P.EV OVV 7TeL<JU~ W~ aVUYKa.<JUS aOLKeL, Tj OE 7TeL<J8eL<JU W~ 
avaYKu<J8eL<JU Tep AOYtp P.a.TTJV aKOVEL KaKWs. (13) OTt 0' Tj 7TeL8w 
7TP0<JLOU<JU Tep AOy~ KUt r7Jv tPvx7Jv ET'V7T(iJ<JUTO 07T~ E{3ovAeTo, XP7J 
p.u8eLv 7TPWTOV p.ev TOUS TWV p.eTewpoAoyWV AOYOVS, oZTtves ooguv 
aVTt. oo~ r7Jv p.ev a<jJeAop.evoL r7Jv 0' Evepyu<Ja.f.LevOL Ta cl7TL<JTU 
Kat. c'i0TJ)..U <jJULVE<J8UL TOLS ~ OO~ OP.f.La<JLV E7TOLTJ<JUV· oeVTepov oe 
TOVS aVUYKULOV~ OLa AOYWV dywvus, EV oIs Eis AOYOS 7TOAVV 0XAOV 
ETeptPE Kat. E7TeL<JE TeXVTJ ypu<jJeLS, OUK dA7J8eL~ Aexeeis· TPLTOV 
<oe> <jJLAO<JO<jJWV AOYWV ap.£,A)..as, EV ais OeLKVVTaL Kai. yvWf.L~ 
nixos W~ eup.eTa.{3o)..oV 7TOLOUV r7Jv Tfjs 06gTJs 7TL<JTf.V. (14) TOV UUTOV 
OE AOYOV €xeL ~ Te TOU AOYOV ovvaf.LLs 7TpOS rryv Tfjs ifJvx:fjs TUgLV ~ 
TE TWV <jJUPP.a.KWV TUgLS 7TpOS r7Jv TWV <Jwf.LUTWV <jJV<JLV. w<J7Tep yap 
TWV <jJuPf.LUKWV clMOVS clMU XVp.ovs EK TOU <Jwf.LUTOS EguyeL, KUt. Ta 
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{-LEV vOO"ov Ta. OE {31.0V 1TuveL, OVTW KUI. TWV AOYWV ot. {-LEV €AV7TTjO"UV, 
Ot. OE erepljIuv, ot. oe €<po{3TJO"uv, ot. oe els 8apO"os KU-rEO"T7]O"UV TOUS 
aKouovTUS, 01. oe 1TeL801. nVL KUKij rryv ifIuriv €<pup{-LaKevO"uv KUI. 
'C / ES EY0-rrrEVO"uv. 
(15) KUI. on {-LEV, El AOYqJ €1Tef.aBTJ, OUK TJoLKTJO"ev aM' frn5xrJO"EV, 
ELP-rrrUL' rryv oe TETapTTJv ulTf.uv TqJ TETapTqJ AOYqJ oLE~eL{-LL. El ydp 
EPWS ~v 0 Tui)ru m:1.VTU 1Tpa~us, ou XUAe1Tws oLu<pev~eTUL ri]v rijs 
AeyO{-LEv7JS yeyovEvuL a{-Lup-ri.us ulTi.uv. a ya.p opwf.Lev, EXeL <pUO"LV 
OUX fJv TJf.Lel.s 8EA0f.Lev, aM' fJv EKUO"TOV ETVXe' OLd oe rijs oljIews TJ 
IjIvri Kav TOI.S TP01TOLS TV1TofJruL. (16) UUTf.KU ydp OTUV 1TOAEf.LLU 
aLO-rypov, TOU f.Lev aAe~pLOv TOU oe 1Tpo{3A-ryf.LUTU, eel] 8eaC17]TuL TJ 
OIjILS, ETapG.xfJ7J KUI. ETG.pu~e rryv rjJvxfJv, Ware 1ToAAG.KLS KLVOVVOV 
TOU f.LEAAOVTOS <Ws> aVTos <pevyovaLv EK1TAuyEv-res. laxvpd f.Lev TJ 
uf.LEAeW TOU VOf.LOV OLd TaV <po{3ov elaqJKf.aBTJ TaV a1To rijs oljIews, 
1jns EA80uau E1Tof.TJaev uf.LeMjauL KUI. TOU KUAOU TOU aLa. TOV VOf.LOv 
KPLVOf.LEVOV KUL TOU ayu80u TOU OUt rryv Vl.K7JV YLVOf.LEVOV. (17) ijoTJ 
8€ nves lMvTes <po{3epd KUI. TOU 1TUPOVTOS ev TqJ 1Tupovn xpovqJ 
<pPOV-ryf.LUTOS e~EO"T7]O"uv' OVTWS a1TEa{3eae KUI. e~-ryAuaev a <po{3os TO 
VOTJf.LU. 1ToMot. oe f.LUTUf.OLS 1TOVOLS KUt. OeLVal.S VOO"OLS KUt. ovaLaTOLS 
aWf.LG.TWV €V awf.Lu KUL axfjf.LU TeAef.ws a1Tepyaawv-rUL, T€P1TOVO"L T-ryV 
OIjILV' TJ OE TWV avopLaVTWV 1Tof.TJaLS KUL TJ TWV ayuAf.LaTWV epyuaf.u 
8EUV TJOEI.UV 1TUPEO")(ETO TOI.S 0f.L{-LUaLV. OVTW Ta. f.Lev AV1TEI.V TO. oe 
1T08El.v 1T€<PVKE ri]v OIjILV. 1TOAAd oe 1TOMOI.S 1TOAAWV epw-ru KUI. 
1T'o80v EvepyG.~ETaL 1TpUYf.LaTWV KUI. aWf.LG.Twv. (19) El oDv TqJ TOU 
'AAe~G.vopov aWf.Lun Ta rijs' EMv7JS Of.Lf.LU iJaBev 1Tpo8vf.LLUV KUI. 
Q.f.LLAAUV EPw-rOS riJ IjIvx7J 1TupEowKe Tf. 8uvf.LuO"TOV; os el f.LEV 8eos 
8EWV 8Ef.UV OVVU{-LLV <exwv>, 1TWS av 0 1jaO"wv eL7J TOUTOV a1TwO"uaBuL 
KUI. U{-LVvUaBUL OVVUTOS; El a' EO"TI.V uv8pw1TLVOV vOO"1Jf.LU KUI. rjJvx.fJs 
ayvo7Jf.Lu, oux ws af.LapTTJf.Lu f.LEf.L1TTEOV, aM' Ws u-rUxrJf.LU VOf.LLO"TEOV· 
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~)..eE yap, clx; ~)..eE, ljroris aYPEVJ.LaCnv, OU yvWJ.L7JS {3ovAEVJ.LaatV, KaL 
€Pf.J.YIOS avaYKaLS, OU T€XV7JS 7TapaaKEvaLs. 
(20) 7TWs ovv XP7J o£KaLOv maaaf)aL TOV rijs 'EA.€v7JS J.LwJ.Lov, -ij-ns 
ErT' Epaaf)ELaa ELTE AOYCP 7TEtaf)ELaa ErTE {3Lq. a.p7Taaf)ELaa ErTE V7TO 
eELas avaYK7JS avaYKaaf)ELaa €7TpaqEv a €7TpaqE, 7TavTWS" OWcPEVYEt 
rryv alTLav; 
(21) acPELAov TqJ AOYCP ovaKAELav yvvaLKcJs-, EV€J.LEI.Va TqJ vOJ.LCP ov 
Ee€J.L7JV EV apxfJ TOV AOyOV· E7TEl.pae7JV KaTaAvaaL J.LwJ.Lov aOLKLav Kat. 
8oq7Js aJ.Lae£av· E{30VAfJ87JV ypatjJaL TOV AOYOV' EA.€V7JS J.LEV EYKWJ.LLOV, 
EJ.LOV OE 7Ta[yvLOV. 
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lla 
~ , ~ 
TOV aVTOV 
• 17TEP IIaAa.p.Tj3ovs 'A1ToAoyLa 
(1) TJ f.LEV KUT7]YOp£U KUL 1] d7TO~oyiu <KUL 1]> KpiaL, ou 7TEPL 
eUvaTOU yiYVEml.· eaVUTOV f.LEV yap 1] rpvaL, rpUVEPfj. riJ rjJTJrpqJ 
7TaVTWV KUTErjJTJrpiauTo TWV eVTJTWV, {prEP 1]f.LEpU EYEVETO' 7TEpL OE 
rij, dTLf.Liu, KUL rij> TLf.Lfjs 0 Kivouvos EaTL, 7TOTEpa f.LE XPTJ OI.KU£WS 
, , 
ULTLUS 
{3Luiws d7TOeUVEiv. (2) oLaawv OE TOVTWV OVTWV TOU f.LEV o~OU uf.LEis 
KPUTEiTE, TOV 0' EYW, rijs f.LEV O£KTJS EYW, rijs OE {3ius uf.LEis. 
d7TOKTEivul. f.LEV yo.p f.LE OUV7pEa8E {30U~Of.LEVOL Pq.o[ws· KpUTEiTE yap 
, / 't' ,~ , " , ,.... (3) , , -;- ~ KUL TOUTWV, wv OuaEV EyW TUYXUVW KpUTWV. EL f.LEV OUV 0 
KU-r-ryyOpos 'OouaaEvs 7] aurpWs €7TLaTo.f.LEVOS 7TPOOLOOVTU f.LE rryv 
'EA~o.ou Tois {3Up{3o.pOLS 7] oogo.{wv y' df.Lfj OVTW mUTU €XELV 
E7TOLEiTO rryv KUTTJYOP£UV OL' EVVOLa.V rijs 'EA)'o.oos, apLaTOS av ~V 0 
'EA~o.ou, ETL OE 7TpOS TOVTOLS TOV dOLKOVVTU TLf.LWpOVf.LEVOS; el OE 
rpeOVqJ 7] KUKOTEXV[q. 7] 7Tuvovpyiq. avVEeTJKE mVTTJv TTJV UlT{UV, 
av ELTJ. 
(4) 7TEpL TOVTWV ~EYWV OE 7TOeEV apgwf.La.L; Ti OE 7TPWTOV d7TW; 7Toi 
OE rijs d7TO~oyius Tpo.7TWf.LUL; UlT£U yap dVE7TioELKTO, €K7T~TJgLV 
Ef.LrpUVfj Ef.L7TOLEi, oLa OE rryv EK7T~TJgLV d7TOpEiv dVo.YKTJ TqJ ~oyqJ, av 
f.L7J TL 7TUP' uurij, rijs d~7]8Eiu, Ka.L rijs 7TUpOVCJ'7]S dVo.YKTfS f.Lo.ew, 
oLouaKo.~wv E7TLKLVOUVOTEPWV 7] 7TOPLf.LWTEpWV TUXWV. (5) OTL f.LEV ovv 
au aurpWs <Elow,> 0 KU-rTJy0PO, KUTTJYOpEi f.L0U, aurpw, oLou' 
aVVOLOU yap Ef.LUVTqJ aurpWs OUOEV TOWVTOV 7TE7TOLTJKW" OUO' EOLX 
07TWS Civ EloEiTJ TL, OV TO f.LTJ YEVOf.LEVOV. El O€ OlOf.LEVO' OVTW mVTU 
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J1TLOELgW Tp01TWV· OUTE yap {30V;":ry8E1S Jovva[1:T]v av OUTE Ovva[1-EVO~ 
J{3ov;":rj87]V €pyOL~ J1TLXELpELV TOLOVTOL~. 
(6) J1T1. TOUTOV oe TOV AOYOV EI[1-L 1TPW'rOV, wS aovvuT6~ El[1-L TOUTO 
1TpaTTELv. EOEL yap nvu 1TpW'rOV apriv YEvea8uL rij~ 1TPOOOO"LUS, -r, 
oe apx:T! AOYOS av Er7]· 1TpO yap TWV [1-EM.OVTWV EPYwv avaYK7] 
iloyov~ YLvEa8UL 1TpOTEpOV. AOYOL oe 1T~ av yevo(.vTo [1-TJ o"vVOVo"LU~ 
nvoS'" YEVO[1-€V~; O"VVOVO"LU oe TLVU TP01TOV yevoLT' av [1-7rr' JKELVOV 
, ~ EKELVOV JAeOVTOS'"; ouoe 
1TUPUYYEALU oLa ypU[1-[1-aTWv d4JiKTaL aVEv TOU rPePOVTOS'". (7) aAAa. 
07] TOUTO nfl iloycp OVVUTOV YEvea8u(.. KUt. 07] TOLVVV aVVEL[1-L KUt. 
I , .... ,,"', I I I I v O"VVEO"TL KUKELVOS E[1-0L KUKELVCP EyW - nvu TP01TOV; T('VL nS'" Wv; 
"EAA7]V {3up{3apcp. 1T~ aKOVWV KUI. Aeywv; 1TOTEPU [1-0VOS [1-ovcp; a.U' 
" "" " , ' '" ' e" , , " ayv07]O"O[1-EV TOVS'" UIV\7]I\WV l\oyOVS'". UI\I\U [1-E EP[1-7]VEWS'"; TPLTOS'" upu 
[1-apTVS'" YLVETUL TWV KPV1TTE0"8UL OEO[1-EVWV. (8) aAAa. 07] KUt. TOUTO 
YEvea8w, Kui1TEP ou YEVO[1-EVOV. eOEL oe [1-ETa. TOVTOVS'" 1TLO"TLV OOUVUL 
1Tpo06T7J 1TLO"TEVELV €[1-EM.EV; aM.' O[1-7]pOL; TivES'"; oZov Jyw TOV 
dOEArPOV gOWK' av (ou yap E1xov aAAov), 6 oe {3ap{3upoS'" TWV UL€WV 
I I ,~, 1" '/ " " I 'I 
nvu· 1TLO"TOTUTU yup UV 7]V OVTWS E[1-0L TE 1TUP EKELVOU EKELVCP TE 
1TUp' €[1-ou. TUUTU oe YLYVO[1-EVU 1Ta.O"LV U[1-LV av ~v rPuvEpa. (9) 
4n7O"EL nS'" Ws XPT][1-UO"L -r7Jv 1TLO"TLV J1ToLOV[1-EeU, JK€LVOS'" [1-ev OLOOVS'", 
Jyw oe AU[1-{3avwv. 1TOTEPOV OVv OALYOLS'"; aAA' OUK " , \ ELKOS'" UVTL 
'dS'" ovv ~v -r, KO[1-LOT]; 1T~ 0' av <fJ ciS'"> JKO[1-LO"€V fJ 1TOAAoi; 1TOAAWV 
yap KO[1-L~6vTWV 1TOAAOI. av ~O"uv [1-apTVpES'" rijs €1TL{3ovMjS'", EVOS'" oe 
'r ' KO[1-L",OVTOS OUK " , ' ,)..' '\' UV 1TOI\V n TO 'f'EpO[1-EVOV 7]V. (10) 1TOTEPU 0' 
rPepwv elafjAeEV; a[1-rPoTEpU ya.p a1Topu. Au{3wV oe 07] 1T~ av EKPUtf;U 
, 
n aV 
WrPEAOV[1-7]V d1T' UUTWV; 
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(11) KUt.. yeveaew KUt. Ta. /L-TJ yeVO/Levu. avvf/;;.eo/LeV. 
eL1TO/LeV, TJKOVaU/LeV, XPTJ/LUTU 1TUP UUTWV €AU{30V, EAueov AU{3WV, 
EKpvifJa. EOeC, ofrrrov 1Tpa'T'TeC,V WV €VeKU TUUTU EyeVeTO. TOUTO 
TOl.VVV en TWV elp7J/L€VWV o.1TopWTepOv. 1Tpa'T'TWV /LEV ya.p UUTOS" 
v ~ e ~ ~, !'\ '\' , ~, ~ ..... c ..! '\ '\ , e'" e1TpUTTOV 7J /Le eTePWV; CL/V\ OVX EVOS" 7J 1TpU", c,S". (l/\/\U /Le ETepWV; 
Tivwv; 07]AOVO'Tt TWV auVOVTWV. 7TOTEPOV €AEV8epWlI 7] OOVAWV,· 
EAeveepf.q. 
, TOVTWV. <OLa.> 
Te£xOVS"; a1TUaLV apu cPUVepa. yevoLTo av. tJ1Tuf.epLOS" yap 0 {3i.oS" 
(aTpUT01TeOOV ya.p) EaT' EV 01TAOC,S". EV orS" <1TaVTeS"> 1TaVTU OPWat 
KUt 1TaVTeS" V1TO 1TaVTWV 0pWVTUL. 1TaVTWS" apu KUt 1TaVT7J 1TaVTU 
1TpaTTeC,V o.OVVUTOV 7]V /LOL. 
(13) aK€!f;Uaee KOLVij KUL To;k T£VOS" EVeKU 1TpOa7]Ke {3ovA7]8fjvUt. 
€1TaV€l./LL.) 1TOTePOV <TOU> rupuVVE'iv; V/Lwv 7} TWV {3up{3apwv; o.AA' 
V/LWV; o.AA' o.ovVUTOV ToaOVTWV KUL TOWVTWV, orS" V1TapXeL a1TUVTU 
cPpOV7J/LaTWV, {3uaLAe£U 1TOAeWV. (14) o.AAa. TWV <{3up{3apwv>; a OE 
1TUPUOWo-WV OE 
{3up{3apovS", Eis- WV 1TOAAOVS-; 1TdauS" 7} {3t.aaa/LevoS"; OtJTe yap EKe'iVOI. 
1TEC,aefjVUI. {3oVAOI.VT' av, OUT' EYW {3l.aauaeul. OVVU£/L7JV. a.AA' LaWS" 
EKOVTES" EKovn 1TupuowaovaLv, /LLaeOV TfjS" 1Tpoooa£uS" o.vnol.oovTES"; 
o.AAa yE mihu 1TOMfjS" /LwpiaS" Kat.. 1TLaTEUaaL Kat.. oegaaeul.· TiS" ya.p 
av EAOI.TO oovAE£av o.VTt.. {3aaLAEiaS", o.VTt.. TOU KPUTiaTOV TO 
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E1TEXELfY/7aa TOVTOLS. aX\.a )(!YTJp.aTa p.E:V p.€TpLa K€KTTfp.aL, 1TOX\.WV OE: 
ou8E:v O€op.aL· 1TOX\.WV yap O€OVTaL XPTfp.aTWV 01. 1ToX\.a oa1TaVWVTES, 
aAA' OUX , OL KPEL7"7"OVES TWV rijs TjOOVWV, aAA' , OL 
OOVAEVOVTES TUlS Tjoovu7.s KUL. , , a1TO 1TAOVTOV 
TOLOVTOLS epyoLS av-ryp EmXELp-ryaELE KaL. p.€aws ~POVLP.OS. a1T' apErijs 
yap aAA' OUK a1TO KuK671JTOS ui. np.ai· 1TPOOOry OE: TfjS 'E\Aaoos 
EVOE-ryS wv- , , E1TL , , V1TO TWV 
Evnp.OTaTWV, u~' UP.Wv E1TL. ao~Lq.. (17) KUL p.-ryv ouo' aa~aAE[as 
[Jiv] OVVEKa ns av TaUTU 1TpaguL. 1TaaL yap (5 yE 1TPOOOTTfS 
1ToMp.LOs, T0 vop.lfJ, rij OLKT]' T07.S 8E07.S, T0 1TA-ry8EL TWV av8pcfmwv· 
TOV P.€V yE vop.ov 1Tapaj3aivEL, -r-ryv OE: OLKTfV KaTaAVEL, TO OE: 8E7.0V 
anp.a{EL, TO OE: 1TAfj80s oLa~8E£pEL. T0 OE: TOLOVTlfJ <0> j3LOS 1TEPi. 
KLVOVVWV TWV P.EyLaTWV OUK €XEL aa~aAELav. (18) aAAa o-ry ~r.AOVS 
ns av aOLK-ryaELEv. EP.Oi. OE: 1Tav TouvavTLov EY£VETO· TOUS p.E:V 
~r.AOVS KUKWS E1TOLOVV, TOUS OE: ExepOUS W~€AOVV. aya8wv p.E:V oiJv 
eYKTTfaLv ouoEp.Lav ElxEv Tj 1TpagLs· KUKWs OE: 1Ta8ELv OUOE: Eis 
I 
n P.OL 
, EaTLV, Er nva ~oj3ov 7] 
I 1TaVTU 
~ ~ /,/., / \ ' (;1 I ~, -. ',./... EP.UVTOV, TOKEUS, 'f'LI\OVS, u",Lwp.a 1TPOYOVWV, I..Epa 1TUTPlfJa, TU'f'0VS, 
1TaTpl.Oa -r-ryv P.Eyl.aTTJV TfjS' E\Aaoos. a OE: 1TaaL 1TEPl. 1TUVTOS EaTL, 
TaUTa av TOL, aOLK-ryauaLv EVEXEl.pLaa. (20) aK€~ua8E OE: KUl. TOOE. 
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[-L€VE~V EV TOls f3Upf3a.pOL~; 'TTUpU[-LEATJerUVTU '1TC:LVTWV TWV [-LEY[crTWV, 
EcrTEfY17[-L€VOV rij~ KaAALO'1"7]S n[-L7]s-, EV u1ax.[aT7J OVerKAELq. oLC1YOVTa, 
, , 
'TTOVOV~ E'TT 
{3~WTOS 'TTLcrTE~ EcrTEp7][-L€VqJ. XPTJ[-LUTa [-LEV yap a.'TTo{3uAOVTa <7} > 
ropUVVLOO~ EK'TTEerOVTU 7} rTJv 'TTUTp£OU </;VYOVTU a.vuAa{3oL n~ av· 0 
~,~ '{3\\ , '11 V , 
DE 'TTLcrTLV U'TTO UI\WV OVK UV ETL K7i]erULTO. on [-LEV OOv OUT' Q.v 
<EOVVa[-L7]v {30VAa[-LEVO~ OUT' Q.v ovva[-LEVO~ > E{30VAO[-L7]V 1TPOOOUVUL 
rTJV '.EV..aou, OLa TWV 'TTPOELp7][-L€VWV O€OEI.KTaL. 
(22) {3ovAO[-LUI. OE [-LETa TUUTa 'TTpO~ TOV KUTTJYOPOV OLUAEx8fjvUL. TLVL 




EcrTLV, , , UVTO~ </;UVTJ-rW, 
[-LUpro p7]era TW. " EcrTUI. 
[-LUprop7]8€V. E'TT€~ VUV )IE OUO€TEPO~ T7f1-WV 'TTUP€XETU~ [-Lapropu. (23) 
</;TJerEL~ rer~ rerov Elvu~ TO er€ yE TWV YEVO[-L€VWV, W~ crV </;TJ~, [-L7J 
'TTUP€XW8UL [-L6.pTVPU~, TWV OE [-L7J Y€VO[-L€VWV E[-L€. TO OE OUK rerov 
EcrTL· Ta [-LEV yap a.y€v7]Ta 'TT~ a.OVVUTa [-Luprop7]8fjVUL, 'TT€pt. OE TWV 
Y€VO[-L€VWV ou [-Lovov OUK a.OVVUTOV, a.Ma KU~ pq.owv, OUOE [-Lavov 
MowV, a.AAa erol. [-LEV OUK ~v oLov <TE> [-Lavov [-Lapropu~ a.Ma KUt. 
if;EVoO[-Lapropu~ EVPEl.V, E[-LOt. OE OUO€T€POV dPEl.V TOVTWV OVVUTOV. 
(24) on [-LEV oov OUK oIa8u a. KU7IJYOPEl.~, </;UV€POv· TO 07J AOL'TTOV 
<OUK> €lOOTU erE OO~6.~€LV. Ehu, rZ 'TTaVTWV a.vepw-rrwv TOA[-L7]POTaT€, 
86flJ mcrTeveru~, a.mcrToTaTqJ 'TTpaY[-Lun, T7JV a.AfJeELUV OUK e1.8Ws-, 
av8pu 'TTEP~ , T~ TOWUTOV epyov 
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'TOIS oogci~OVO"L OEL 7nO"'TEVELV dX\.a 'TOIS EiooO"LV, OU'TE rryv oogav Tfjs 
d):TJeE£a~ 7nO"'TOTEpaV VOfJ-£~ELV, dX\.a 'TdVUVT£U rryv dA#JELaV rij~ 
06frp. 
(25) Ka7IfYop-ryO"a~ OE fJ-OV oLa 'TWV ElfYTlfJ-EVWV AOYWV ovo 'Ta. 
Wc-rrEP OUX OrO V 'TE 'TOV au'TOV 
o.v8pumov EXELV. 07TOV fJ-€V ycip fJ-E </riJs ElvuL 'TEXV-ryEV'Tci 'TE Kat. 
OELIIOII Kat. 7TOpl..fJ-OII, O"ocpLav fJ-OV KU7IfYOpEL~, 07TOV O€ AEYEL~ Ws 
7TpOVO[OOVII ri]v' EMcioa, fJ-av£av· fJ-aVLa ycip EO"'TLV EpyOI..~ E7nXELPEI.II 
'TOV~ 0' Ex8pov~ WCPEA-ryO"EL, 'TOV O€ av'TOU f3LOV E7TOVE£OI..O"'TOV Kat. 
acpaAEpov Ka'TaO"'Tf]O"EL. Ka£'TOI.. 7T~ xp7J. dvopt. 'TOLOVnp 7nO"'TEVELV, 
OO"'TL~ 'TOV au'TOV AOYOV AEYWV 7TpO~ 'Totk UU'TOV~ a.vopa~ 7TEPt. nov 
av'TWV 'Ta. EVaV'TLun-a'TU AEYEL; (26) f3ovAOLJ1:T]V 0' av 7Tapa aou 
7TV8EooaL, 7TO'TEPOV 'TOV~ aocpov~ a.vopa~ VOfJ-L~EL~ dvo-ry'Tov~ 1} 
'TOV~ yE cppollouv'Ta~ 
I '8- , \ .,., ,/..f , " 7TapOII'TWV aya wv. EL fJ-EV OVV ELfJ-L 0"0'jJ0~, OVX 7Jf.LUp'TOV· Ei 0' 
ilEa 7TpciaO"oll'TO~ OVVcifJ-EVO~ ou f3ovA0fJ-UL· <f3oVAOfJ-UL> yap ou 'T01.~ 
aol.~ KaKOI.~ dAAa 'TOIS Ef.LOI.~ dya80L~ d7TOCPEVYELV rryv alT£av 'Tav'T7]v. 
7TpO~ f.L€V 0011 a€ 'TaU'Ta. 
, -
€L7TELII 
E7TLcp80vov f.L€V dA7J8€~ OE, <f.L7J > Ka7IfYop7Jf.LEVU) f.L€V OUK dVEK'Tci, 
Ka'T~OpoVf.LEVU) O€ 7TP0u7]KOV'Ta. vuv yap EV Vf.LI.V €UeVVU~ Kat. AOYOV 
tJ7TEXW 'TOU 7TapOLX0f.LEVOV f3£OV. OEOfJ-aL OOV VfJ-WV, av Vf.LC'i~ U7TOf.LII-ryO"W 
'TWV 'TL Ef.LOt. 7TE7TpaYf.LEvwv KaAWV, f.L7JOEVU cjJ8ovfjO"aL 'TOIS AEyOfJ-EVOI..~, 
aAA' avaYKaLOV ~O"aooaL Ka7IfYOp7Jf.LEVOV OELva Kat. ~EVOfj Ka£ 'TL 
'TWII aA7J8wv ayaewv El7TEI.V EV €iOOO"LV Uf.LLV· 07TEP 7jOLO"'TOV f.L0L. (29) 
7TpciJ'TOII f.LEV OOV Kat. OeV'TEPOV Kat. f.LEYLO"'TOV, OLa 7Tall'TO~ a7T' apxfJ~ 
€l~ TE§AO~ allaf.Lcip'T7J'To~ a 7TapOLXOfJ-EVO~ f3LO~ EO"'T£ f.LOL, Ka8apo~ 
7TciO"7]S al'T£a~· OUOEt.~ yap av oUOEf.LLav al'T£av KaKo'T7J'To~ aA7J8fj 7TpO~ 
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? WV Oth-ws , OVK 
q;-ryau<; OUK av tjJEVaUL/-LTJV OUO' av €"AEJ'XftELTJV, ou /-LOVOV dvu/-LapT7JT0<; 
d"A"Aa KUL /-L€YU<; EUEPY€TTJ<; V/-LWV KUL 'TWV' E"A"A-ryvwv KUL 'TWV a:7TaV'TWV 
dv8panrwv, ou /-Lovov 'TWV VVV OV'TWV d"A"Aa <KUL> 'TWV /-LE"A"AOV'TWV, 
Elvu~. 'TL<; yap av €'TTOLTJaE 'TOV dv8panTLvov {JLOV 'TTOP~JLOV €g d'TT0poV 
KUt. , E't" KEKoaJLTJJLEVOV s UKoaJLOV, 
JL€YW'TOV El<; 'TT"AEOVEK'T-ryJLU'TU, VO/-LOV<; 'TE YPU'TT'TOV<; q;VAUKU<; ['TE] 'TOV 
O~KULOV, ypaJLJLU'Ta 'TE JLv-ryJLTJ<; opyUVOV, JLE'TpU 'TE KUL aru8JLcl, 
avvu"A"Auywv EU'TT0POV<; ow"A"Auya<;, dp~8JLov 'TE XPTJJLa'TWV q;v"AUKU, 
7TVpaov<; 'TE KpU'TLarov<; KUt. 'TUXLarov<; dYYEAOV<;, 'TT€aaov<; 'TE OXOA~<; 
(£AV'TTOV OW'Tp~{J-ryv; 'TLVO<; OVV EVEKU rav8' VJLOS V'TTEJLvTJau; (31) 
oTJ"Awv <JL€v> on 'T07s 'TOWV'TO~<; 'TOV VOVV 'TTpoa€xw, CTTJJLE~OV O€ 
'TTOWVJLEVO<; on 'TWV ulO)(jJwv KUt. 'TWV KUKWV epywv d'TTEXOJLU~· 'TOV 
yap €KELVO~<; 'TO V VOVV 'TTpOaEXOV'TU 'TO~<; 'TOWV'TO~<; 'TTpOa€XE~V 
dOVvu'TOV. dg~w O€, El JLTJO€V UU'To<; vJLOS dO~KW, JLTJO€ UU'To<; vq;' 
VJLwv dO~KTJ8~va~. (32) KUt. yap OUO€ 'TWV (£"AAWV €'7TL'TTJoEvJLa'TWV 
rf "t ~ , OVVEKU Us ~o<; E~JLL KUKW:; 'TTaOXELV, ov8' V'TTO VEW'TEPWV ov8' V'TTO 
'TWV 
ovarvxoVV'TWV OlK'TLpJLWV· OV'TE 'TTEVLU<; V'TTEpOpWV, OUO€ 'TTAOV'TOV 
OV'TE €V JLaxuL<; dpyo<;, 'TTOLWV 'TO 'TUaaOJLEvov, 'TTEL8oJLEVO<; 'TO~<; 
(£PxovaLV. d"A"Aa yap OUK €JLOV €JLUV'TOV €'TTULVE~V· 0 O€ 'TTUPWV KULP0<; 
-ryvaYKuaE, KUt. 'TUV'TU KU'T7]YOPOVJLEVOV, 'TTav'Tw<; d'TTo"Aoy-ryaua8uL. 
(33) AOL'TTOV O€ 'TTEPt. V/-Lwv 'TTpo<; vJLii<; €arL JLOL AOYo<;, OV El'TTWV 
, KUL 
'TTUpUL'TTJaL<; €V OXAcp /-L€V oVCTTJ<; 'T~<; KpLaEWS xp-ryaLJLu· 'TTUpa 0' VJL~v 
'TO~<; 'TTPW'TOL<; ovaL 'TWV' EAA-ryVWV KUL OOKovaLV, OU q;L"AWV {J07]8ELUL<; 
OUO€ "AL'TU~<; OUO€ OLK'TOL<; OEt: 'TTd8ELV vJLii<;, d"A"Acl 'TqJ auq;Eara'Tcp 
OLKULCP, oLoaguV'Tu 'Td"A7]8€<;, OUK d'TTu'T-ryauv'Ta JLE OE~ OWq;VYE~V 'T7]v 
ul'Tiuv rav'TTJv. (34) vJLii<; O€ Xp7] JL7] 'T01.<; "AOYOL<; JLii"A"Aov ij 'TO~<; 
epyoL<; 'TTpOaEXELv 'TO V vovv, /-LTJO€ 'Ta<; ul'Tiu<; 'TWV €A€yxwv 
'TTpOKPLVELV, /-LTJO€ 'TOV OALYOV xpovov 'TOV 'TTOA"Aov aoq;WrEpov ~YE~a8E 
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KP~TT]V, JL7JoE T-ryV OW{30A-ryV Tfjs 7T€£pa~ 7TLaTOT€paV VOJL£~€~V. a7TaVTa 
yap T07s ayaeoZ~ avopaa~ JL€yaA~ €UAa{3€£a~ Q.JLapTaV€~V, Ta oE 
aVT]K€aTa TWV aK€aTWV ETL JLCiAAOV- TaUTa yap 7TpOVOT]aaa~ JLEV 
ouvaTa, JL€TaVOT]aaa~ OE av£aTa. TWV oE TOWVTWV EaT[V, " OTav 
aVOp€S" avopa 7T€pl. 8avaTou Kp[VwaLV' 07T€P EaTl. VUV 7Tap' vpiv. 
(35) €l JLEv ODV ¥ o~a TWV AOYWV T-ryV aAT]e€WV TWV EPYWV Kaeapav 
T€ y€v€a8a~ TOZ~ aKovoua~ <Kat.> cpav€pav, €V7TOPO~ av €l.7J TJ Kp[a~~ 
7j07J d7TO TWV €lp7JJL€VWV- E7T€~O-ry OE OUX OVTWS" EX€~' TO JLEV aWJLa 
TOUJLOV cpUAa~aT€, TOV OE 7TA€[W xpOVOV E7TLJL€[vaT€, JL€Ta OE Tfj~ 
dA7JfJ€£a~ T-ryV Kp£a~v 7To~T]aaT€. VJLZv JLEV yap JL€ya~ 0 K£VOUVO~, 
aO[KO~~ cpav€Za~ 8O~av T-ryV JLEV KaTa{3aA€ZV, T-ryV OE KTT]aaa8a~. TOZ~ 
OE dyaeoZ~ dvopaa~v a~p€TWr€PO~ eavaTO~ OO~~ alaxPCi~' TO JLEV 
yap TOU {3Lou T€AO~, TJ OE Tcf; {3Lcp voao~. (36) Eav OE dO£KWS" 
a7TOKT€£V7]T€ JL€, 7TOAAOZ~ y€vT]a€Ta~ cpav€pov' EYW T€ yap <OUK> 
dyvw~, vJLwv T€ 7TCia~v"EAA7Ja~ yvwP~JLO~ TJ KaKOT7J~ Kat. cpav€pa. Kat. 
T-ryV alr£av cpaV€pav a7Taaav VJL€Z~ €~€T€ Tfj~ dO~K[a~, OUX 0 
/ 'r I ", ", , I \', y€VO~TO JL€~~WV TaUT7J~. OU yap JLOVOV €~~ €JL€ Ka~ TOK€a~ TOU~ €JLOU~ 
Q.JLapTT]a€a8€ O~KaaaVT€~ do [KWS", dAA' vJLZv aUToZ~ O€LVOV ae€OV 
, , 
a7T€KTOVOT€~ 
cpav€pav OUOE , , a~T~av 
(37) €l.p7]Ta~ Ta 7Tap' EJLOU, Kat. 7TaVOJLa~. TO yap V7T0f-Lvfjaa~ Ta od 
f-LaKpWv €lp7Jf-L€va avVTOf-LWS" 7TpO~ JLEv cpavAou~ O~KaaTa~ €X€~ AOYOV' 
TOUS" oE 7TPWTOU~ TWV 7TpWrwv "EAA7Jva~ 'EAAT]VWV OUK a~LOv ouo' 
d~~waa~ f-LTJr€ 7TpOa€x€~v TOV VOUV f-LT]T€ f-L€JLvfja8a~ Ta A€x8€vra. 
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'TOU a.U'TOU 
Maximus Planudes, Commentary on Hermogenes' Id. (voI.v, 
pp.548,8-551,1, ed. Waltz) 
L1wvvawS' 0 7TpEa{3(rrEp0S' ev r4J oEvrepqJ lIEpt. xapaKr-rypwv 7TEPt. 
TOPYLOV Mywv raOE qXTjaLV' «OLKavLKOtS (-LEV ovv ou 7TEpLeTVXov 
aurou AOYOLS', 07](-L7JYOPLKotS oE oAiYOLS' KaL naL Kat. rexvaLS', rots OE 
7TAELoaw e7TLOELKnKOLS'. r~ oE loeaS' aurou rwv AOYWV rowuroS' 0 
'/' 'Y ~, " \ , , , xapaKr7]p t EyKW(-LLa':,EL OE rovS' EV 7TOI\E(-LOLS' apLarEvaavraS' 
uri yd.p U7TfjV rotS uvopaaL rovrOLS' JJV OE~ uvopam 
7TpoaE~vaL; r{ oE KaL 7TpOafjV Jw OU OE~ 7TpoaE~vaL; €l7T€~V OvvaL(-L7]v 
'" ' ~, , 'e' "'e' '?' '" "e ' 'f'VYWV OE rov av PW7TLVOV 'f' ovov. ovrOL yap €K€Kr7]vro EV EOV (-L€V 
r",v upEr-ryv, UVepW-rrLVOV oE ro eV7]Tov, 7ToAAd. (-LEV 0", ro 7Tapov 
e7TLELKES' rou aueaoovS' oLKaLov 7TPOKpLVOVr€S', 7ToAAd. OE 
uKpL{3€LaS' AOYWV opeor7]Ta, rourov VO(-LL'OVr€S' e€LOrarOv , KaL 
7TOLE~V, Kat. owad. uaK-ryaavrES' (-LaALara ~V O€L, YVW(-L7]V <Kat. 
PW(-L7]V>, r",v (-LEV {3oVA€VOVr€S' r",v 0' U7TOr€AOUvrES', e€pa7TOVr€S' (-LEV 
rwv UOLKWS' ovaTVxovvrwv, KOAaaraL oE rwv UO{KWS' €UTVXOVVrwv, 
aUeaO€LS' 7TpOS' ro av(-L<pepov, €UOpY7]TOL 7TpOS' ro 7Tpe7Tov, r41 <ppOVL(-LqJ 
rfjS' YVW(-L7]S' 7TaVOVr€S' ro a<ppov <rfjS' rOA(-L7]S' > , u{3pwrat. €lS' rouS' 
u{3pwraS', Koa(-LwL ElS' rous- Koa(-L{ovS', a<po{3oL €lS' rouS' u<po{3ovS', 
oELvoL ev ro~S' O€LVOLS'. (-LaprupLa oE rovrwv rp07TaLa ear-ryaavro rwv 
7TOAE(-L{WV, L1LOS' (-LEV uyaA(-Lara, €avrwv oE uvae-ry(-Lara, OUK a7TELpoL 
ovrE E(-L<pvrov "Ap€oS' ovr€ VO(-LL(-LWV epWrwv ovr€ evo7TA{ov €PLOOS' 
ovrE <pLAoKaAov Elp-ryv7]S', aE(-Lvot. (-LEV 7TpOS' rouS' 8EOUS' r41 oLKaLqJ, 
DawL OE 7TpOS' rouS' rOKEas- rfj e€pa7T€Lq., oLKawL OE npos- rouS' 
uarouS' r41 raqJ, €ua€{3eLS- OE 7TpOS' rouS' <piAovs- rfj 7Tiar€L. rOLyapouv 
75 
ath·wv a1Toeav6v7"wv 0 1T6eo~ ou avva1TEeaVeV aAA' aeaVa7"O~ OUK €V 
1 
Isokrates, 10.3 (ed. Mathieu-Bremond) 
'\:" , 'A.. ' aouva7"a 1Te~pWFJ-evov a1T0't'a~ve~v; 
Isokrates, 15. 268 (ed. Mathieu-Bremond) 
avFJ-f3ouAeVaa~FJ-' av 7"o'i~ VeW7"EpOL~, FJ-7] FJ-EV7"OL 1Tepuoe'iv 7"7]v rpvaLv 
7"7]v aU7"wv ... €~OKe[Aaaav el~ 7"olk A6you~ 7"OV~ 7"WV 1TaAaLwv 
aorpw7"wv, <iJv 0 FJ-EV a1TeLpov 7"0 1TMjeo~ Erp7]aev elvaL 7"WV QV7"WV, 
'EFJ-1TeooKMj~ OE 7"E7"7"Upa Kat ve'iKo~ Kat rpLA£av €V aU7"o'i~, "Jwv 0' ou 
1TAe[w 7"PLWV, 'AAKFJ-EWV OE OVO FJ-6va, IIapFJ-ev[o7]~ OE Kat MEA~aao~ 
EV, ropy[a~ OE 1TaV7"eAW~ OUOEV. 
2 
Olympiodoros, in Grg. Proem.9 
dFJ-EA€~ Kat yparpeL 0 ropy[a~ Dept. <Puaews aVyypaFJ-FJ-a 





lIEpl TOU ~~ DVTOS 
[Aristotle], De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia 979a12-980b21. 
979a12 aUK eLva£ C?7]aLl! OUO€V' el 0' EaTLV, ayvW<rTOv elvaL' 
KaL on / fLEV OUK ean, atJveeLs Ta €r€POLS elp7]fL€va, 
oaOL 7TepL TWV /OVTWV '\€YOVTES TavavT£a, WS OOKOUaLl!, 
, .J... / ~ ..... / t , rI r/ \' \ \' t ~E' a7T0'f'aLvovTaL aUToLS, OL fLEV OTL EV KaL ou 7TOl\l\a, OL 0 
aD on 7To'\'\a KaL OUX '/ €V, KaL oL fLEV on ay€v7JTa, oL 0' WS 
";' /, , / ' / ,~\ ~\ " , ELl!aL, fL7JTE ayE V7]Ta fL7]TE YEvofLEva' ouoev av EL7]' eL 
OVTe €V, OVTE 7To'\'\a, OVTe / ay€v7JTa OVTE YEVOfLEva, Ta fLEV 
OVTE elvaL, OVTE fLT] ElvaL. 
~TTav / TO fLT] ov TOU OVTOS EL7]. TO TE yap fLT] ov ean fLT] 
OV, KaL / TO OV OV, [WaTE OUOEV fLii'\'\ov elvaL TJ OUK 
ElvaL Ta 7Tpay / fLaTa]. 
WaTe OUK av OVTWS, OUOEV av er7] el fLT] / 








, <' '8 <' ' f3' 'c '!' v ouoaf-Lo EVOE OVf-L a~V€L ES wv E~P7JKEV, 
35 
cLU' wa7TEpEL OUOLV aVTow, TOU f-LEV / aVToS', 
~ "" 'v "V , "" , '\.....Jl' TOU u OUK OVTOS', TO f-LEV EaT~, TO 0 OUK al\'lvES', 
979b 1 TO f-LEV f-L7] av. 
TO OE af-Lcpw 7] TO ETEPOV OUK Eanv; OUOEV yap <frrTOV>, 
5 
TO OE KaL Ean v En. 
y' UV EL7] "TO f-L7] OV EaT~V ", aAA' / El 07] OVTW), 7TOTEPOV <au> 
aUTO yap OVTW yE TouvaVT[OV €O~KEV y[yvEa8a~. 
el yap / TO TE f-L7] OV av Ean KaL TO OV av EaTW, 10 
15 
78 
on €l / 'Tat.lTov 'TO JLTJ oV KaL 'TO OV, 'TO 'T€ OV OUK €(T'T~ 
rt I " WO"T€ 1TaV'Ta €(T'T~V. 
JL€'TCJ. o€ 'TOU'TOV 'TOV AOYOV cfrrJO'£V· €i o€ €(T'T~V, 7j'TO~ 20 
dyev7] / 'TOV :ry Y€VOJL€VOV €lva~. KaL €i JL€V dyev7]7ov, 
'TO 0' (l1T€~POV OUK / av Elva!. 1TOU. OU'T€ yap EV aV'TqJ OU'T' av 
EV (lAAlp €lva~· / OVO yap av OV'TWS" :ry 1TA€!'W €lva~, 
'TO 'T€ EVOV KaL 'TO EV 0. JL7]oaJLou / oe ov OUO€V €lva~ Ka'Ta 'TOV 25 
'TOU zr]vwvo~ AOYOV 1T€PL 'Tfj~ / xwpa~. 
oDoe / Y€VOJLEVOV. y€vea8a~ youv ODO€V av OU'T' E~ OV'TO~ 
OUT' EK J.L7J / OV'Tos. el yap TO OV }.LETa7TEO'OL, aUK av €T' 
€lva~ 'TO OV, / WO'1T€P y' €i KaL 'TO JLTJ OV YEVO~'TO, 
ODO€ JLTJv 0130' EK <p..TJ> OV'TO~ av y€VEa8a~· 30 
ei 0' EO'n (aD) 'TO / JLTJ OV, Ot.' a.1Tep OUo' EK 'TOU OV'TO~, 
o~a 'Tau'T' av OUo' EK 'TOU JLTJ / OV'TO~ YEvEa8a~. 
:ry YEVOfL€VOV €lva~, 'TaU'Ta oe <dovv'Ta>, dovva'Tov n Kat. elva~. / 
" 'V " n" \' "./.... I , I 
€n E~1TEP €(T'T~, EV 7] 1TI\E~W, 'r7]O'~V, E(T'T~V· 
el oe fLTp-€ EV JL~'TE / 1TO,{AC£, OUO€V av Er7]. Kat. EV JL€V ...... . 
Kat. on dawJLa'Tov av Er7] / 'To ........• EV K ••..• E €xOV 
/ ~ ~ Z/ \ / "~' v /'~' fL€V y€ ...... 'Tlp 'TOU 7]VWVO~ I\OYlp. EVO~ oE OV'TO~ ouo 
." ';' '~" I \ \ \ ,~\ av ...... €~va~ ouaE JL7] ........ JL7]7E 1TOl\l\a .... E~ aE 
/ / / \ \ / , ,~/, fL7]7€ ·······fL7]'TE 1TOl\l\a e(T'T~V, ouaEV E(T'TLV. 
980aloDo 'av Kwryefjva£ 1>7]O'~v oDoEv. Ei yap K~V7]8E£7], / 
OV eL7], / 'TO 0' oDK OV yEYOVO~ Er7]. 




cprp£v, ~ (w6p7]Ta~, rou Qvros, j dvrt. rou KEVOU ro o~7JpfJa8a~ 
A.€ywv, Kae6:TTEp EV rotS AEVK£1T j 1TOV KaAovp.EvO~S AOyo~S yEypa1Tra~. 
Elva~ OVV OVOEV, ros j d1TOOE£~E~S A.€YE~ <rauras> ... 
a1Tavra OELV yap ra cppOvoup.Eva Elva~, j Kat. 
ro p.iJ QV, Er1TEp p.iJ Ea-n, P.7JOE CppovELa8a~. 
, ~'" j' ~ , " " ,I, ~~ ,~, E~ 0 ovrws, OvaEV av E~1TO~ 't'EVOOS ovaE~S, 
dAA' WO'1TEP OVOEV j p.aAAov a OPWP.EV ea-nv, ovrw <OVOEV> 
Kat. EvraUea j 1TOAAOt. av ravra OWV07JeELEV. t r<a> OVV p.aAAov 
<ro~6.>o ' 7] <r>a ro~6.o' j Ear£ t, 1TOLa OE rdA7]8fJ, a07JAov. warE 
"\ \ " \ ";'~ ~" -I.' ~ " j \ ' " al\/Hp; 0 yap EWE, 1TWS av -ns, 't'7Ja~, rovro E~1TO~ I\oycp; 7J 
mvs av EKELVO OfJAOV dKouaav-n y£yvo~ro, p.iJ i06vr~; j 
,~\ j" \ " '" \ \ \ -I.e' \ ovaE 7J aK07J ra xpwp.ara aKovE~, al\l\a 't' oyyovS' Ka~ 
A.€YE~ 0 j A.€ywv, dAA' 015 xpwp.a OVOE 1Tpayp.a. 
" " ~ ,~, '\ ~'<,/,' -I. "> j 7J Eav xpwp.a, WWV, Eav aE 't'0't'0V aKa v aas; 
dpxT/V yap 015 <if;ocpov> A.€YE~ <0 A.€>ywv OVOE xpwp.a, 
dAAa AOYOV' War' j OVOE owvoELa8a~ xpwp.a ea-nv, 
dAA' opav, OVOE if;ocpov, dAA 'j dKOUE~V. 
Ei OE Kat. EVOEXEra~ y~YVWaKE~V rE Kat. a av 
y~YVWaK7J j A.€YE~V, dAAa 1TWS 0 dKOUWV ro avro Evvo-ryaEL; 







ElvaLo OVa yap I UV Er7] TO €VO 
,~, ,,, ,/.... ~ , \' \', I ,~, 
EL OE KaL EL7], 'f'7]rTLV, EV 1T/\ELOrTL KaL TaVTOV, OvoEV 
" .,. " ..... ,.- , , , .- ,..... 1" '1\ 
EKELVOL~ OVaL KaL EV TlP aVTlPo EL yap EV TlP aVTlP, EL~ av 
aAA'1 au OVa EIEVo 
,/.. I ~"~" , 




Sextus Empiriclls, Adv. Math. 7. 65-87 
(65) ropyia~ oE 0 AEOV'TLVO~ EK 'TOU UU'TOU fLEV 'TaYfLu'To~ trrrfjpXE 
'TOZ~ dV7JP7]KOa~ 'T21 KP~'T77PWV, ou KUnt 'TTJv ofLoiav DE E7TLf3oATJV 'TOZ~ 
7TEP~ 'T21V IJpurrayopav. EV yap 'T4' E7TLypuc/>ofLevqJ rrEp~ TOU f.LT] QVTOS 
Ka~ . 7TpCYrOV " O'T~ OUDEV Eanv, DEVTEPOV " O'T~ , E~ Ka~ Eanv, 
dKUTaA7]7T'TOV dvepcfnrqJ, 'Tpi'TOV on El KUt. Ka'TUA7]7T'TOV, dAAa ToL yE 
dvego~aTov Kat. dVEPfL7JVEV'TOV 1"4' 7TeAa~. 
(66) on fLEV OVv OUOEV Eanv, €7TLAoY£'ETa~ 'T21V 'Tp07TOV TOU'TOV' El 
yap Ean <n>, 7jr0~ 'T21 OV Eanv Tj 1"21 fLTJ ov, Tj KaL 1"21 OV Ean KUL 
TE afLa Kat. OUK EaTa~' ~ fLEV yap OUK OV vOEZTa~, OUK Ea'Ta~, ~ DE 
Ean fLTJ ov, 7TaAw EaTa~. 7TaV'TEAW~ DE a'T07TOV 1"21 ELva£ n afLa Kat. 
" \ OV. Ka~ 
OV OUK Eara~' EVaV'T£a yap EaT~ Taura dAA7JAO~~, KUL El 1"4' fLTJ ovn 
aufLf3ef37]KE 'T21 Elva~, 'T4' ovn aufLf37JaEra~ 1"21 fLTJ Elva~. OUXt. O€ yE 
(68) KU~ fLTJv OUDE TO OV Eanv. El yap 1"21 OV EaT~V, 7j'T0~ d£o~ov 
dpX7Jv. 
(69) 1"21 yap y~vOfLEvOV 7Tav EXE~ nv' dpxfJv, TO DE dLDwv dyev7]Tov 





, ~ UV'TOV 
1"21 
,,I ~, ,,I ,~", ""y r/ 'v EfL7TEP~EXOV, 'TOU OE a7TE~pov ovoEV Ean fLE~."OV, werTE OVK EaT~ 7TOV 
82 
, , 
EaTLV, oe yE 
aT07TOV. TO[VVV ouoe EV aun;:; EaTL TO av. Wcrr' Ei d[OLOV EaTL TO av, 
a7TELpov EaTLV, Ei oe a7TELpOV EaTLV, OUOafJ-Ov EaTLV, Ei oe fJ-7JoafJ-Ov 
EanV, OUK EaTLV. Toivuv El. dioLOV EaTL TO QV, ouoe T7JV dpxiJv av 
, 
EaTLV. 
(71) Ka~ fJ-7Jv ouoe YEV7JTOV ElvaL OVVaTaL TO av. el. yap yeYOVEV, 
yeyov€v" el yap OV EO'TLV, OU yeyovev aAA' EaTLV 7]07f OUTE EK TOU 
'" '"J.. /\ (', C "\ , , v avaywfJS O'f'ELI\ELV U7Tap<:,E{J)5; fJ-ETEXELV TO YEVV7JTLKOV nvos. OUK apa 
(72) '''''' "'" ""''' OuaE TO avvafJ-'f'OTEpOV, awwv afJ-a 
TO DV, OU yeYOVEV, Ka~ Et. yeYOVEV, OUK EaTLV diowv. Toivuv Ei fJ-frrE 
(73) Ka~ aAAws, Ei EaTLV, 7jTOL ev EaTLV 7] 7ToAAa' oi5TE oe ev Eanv 
" \ \ -' (' e ' ,,,,, \" , \ ff OUTE 7TOl\l\a, ws 7TapaaTa 7JaETaL' OUK apa EaTL TO OV, EL yap EV 
Eanv, 7]TOL 7Toaov EaTLV 7] avvExes EaTLV 7] fJ-eYEeOS Eanv 7] aWfJ-a 
Eanv. 0 n oe CLV ~ TOVTWV, OUX ev EaTLV, dAAa 7Toaov fJ-ev 
, v OUK EaTaL dOWLpETOV. 
TPL7TAOVV EaTaL' Ka~ yap fJ-TJKOS Ka~ 7TAaTOS Ka~ j3aeos egEL, aT07TOV 
oe yE TO fJ-7Joev TOVTWV ElvaL A€YELV TO QV' OUK apa EaT~V EV TO av. 
dvatpOUJ.LEVOV avvavatpeLTUL Kat ra 1ToAAa .. aAAd. yap OTt J.LEV OUTE 
" v ov EaTL TO OV Ean, , , TaUTOV 
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(76) ou p.7]v aM' Er'lTEp TavTov €G"TL T0 p.7] DV'TL TO DV, OU ovvaTaL 
., A.. / '¥' "'".../.. / "" " ',I , ap.'f'OTEpa ELVaL.· EL. yap at-"'f'oTEpa, ou TaUTOV, KaL. EL TaUTOV, OUK 
ap.cPoTEpa. oiS" E'lTETaL. TO p.7]O€v ElvaL. EL yap P.frrE TO OV €G"TL P.frrE 
TO p.7] OV P.frrE ap.cPOTEpa, 'lTapa O€ Taiha OuO€V vOE'i:TaL., ovoev 
(77)o'TL O€ Kav ~ 'TL, Toiho ayvWO'"7"OV TE Ka~ aVE'lTLV07]1"OV EG"TLV 
aVepW'lTqJ, 'lTapaKELp.evWS" tJ'lTOOELKTeov. El yap Ta cPPOvovp.Eva, 1rrJat.v 
o TopYLaS", OUK EG"TLV DVTa, TO OV OU cPPovE'i:TaL. Kat. KaTa A6yov· 
Wa-rrEP yap eL TOtS cPpovoup.eVOLS" uvp.{3e{37]KEV ElvaL AEUKOZS", KaV 
UVP.{3E{3fJKEL TOZS" AEUKOZS" cPPOvE'i:aeaL, OVTWS" Ei TOZS" cPpovoup.evoLS" 
uvp.{3e{37]KEv p.7] ElvaL oVaL, KaT' avaYK7]V uvp.{3fJaETaL. TOZS" oVal. p.7J 
cPpOVEZaeaL.. 
(7S) it, , El. Ta 
, " OUK EG"TLV TO OV OU cPPOVE'i: TaL.". Ta oe yE 
cPPOvovp.Eva ('lTpOA7]'lTTeOV yap) OUK €G"TLV DVTa, OJS" 'lTapaa-rfJaop.EV· 
OUK apa TO OV cPPovE'i:Tal.. Kat. <p.7Jv> O'TL Ta cPPOvovp.Eva OUK EG"TI.V 
oe EG"TL, cPaVAov.] OUO€ yap CLV cPPOvfj 'TLS" aVepW'lTOV L7TTap.EVOV 7] 
app.aTa EV 'lTEAaYEL TpeXOVTa, EUeeWS" o.vepW'lTOS" Z'lTTaTaL. 7] app.aTa 
EV 'lTEAaYEL TpeXEL. Wa-rE OU Ta cPPOvovp.Eva EG"TLV DVTa. 
(SO) 'lTPOS" TOVTOIS el Ta cPPOvovp.Eva EG"TLV DVTa, Ta p.7] DVTa OU 
cPPov7]8fJaETaL. TO'i:S" yap EvaVTLOLS" Ta EVaV'TLa uvp.{3e{37]KEV, EvaVTLOV 
oe EG"TL TcIJ av'TL TO p.7] av. Kal. OLa TOVTO 'lTaVTWS", Ei T0 DV'TL 
uvp.{3e{37]KE TO cPPOVE'i:aeaL., TcIJ p.7J DV'TL uvp.{3fJaETaL TO p.7] 
cPPOVE'i:aeaL. Q.TO'lTOV 0' EG"Ti. TOVTO· Ka~ yap l'KvMa Kat. X£p.aL.pa Kal. 
'lTOAAa TWV p.7] DVTWV cPpoVEI.TaL.. OUK apa TO QV cPP 0 vE'i:Ta I.. 
(Sl) Wa'lTEP TE Ta opwp.Eva 15t.a TOVTO opaTa AeYETaL. O'TL apaTaL, 
apaTa EK{3aMop.Ev O'TL OUK aKovETaL, Ta O€ aKOUG"Ta 'lTapa'lTep.'lTop.Ev 
O'TL oUX OpaTaL (EKaG"TOV yap U'lTO rijS" lOLaS" alaefJaEWS" aM' oUX U7T' 
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rJ)..J\7JS OcPECAEL KpLvEa8aL), ovrw KaL ra cPPOVOVJLEva KaL El JL-TJ 
{3AE7ToLro rij OIj;EL JLTfoe aKOVOLro rij aKoij EO"IaL, on 7TpOC; roil 
OlKE£OU AaJL{3aVEraL KPL77JpLOU. 
(82) El oJv cPPOVEL nc; €V 7TEAaYEL apJLara rpEXELv, KaL El JL-TJ 
{3AE7TEL railra, OcPELAEL 7TLO"IEVELV on apJLara EO"ILV €V 7TEAaYEL 
rpExovra. ar07TOV oe roilro· OUK apa 1'0 OV cPPOV€LraL KaL 
KaraAaJL{3aV€raL. 
(83) <::' ' , , (; OE, aVEs OLO"IOV yap ra ovra 
)/ (\ ~ /, .... ~ I 8' 't, t , , I\oyov, OC; ErEpoc; EO"IL rwv U7TOK€LJLEVWV. Ka a7T€p OUV 1'0 oparov OUK 
cPTfaf.v, a7TO rwv E;w8EV 7TpOa7TL7TrOvrwv Tjp.7.v 7TpaYJLarwv auvf.O"IaraL, 
rOUrEO"IL rwv ala87J7wv. €K yap rijc; roil XUAoG €YKup-r]a€w<; 
€yyf.V€7aL TjJLLV 0 Kara ravr7]S rfjc; 7TOLOrrrrOC; €KcPEpOJL€VOC; AOY0C;, 
KaL €K rfjc; roG xpwJLarOC; IJ7T07TrwaEW<; 0 Kara roG xpWJLaroc;. El oe 
roilro, oux 0 AOYOC; roG €KrOC; 7TapaO"larLKOC; €O"ILV, aAAa 1'0 €KrOC; 
roil AOYOU JLTfvunKOV yf.vEraL. 
(86) KaL JL-TJv ouoe €V€O"IL AEYELV, on OV rpo7Tov ra opara Kai. 
. 
o AOY°C;, " WO"IE ovvaa8aL 
El yap Kai. tJ7TOKELraL, 4>TJaf.v, 0 AOY0C;, aAAa OLacPep€L rwv AOL7TWV 
LJ7TOKELJLEVWV, KaL 7TA€{O"IqJ OLEV-r]VOX€ ra opara aWJLara rwv '\oywv· 
01.' erepou yap opyavou A7J7TrOV EO"IL 1'0 oparov KaL OL' aAAOU a 
'\oyoc;. OUK apa EVOELKVU7aL ra 7TOMa rwv IJ7ToKELJLevwv a '\oyoc;, 
W<:rrr€P ouoe EK€LVa r7Jv aM-r]Awv oLaoTf'\oL cpvaLv. 
(87) rOLOvrwv oJv 7Tapa r4J Topyf.q. ipropTfJLevwv OLX€7aL oaov E7T 
auroLC; 1'0 rfjc; aA7j8€{ac; KPLr-rJpLOV· roil yap JL-r]rE ovroc; JL-r]r€ 
yvwp{~€a8aL oUvaJLEvOu JL-r]r€ aAAqJ 7TapaO"la8fjvaL 7T€cPuKoroc; ouoev 
CLV ELTf KPLr-rJpLOV. 
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4 
Plato, Men. 76a8-e4 [Meno-Sokrates]. 
uvopi. 1TpEaf3vlIJ 1TpaYJLaTa 1TpOO'Ta'TTE~~ d1TOKp£VEaea~, aUTo~ OE OUK 
€e€AE~<;: uvaJLV7'JO'eEi.~ EL1TELV, 0 n 1TOTE AEYE~ TopyLa~ dPErTJV Elva~. 
" on 
01TEP 1Towva~v Ot TpUcp(jjVTE~, " aTE 
f30VAE~ '" ouv KaTe!. Topyf.av 
au; - OUKOUV AEYETE d7Toppoas Tl.,Vas TWV OVTWV Ka-ra 'EJ.L7TEOOKA€a; -
acp60pa YE. Kat. , E~~ OU~ , Ka~ , aL. U1ToppoaL 
, " ....." ,~, !,.1 " 'r "t v .... EVWIS TWV 1TOpWV, TaS' oE CAa'TTOUS' 7J JLE~."OUS' E~va~; - EO'T~ TaUTa. -
OUKOVV KaL oifJL.V KaA€LS' n; - €ywy€. - €K TOVTWV oTJ "at5V€S' 0 TOL. 
at5JLJLETpO~ Kat. alae7JT6~. - apL.O'Ta JLOL. OOKEL~, iJJ .LWKpaTE~, TavT7Jv 
TTJV d1T6Kp~a~v €LP7JKEVaL.. - raWS' yap aoL. KaTe!. O'UVTj8ELaV ELp7]TaL.· 
KaL aJLa olJLa~ €VVO€'iS' on €X0L.S' av Jg aurijS' EL1T€LV KaL cpwvTJv 0 
€O'T~, KaL oaJLTJv KaL aMa 1ToAAa TWV TOWVTWV. - 1Tavu JLEV oDv. -
TpaY~KTJ yap EO'T~V, Jj MEVWV, TJ d1T6Kp~a~~ WaTE dpEaKE~ ao~ JLiiAAOV 
5 
Theophrastus, Ign. 73 (p.47, ed. Coutant) 
86 
Y£VETaL J-LaJ.J..OV dVaKAWJ-LEVOV, TO 8E dOUVaTEL 8Ld. -n,V dV0J-L0LOT7JTa. 
WarE TO J-LEV T4i depoLaJ-L4j Kat. rij AeTrTOT7JTL 8La8uoJ-LEvov €is TO 
EKKa.VJ-La 8vvaTaL Ka.£ELV, TO 8' ov8' eTEpov EXOV ou 8vvaTaL. 
Ega1TTETaL DE d1TO TE rijs VEAOu Kat. d1TD TOU XM.KOU Ka.t. TOU 
apyt5pov TP01TOV TLva epyaa8evTwv, OUX, W<nrEP Topy£a.e; </rryat. Ka.t. 
aAAoL DE TLVES OrOvTaL, 8Ld. TO d1TLEvaL TO wp 8Ld. TWV 1TOpWV. 
Sa 
Athanasius Alexandrinus, Prolegomena on Hermogenes' Stat. 
(Rh.Gr., vo1.14, p.180,9ff., ed. Rabe) 
rTJv De TPLT7JV ;nrrOpLK7]v 1TEPt. YEAoLw87] TLvd. TWV J-LELpaKiwv TOV 
KpOTOV aVEYE[povaav Ka.t. KOAaKE[av trm:ipxouaav dvaL07j, 7Jv Ka.l. 
J-LETEXELp£aavTo EV J-LEv xapaKrijpL Kat. EVeUJ-L-r7J-LaaLV 1JJ-LapryJ-LEVOLS O[ 
1TEPt. 19paaVJ-Laxov Kat. TopYLav, 1ToMqJ J-LEV T4i 1TapLaqJ xp7]aaJ-LEVOL 
Kat. rr,v EVKa.LP£a.V WV07]KOTEe; TOVTOU TOU axr7J-LaTos, EV 8E 8La.vo£q. 
Kat. Tp01T1.p AegEWS aAAOL TE 1TOMOI. KaL 8iJ Kat. TopYLae; aUToe; 
KOVCPOTa.TOS wV, as- Kal. riJv d1TaYYEALav TaVT7]V EV TqJ 'E1TLTa.CPLqJ 
a.VTOU OUK loxVwv yV1Tae; El1TELV ~WVTae; Erp7]KE Tacpoue;· 8LavoLq. 8e 
U1TEK1TL1TTEL TOU 8eovToe; Ws Kal.' IaoKparys J-LapTVpEL OUTWS cpaaKWV-
'·de; yd.p a.v KTA. '[fr.1] 
[Longinus], De Sub/.3. 2 (ed. Russell). 
Ta.UT1) Kat. Td. TOU AEOVTLvov TOPYLOV yeAaTaL ypacpovToe;, SepfrJs a 
TWV JIEpawv ZEve; Ka.l. yV7TES EJ-Lif;uXOI. TacP0L. 
Hermogenes,Id. I (p.248,26-249,7, ed. Rabe) 
1Tapa. oe TOLe; u1TOgUAOI.S TOUTOl.al. a01Jl.CJ'TaLe; 1TaJ-L1TOAAa EupoLe; aVO 
Tacpove; TE yd.p €J-Lt/Juxovs Tove; yV7Tae; AeyovaLv, WV7TEP E Lat. J-LaALCJ'Ta. 
agwL, KaL aAAa TOLa.UTa tjJuxpEUOVTaL 7TaJ-L7TOAAa. €KTpaX7JM~ouaL 8' 
a.vTove; a.Z TE TpayqJ8£al. 1ToMd. EXOUaal. TOUTOV 1Tapa.OEiYJ-LaTa, Kat. 




Philostratos, VS I. 9, 5. (p.209, 12f., ed. Kayser); cf. Test.1a. 
'Tel J.LEV KU'Tel 'TWV {3up{3apwv 'Tp07TmU vJ.Lvove; d1TUL'TEl:, 'Tel oE KU'Tel 
'TWV t EM-ryvwv 8p-ryvove;. 
Isokrates, 4. 158 (ed. Mathieu-Bremond) 
EVpOL 0' av ne; EK J.LEV 'TOV 1TOAEJ.LOV 'TOV 1Tpoe; 'Tove; {3up{3apove; 
uJ.Lvove; 1TE7TOL7JJ.L€VOVe;, EK oE 'TOV 1Tpoe; 'Toue; "E\.II.7Jvue; 8p-ryvove; TJJ.L'iv 
yeYEv7JJ.L€VOve; . 
7 
Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 14, 1414b29 (ed. Kassel) 
II.€YE'TUL OE 'Ta 'TWV E1TLoELKnKwv 1TpooiJ.LLa kg E7TU£VOV 7] if;oyov' oLov 
Topy£ue; J.LEV EV 'Tefl' OIl.VJ.L'lTLKefl 1I.0Y£!l V1TO 1TOlI.lI.wv agwL 8uvJ.La'EaBuL, 
cJ (ivopEe;"EII.II.1]VEe;. E1TULVEl: yap 'Toue; 'Tae; 1TuvwVPELe; avvayov'Tue;. 
8 
Clemens AIexandrinus, Stro. 151 (II, p.33,18-22, ed. Stahlin) 
"KU~ 'TO dyWVLOp.U 7]J.Lwv KU'Ta 'TOV AEOV'T'ivov Topyiuv OL'T'TWV roe] 
dPE'TWV OEl:'TUL, 'T01I.J.L7Je; KU~ (J'0cpLue;'" 'T01I.J.L7Je; J.LEV 'TOV KLVOVVOV 
V1TOJ.LE'ivuL, (J'ocpiue; OE 'TO UrVLYJ.LU yvWVUL. a yap 'TOL 1I.0yoe; KUea1TEp 
'TO K-rypvyJ.LU 'TO 'OIl.VJ.L1T£U(J'L KUII.El: J.LEV 'TOV {3ovIl.OJ.LEVOV, (J"TECPUVO'i oE 
'TOV OVvaJ.LEvov. 
Sa 
Ploutarkhos, Coniuga/ia praecepta 43, Moralia 144 be 
Topy£ov 'TOU pfrropoe; dvuyvov'Toe; EV' OIl.VJ.L1T£q. AOYOV 7TEP~ OJ.L0vo£ue; 
'Tol:e; ·'E\.II.7J(J'LV ° MEl\av8we; "ou'Toe; TJJ.L'iv" ecp7J "avJ.L{3ovII.EuEL 1TEP~ 
oJ.LovoLue; oe; UU'TOV KUt. rTJv YVVU'iKU KUt. rTJv BEpa1TuLvuv loiq. 'TpEl:e; 
QV'Tue; 0J.L0voe'iv ou 7T€1TELKEV ". ~v yelp ~ eOLKE ne; epwc; 'TOV 
Topyiov KUt. '7JII.O'TV1TLU rf!s" yvvuLKoe; 1Tpoe; 'TO eEpU1TULV£OWV. 
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9 
Philostratos, VS 19,4 (p. 209,3f., ed. Kayser); cf. Test.l 
10 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.14, 1415b32-1416a3 (ed. Kassel) 
DE 77KwTa EX€L [1TpOOL/kLa J .. . 7"OWV7"OV yap 7"0 Topy£ov EYKW/kLOV Els-
'ffiEiovs-· OUOEV yap 1TpO€~aYKwv£aas- OUDE 1TpoavaKLv-ryaas- Eu8vs-
apXE7"aL "1" ffiLS- m)ALS- €VOaL/kwv". 
(11, 11a=tEMv7]s-'EYKwJ.Lwv and tY1TEp IIaAaJ.L-ryDovs- 'A1ToAoy£a) 
12 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.18, 1419b3-5 (ed. Kassel) 
O€LV €</rrJ Topyias- rTJv J.LEV a1Tovo7]V oLacP8€[P€LV 7"WV 
yeAw'n, 7"OV OE yeAWTa a1Tov07J, op8Ws- Mywv. 
Plato, Grg. 473e 
, , 
EVaV7"LWV 
7"£ 7"OU7"O, (J nWA€; YcAus-; aAAO aD 7"OU7"O Eloos- EA€yxov 
E1T€LOdv 7"[s- n Er1T7], Ka7"ay€AUV, EA€YX€LV OE /k-ry; 
, , 
€aTLV, 
Schol. on Plato, Grg. 473e 
7"OU7"O 1TapaYY€A/ka Topyiov, 7"0 7"as- a1Tovoas- 7"WV avnD[KWV Y€!.WTL 
EKAVELV, 7"a OE YEAoLa 7"aLS- a1TOVOaLS- EKKpOVELV. 
Olympiodoros, in Grg. 20,5 (p.1l3, 24-27, ed. Westerink) 
laTeov yap on Topyiov EaT!. 1TapaYYEA/ka on "El /kEV /:; EvavTios-
a1TOVOaLa AeYEL, yeAa, Kal. EKKPOV€LS- aUTov· El DE EKELVOS- YEA~ aov 




Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Compo 12,5. 
KaLpov OE OU'T€ /rfrrwp ouo€ls OU'T€ qJLt...oaocpoe; €ie; 'TOO€ xpovou 
'TEXV7]V WpLa€V, Ouo' 5a7T€p 'TTpclrrOe; €'TT€xdP7]a€ 'TT€pt. av'TOV ypacp€LV 
ropyiae; 0 A€OV'TLVOe; ouoev 5 n t...oyou agwv eypm/;€v· ovo' eXH 
cpvaLv 'TO 'TTpaYJ-Lu €le; KUeOt...LK7JV Kat. ev'T€XVOV nva 'TT€p£t...7]tjnv 
'TT€a€LV, Ouo' 5t...w<; €7TLarT]J-L7J e7]pU'TOe; €anv 0 KULpoe; at...t...a OO~. 
14 
Aristotle, SE 33, 183b36-184a8 
Kat. yap 'TWV 'TT€pt. 'Tove; €PLaTLKOVe; t...oyoue; J-LLaeUpVOVV'TWV oJ-LO£u 'TLe; 
~v iJ 'TTU£O€UaLe; rij Topy£ou 'TTpuYJ-LU'T€£q.· t...oyoue; yap Ot J-LEV 
, OL €o[ooauv oik 
,\ ' ,,I ".'~ 
'TT1\€LaTUKLe; €J-L'TTL'TT'T€LV o..p'fV7]auv 
'TTap' au'Twv- ou yap 'TEXV7]V at...t...a 'Ta a'TTo rije; 'T€XV7]e; OLOOV'T€e; 
'TTaLO€U€LV tJ7T€t...aJ-L{3uvov, dXrrr€p av €r ne; €'TTLarf]J-L7]V cpaaKwv 
'TTapaoWa€LV €'TTt. 'TO J-L7]oev 'TTOV€LV 'Tove; 'TTO 0 ue;, €hu aKU'TO'TOJ-LLK7JV 
J-LEV J-L7J oL06.aKoL J-L7]o' 5e€v ouv7Ja€TUL 'TTOp£~€aeaL 'Ta 'TO LaV'Ta, 00£7] 
OE 'TTot...t...a YEV7] 'TTUV'TOOU'TTWV tJ7TOo7]J-LaTwv. oV'Toe; yap {3€{307}87]K€ J-LEV 
Plato, Phdr. 261 b-c 
at...t...a J-Lat...LaTU J-LEV 'TTW<; 'TT€pi. 'Tae; oLKue; /...EY€TaL 'T€ Kat. ypacp€'TaL 
TEXV7J, t...EY€TaL OE KUt. 'TT€pl. o7]J-L7JYopLue;· €'TTI. 'TT/...EOV OE OUK aK7JKou. 
dXr]Koae;, as EV 'J).£qJ oxot...a~OVT€e; auv€yputf;a'T7]v, TWV OE 
ITat...aJ-L7JOoue; aV7JKooe; yEyovue;; - Kal. val. J-La ,1L' eywy€ nov 
:\T' " r ' lI.T' , H€aTOpOe;, €L J-L7] 1 OpyLUV 1Y€aTOpU nvu 
Cl " , C\'~ 'O~ , opaauJ-Laxov T€ KUL o€OOWPOV ouaa€u. 
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15 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.3, 140Sb34-1406al (ed. Kassel) 
~ \ - " , , r ' "r '\ OL'1TIlO~S- oV0f.Laa~v ... Kal. WS' 1 opy~as- WVOf.La",EV 7rrWX0f.LouaoKOllaKas-
16 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.3, 1406b4-11 (ed. Kassel) 
Topy{as- XAWpa KaL aval.f.La TO. 7TpaYf.Lam· aU O€ mVTa alaxP6k f.L€v 
eG'7TELpa5", KaKW5" O€ €eep~aa5"' 7TOI.TJTI.KWs- yap ayav. 
17 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.17, 1418a32-37 (ed. Kassel) 
€V O€ TOL5" €mOEI.KnKOl,5" OEl, TOV AOYOV €7TELaOOWVV €7Ta£VOI.5", olov 
'IaoKpaT7J5" 7TOI.EL· dEL yap nva ElaaYEL. Kat. 0 eAEYEV Topy£a5" on 
oUX U7TOAE{7TEL aUTov <5 AOY05", TaUTO EG'TLV' El yap' AXLAAea Aeywv 
n \ " - -,. A' I -L 'e I , I ~, ,'~ I 7]IlEa E7TaI.VEL, ELTa l.aKOV, E Ta TOV EO V, 0f.L0I.WS' aE Kal. avopLav, 
18 
Aristotle, Pol. 1. 13, 1260a21-28; cf. Fr. 19. 
Kat. OUX fJ aUTiJ yuval.K05" Kat. dvopos-, ouo' dvopLa KaL oLKawaVv7], 
Ka8a7TEp 0ETO };wKpaT7]5" ... Ka80Aou yap oE A€YOVTE5" Ega7TaT<lXnV 
eaUTOl.Js-, on TO EV eXELV TTJV ljroxiJv dPEITJ, ~ TO op807TpaYELV, 7j n 
TWV TOWUTWV- 7TOA-V yap Uf.LELVOV A€youaLv oE €gap~ef.LOVVTE5" Ta5" 
apETCls, Wo-rrEP TopyLa5", TWV OVTWS' opl.~op..evwv. 
19 
Plato, Men. 71e-72a; cf. Fr. 18. 
7TPWTOV f.L€V, El f30VAEL avopo5" dPEITJV, pq.owv, on aV1"77 €G'Tt.v 
avopo5" dPE1"7], LKavov elval. TO. rij5" 7TOA€WS' 7TpaTTEI.V Kat. 7TpaTTOVTa 
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Ka.1. , , a.V1"OV 
eUA.a.(3eLa8a.l. f.L7JO€V 1"OI.OU1"OV 1Ta.ee'i:V. eZ O€ {3oUA.el. YVVa.l.KOS dperr,v, 
ou xa.A.e1T()v i3l.eA.eeLv, on oeL a.trr7]v rTJV OlKLa.v eu oZKeLV, uqj,ovua.v 
re rei EVOOV Ka.L Ka.rr,KOOV ovua.v rou dvopos. Ka.L ru7J €<TT"l.V 1Ta.l.OOS 
dper-ry, Ka.L e7JA.eLa.s Ka.1. appevos, Ka.1. 1Tpeu{3vrepov dvopos, eZ f.L€V 
{3ouA.el., €A.eVeepov, ei O€ {3ouA.el. OOUA.ov. 72a Ka.1. aMa.l. mlf.L1ToMa.l. 
EKaaT7JV yeip rwv 1Tpa.~ewv Ka.1. rwv T]A.I.KI.WV 1TpOS EKa.<TT"OV epyov 
EKa<TT"qJ T]f.LWv T] dperr, €<TT"I.V, Waa.urws i3€ olf.La.I., JJ LWKpa.res, Ka.1. T] 
I Ka.KI.a.. 
20 
Ploutarkhos, Cim. 10,5. 
Topyia.s f.L€V 0 Aeovrivos <jJ7JUl. rov KLf.Lwva. rei xpTJf.La.ra. K1"Cia8a.l. f.L€V 
Ws XPqJ1"O, xpf]a8a.l. O€ Ws nf.LqJ-ro. 
21 
Ploutarkhos, De adulatore et amico 23, MoraIia 64C. 
o f.L€V yeip <jJLA.oS OUX Wa7rep d1Te<jJa.Lvero TOPyLa.S, a.V1"qJ f.L€V d~l.{!xrel. 
rei 'OLKa.l.a. rov <jJLA.oV iJ1TovpyEiv, €Ke£vqJ 0' a.uros v1T7Jperr,uel. 1ToMei 
KUL rwv f.L7J oI.Ka.Lwv. 
22 
Ploutarkhos, De mulierum virtutibus, prooem., MoraIia 242ef. 
T]p.l.V O€ KOf.LifJorepos f.L€V 0 TopyLa.s <jJa.Lvera.l., KeA.eVWV f.L7] '1"0 el'Oos 
ciA.A.ei rTJv ooguv elva.l. 1T0A.A.0(;S- YVWPI.f.Lov rijs- YVVa.l.KOS-. 
23 
Ploutarkhos, De gloria Atheniensium 5, Moralia 348C. 
~ve7Jue 0' T] rpa.yqJoLa. Ka.t. o I.. e{3o fl37J, Buvf.LuaTOV eiKpOa.f.La. KUt. 8ea.f.La. 
rwv '1"0'1'" dVepW7rWV yevof.Lev7J KuL 1Ta.pa.axouua. ro(;s- f.Lu801.s Ka.t. 1"o(;s 
1Ta8eul.v d1Ta1"7]v, ws Topy£us </J7Juiv, 7]v 0 '1'" d1Ta.-rfJUa.S C)l.KUl.Orepos 
rou f.L7J d1Ta.rr,Ua.V1"OS, Ka.t. 0 d1Ta.-r-ry8eLs- uo<jJw,.epos rou f.L7] 
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, --.A' a7Ta. 'fVeVTO~. <5 f.LEV yap d7Tarr]aa~ Dt.KaI.6TepO~, 
24 
Ploutarkhos, Quaestiones convivales VII 10,2, Moralia 715e 
<' "E' , , ~f3 ELVal., TOV~ -rr-ra E7T1. .:;, '/ a~. 
Aristophanes, Ran. 1021. 
TOUe' 
Philo demus, Herculan. Volum. CoiL Altera (1873) T. VIII, p. 15 
(not included in any other edition of G.'s work) 
TOU AlaxVAOV D [ ... ] "Apews- EAeye. 
25 
Proklos, Chr., in Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi, p. 26, 14-20 ed. 
Wilamowitz (cf. FGrHist 4 F 5b) 
dvayoval.v aUTou [' 0fLTJPOV] ... ropy[a~ DE 0 A.EOVTI:VO~ el~ Movaal:ov 
aUTov .\Eye I.. 
26 
Proklos, Hes. Op., 760ff. (p.232,12-14, ed.Pertusi) 
ou yap a.7TAuk dA-ry8ES (3 EAeye ropy[a~' EAeye DE "'TO fLEV elvat. 
dcPavE'> fL7] 'TVXOV 'TOU DOKELV, 'TO DE DOKELV daeevE~ fL7] 'TVXOV 'TOU 
elval. ". 
27 
Schol. T on Homer, IL 4. 450a 
93 
28 
Anonymous, 'A7T'mp8eyp.a-ra. ~tJ..oao4x»v, No 34, Syrian Ms. of 
Sinai Abbey fol.148a (Studia Sinaitica) 1 (1894), p.35). For a 
translation and notes see Buchheim 1989 and notes ad loc. 
29 
Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 743, No. 166. (p.68, ed. Sternbach) 
Topy[ae; 0 pTp-wp EAEYE Tove; ~~Ao(Jo~[ae; j1-EV c1.j1-aAovvTae;, ITEpL DE 
Ta €yKvKA~a j1-aef]j1-aTa y~voj1-€vove; oj1-oLove; Eiva~ TOI.e; j1-v7J(JTfjp(J~v, 
01. ll7JVEA07T7JV eEAOvTEe; -ral.e; eEpa7T'aLva~e; avTfje; €j1-£YVVVTO. 
30 
Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 743, n.167 (p.69, ed. Sternbach) 
Topy{ae; Tove; pTp-opae; €~ Oj1-0Love; Eiva~ TOI.e; f3aTpd.xo~e;· Toue; j1-EV 
yap €V {Joan KEAaOEI.V, Tove; oe ITpoe; KAetfnJopav. 
31 
Sopatros, Ll~aLpE(J~S ~'1J7"71p.&.T{J)V (Rh. Gr. Vol. 8, 23,21-23, ed. 
Walz) . 
Topy[ae; j1-VOPOV Eivm A€YWV TOV 7]ALOV. 
ADDENDUM 
Pollux, IX.1 (p. 148, ed. Bethe) 
'OvOj1-a(JT~KOV [n] [f3~f3A[OV] ITEITO£ 7JTa~ Topy[q. T41 (JocP~aTfj, oVTwuL 
j1-EV c1.Kov(Ja~ ITa~OEVnKov, ELe; DE ITEl.paV €AeEI.V OA£YOV AOYOV ... Tcl TE 
yap aAAa ';'v xpELav aVTwv c1.IToo€xoj1-a~, KaL on TOV TWV OVOj1-clTWV 
KaTclAOYOV, EXOVTcl n rij 1>V(JE~ ITpo(JKOp€e;, T41 Tp07TCJ,J Tfje; OLa8€(JEW<; 
(JE(Jo1>~(JTa~ ITpOS TO aAVITOV €V T41 Tfjs UVVTcl~EW<; ax!Jj1-an, ~ 
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f.L7Joevu eCirrov 'T(lJ yvwa8evn 7TPOKUf.LEZV, 
7TOeEZV. 
, ~ UKOVaUl. 
The following fragments are cited in section C in DK (MLf.LTJaEL~) 
1 
Plato, Symposion 198c. 
KuL yap f.LE Topy£ov 0 AOyo~ [' Ayaewvo~] dVEf.L£f.Lv7JaKEv, Wa-rE 
dTEXVW~ TO TOU' Of.LTJpOV E7TE7TOVe7J· ECP0f30Vf.L7JV, f.LTJ f.LOL TEAEVTWV 0 
'Ayaewv Topy£ov KEcpuAiJv OELVOU AeYELV EV TqJ Aoycp E7TL Ef.LOV Aoyov 
7Tef.Lljiu~ UVTOV f.LE A£eov rij dCPWVLq. 7TOLTJaELEV. 
Plato, Symposion 185c 
IIuvauv£ov O€ 7Tuvauf.LEvov - oLouaKovaL yap f.LE [' A7TOMOOWpOV] Lau 
\/ ~ \ ~ ,J.. / I\EyELV OVTWCTL OL C10,/,OL. 
Xenophon, Symposion II 26. 
2 
av O€ TJf.LZV ot. 7TUZSE~ f.LLKpUlS dAL~L f.LLKpa E7TLljiEKa'WCTLv, Zvu KuL 




11. The Encomium of Helen 
1. The Argumentation 
G., following his poetic predecessors, introduces his praise of HeI. 
with a Priamel, which according to B'~<I.ildy (1962, p.5) "is a focusing 
or selective device in which one or more terms serve as foil for the 
point of particular interest". The topic-word in this Priamel IS 
KOO'P.OS"; 1 G. proceeds by determining what is KOO'P.OS" for several 
elements (lTOA€L:€VUvopLu, O'wp.un:Ka.AAoS", ifruxfJ:ao<jJLu, 
1Tpa.yp.un:dp€nj), and he places the focal element last: KOO'P.OS" for a 
speech is truth. G.' s task then is to tell the truth about Helen, the 
notorious trouble-maker. 
In a programmatic paragraph G. explicitly puts forward the very 
object of his speech; "to say rightly what ought to be said and to 
refute the critics of Helen". Who are the critics of Helen? Those 
who have listened to the poets and her nomen/omen. It is clear that 
for the purposes of his own argumentation, G. presents Helen as a 
woman unanimously criticised by the poets, though we know that 
the poetical tradition is divided. And her nomen/omen - a 
reminiscence of the archaic conception that the name brings out the 
nature of the subject it describes - is a further reference to the poets. 
The ignorance created by the poetical tradition must be replaced by 
the argumentation of the rhetor. AOYLO'P.OS" is his own method: the 
rationalistic examination and the use of arguments are opposed to 
the account of the poets, whose words are the result of inspiration. 
G. then gives an account of Helen's birth, he praises her 
incomparable beauty and composes a brief encomium of her suitors, 
1 For this word see note ad loco 
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which works as an implicit encomium of herself; for having 
attracted so many and so important men suggests that she herself 
must have been an important woman as well. 
With a rhetorical paraleipsis (praeteritio) he bypasses her 
marriage with Menelaos, because as he says "to tell those who know 
what they know carries conviction but does not give pleasure." This 
disclaimer is to some extent misleading. Although, G. claims that 
the presentation of information already known does add credibility 
to one's speech, he does not claim that sacrificing the informativity 
of a speech detracts from its credibility. This is explained if we 
compare it with G.'s statement later, in ch.13, that a speech written 
with skill and not spoken with truth can please and persuade a large 
crowd. Evidently, in this case a reference to Helen's marriage would 
not be very pleasant and it would hardly fit in G.'s argumentation, 
whereas the presentation of her noble birth and of her noble suitors, 
create an encomiastic image of Helen. This is a good example of 
what the early theorists of rhetoric meant by the term kairos 
(cp.fr.13): presenting the right arguments in the right time and in the 
right occasion. 
The presentation of the possible reasons that forced Helen to 
elope with Paris has now been prepared: divine power, violence, 
speech, love. It is evident that Helen, put under the pressure of so 
strong powers had no other choice; as de Romilly remarks, this 
principle is "repeatedly applied by the orators ofThucydides" and it 
is "in constant use in the arguments of tragedy and later also in the 
speeches of the orators". The main aspects of this "principle" are the 
following: 
1. The invention of possible reasons (or excuses) is based on 
probabilities; G. says that these are the causes "which made it 
reasonable (ElKD~ ~v) for Helen's departure to Troy to occur". These 
probabilities are not mutually exclusive; each one is equally 
possible, though a combination of them is not to be rejected. 
2. Their common denominator is that all of them possess a divine 
power or the possibility to work their will on their victims by 
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compUlsion: gods are invincible by their nature, violence, though 
not personified in the Encomium, is presented by Hesiod (Theog. 
383-385) as the daughter of Styx and Pallas and the sister of Kratos 
and Nike; speech is defined by G. as "a powerful ruler, whose 
achievements are supehuman (eELoraTa)" and love (€P~ is 
described as a god with a god's power. 
3. The discussion of divine power, AOYOS- and love involves a good 
deal of theoretical argumentation, whereas the discussion of 
physical violence is straightforward. 
Divine power is not dealt with exhaustively; defending Helen as a 
victim of divine power is as old as the fliad; what is surprising is the 
presentation of the decisions of the gods in civic terms (if;7]cpLup.auL, 
(3ovAEvp.auL 6) which belong to the proceedings of an Assembly. G. 
does not simply state that divine power is by its nature invincible; 
this political terminology prepares the rationalistic approach to the 
power of the stronger. With an axiomatic phrase, he states that" it is 
not natural for the stronger to be hindered by the weaker, but for the 
weaker to be governed and guided by the stronger, and for the 
stronger to lead and the weaker to follow." This typically Gorgian 
antithetical structure expresses a predominant theme of the moral 
and psychological problematic of the sophistic movement, that is the 
nomos / physis opposition and its implications concerning the right 
of the might. 
Violence is discussed briefly; if Helen was forced to desert her 
husband it is not right to put the blame on her, who was the victim, 
but him, who as a barbarian committed barbarous crimes. 
What follows is the discussion of '\oyos-. This part of the 
Encomium is of high importance since it provides one 0 f the earliest 
theoretical approaches to the functions of human speech and its 
psychological implications. Poetry, magical spells, the 
psychotherapeutic value of speech, the pragmatics of human 
communication and its context, the philosophical discourse, the 
rhetorical persuasiveness will serve as examples. 
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"Speech (.:\oyos) is a powerful ruler. Its substance (O'clJf.Lu) is 
minute and invisible, but its achievements are superhuman 
(e€LO-rU-rU)"; with this striking personification G. begins the 
discussion of speech. The .:\oyos to which divine power is attributed 
here is not any particular kind of speech, but speech as a whole. The 
divine nature of .:\oyos is not at this stage presented as the result of 
human craftsmanship. The human factor is deliberately kept back. In 
the present context, .:\oyos is an autonomous being with superhuman 
powers. 
Two kinds of speech are adduced as examples of the power of 
.:\oyos: poetry and incantations. Poetry is defined as "a speech with 
metre". This definition is interesting because of the shocking 
assumption that the specific distinction between poetry and other 
kinds of speech is metre. By saying so, G. underrates poetry in the 
respect that it is implied that all the parameters of poetical language, 
except metre, are common with all the other kinds of speech. And 
G. 's poetical style is a clear manifestation that what is said here is in 
absolute accordance with his practices. Aristotle claims that "as the 
poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to 
have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical 
style that first came into being, as that of G." (Test. 29). I consider 
that G.'s poetical style, with the abundant use of ornamentation, is 
not merely a capriciousness. He seems to have awareness of the fact 
that he is creating a new literary genre which will answer the 
demands of an increasing need for persuasive speech. As 
Untersteiner put it, G.'s emphatic definition of poetry seems to be 
"peculiar to a man who knows that he has created the modem 
sophisticated prose" (1961, p.99). The ability of poetry to mould the 
souls of the listeners (the r/roxuyor;£u of Plato) and its channing form 
are the foundation stones of the new rhetorical prose. 
The discussion of the emotions caused by poetry follows a 
pattern regularly used in the Encomium: poetical speech (the 
stimulus) comes into the soul of the listeners and it arouses fright, 
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pity and longing. The physiological signs or better the symptoms 
with which the soul expresses the affection are the tears and the 
shuddering (cpPLKTJ) of the audience. In addition, G.'s remarks that 
poetical speech makes the soul experience a suffering of its own at 
the sufferings of others. The passage, with the combination of cpof3o~ 
and €J1.EO~, reminds us of the definition of tragedy in Aristotle's 
Poetics, but this verbal similarity is not a finn ground to say, as 
many scholars did (see comment ad loc.), that G. anticipates the 
'Kci8apa,~-theory' of Aristotle. 
The second example of the power of logos comes from the realm 
of magic. Incantations are the spells that in the popular view can force 
someone to act in a way that does not correspond to hislher intentions 
and we have evidence that they were used for therapeutic reasons as 
well. Their power was derived from the gods. According to G., when 
the power of the incantation reaches the opinion of the soul it 
enchants it and the soul persuaded is now forced to change opinions, 
that is it adopts different views from those that it originally had. In 
other words the person is alienated from itself and its actions are in 
accordance with the commands of the incantation. This is because 
"sorcery and enchantment can mislead the soul and deceive the 
judgment". 
After the presentation of the examples of poetry and incantations, 
the emphasis is placed on the recipients of logos. Most people 
persuade by creating a false speech. I But false speeches would not 
have been equally persuasive if men "possessed memory of the past, 
understanding of the present and foreknowledge of the future". But 
since it is not so "most men make belief the adviser of their soul". 
This passage gave rise to several interpretations and it has 
regularly been used as a manifestation of G.'s epistemological 
distinction between knowledge and opinion. Scholars who take this 
I In his short introduction, G. claims that unlike the poets he intends to tell the 
truth; similar declarations of intention are frequent in Pindar as well; cpo O. 1. 
46ff., N. 7. 20-4. 
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view claim that G.' s epistemological view is that men do not have 
access to knowledge and as a matter of fact they are condemned to 
trust opinion, defined here as slippery and unreliable. In my view, 
G.'s texts do not call for interpretations coloured by sustained 
epistemological, metaphysical or even ontological theories. What is 
said here is a clear argument: most, not all men, rely on belief, 
because it is not easy, not because it is impossible, to have access to 
knowledge. So if Helen was deceived, it is because she did what 
most men do. 
If Helen was persuaded by words we should not put the blame on 
her, but on the man who persuaded her, because as we are told 
"persuasion, though not having an appearance of compulsion, has 
the same power". llELeW and alla:YK7] are two basic Greek notions. 
Herodotos (VIll.ll1.2) says that when the Andrians refused to 
contribute money to the Greek side during the Persian Wars, 
Themistokles told them that the Athenians are coming with two 
great gods: Persuasion and Compulsion. Aristotle (EE 1224a39) 
clearly distinguishes them as well. G. seems to underrate this 
established distinction for the purposes of his argumentation. 
The power of persuasion is demonstrated with three examples, 
taken from three different contexts of human communication: the 
accounts of the natural philosophers, the speeches delivered in the 
courtrooms, the discussions of the philosophers. From this point G. 
is not concerned with the extra-human power of logos, but with the 
persuasion as a result of human abilities, in other words we are in 
the realm of rhetoric in the widest possible meaning of the word. Let 
us throw some more light on the examples: the first example is 
taken from the theories of the 'natural philosophers', the 
'cosmologists'; G. claims that these men make things otherwise 
invisible to the natural eye visible to the eye of the mind. 
1. The argument seems persuasive: Anaxagoras 59A72 for example 
thought that the sun is a flaming stone. People, not being able to 
refute this theory on the basis of their natural senses, are persuaded 
by words. And this was probably what G. meant by the phrase: 
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"existence is not manifest if it does not involve opinion, and opinion 
is unreliable if it does not involve existence" (cp. fr.26). 
2. The second example is pertinent to the speeches delivered in the 
courtrooms; "a single speech pleases and persuades a large crowd, 
because it is written with skill, not spoken with truth". The 
opposition of the one speech to the mob (oXAor;) alludes to mass 
psychology~ The self-consciousness of the speaker reappears; being 
persuasive means pleasing the audience. 
3. The third example derives from the "conflicts of philosophical 
speeches"; in these debates an opinion is valid until substituted by 
another, imposed by the development of the argumentation of the 
opponent. The interlocutors of these debates are differentiated from 
the 'cosmologists' and the 'advocates' because they do not proceed 
with a speech composed in advance; their success depends on their 
alertness and the adjustability of their argumentation. 
G. then, moves on to the demonstration of the power of 
persuasive speech and its impact on the human soul; by using a 
mathematical relation, he maintains that, "the power of speech bears 
the same relation to the ordering of the mind as the ordering of 
drugs bears to the constitution of bodies"; as there are drugs with 
therapeutic value and others which are lethal, in the same way there 
are speeches that evoke positive and speeches that evoke negative 
emotions. And there are other speeches which, by means of 
malicious persuasion (7T€~eo7. KUK7j), harm the soul. 
The fourth reason is love; but paradoxically the word love is 
from the very beginning of the argumentation substituted by the 
word oif;~r; ('vision'); the argument is built upon the idea that we are 
not responsible for the appearance of an object. The argumentation 
involves once more the examination of the psychological parameters 
of the function of vision and its impact upon the soul. The emotions 
103 
caused by sight are divided into two categories: the negative and the 
positive. G. begins with the negative ones: 
1. When soldiers face the offensive and defensive weapons of the 
enemy they flee because these very weapons foreshadow frightful 
events. So their fear makes them disregard the benefits of a victory. 
Frightful sights cause psychological disorders. 
2. Things that people have seen in the past are engraved in their 
memory, and because of them, people still experience terrifying 
emotions in the present. 
Several traits of "behaviourism" can be traced here: a stimulus 
produces through EKTrIl:llg~s (panic) emotions of fear. The external 
display of these emotions can take various forms (e.g. the flight of 
the army). This inclusive typology of emotions allows G. omit 
further examples of frightful sights, because, as he says, they are 
'similar to those mentioned" 
The positive emotions are shown by the effects of the products of 
the fine arts on the soul. Two kinds of artistic activity are used: 
painting and sculpture. 
With a clause of striking density G. describes both the process of 
creation and the effects of a painting: "when painters complete out 
of many colours and objects a single object and form, they please 
the sight". 
Saying that the products of the fine arts can evoke the same 
emotions as speech, that is pleasure (r€.p~ts), is obviously an echo of 
the conception that both art and literature are mimetic; the 
difference between them, according to G., is that words please the 
soul, whereas fine arts please the sight. 
But pleasure is not the only result of art; from the passive state of 
pleasure, the soul is now passing to the active action of love. This is 
the ro~ov 1Tci87]p.u which is invoked by poetry in the human soul (9): 
falling in love with soulless objects is the highest achievement of 
the mimetic process (a1T€PyuC1ius). 
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"So if Helen's eye, pleased by Alexander's body, transmitted an 
eagerness and striving of love to her mind, what is surprising?" The 
practical use of the theorisation concerning the sight is now obvious: 
It was not Helen who fell in love with Paris, but her eye, which was 
pleased by his 'statuesque' body. 
With a repetition of the causes that made Helen follow Paris, G. 
reaches the end of his speech. In all of the cases Helen is not 
responsible for what has happened; she was the victim. But it seems 
that G. saw fit to tantalise scholars at the very end of Hel., because 
after his statement that he has kept to the purpose which he set at the 
beginning of his speech, that is to remove infamy from Helen, he 
goes on to voice his personal intentions in composing this speech: it 
was meant to be an encomium for her, and a 1Ta£yv~ov for himself! 
II. I 1Tal. YVI.OV 
Authors do not always utter their intentions in their own texts; in 
deciding how one should interpret a text whose author prescribes in 
it how he means us to perceive it, there are, I believe, two routes: 
one either ignores the author's statement or one decides to bring 
one's interpretation into harmony with the author's stated intention. 
But all this depends on the meaning one gives to the word 
'intention'. I readily exclude the following meaning: 'G. wrote Hel. 
to amuse himself', because it cannot be confirmed or rejected on 
any firm ground, and chiefly because it does not contribute to our 
understanding of his writing. On the contrary, I am ready to accept 
an investigation of the function of his statement that Hel. is a 
1Ta£yvLOv in the general context of this speech. 
What is a 1Taf.yvLOv? Isokrates, in his own Hel., imputes to some 
'sophists' that they deal with unimportant subjects, on the basis that 
these subjects are not demanding enough. In explaining his view, he 
maintains that serious subjects 1"Oo-OU1"4J XaAe1TW'TEpaV €XOVo-l. rr,v 
1"OU 1Ta[~eI.V E1TI.1Tovw-repov Eo-1"(.V, and he then goes on to explain that 
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for this very reason no one has any difficulty in 'praising' salt, or 
{30J.L{3V>"LOV~ (a kind of insect). Having said that, he praises Kat. TOV 
ypatj;aVTa 7rEPL rij~' EM:v7]S (who else but G.?) for undertaking the 
task of composing a speech for Helen. Interestingly enough, 
Isokrates locates an element in G.'s He!. which makes his 
achievement open to criticism: 'Although he claims [sc. G.] that he 
has written an encomion about her, in fact what he says happens to 
be a defence of her'. Isokrates has the last words of G.'s He!. in 
mind (or even before him), and his words acquire interesting 
implications if we take into account the fact that in this section of 
his He!. he makes a distinction between O'7TOVOa~E~v and 7ra£{E~v, as 
two distinct intellectual activities. In other words, why does 
Isokrates present himself as ignorant of G.'s own statement that He!. 
is a 7ra£yvLOv? 
There are the following possibilities: a) he did not have G.' s text 
before him, or, in the version that he had before him that last word 
of the text was missing, b) he preferred to refer solely to the part of 
G.'s self-referential statement which would give him a more suitable 
raison d'etre for his own encomion, c) he did not take G.'s 
statement as an honest confession, d) a 7raLYvLOv mayor may not be 
serious. (a) should be excluded; even if Isokrates did not have 
before him G.'s actual words, the antithetical, polished form of the 
sentence makes it extremely easy to memorise it; what is more, 
Isokrates' own words pick up G.'s ones (cP7](IL J.LEV yap €YKWf.LLOV 
YEypacP€l/a~ 7rEPI.. aV'T7]S = E{3ov>..fJ87]1/ ypatj;a~ TOV >..6"101/' .£>..€I/7]S ..• ; 
note that in the preceding paragraphs Isokrates uses €7ra~l/o~ and 
e7ra~I/EZI/ , not ErKWJ.L~OI/). (b) is harder to refute; it could have been 
the case that Isokrates deliberately turned a blind eye to the word 
7raLYvLOv, because he wanted to stress that his Helen exemplified 
what real eYKWJ.Lt..a should look like; yet, it is hard to explain why he 
fails to capitalise on G.' s own self-characterisation, when he has just 
mentioned that some people prefer the royal road to the stony 
serious subjects. (c) Whether G.' s statement were or were not 
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honest, Isokrates could in either case have proceeded by using it. 
Isokrates would not have been intimidated by G.'s dishonesty, as the 
wording in his massive criticism in 10.3 evinces. (d) seems to me 
the only possible explanation; Isokrates was certainly aware that G. 
thought his own work to be a 1Tuiyvwv, but he did not see fit to use 
this self-reference in his criticism. G.'s He!., and the encomia of 
others that Isokrates has in mind differ significantly. 
The analysis so far shows that Isokrates at least did not find any 
absence of seriousness in He!. That he adduces G.'s example to 
show what real E1TULVOL should deal with points in this direction, as 
it does that he builds his own speech on the basis of what he deems 
as a minor misfire of G.' s speech. In this light, it appears that 
despite the word 1TULYVWV G. intends us to construe his speech as a 
senous pIece. 
We may now turn to modern views; 1 modern scholarship has 
more or less used the word 1TULYVWV as a catalyst, which has the 
potential to overturn the whole meaning of He!. Accordingly, it has 
been suggested that if the word implies a humorous tone, then He!. 
is a humorous piece, or at any rate that with this word G. underrates 
his own work (see Kennedy 1991, p.288); similarly, it has been 
thought that "he may have been equally aware of the usefulness of 
parody and pastiche as a means for focusing students' attention and 
making their memories more retentive" (Cole 1991, p.78). On the 
contrary, Poulakos explains that no teacher of rhetoric would 
conclude with an expression saying "you've been had" (1983, p.3). 
An interesting view has been forward by Verdenius (1981, p.12S), 
who maintains that "this kind of 'Verfremdung' seems to be the 
main reason why he called the speech 'a diversion of myself". 
Bertold Brecht's Verfremdung, Verdenius explains, means that "the 
audience should be stimulated by the author to keep a critical 
distance from the deceptive fictions and not to take images for 
I For further literature and summaries, see Untersteiner 1954, p.I31 and n.106, 
Bona 1974, p.33, Caffaro 1995, p.73, Schiappa 1999, p.I30-1. 
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reality". G., throughout the discussion of the third reason (8-14), 
keeps reminding us that persuasion is violent, that it can be 
malicious, and that it certainly affects our soul. So one may ask 
oneself: if G. shows how and why persuasive speech victimises its 
auditors, why should I become the victim of his own speech? This is 
potentially valid criticism; but there are some points to be made. 
There is no reason to suggest that 1Ta.£yv~OV refers solely to the 
discussion of speech in 8-14, and in any case, had G. intended to 
produce the effects of 'Verfremdung' by saying that his work is a 
1Ta.iyvLOv, he would not have waited until the very end of his speech. 
His audience should have been warned earlier. 
Schiappa (1999, p.130-1) has recently claimed that "there is 
plenty of textual material with which to work without 
overemphasizing the significance of the last word. After all, one 
might speculate that G.'s choice ofpaignion was merely a matter of 
acoustical preference, since paignion is a useful word to complete 
the melodious phrase men enkOmion emon de paignion". 
Agnosticism in literary interpretation is perfectly justifiable and 
sometimes preferable; but it should not take refuge in formal 
embroidery. If this method is to be employed, then probably one 
may claim that eYKwJL~oV is an equally ''useful word to complete the 
melodious phrase" JLev eYKwJLLOV eJLov Qe 1Ta.i yVLOV. 
As far as I known, no one has paid enough attention to the 
iconoclastic reconciliation attempted in He!. of what normally is (or 
was thought to be) distinct; some obvious examples: a dualism is 
discernible in the examination of ;tayoS" which serves both as an 
argument for Helen's case, but which also is a theoretical 
generalisation about it. Persuasion made Helen its passive object, 
but we know that G. employs persuasion to persuade us too. What is 
said in this speech serves this speech's aims, but the generalisation 
involved in it makes its contents applicable to any possible case 
where persuasion is involved. Helen is a mythical person, but every 
effort is made by G. to present her case as a real one; traditional and 
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modem are reconciled in an almost postmodernist pastiche. In the 
same connection, 1T€LeW, which is frequently depicted on vases 
alongside Helen and Aphrodite, is in this speech rationalised to the 
extreme with purely secular and somewhat trivial examples (cp.13). 
Aoywp.os- is added to a traditional and mythological narrative, which, 
in fact, is never narrated, on the basis that Aoyos-, or the kind of Aoyos-
uttered in this text, can overcome linear accounts. Love, a 
notoriously irrational power, is rationalised as well; its divine nature 
is referred to en passant, and even there it is no less rationalised 
(19), in a way which clearly echoes the rationalisation of divine 
power at 6. The genre to which G. aspires his work to belong was at 
his period monopolized by the poets, and it is thus a thrust at the 
normative horizon of expectations.! The highly poetical style used 
by G. is in constant opposition to the rationalisation he attempts 
(although one may here object that Empedokles and Parmenides 
expressed their philosophical credos in verse; but strictly speaking 
G. 's composition is not a poem). 
Specific and general, divine and secular, rational and irrational, 
practical and theoretical all coexist in a text the character of which is 
undoubtedly unparalleled in what we possess from this period; Hel. 
is unbound by the restrictions of reality and real facts, even by the 
representation of factual reality which prevails in Pal. The word 
1Ta£yvLOv indicates, I think, G.'s awareness that he is creating a 
speech for speech's sake. Helen's case was in G.'s hands a toy, and 
a toy always gives you the possibility to play with it in the way you 
want.2 That he expresses this awareness may be seen as a somewhat 
boastful declaration of the limitless power of A6yos-, to which he 
overtly commits himself. 
I Dover (1968, p.237) suggests that "k.YKWf./-LOV and €YKWf./-Lcf.~€LV are freely used in 
the fourth century of fonnal praise in prose or verse, but in fifth-century usage 
€YKWf./-LOV is especially a poem celebrating someone's victory" 
2 G. repeatedly in the speech betrays his easiness in dealing with Helen's case: 
SijAOV on... 7, OliSe 1TOOC; TOUTO YaA€1TOV cl1ToA0J'77cra.08aL ... 8, au YaA€1TWc; 
SLa<p€V§ETaL ••• 15. 
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III. Gorgias' Encomium of Helen and Euripides' 
Troades 
a) Some introductory remarks 
The VIew that there is some relation between G.'s Hel. and 
Euripides' Troades originated in the 19th century, but as happens so 
often, there is still a good deal of controversy as far as the extent and 
the quality of this relation are concerned. Some scholars, especially 
those who trace a hidden or an overt 'influence' when similarities 
between two works occur, have been ready enough to date G.' s 
work on the basis of its affinities with Euripides' Troades. Some 
others find in Euripides' Troades only what they would describe by 
the tenus 'Sophistic' features or features of the 'sophistic rhetoric', 
which are in themselves problematic, if one bears in mind that not 
much of the work of the Sophists exists, l or that in any case, what 
exists is not always enough to serve as the basis for comparisons. I 
will not be concerned with the date ofG.'s He!.; the absence of any 
external evidence makes such an attempt shaky, and it seems to me 
that the arguments that have been put fonvard so far prove nothing 
but the fragility of the conclusions they are meant to support. 2 
I take as a starting point a disclaimer made by Croally:3 "The 
question is not of priority, or even influence, but of similarity". I 
thus propose to commence my discussion by pointing out some 
similarities or dissimilarities between Helen's speech in the agon 
and G.'s Hel.; in this connection, I shall briefly discuss the possible 
affinities of Helen's speech with The Defence of Palamedes. I then 
propose to investigate the ever elusive issue of the presence in the 
I For 'sophistic rhetoric' see most recently Schiappa 1999, p.48ff. 
1 For a summary of views see Orsini 1956, p. 82-3, 87 n.l; for more recent views 
see Mazzara, 1999, 142-180; Croally 1994, p.155. 
3 See Croally 1994, p.155. 
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Troades of the individual arguments employed. by G. A short 
postscript is devoted to one of the most obvious features of G.'s 
style which is discernible in Helen's speech in the agon. At any rate, 
the comparison will not be one between the Troades and 'Sophistic 
rhetoric'; on the contrary, I will confine myself to what seems to me 
a more moderate, but more feasible metho~ which is the 
comparison of some of the rhetorical aspects of this play with G.'s 
own rhetoric. 
b) Gorgias' Helen and Helen's defence in the agon 
The first obvious similarity between Euripides' speech in the agon 
of the Troades and G.' s Encomium is that they are both imaginary 
defences of a mythical person; the first obvious difference is that 
Helen's arguments in the Encomium are not answered, whereas in 
the Troades Hekabe's speech is designed to overturn the arguments 
put forward by the defendant, who, in an unusual reversal of the 
normal forensic 1 order delivers her speech first. 2 These basic 
remarks are not without importance, first because it should be 
remembered that G.' s speech is an Enkomion to Helen, and hence 
the person praised is not a defendant in a forensic sense. 3 
1 To avoid any misunderstandings, I wish to stress that I am well aware of the fact 
that the Troades is a tragedy, and that consequently I do not expect it to comply 
with the rules of forensic rhetoric. I even more fully appreciate that, even though 
every reader is perfectly justified in admiring the 'Sophistic' or rhetoric 
intellectualism of Euripides, whatever this might be, Euripides was probably 
primarily concerned with producing a good drama, and consequently the 
rhetorical elements that I discuss here contribute in the one way or the other to his 
dramatic purposes. These purposes have been and are still vigorously examined 
by others. My concern is with an as accurate as possible description of the 
rhetorical aspects of the Troades, as these are exemplified in the work of G. 
2 See Lloyd 1992, p.l0l. 
3 In this respect, the only other preserved speech by G., The Defence of Palamedes 
probably offers a more fruitful ground for an approach to the rhetorical formalities 
adopted by Euripides, for the hero in that speech defends his own life before an 
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If now one wishes to locate the most important feature that 
G.'s Hel. and Helen's speech in the Troades have in common, one 
should tum to their intention. Neither of them attempts to refute a 
fact; on the contrary, in both of them the demonstrandum, as it 
were, is the refutation of personal responsibility for an act the 
commission of which is never questioned. 1 G. clearly accepts that 
Helen 'did what she did' (6), and he points out that his programme 
is to show the possible reasons which prompted the elopement of 
Helen (KaL 1Tpo8-r,(J'op.aL 'TaoS" al'T£a~ OL' Cis dKOS- ~v yeveaBaL 'TOV rijs-
'EII.€vifS" els- rTJv Tpo[av a-ro;\ov 5). Similarly, Helen, situated for ten 
years in the sacked cit'j of Troy, is not in· a position to maintain that 
she did not desert her husband or that she did not travel to Troy. 
Like G.'s He!., the Helen of the Troades seeks to disclaim 
responsibility . 
But if there are similarities, there are dissimilarities as welL In 
the Troades, Helen has the advantage of addressing her prosecutor 
and her judge directly and thus of shuffling responsibility on to 
persons who are present. She blames Hekabe for giving birth to 
imaginary law-court whose members we are invited to believe are the leaders of 
the Greeks in the Trojan war. The speakers in both Pal. and Euripides' Troades 
need to persuade at least two audiences: the mythical judges and G. 's students (in 
the broader sense) in the former, Menelaos and the audience (in the broader sense) 
in the latter. This entails that formal constituent elements of forensic oratory 
which are undoubtedly present in the speeches of the agon can better be compared 
to PaL than to HeL It would suffice to mention some of the characteristics that 
these speeches have in common: in both the Troades and Pal. we frod a proemion 
where the defendant seeks to define hisfher position towards hislher judges (P.2, 
Tro.914-8); in both of them the issue of o.VTLKa.rrr;opia. is raised (P.27, Tro.917); 
in both of them facrual reality and possible motives are discussed (,reality': Pal. 
6-12 Tro.938-H, 951-958; motives P.13-21, Tro.946f.). And., of course, in both 
the register is formal. with frequent indications on the part of the speaker of 
his/her self-awareness of the structure ofhisiher speech (see Postscript). 
1 For later theoretical discussions of the distinction between refutation of facts and 
refutation of responsibility see Gagarin 1997, p.122; Cole 1991, p. 78. For matters 
of responsibility elsewhere in the Troades and other Euripidean plays see Lloyd 
1992, p.l 02. 
112 
Paris, and she blames Menelaos for going away and leaving her 
alone with his guest. No doubt, she blames Aphrodite as well, but 
since divine responsibility is an argument also employed by G., we 
should better discuss it when we address the possible similarities 
between the individual arguments used by G. and Euripides. At the 
moment, it would be enough to observe that responsibility is never 
attributed to a person in G.'s Hel. And it is equally true that in this 
speech G. never (unlike the Hel en 0 f the T roades) resorts to facts, as 
he amply does in his Pal. He is confident enough to deny Helen's 
responsibility on the ground of a general and to a great extent 
'theoretical' discussion of the four causes (perhaps with the 
exception of the second one, that is 'violence'). In fact, the way he 
builds up his individual arguments is so disconnected from the 
specific case he defends that his reasoning, or parts of it could easily 
be applied to numerous other cases. The Helen of the Troades on the 
other hand tests the argument that she should have escaped from 
Paris' place after his death by reasoning in a manner that resembles 
cases where factual reality is involved. She says that she tried to 
escape, but the watches always stopped her on the walls, and she 
goes on to consolidate her argument by challenging her audience to 
check the reliability of her statement by questioning the guards. This 
type of argument, one of Aristotle's aTEXV0L. 7T£a-rEL.S, is as may be 
expected frequently employed in Pal. (e.g. 7, 22-23), for in this 
speech what is at stake is not the responsibility of the hero, but the 
commission of the crime itself. But again, Palamedes does not 
simply narrate facts; he argues his case by proving that each 
necessary stage for the preparation and the commission of treason 
was in his case impossible, so that his discussion of 'factual' reality 
is largely based on argument from probability (ElKOS), an element 
that Helen's speech totally lacks. l 
1 Argument from probability is used only by Hekabe at 976-982; she, like 
Palamedes, denies to refer to 'facts'; she rather reaches a reductio ad absurdum 
by showmg that the goddesses had no reason to be involved in the Judgment. 
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It has perhaps been made clear that the defence of Helen in the 
Troades displays more significant generic similarities with G.' s Pal. 
than with his Hel., and that the main feature that both these speeches 
by or on Helen share is that they both seek to free her from the 
responsibility of her actions. However, the means by which this aim 
is accomplished are considerably different; to this respect Pal. 
probably offers a better example of the kind of rhetoric that 
Euripides adopts, due to its forensic, if imaginary, character. 
c) Gorgias' a.Lria.1. in the Troades? 
As is well known, G. disclaims Helen's responsibility for her acts 
on the basis of four causes (a.Lr[a.r.): a) divine wish, b) natural 
violence, c) persuasion, and d) love. These reasons are not mutually 
exclusive, but even if it were only for one of them that Helen eloped 
to Troy, she is still clear of guilt. Scholars, now, who seek to 
establish a relation, chronological or other, between the Troades 
and G.'s Hel. tend to locate some or all of these reasons in the 
fanner work, 1 whereas those who deny such a relation argue that 
Euripides' play exhibits none or just a few and at any rate 
insufficient similarities with G.' s Hel. 2 In what follows I propose to 
show that no such direct relation can be established, or at least it 
cannot be established on the mere basis of tracing the four causes of 
1 Croally 1994, p.155 is the most obvious example; Goldhill, 1986, p.237 claims 
that "Helen is given several of Gorgias' arguments to exculpate herself'; see also 
Conacher 1998, p.53. Wardy 1996, p. 165 n.46 solves the problem with great ease 
by referring to Barlow 1986, pp.207 -8, who says: "by showing that persuasive 
words can persuade, but fail to lead to consistent action, Euripides may have in 
mind Gorgias' gross overestimation of them in his Encomium (10-14) and be 
demonstrating a different view"; Wardy clearly lacks Barlow's caution, for the 
latter elsewhere concludes that the Encomium of Helen is "a work which 
Euripides was probably familiar with, although the precise dating of it has not 
been established", 206. 
2 See Lloyd 1992, p. 100, and MacDowell 1982, p.12. 
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G. in the play by Euripides. If Euripides responded to G., or to the 
effects of his rhetoric, as some scholars believe, 1 he would have 
something more to say about logos and peitho. But as we shall see, 
the allusions to logos in the Troades do not appear to have any 
significant relevance to G.'s discussion of it in his Hel. Moreover, 
the mere location of some or all of the four causes in Euripides' play 
is not a convincing argument for its relation to G.'s Hef.; again, if 
Euripides had wished his play or parts of it to be construed as a 
criticism of G. he would not have restricted himself to a neutral 
reiteration of them. G.' s untraditional approach to the exculpation of 
Helen does not lie in the novelty of the causes he proposes, because 
some of them at least (certainly 'violence' and 'divine wish,)2 were 
already available in the mythical tradition. On the contrary, G.'s 
radicalism, as it were, is chiefly thanks to the way in which he 
modifies the traditional raw material for the purposes of his 
argumentation. 'This disclaimer ultimately suggests that if one is to 
accept any relation between the two works, one should draw this 
conclusion by also considering to a certain degree how the Sophist 
reasons for his four reasons. For the sake of clarity I propose to 
discuss each reason separately, although it is true that the 
argumentative schemata that G. employs to support the feasibility of 
his four causes frequentlyoverlap.3 
i. Cause 1: 'Divine wish' 
The first of the causes seems to be the strongest argument in the 
hands of those who support the view of a Gorgian presence in the 
I See Scodel1980, p.99. 
2 I would add persuasion on the basis of evidence deriving from vase·paintings; 
see Ghali-Kahil1955, pp. 59-60, 225-230 and Noel 1989, p.140ff. 
3 I have suggested elsewhere (see Introduction) that the discussions of logos (8-
14) and love (15-19) are marked by a very similar 'theorisation', and that for this 
reason the section about speech and persuasion is not more important than the rest 
of the reasons proposed by G. It is perhaps more pertinent to our interest in the 
pre-Platonic development ofliterary, rhetorical and linguistic theory. 
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Troades. G. argues that if it were Tvx:r?S {3ovll.:r]p-aar.. KaL eewv 
/3ovll.evp.aul. KaL 'Avc1.yK7]S rfrrlcjJtap.aal.v that Helen did what she did, 
she is not responsible for her acts. It should be remembered, first of 
all, that G. does not here or elsewhere mention Aphrodite. In fact, 
the discussion of love, the fourth cause, proceeds in a rationalistic 
manner to an extent that only a passing reference to love (epws) is 
needed (19). In both these cases G. argues by making use of the 
common view that god is superior to man, yet when it comes to love 
itself at 19 he brings in the pathology of epws, which we learn is a 
human vOG7Jp.a and an dYV07Jp-a, an ignorance of the soul. 
It should be established then that when G. brings m divine 
responsibility, his approach is rationalistic. For as he says, it is 
nature that dictates that the weaker submits to the stronger, which in 
this case is divine power (rqJ eeqJ KaL rij rUxrJ). G.'s argument here 
clearly echoes one of the most intense polarities of the philosophical 
investigation of his times, that is the relation between vop.os and 
cpvav;. This is not the place to discuss this polarity, but as far as this 
particular argument is concerned G. seems to adhere to a sort of 
pragmatism which in this case has insignificant implications for the 
morality of his rhetoric, because no one would disagree that the god 
is superior to men. But who are the gods G. calls upon for the 
exculpation of Helen? As we have seen Aphrodite and the rest of the 
goddesses of the Judgment are clearly left out. Instead of them, G. 
refers to personified abstract notions: TvX'! and 'Avc1.YK7], along with 
the general 8ewv,1 which are now combined with technical terms 
from the field of the administration of the city (f3ovll.evp.auL, 
t/;7]cpiup.aul.). It seems that G. intended to distance himself from the 
mythical tradition, and this instance is a good example of how myth 
is rehabilitated in fifth-century rationalism. 
If now one turns to Euripides, one finds out that when Helen 
refers to divine responsibility the only immortal she puts the blame 
1 Cpo Empedokles DK 31 B 115,1 ECTrLV' AvciyK'l7S XJYi7j.UJ.. eEWV ifni,p~ap.a. 1TaAa.~6v, 
whom G. may have in mind here. 
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on is Aphrodite. Conacher, now, claims that "If we look at the 
Euripidean Helen's defence (at Tro.914:ff.), we will find that the 
power of Aphrodite is the only one which also appears in G.'s 
Encomium", 1 and Croally, who finds more similarities maintains 
that "it was Aphrodite who offered her to Paris (929-31), thus 
making her abduction a decision of the gods (Gorg. He!. 6)".2 
Unfortunately, the "power of Aphrodite" does not appear in G. Hel. 
As I have shown G. makes every effort to distance himself from the 
details of the standard account of the mythical tradition; it is a part 
of his logical reasoning to argue by generalising, and by offering 
general schemata (in this case 'divine power is superior to human 
alertness') with a universal applicability. In Euripides on the other 
hand it is Aphrodite herself that Helen puts the blame on. She says: 
-ri]V eeov K6AU~E KuL LiLoS" Kpe£O'O'wv yevov, 
AS" -rWV jJ-f:V aMWV OULp..OVWV EXeL Kpa-roS". 
(947-50) 
The argument here is a fortiori: 'if Aphrodite is superior (Kpe£O'O'wv) 
to all-mighty Zeus, how could I resist her power?'. Helen's allusion 
here is clearly to the power of love which is inflicted by Aphrodite 
herself 3 The KpeLO'O'wv of G. is different from the one to which 
Euripidean Helen resorts. It is a KpeLO'O'wv general enough to include 
all the possible aspects of the compared elements: god (not goddess) 
is superior to man as far as 'violence (/3£q.) and wisdom (O'o</;£q.) and 
the rest of the things are concerned'. The god himself that G. 
compares to human beings remains unspecified, 4 or it is as general 
as Tux:ry or 'AvaYK7J. 
I Conacher 1998, p.53. 
z Croally 1994, p.155. 
3 Cpo also Eur. Hipp. 1-6, and 443ff. 
4 All the occurrences of the word eeds- in HeL 6 denote the divine factor in general: 
eeou 1Tp08upiq. rill8po'rrrou 1TP0f1-7J8£q.; eeOc; 0' rillBpo'rrrou KpeiCTO'WII; lOt OVII rij ruxr.J 
Kat. 1"4i ee4i ...r,v aiTiall rillaBeTEolI .•. Helen in the Troades also closes her speech 
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When G. later (19) refers to €Pus himself, the argument will 
still be based on the relation of the superior to the inferior. At that 
point the argument is a hypothetical and disjunctive one: if €Pus is a 
god (G. does not even take that for granted), as a god he is superior 
to mortals; if love is a morbid state of the human being and an 
ignorance of the human soul, then the blame should not be put on 
the person who suffers from it. In either case Helen is innocent. This 
argument comes at the end of the discussion of the fourth cause, 
namely love, which, it should be remembered, has up to this point 
been considered mainly with a rational examination of examples of 
the impact of vision upon the human soul, and it is thus meant to be 
a specification of what happened in the case of Helen. Had G. 
wished to bring in Aphrodite in the one way or the other this would 
have certainly been the most appropriate part of his speech to do so. 
But he does not. His discussion of love is clearly dissociated from 
Helen, and the responsibilities of Helen's action are thus not shifted 
on to any particular god. G. could not be less personal. l 
It has then become clear, I hope, that scholars who are able to 
locate in G. the Aphrodite (or indeed the rest of the goddesses 
involved in the Judgment) simply do not realise that divine 
responsibility is presented in a very different fashion in this work 
than it is in Euripides' Troades. In this play, divine intervention in 
Helen's affairs has always a name, or at least this is certainly the 
case in both Helen's defence and Hekabe's refutation of it. In the 
Troades love inflicted by god remains an excuse, because the 
rationalisation attempted by G. in the Encomium is there absent. On 
the contrary, calling upon Aphrodite's power as a means of 
exculpation occurs elsewhere in tragedy, and certainly in other plays 
by Euripides, e.g. in his Hippolytos, which was written thirteen 
with the words EL be .-Wv eEWV KPUTELV / f3ou;\'IJ, .-6 XJY7l~ELV ci.iJ-Ol1eS' ea-rr. aov TelaE, 
but who else can she have in mind but Aphrodite? 
1 See de Rornilly 1976, p. 309-321, who claims that G.'s Encomium "la reference 
au mythe est soigneusement ecartee ... La. la souverainete de l'amour reste une 
excuse decisive, mais sans avoir besoin de se fonder sur des legendes", 319. 
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years before the Troades. 1 The fact that in the Troades it is Helen 
who employs it is certainly not in itself a sufficient reason to 
conclude that Euripides answers G .. 
ii. Causes II and 1]1: 'Physical violence' and 'Speech' 
Since there is very little in Euripides to suggest any affinities with 
G.'s third and four causes I discuss them together. The 
argumentation for the possibility that Helen was violently abducted 
is more straightforward than the discussion of any of the other four 
causes in the Encomium; G. very briefly suggests that if Helen was 
abducted by force it is not she that we should blame, but the violator 
who committed an unjust act. It seems now that the Helen of the 
Troades never claims that she was dragged away by force, because 
most editors and commentators bracket 959-60, a reading that 
makes the subject of 0 /k€V j3£q. ya/kt{i Deiphobus; but the point she 
makes is that she married Paris by Aphrodite's force. 2 This being 
the case, the only two other references to Helen's forcible abduction 
are the one in Hekabe's speech (998-1001), and one less frequently 
mentioned, if ever, in Cassandra's speech, where the prophetess 
maintains KaL raiJe' €KOVa7JS KOU j3£q. /..€/..7JU/k€v7]S (373). That Helen 
lFor more instances of the use of love as an excuse in tragedy see de Romilly 
1976, p.17. 
2 Barlow 1986, pp. 211-12, who adopts Wilamowitz's reading, maintains "Helen 
is making the point that Aphrodite is the only bia and she sums this up at 964-5", 
212. Similariy, Lloyd 1992, claims that "Nor does Euripides' Helen argue that she 
was forcibly abducted, and Hecuba's attribution of this argument to her is thus a 
mistake" (p.101). Croally 1994, p.lSS, accepts that Helen says that "Paris married 
her by force", as he, of course, argues for the relation of G. to Euripides. It is not 
clear to me if Meridor 2000, p. 20, thinks that Helen argues that she was abducted 
by force when in commenting on Hekabe's speech she says that "Hecuba now 
questions her opponent and asks which Spartan heard her cry for help when, as 
she claims, Paris abducted her by force". 
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does not use violence as an argument to improve her position, and 
thus avoid the punishment that Menelaos has decided for her 
manifestly weakens the possibility that Euripides draws upon G.'s 
Encomion. 
The section about AOYOS', which according to some scholars 
constitutes the pivotal argument of G.'s argumentation, is not used 
by Helen at all. There are however some allusions in the play to 
speech and persuasion, which are not sufficient to establish a direct 
relation between the two works. l At 909, Hekabe in a self-
referential statement claims that her AOyOS' will be enough to kill 
Helen, which reminds us the limitless powers that G. attributes to 
AOyOS' in saying that AOy0S' ovvaa-r7JS p..eyas ecrriv, (35" O}LI.Kpo-r&rqJ 
awp..an Kat. dcPavecrraTqJ eel.O-raTa epya d1ToTeAeL (8). And at 966-8, 
where the chorus urges Hekabe to defend her children and her 
homeland effectively against Helen's persuasion, for she is a sinister 
person who speaks well. Again, one may observe the existence of 
the recurrent polarity between deeds and words, which, as I am 
inclined to believe, G. largely neutralises in his work; in Pal. for 
instance the hero asks his judges p..iJ TdiS' '\oyOls p..a.;u.ov 77 TOLS' 
epyoLS' 1TpOaexel.v TOV VOUV (34), for el p..€JI Ol.a. TWV AOYWV -r7Jv 
dA7}8el.av -rwv epywv Ka8apav Te yeJlea8al. TOLS' dKOVOV(J'l. <Kat. > 
cPavepa.v, eihropoS' (LV eL7] 1] KpiU'I.S' ... (35). Similarly, in He!. (13) 
where G. tries to show the effects of persuasion through examples 
from different kinds of AOy0l., he claims that one speech written with 
skill pleases and persuades a great mob, even if it is false (TEXVTJ 
ypacPelS, OUK dA7]8e£q. AexfteLS'). Nevertheless, none of these instances 
proves that Troades draws upon G.' s He!. All they show is an 
awareness of the power of AOYOS', and its potential to misrepresent 
factual reality by clever interpretations of it. 
1 Mazzara's points (1999, p.169ff) on ~€Va.7Tci.TTJS" at Tro.864-6 seem to me too 
pressed. 
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iii. Cause IV: 'Love invoked by vision' 
When G. starts his examination of Love as a possible aLrl.a for 
Helen's elopement to Troy, he says: El ya.p ep~ ¥ <5 -rClU-rCl 7rcT.v-rCl 
7rpcT.~as, ou Xa.AE7rWs- 8LClcPEV~E'ra.1. -rT]v rijs /..€yoP.e1l7JS yeyovevClI. 
ap.Clp-riClS ClL-riClV (15). But he then immediately goes on to maintain 
in an axiomatic manner that 'objects of our vision do not have the 
nature that we want them to have, by the one that each one of them 
happens to have', which is different from what we expect him to 
say, as this sentence introduces an apparently different topic, that is 
the relation between objects of the external world to human visual 
perception. In fact, the whole of the discussion of love as a possible 
cause proceeds by a rationalistic approach to human vision, and its 
impacts on the psychological realm. This discussion, whose 
underlying argumentative schemata are very similar to those used in 
the discussion of logos in 8-14, is meant to create analogies to 
Helen's particular case; in other words, G. attempts an 
argumentation where a score of irrelevant material about the impact 
of vision on human soul are employed so that his heroine's case 
may be presented as another example that confirms his general 
observations. 
It is interesting now to pay some attention to the manner in 
which G. passes from the general discussion of vision to the specific 
case he argues for; at 19, he asks: El p.ev -rep -rou' A/"E~civopou CTwp.Cln 
-ro rijs' Ell.ev7JS' OP.P.Cl -r,cr8ev 7rpOeUP.£.ClV KClt a.P.LMClV epCJ.Yros rij ifroxij 
7rClpeOWK€ -rl. eClUP.Clcr-rOV, which means that since we accept that 
objects of the world have the appearance that they happen to have, 
and since they can affect our emotional world through our visual 
perception of them, as the examples adduced prove, we should not 
then be surprised if Helen fell in love with Paris: her eye (not Helen) 
was pleased by his body (not Alexandros), and she thus gave in. The 
impersonal tone attempted here is striking; human beings like Helen 
are presented with no personal will, and all responsibility is passed 
over in the name of psychological observations. This is undoubtedly 
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a radical rehabilitation of the traditional view that love starts from 
the eyes; what G. adds to it is a sophisticated explanation of how 
and why such a thing occurs. 
This being the case in the Encomium, we may now turn to the 
Troades; Helen in her speech is never audacious enough to use 
Paris' beauty as an argument. She merely says that Kypris was 
amazed (€K-rra:yl\.oUfl-EV7J 929) by Helen's beauty, and thus decided to 
offer her to Paris, if she were to win the contest. More relevant 
remarks about the interrelation of vision and love are actually made 
by her opponent. Hekabe. In the lines that precede Helen's 
appearance on stage, Hekabe pleads with Menelaos to avoid eye 
contact with his wife, because she may invoke desire in him fl-TJ (j' 
EI\.7J -rro8w. I uLoe!: yao cLVSOWV DlLUeaT " €guLpe!. -rrol\.eLS' ... (891-2). In 
fact, Hekabe is afraid that Helen's punishment will never take place 
if Menelaos sees Helen. As Scodel eloquently put it "there is a sort 
of circular irony here: the real defence of Helen lies in the very 
reason that her presumed guilt is not punished". 1 
There is another place, in Hekabe's speech this time, where 
seeing is related to love; in answering Helen's claims about the role 
of the goddesses she rather straightforwardly retorts that the Spartan 
woman was simply dazzled by Paris' beauty, and her mind was thus 
transfonned into Aphrodite (987-8).2 And a few lines later (991-
996) she has more to say about her son's appearance, this time the 
emphasis being placed on his sparkling, oriental clothes. Helen, she 
maintains, was just lured by his glowing appearance, and she was 
thus tempted to secure a more luxurious life than the one she was 
offered by her Spartan husband.3 In fact, Hekabe will at the end of 
1 Scodel 1980. p.99. 
: For a most recent discussion of 0 aoS" S' lSwv lILV vouS" E-;rodIJn Ku'TTp~S" (98S) see 
Yferidor 2000, p.IS. 
3 I do not understand :\-feridor's point (2000, p.27-8) that "it is hardly irrelevant 
that Gorgias' lis! of likely causes for Helen's elopement ... includes no passion for 
riches and luxury. Hecuba's speech may have been composed with Gorgias' 
Encomium of Helen in mind". If she means that G.'s speech is earlier than 
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her speech rebuke Helen for being insolent enough to appear in 
smart dresses (1022ff.), instead. of rags, and with her hair shaved.. 
Apart from betraying her shamelessness, as Hekabe wishes to show, 
Helen's immaculate appearance could be read as a metaphor for her 
immaculate and sophisticated speech. 
As was the case with the other three causes, the fourth one 
does not seem to have any presence in the Troades; Conacher, in 
discussing line 988, claims that "it is tempting to think that 
Euripides is picking up this Gorgian argument and mischievously 
using it against Helen instead. of for her". I But apart from being 
tempting, the view that there is no evidence to support that Hekabe's 
point presumes G.' s observations about the impact of seeing on the 
souL For Hekabe's argument is far less subtle and less sophisticated 
than G.' s one. And at any rate, love was interrelated with vision 
long before Euripides wrote the Troades. In this context it would 
suffice to mention two examples: the first is from a play by 
Euripides himself; in Hippolytos 525, the chorus says'"Epws"Epws, oS" 
KaT' 01L1La.TWV / a-ra.,ELS" 1ro8ov. The second one is derived from a 
very different field, but it is probably not irrelevant in the present 
context; because ifwe turn to Empedoldes' fragments 86, 87, 95, we 
soon find out that the creator of the eyes is no one else but 
Aphrodite.2 
Postscript 
One of the most obvious characteristics of the agon of the Trojan 
Women is the self-referentiality of Helen's speech, which 
Euripides' Troades, because G. has nothing to say about luxuries, then Meridor 
simply presses an unimportant point too much. And at any rate, as we have seen.. 
G. argues in such a general manner that any specific mention of Helen's luxuries 
would be surprising. Meridor probably fails to understands the extent to which the 
Sophist theorizes in his speech. 
I Conacher 1998, p.57. 
2 Cpo also Ibycus 287 PMG. 
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undoubtedly makes it sound like a formal. immaculate pIece of 
rhetoric. I Helen does not proceed by simply arguing for her case;2 
she goes beyond that by relentlessly alluding to the manner in which 
her speech is organised. This sort of mannerism happens to be one 
of the most characteristic features of G.' s style,3 whose fondness for 
marking the transition from the one part of his speech to the other is 
omnipresent; in both of his preserved speeches he programmatically 
announces his aim at the beginning and he then unfailingly 
signposts the passage from the one to the other subdivision of his 
argumentation, by referring either to the substance of what follows 
or to the manner in which he attempts to proceed.4 
In the proemion of her speech. Helen claims that she will attempt 
with her speech to answer the charges that she anticipates will be 
brought against her, and this is expressed in a most Gorgian manner, 
with remarkable antitheses.5 She then goes on to blame Hekabe for 
I See Lloyd 1992, pp. 5 and 101; as this scholar shows, this expressed self-
awareness on behalf of the speaker is not peculiar to this agon, and it may well be 
true that to a certain extent the same practice is employed by Hekabe as well. As 
Lloyd (1992) maintains "'The second half of Hecuba's unusually long speech 
shows far fewer signs of the philosophical and rhetorical influences that were so 
striking in the fITst half', p. 109. But Helen's speech serves better the purposes of 
this thesis. 
2 This rhetorical practice is discernible in Agathon's speech (cp. PI. Symp.196d), 
and it is parodied in Aristophanes' Frogs 906-7; Isokrates picks it up in 10.8 (rirv 
)Lev ovv cipxiJv 'TOU >'6yov 1TOLTpOp.G.1. rirv cipxiJv 'TOU yevov5" aririjS" [sc. of Helen]). 
3 See MacDowell 1982, p.18-19. 
4 Some examples: in Pal. 5 the hero outlines the two main arguments against the 
charge of treason: 'Even if I had wished to betray the Greeks to the Trojans I 
would not have been able to do so, but even if I had been able to do so I would not 
have wanted it'; sometimes the demonstration of the arguments is smoothly 
completed by a reiteration of what has just been proved (cp. Pal. 12,21, and Hel. 
20, where the four causes are repeated in the reverse order). 
5 Line 918 (-:-01:5" (]"oi:aL -:-ciJ.Ld. Kat. n1 (]". al. -ncip.a.ra) has been though to be spurious 
(e.g. by Diggle), because "it misleadingly implies that Helen addresses Hecuba 
directly at some point whereas she never does" Barlow 1986, p.210; Conacher 
1998, p.56 quotes and translates it. With or without keeping the line the style of 
the opening of Helen's speech is anyway antithetical, but it is worthwhile noticing 
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giving birth to Paris, and the old man (-rrp€a~us 921).1 It is clear that 
Helen presents first what would come first in a logical 
representation of 'factual' reality, and this is amply brought out by 
the wording (-rrpiifrov j.LEV dpXds ... oevTepov). The same process is 
discernible in the section of Pal. where the hero refutes the 
possibility of committing the crime of treason by demonstrating that 
each necessary stage for the preparation of such a crime was 
impossible; there as here it is emphasised that the starting point of 
the argumentation should coincide with what should come first in 
the only possible logical sequence of events (err!. OE Tovoe TOV 
Aoyov elj.L1. rrpiifrov ... €OeL yap nva rrpWTov dpxT7v yeveat1al. rijs 
rrpoooaias, f] DE dpxT7 ... 6; rrp&rov j.LEV ouv KaL DevTepov Kal. 
j.L€yurrov, , o 
rrap0l.x0j.Levos ~£os ... ). G.'s Hel. provides us with no fewer 
examples of this technique, but due to the nature of this speech 
which is meant to be an eYKWj.LI.OV, it is not the defendant who 
explains how she will proceed, but the rhetor himself. In this 
context, it would suffice to bring in an example from the part of the 
speech where G. is about to present the four causes (5): 
that antitheses or other devices expressed with pronouns are very regular and very 
distinct in Pal., especially when, as Helen does here and as she will do later at 
945, he addresses someone: in 23 he addresses Odysseus (TO erE ye nuv 
yevo/kEvwv, w; aU </nj> ... TWV OE /kT, yevo~vwv €~), and later at 28 and 33 he 
addresses the judges (-rrpo, 0' upii, ... -rrepi. €f.Wu ,\o~ -rrOV OE -rrepi. up.Wv -rrpo, upii, 
eern f.W~ '\6yos-). These occurrences also serve as examples of G.'s marking the 
passage from the one section of his speech to the other, and the same holds for 
Troades 945. 
I Some scholars identify !rim with Priam (e.g. Barlow 1986, note ad loc.), others 
with the old shepherd (e.g. Lloyd 1992, p. 102 and note 29). 
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With a praeteritio G. makes the statement that his speech is not 
meant to deal with factual reality, because what really matters is 
whether Helen was responsible for her elopement, not the fact that 
she eloped.. No doubt, this is manifestly accepted by him. 
The same sort of formal (and rather formulaic) indications of 
transition appears also in the main body of Helen's speech; the 
marked passage to the second argument (that is the Judgment of 
Paris) with the J.v8ellOe Ta::ri),ol. 7T' at 923 is clearly an invitation to 
understand it as a logical inference from what has already been said, 
and it is thus employed by Euripides with the intent both to add 
cohesion to the speech and to ensure that this cohesion will be 
evident to the audience, should this be Menelaos and Hekabe or the 
spectators. It is with exactly the same words that Helen will pass to 
the third argument (that is the benefits that the outcome of the 
Judgment secured for the Greeks). She says TOil Elleell 0' W~ €xer. 
CTKeljIar. ),0YOII (931). 
These formulas of transition are repeatedly used by G. in his 
Pal.; at 24 the hero has just shown that Odysseus accused him 
without having any knowledge of the facts, and he then assumes that 
the only remaining possibility is that Odysseus relied merely upon 
his opinion oo~a; the words he uses are TO 01] ),Ol.7TOII .•. At 13, 
Palamedes invites his judges to CTKeljIaa8al. KOl.llfj Ka~ Tooe, that is to 
recollect that no possible motives would have been fulfilled by the 
commitment of treason. Before Helen passes to the discussion of her 
possible motives at 945, she utters an ErEll, which is a way of 
passing to the following argument by partly and tentatively 
conceding that even if what has been said up to this point is not 
accepted, what follows excludes any possibility that she could 
reasonably be held responsible for her acts. The very same word is 
used by Palamedes in the section of his speech where he shows that 
all the necessary stages for the preparation of treason were in his 
case impossible (Pal. 10). To this instance one could add various 
more formulas that serve the same purpose (aMa. 0-;' TOVTO TqJ A6yCfJ 
126 





KO<7lLO~ ••• a.A~eELa.: G. begins his prose-encomium by employing a 
literary device which is amply used in poetry, namely a Priamel; 
although it seems that G. does not attempt to create a climax, the 
elements that he selects as foil for the notion that he wishes to focus 
on (AOylp be d)..ry8€La) are not arranged haphazardly. The first one, 
7TOALS", is an inclusive entity, and the following four form two 
antithetical pairs: the first of them (O"w!i-anNvxfI) comprises the two 
constituent parts of human existence (G. seems to accept the 
independence of those two elements), and the second the common 
rhetorical distinction between works and words. It is clear that G. 
lays the emphasis on the very last element, namely true speech. As 
the programmatic statements that follow amply bring out, G.'s 
intention is to restore Helen's reputation by offering a rational 
examination of her case. G., by expressing his commitment to truth, 
implies that his speech possesses KOO"!i-OS". This quality, which is 
forms the topic word of the Priamel, persistently resists 
interpretation. The main meanings of the word are a) ornament, and 
b) order. In this context, G. uses KOO"!i-OS" as a signifier with multiple 
signifieds, all of which depend upon and are determined by the 
element defined. For a city KOO"[.LOS" is the robustness of its men, for 
body it is beauty .... As MacDowell puts it KOO"[.LOS" is "the proper 
condition in virtue of which a city is a good city, a body is a good 
body etc." (1982, p.33). Although it is clear what KOO"[.LOS" is for the 
particular elements, the meaning of KOO"[.LOC; itself remains obscure. 
Untersteiner renders it with the word 'harmony' (1961, p.8S), G; 
Bona (1974, Sff.) translates 'perfection' and observes that it cannot 
be taken to mean ornament, for "neither the absence nor the 
presence of an ornament ... would make an object be worth blaming 
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or praising in its own right" (pp.5-6). More recently Wardy has 
argued that "this unqualified exclusion of 'ornament' is thoroughly 
misguided" and concludes that "the last thing readers should do in 
reacting to par. 1 is to suppress their initial responses to all the 
connotations of kosmos" (1996, p.156 n.8). I find Wardy's reading 
attractive and consequently I consider that KDap.oS" should be 
construed as flexibly as possible. Sykutris' general description of 
G.' s style fits perfectly these lines: "~KE~VO -rrOD Xa.pClK1"1']pL.~El.. TOV 
q,pacrn.KOV TPO-rrOV TOU r oP'YL.OU ELval.. Eva uq,o~ Ka-r' EmKpa.1"1']01. v 
o v 0 p. a a T l. K 0 v, 0X'- P1lp.anKov .•. P.€ -r-f]v AO'YI.K~V au~v dOpLa-rLaV 
~Vl.axuETal.. -it p.oU01.K61"1']~ KUt. -it auvul..ae"'1I.LanK6'T1l~ TOU OAOU, KuL a 
AOYOS p.era{3dJV..e-ral. els 7Ta.peAaaI.V 7Tapa.a-ro.aewv KaL elKOVWV 
7TOAvxpWp.wv" (the emphasis is mine; Sykutris 1934, p.137). To 
these remarks we should add that the construction is strikingly 
symmetrical: the cola following the topic-word Koap.os are 
constructed in exactly the same manner, (a) Noun (dat.) (b) Particle 
(c) Noun (nom.), and unlike the poetical Priamels there is no 
increase in the length of the individual elements (cp. Race 1990, 
p.10). The interchange in the quanity of syllables is as follows: (a)2-
(c)3, (a)3-(c)2, (a)2-(c)2, (a)3-(c)2, (a)2-(c)3. 
e:uavopL.a: the quality of men is stressed here, as MacDowell 
observes (1982, p.33; cpo Xen. Mem.3.3.12-3: ovoe evavop£a EV 
aM.7] 7TOAel. op.o£a rij Ev8o.oe avvo.yeral.; AI. Nub.297-8: 7TapeeVOI. 
op.{3po<j>opOI., / eA8wp.ev AI.7Tapa.v x80va IIwQ.oos, evavapov yav ..• ). 
oWp.a-rr..: 'body' in a physical sense; it is significant that it precedes 
'soul' and that it is distinguished from it, as the next pair AOYOS / 
7Tpayp.a presents two notions typically opposed to each other. Each 
one of them seems to acquire independence, as it is attested from 14. 
Musti (1993, p.864) contends that "il significato fisico del termine 
[sc. body J sia ben rappresentato nella letterarura greca arcaica e 
classica" and he also remarks that its usage in G. is "realistico, e 
perfino crudo". awp.a admittedly plays an important role in He!.: it 
was the 'body' of Helen that attracted the bodies of her noble suitors 
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(4), it was the body of Paris that attracted. Helen's eye (19). Helen's 
beauty attracted the bodies of noble suitors, and this attractiveness is 
used in the (only) ptrrely encomiastic part of The Encomium of 
Helen; Paris' beauty attracted Helen,. and this seduction is used for 
her defence. In his relativistic definition of 'body', G. attributes to it 
a property (KaMOS), which will be proved to be double-edged, as far 
as the persons who possess it are concerned. ~ OE <7o<j>(a.: it is 
difficult to understand what G. had exactly in mind when he joined 
'wisdom' with 'soul'. Wisdom belongs to the same lexical field 
with sophist, and it has a great range of meanings (see Gladigow 
1965). Kerferd holds that "According to the received 
account. .. these terms ('wise' and 'wisdom') went through a kind of 
evolution in their meanings, from (1) skill in a particular craft, 
especially handicraft, through (2) prudence or wisdom in general 
matters, especially practical and political wisdom, to (3) scientific, 
theoretic, or philosophic wisdom ... this sequence is artificial and 
unhistorical, being essentially based on Aristotle" (1981, p.24). In 
He!. <7o<jJLa recurs in 4, listed among other virtues of Helen's suitors 
and it is presented as something acquired by men through learning, 
it is an €1TLKrrrrOV skilL What G. has in mind specifically as 'wisdom 
in the soul' may emerge - though not conclusively - from Helen 11: 
most people are deceived because, due to absence of memory of the 
past, of judgment for the present and of foresight of the future they 
employ opinion (oo~a) as counsellor of their soul. We may infer 
from this passage that probably the presence of these qualities is 
what makes the human soul wise. -rrpa:YIl-a.-n. OE a.PE-n1= "one might 
have supposed that dpe-rTJ just meant 'merit', vinually equivalent to 
KOOp,OS. But it is in accordance with the archaic use of the word to 
regard it as applicable primarily to action" (MacDowell 1982, p.33; 
cf. Mst. EN 1098a 7-12, where dpe-rTJ is presented as the perfection 
of epyov: el. o-r, €a-rLv epyov dv8punrou t/rox!Js Evepyel..a. Ka-ni J\Oyov 7} 
p.-r, aVEU J\oyou, TO 0' aUTO <jJap.€v epyov eLval. Tqi yevel.. Toi.Joe Ka/. 
TOi.JO€ O"1TVoaiou .•• 1Tpoa-r1..8ep.ev7]S" rijs' KaT' dperT]v tJ7Tepoxfjs 1TpOS 70 
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€pyOV). Wardy (1996, p. 156) criticises this reading on the basis that, 
"although it is true that pragma could mean 'action', there is no 
evidence for a limitation of generalized 'arete' to action... My 
alternative reading takes pragma as equivalent to 'thing' in the 
widest possible sense". But Wardy does not do justice to the text; 
action is traditionally opposed to J\oyoS" and it is not accidental that 
they are juxtaposed here. Tney form an antithetical pair, picked up 
in the following sentence . AO")'<tl OE cL\~eE1.a.: it is generally and 
commonly assumed that G., as a pure rhetorician, was not interested 
in truth; Dodds (1959, p.8) contends that his works "make the 
impression of a dazzling insincerity, an insincerity so innocently 
open as to be ... entirely void of offence". Many scholars tend to 
assume that G. was uninterested in truth, so that his practices 
amount to nothing but mere deception. This criticism is as old as 
Plato; in Phaidros 267a, we read: T€LaLa.v Q€ lopyLa.v T€ €d.aofJ-€v 
"<;' " , _ .!\,...q_ , " 1'<;" '.\ ' 
€VO€LV, 01. 1TpO 'T'WV CI.I\'/VWV Ta. €LKO'T'a. €LUOV WS" TLfJ-7JT€U 1T1\€OV. 
There is no doubt that G. sometimes uses probabilities in his 
speeches, especially in Pal., but there is no evidence suggesting that 
he deliberately ignores truth. On the contrary, it would be extremely 
foolish for a rhetor to ignore truth, that is factual reality, since it 
undoubtedly provides him with unshakable evidence (see Gagarin 
1994, p.46-57). Similarly, Kerferd's view that "G. is introducing a 
radical gulf between logos and the things it refers to" and that 
because of this gulf "we can understand quite easily the sense in 
which every logos involves a falsification" (1981, p.81) is 
unattractive, for it relies much upon the ontological autonomy given 
to logos in ONE, without considering that it is very unlikely that G. 
put in that text any systematised theory to which he was himself 
committed. As Schiappa (1999, p.125) has recently put it, 
"propositions of the form 'G. had a theory of X' are potentially 
misleading", because "they overestimate the maturity of a theory's 
development by implying more coherence and completeness than 
can be demonstrated with the available evidence" and also because 
"the attribution of a number of theories to ancient writers on the 
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basis of isolated or few fragments mischaracterises the process of 
intellectual investigation in ancient Greece during the sixth and fifth 
centuries". Consequently, there is no reason to suspect that when G. 
says that 'truth' is KOcrp.OS- for Jl.oyos- he is dishonest. In 2, he 
programmatically announces that he intends to show the tru~ and 
we may thus assume that he considers (and that he would wish us to 
believe) that his Jl.oyos- is not a Jl.oyos- of dKOcrp.£a.. It is a Jl.oyos- which 
proceeds with Jl.OYLG'P.OS-, that is with logical argumentation 2, a 
speech which is opposed to the speech of the poets. 
<1vopa. OE .•. E.m.eE1.'VW.: all these elements can be the objects of praise 
or blame according to their qualities. "Some of the nouns are the 
same as in the previous sentence, others not" (MacDowell 1982, 
p.33). The same scholar suggests that there is not a "significant 
distinction between EPYOV and 1tpU{'P.a.", since G. intends to "achieve 
an even number of items in his list". This view is correct, and it 
gains even more ground by the fact that G. attempts symmetrical 
sounds (10 - gon / er - gon, and p - olin / p -ragma) within 
antithetical pairs (with the exemption of city / action). The 
antithetical character of the introductory sentences is also brought 
out by the statement "praiseworthy things should be praised", 
whereas what is not praiseworthy (not what is blameworthy) should 
be blamed. This deontological statement is tricky; is G. saying that 
what is not praiseworthy is always blameworthy? An easy answer 
would be that the question is too subtle to have any significance for 
the interpretation of the passage, especially when nothing guarantees 
that G. wished anything more than a polished formality (notice the 
alliteration of /p/, the antithesis 5.gwv / dlla.~[qJ the polyptoton -
combined with a repetition - and finally the isocolon all of which 
coexist after the impersonal, and deontic xp-r,). A more satisfactory 
answer is perhaps that G. needs a polarisation, in the form of a 
tertium non datur, functionally supported by the form. It is true that 
when a person, thing or situation is not praiseworthy, this does not 
necessarily entail that it is blameworthy. Nevertheless, G.' s speech 
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cunningly polarises these qualities: Helen must either be 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. The tone from the very beginning 
establishes that what is at stake here is serious. If Helen is not 
elevated to the heights of praise, she will necessarily tumble all the 
way down to blame, where she has already been placed by the poets 
(G. does not of course bother to take into account Stesikhoros' 
Palinode). An implied blackmail, yet an attractive one, since it 
gives G~' s speech its raison d' etre. 
cLtLa.et.a.: the same noun is used in the characterisation of the state of 
mind established by the poets (2, and in 21 it appears combined with 
Saga.). In fact, the phrase ra7J rap ap.afYiia KaL dp.ae£a forms a 
hysteron proteron, for ap.ap-rLa is brought about by ap.a.e[a. We may 
be reminded at this point that Sokrates postulated that no one is 
willingly bad, which means that human morality is primarily a 
matter of lmowledge (see Calogero 1976, p.408-421; for its use in 
Plato cpo PI. Gorg.477b7, and Dodds 1959 ad loc.). 
tLEp,q,ea8a( -re ••• tLwtL"l1-m: with this axiomatic statement G. implies his 
obligation to praise Helen (for the common epinician xpEoS"-motif 
cpo Pi. O. 8.72-75, and especially N. 8.38-9: erw .3' dG'TOLS" aowY KaL 
.A' ~ \ '.1. '/ " " J.. ' ~ " I xvOVL YULa. Ka.I\V't'aLp., a.Lvew aLVTfTa. fLop.'f'av 0 eTTurrreLpWY 
dJ\LTPOLS, which is stylystically close to G.'s expression. See also 
Schadewaldt 1928, 277, Carey 1981, p.28, and Gerber 1982, p. 153, 
with further literature). The construction is stylistically striking; 
notice the chiasm with one infinitive and its cognate noun in the 
centre of the construction and its opposite in sense, with its cognate 
noun. At the beginning and at the end of it (p.€p.tPeaBaL - E7TaLveTG. -
E7TaLveLV - J-Lwp.7JTa), combined with isocolon and homeoteleuton. 
tLwtL0v: "generally poetic; the usual word for 'blame' in later prose is 
QVELQOS" (MacDowell 1982, p.33); it is picked up in 20 and 21 
(p.WJ-Lov dOLxiav; it appears personified in PI. Rep"+87a6: OvO av 6 
.MwJ-Loc;, E</n7, TO re TOLOVTOV J-LEp.lj;aI.TO). 
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TaU S' a.UTaU civOpOS ••• EA€''Y~cu.: A lacuna has been suggested by 
Dobree after EAey~a.L; Diels completed ad sententiam: TO A€YOfL€VOV 
OUK opeWs· -rrPOa-rJKfiH. TO£VlJV EAey~a.L. This is not accepted by 
Untersteiner, Buchheim, and MacDowell, who rightly claims that 
"no supplement is really necessary; the sense and construction are 
satisfactory without it, and it is not for us to foist on Gorgias yet 
another redundant antithesis" (1982, p.33). G. throughout this 
paragraph programmatically announces his task. His statement 
refers to both the content and the method of his speech. He has to 
say rightly, that is by using the appropriate language, what is 
appropriate to be said about Helen, and to refute her critics. Deov has 
been related to the notion of Ka.LPOS (cp. fro 13 with notes; see also 
Frankel 1975, pp.447-8 and n.14), a possibility which is 
strengthened in the light of Epitaphios: TOVTOV vOP.£~OVT€S" 
, 'e I I ,~.f',- ~I , \/ 
KOLVOTUTOV KUL €LOTUTOV VOfkOV, TO O€OV €V TqJ o€OVTL KUL /\€Y€LV 
KUL cJ'tYUV KUI. -rrOL€Lv ••• saying TO Deov, the appropriate thing at the 
appropriate time, along with the accuracy in diction are properties of 
those praised through the speech, and it is in virtue of these 
properties that they are (not were, because they are mortal 
immortals) praiseworthy. G. surely hopes that Helen will also, at the 
end of the speech, be considered a praiseworthy woman (for TO Deov 
see Macleod 1983, p. 52 and n.4). Moreover, the combination of 
Aega.L with ope6is is reminiscent (though it cannot be proved that it is 
dependent upon) OpeOE-rT€La., a term that can be rendered as 'correct 
diction' (Guthrie 1971, p.205, Kerferd 1981, p.68). Linguistic 
investigation was undoubtedly one of the most significant 
contributions of the Sophistic intellectual activity; Prodicus is said 
to have placed his interest in synonymy, Protagoras focused on 
grammatical categories. There can be little doubt that their 
discussion of language was chiefly prescriptive, as it is shown in 
Aristophanes' Clouds, where Protagoras is satirised for his efforts to 
reconcile the grammatical with the natural gender. 
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OtJ.ot¥uxo~: although the word is not traced elsewhere in classical 
Greek (its cognate op.oifroXia. is common in modem Greek), no 
emendation is required. G. encapsulates in a single word the impact 
of AOYOC; on the soul of the audience. In 13 we learn that one single 
logos can persuade a mob (O'xAas-), so that op.6ifroxo, explicitly 
indicated the unifying function of speech, its power to create a 
consent. 
il 'ie nUv 1TOI.''11-rWv ••• m.cm.s: Tne emendations proposed are not 
necessary (see Dies 1913 p.193-4). The Mss reading is satisfactory, 
though it has been taken either to mean a) 'the opinion of those who 
have heard the poets', or b) 'the opinion of those that the poets have 
heard'. The first meaning is strongly supported by numerous texts 
where Helen is criticised on the basis of her morality. Stesikhoros 
was forced to write his Palinodia, because he had slandered Helen, 
and it is interesting that later biographers attribute Homer's 
blindness to his criticism of Helen. Alcaeus B 1 OL. - P contrasts the 
immorality of Helen with the excellence of Thetis, and he closes his 
poem with the following words: oi. 8' d1TWAOVT' dP4" E [M.vq. / KaL 
-rrOA€~C; (cp. Aiskh. Ag. 681ff.). In Euripides' Troades (892-3) 
Hekabe praises Menelaos' decision to kill Helen, because she aLp€~ 
yap dVQPwv OP.P.a.T', €~aLp€~ 1TOA€LS', /-rr£p.-rrP7JO'LV OrKOVC; ... Dies on 
the other hand, has proposed that "dKovaa.vTwv -rrLans equivaut a 
fides ex auditu", and that "sous 1'dKovaa.vTwv de Gorgias," may be 
found "Ie souvenir de quelque legende de cette sorte ou soit l' 
instigation a ecrire, soit meme la revelation de verites jusque-Ia 
ignorees ou travesties seraient venues au poete ... d' un oracle ou 
d'une apparition d' Helene" (Dies 1913, 195). Segal (1962, p.145 
n.63) following Norden, and Untersteiner (1961, p.90) holds that G. 
means the inspiration that poets accept from the Muses; Bona (1974, 
p. 30 n.1) also accepts (b), and more particularly what the poets 
have heard is the oral tradition they have inherited from oral 
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tradition. It is interesting now that Segal (1962) disagrees that 
1T'OI.7JTWv is "genitive of source" depending on a.KOUOOv-rWV, whereas 
MacDowell (1982. p.34) takes the opposite view on the basis that 
there is no genitive "to denote the source of what is heard". 
However, it is hard to take sides. (a) is certainly plain: it refers to the 
recipients of (some of) the poets' account. (b) would be attractive 
under the light of the method proposed by G .. Where he self-
consciously (fiouIlOP.o.l.) proposes a IlO)nap.oS" as his own method, the 
poets, being manipulated by the Muses, merely reproduce what they 
are dictated by them. Probably G. 's wording is deliberately 
ambiguous. 
QV0ll-o.'T'OS" <!n1\.l-'T\---YE.yovev: "Gorgias produces a parr of parallel 
phrases by adding a genitive to each, but the parallelism of 
construction is artificial, because -rOU QvoP.o.-roS" is a subjective 
genitive ... but -rwv au!-upopwv is an objective genitive" (MacDowell 
1982, p.34; he compares 10 rfroxPiS" a.p.o.p-n7p.o.-ro. Ka.I. 8ofrJs-
a.1T'o.rr]p.o.-ro., 19 tfsuxlls a.yp€up.o.al.v ..• , and 3 a P.Ev a.vcpwv 
KpaTl.CJ"TOS ... ). <ln1\.l-'T\: 'significant sound' (MacDowell 1982, p.34); 
Helen's name brings out the reality of the subject it names (cp. 
Aiskh. Ag. 681ff.: -riS" 1T'OT' wvop.o.{€V ~' / ES -ro 1T'o.v E!7]Tt.!/LWS", / p.7J 
Tl.S" OVTl.V' OUX' oPWP.€V 1T'POVO£- / 0.1.0'1. -rOU 1T'€1T'PWP.EVOU / yllWauo.v EV 
nlxq. VEP,WV, / -ra.v 8op£yo.p.f3pov a.P.cPI.V€L- / KTJ e' 'EAEVo.V; E1T'€~ 
1T'P€1T'ov-rWS" / EAEVo.S" €A.o.vop0S" EA.E- / 1TTOIlI.S" EK -rWV a.f3po-r[p.wv ••• ). 
The archaic idea that the name reveals the truth of the object it 
denotes (cp. Heraclitus 48DK) which seems to be found here is 
refuted by G. himself in ONE. In that text it is clearly stated that 
AOyOS" is different from the objects it denotes, in other words a name 
is arbitrarily related to the object it refers to. This disclaimer further 
shows (as is held throughout this thesis) that the comparison of 
passages so as to support theories allegedly put forward by G. is 
methodologically inappropriate. In this context G. intends to oppose 
the irrational and uncritical account of the poets to his logical 
argumentation. We may then assume that probably her name is 
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reminiscent of calamities because of its poetical usage, as it is 
shown by the Aeschylean passage quoted above. Il-vTtll-1l: 
combined with 1n7JJ-7J also in Lysias 2.3 p.vTjJJ-7JV 1TUpa. rijs 1n7JJ-7]S 
il.u{3wv. G. clearly aspires to create a speech unbound by temporal 
limits. il.O'}'Lap.Os unchains him from the linearity of poetical 
narration; it is worth noting that in 5 we are told that through his 
present il.0Y0S' (-rqi il.OyCfl) he can bypass the events of the past (-rav 
/ , /) 
xpovov 70V -rO-rE • 
€)'W O€ ~OUAoP.UI. ••• Souc;; the emphatic statement of his own method 
(introduced with the eyw oE which expresses G.' s intention to 
distance himself from his predecessors) has undeservedly been 
overlooked by scholars (it is worth mentioning that the same 
boastful expression is uttered by Agathon in his 'Gorgian' speech in 
Pl.Symp.194e4: eyw oE {3ovAO{J-UI. 1TpCrrov p.ev EL1TE'iv Ws- XP-TJ {J-€ 
El1TE'iV .•• ). The self-reference denotes personal and free will on 
behalf of the rhetor (. His speech is not fact-bound; the method that 
he will follow is a matter of personal selection. Linguistically 
speaking, after the theme, that is something already known (in this 
case the poets' account) comes the rheme, that is the new 
information which is undoubtedly in a relation of contradistinction 
with what has already been said. This phrase serves thus both as an 
announcement of the method that will be followed by G. and as a 
comment on the practices which have already been followed by 
those who have previously dealt with the same subject (cp. 21 
ef30v Af]87Jv ). AO)'I.at-LOV 'Tt. vu: Verdenius (1981, p.ll 7) claims that G. 
"declares that he will use a special kind of argument, ... but this is 
not specified". Nevertheless, the emphasis here is not on a special 
kind of argument, but on the argumentative speech itself (see 
MacDoweil 1982, p.34). AOYLGJ.LOs indicates G. 's own method, 
which is going to be logical argumentation (that the word mems 
'reasoning', 'logical argumentation' is confirmed by the contexts 
cited by Schiappa 1999, pp.122-123). Segal (1962, p.1l9) saw a 
"rationalistic approach to persuasion in Palamedes" and an 
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"emotional approach in the Helen", and Verdenius applauded this 
view (1981, p.1l8 n.17). This is an artificial distinction, and G.'s 
announcement that he intends to proceed through Aoy,a,uSs is not 
deceptive, as Verdenius thought. For the function of the soul and the 
impact of (an irrational) logos on it is one thing, and the 
examination of this function and its impact quite an other. He!. 
proceeds in an equally logical way. i\l1 the main arguments are 
"remarkably orderly and well-sign-posted" (NfacDowell 1982, 
p.17); the argumentation is apagogic, as is the case in the 
examination of the possible motives in Pal. The examination of the 
impacts oflogos upon the human soul (8-14) and that of vision upon 
it (15-19) proceeds with a good deal of theorisation. There is no 
reason thus to suggest that He!. is irrational. G. by his own 
admission uses Aoy,afl-0S in his speech. 
E.1T1.0€L~a.L Kcr.1. O€L~a.L -niA1'\ees Kcr.1....: EmQ€1gcr., Kat. Q€1gat. is the 
MSS reading, and there is no reason to change it to Q€£gas Kat. 
EmQ€£gas with Blass. MacDowell (1982) prints EmQ€1gcr.t. Kat. Q€1gat. 
T€ Td).:rfJes , taking the ommission of T€ as the product of an 
hap 10 graphy. But this is probably redundant. The second Kat. 
replaces the 77 of the MSS ("for confusion of 7} and Kat., compare, 
for example, And. 1.78, Is. 5.5, D. 3.27", MacDowell 1961, p.121). 
3 
Gorgias proceeds with a praise of Helen which is based on the 
mythical account concerning her birth. her beauty, and finally her 
suitors. Apart from these references in 3-4 very little is otherwise 
relevant to her person in the speech. Even her name is rarely 
mentioned in a speech which is intended to be an encomium for her. 
q,Ua€L ••• 1TPun-WV: a recurrent motif of an encomium is the connection 
of the praised hero to a divine parentage. In this way the praise 
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becomes worthwhile, and at the same time the hero is distanced. 
from the human community, so as to avoid the resentment of men. 
~: the neuter plural adjective refers here to one individual (see 
MacDowell 1982, p.34); cpo Aiskh. Pers.2, 681, Eum. 487; in prose 
Thuc. 3. 821"'<1. p.€CTa. nov 1To/..l.nOV, 6. 77 on aUK "]WV€s l"'elOE ElO'LV. 
OUK <i~AOV ••• OAI:yol.S": with this double litotes G. stresses that the 
superiority of Helen is beyond doubt; notice that the presentation of 
her binh begins with the word ofj/..ov. 
\-L"T1'TpO~ \-La A~Oa.~: Helen's mother was Leda, the daughter of the 
king of Aetolia Thestius, who married her to Tyndareos, king of 
Sparta. When Leda was taking her bath in the River Eurotas, Zeus 
transformed himself into a swan, so as to avoid an eagle. He hid 
himself away in her arms, and the product of their intercourse was 
an egg from which Polydeukes and Helen were born; like Helen, 
"EplJ.6 was also born from an egg (cp. Dunbar 1997, comments on 
695ff.) 
1Ta.Tpos ••• 8e -rupa.vvos: a demanding construction, concerning Helen's 
paternity: 'her real father was a god, but according to the rumours a 
mortal, Tyndareos and Zeus, of which the one was thought to be 
because he was, whereas the other was shown not to be because he 
claimed that he was, and the one was the mightiest man the other the 
ruler of all'. Helen's paternity is attributed to Zeus (1), and 
Tyndareos (2); the construction as perfectly balanced (1,2 / 2,1 / 1,2 
/2,1) It is worth mentioning that according to Pausanias (3. 17. 14), 
Tyndareos' tomb was believed to be next to the temple of Zeus 
Kosmetas in Sparta (cp. Pausanias 3. 17. 14), which is tantamount to 
saying that they were both worshipped at the same place. Ol.a. TO 
e\.va.1. E.Oo~EV: a phrase highly reminiscent of B26. Ika. TO <j>O.va.1. 
i)AE'YX~: MacDowell prints €/..exf}7J; "~/..€yxf37J is translated by Diels-
Kranz 'die Fama trog', but it cannot mean this. If correct, it would 
have to mean something like 'he was proved not to be because he 
claimed he was'; but oui would then be absurd" (MacDowell 1961, 
p.121). Wardy (1996, pp.31-2) defends the reading of the MSS, and 
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interestingly he claims that "Gorgias daringly inverts the description 
of Tyndareus ... The idea, presumably, is that so brilliant is the sight 
of Helen's 'divine beauty' (4) that it immediately suffices to give 
the lie to the mortal's pretension: we can clearly see that her beauty 
is 'divine' in the strict sense of the word" (see also p.156, n.9, and 
Porter 1993, p.276-7). For an unsuccessful mimesis of the Gorgian 
construction, see Isok. 10. 18. 
4 
LO"o6€QV Ka.N..oS-: Hesiod compares Helen with Aphrodite, as far as 
her beauty is concerned (7] ELOOS- EXEV xpvO"e-rr.;' A<f;poo £ -rrys ... fr.197, 
5), and Homer compares her to Artemis (€K 0' . El.ev7] eUAUjLOLO 
eVWOEOS ut/Jopo<f;o1.0 / 7]AVeev, 'APTEjLI.OI. XpvO"7]I.UKa.rcp €I.KVLU 
Od.4.121-2; see also Od.8. 174; on lO"oeeov see Furley 2000, pp.7-
15, esp.10). 
1r1..€l.a-ro.s- Se lrAel.<TiOI.s-••• evELP')'a.au:ro: 'in many men she implanted 
much love-desire'; with the repetition of lTAel.O"T- G. stresses the 
great number of Helen's suitors and the strong emotions of love 
invoked in them by her. The story of Helen's suitors goes that, when 
Tyndaros announced that he was planning to marry off his daughter 
Helen, numerous men turned up in Sparta from allover Greece. 
Tyndareos, out of fear that if he favoured one of the suitors, he 
might provoke the wrath and the enmity of the rest of them, asked 
for Odysseus' support. The latter, one of Helen's suitors, advised 
him to bind the suitors with a pledge: if somebody ventured to stain 
Helen's husband's reputation, all of them were obliged to assist 
him. Helen chose Menelaos, and when Paris seized her, Menelaos 
adduced this pledge. The follow-up is well-known: the Trojan 
expedition. A catalogue of the suitors is offered by Hesiod (fr.197-
204), Apollodorus, and Hyginus. 
Ev~ Se ... aW\-La.1U: the antithesis between €vL and 1TOMa. recurs in the 
context of 13, where it is claimed that one '\6yos- persuades many 
people. The attractiveness of Helen's body is equally strong. 
Helen's body has the power to join the cream of Greek men in a 
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battle against a common enemy. Bucbheim (1989, p.162) has 
plausibly seen an affinity of the wording here with Empedoc1ean 
philosophy; more particularly he contends that "Denn das 
Zusammenbringen von vie1em durch die Attraktion des einen 
(namlich der Kypris bzw. Philotes etc.) ist ein empedokleisches 
Grundrnotiv; vgl. z.B. Emp. DK 31B 35,5 ... oder B21, 8". Helen in 
this paragraph is praised indirectly; after the demonstration of her 
noble and divine birth, the praise of the men she attracted proves 
analogously her own nobleness (cp. Hes. fro 200, 34, 39: ou' dvepES 
E~OX' a.PLOTOL ••. 1TOMa. 0' EEov<a o£.oov>, jJ-€ya KA,eo<s EO'KE 
YU>VULKOS'). It is worth noting that this indirect encomiastic manner 
is largely followed by Isokrates in his Helen, where a considerable 
part of the speech is devoted to Theseus; "The real object of praise 
is the figure of Theseus, that is, the city of Athens itself through its 
illustrious mythological representative" Wardy 1996, p.28 (cp. Isok. 
10.22-2). 
WV ot Il-EV ••• e.axov: Immisch thought that a lacuna follows after 
1TA,OUTOU, to attain a symmetry: N(oun, gen.) {Imm. A(djective, gen.) 
dpXULOU} - N (gen.) A (gen.) N (acc.) - N (gen.) A(gen.) N(acc.) -
N(gen.) A(gen.) N(acc.), but nothing suggests that this should be 
done (one should also notice the homoeoteleuton formed in the two 
central phrases: Euoo-g£av, EUE-g£av, and the repetition of sounds 
1TAou-, -Ey-, -YE-, 1TUA-, strengthened by the three compound words 
starting with an EU-). Rostagni (1922, p.l92, 195) observes that in 
the speech of Pythagoras to the young (Iamblichus, JIEpL TaU 
JIU8UYOpLKOU B£.ou, 8, 42-43), there is an encomiastic speech to 
wisdom (aocPLu) "che ha per base l' identico schema" (Untersteiner 
1961, p.92). Pythagoras, according to this source, categorises 
praiseworthy things into inborn and acquired, permanent and 
temporary. Wealth and offices are inherited privileges, which, when 
legated, their owner seizes to possess them (Tel oe .Ov 1TPO€jJ-EVOV 
OUK EXELII aUTav 8, 43). Physical power, by contrast is a mere 
personal (lo£.uS') characteristic, which cannot be donated to anyone 
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(mix' ... ... OLOV Te eLvaL -rrap' ErEPOU f1-O.TaAa{3e'iv 8, 42). To all the 
aforementioned charismata is opposed wisdom (-rraLoet.a), an 
acquired virtue, which, when achieved by a person, is never lost. On 
the contrary, the person who acquires it is in a position to impart it 
through teaching to others (0 vvaTO V 
p.e-raAapeZv Ka.~ TOV 00111"0. Ik7JO€V T,rrov , , a.VTOV 
ErEPOU 
EXeLv 8, 43; notice 
that the opposite is claimed in the Dissoi Logoi 6, as an argument 
against the teachability of virtue: if virtue is teachable, then the 
person who hands it over to somebody else does not possess it 
anymore). The fact that G. calls 'wisdom' e-rrLK7IJ1'"oc; ('acquired') is 
not of course coincidental: a central theme of the Sophistic 
problematic is the issue of the teachability of wisdom. On the 
traditional view, a person is gifted with wisdom by nature; Pindar 
explicitly supports this conception when in his 2nd Olympian Ode he 
contends that uo<jJoc; <5 -rroMG. eloWe; cPvg.. The fiftb.--century 
intellectuals cast doubt on this idea; wisdom can be acquired, 
provided that one wishes to learn. Protagoras maintained that 
cPuuews Ka.l. dUK-r]U€WS oLoauKa.ALa oe'ZTaL (80 B 3 DK). That wisdom 
is thought of by Sophists as teachable cannot be doubted; if this 
were not true their own mission would have been a self-
contradiction. What is perhaps more radical, is the fact that G. 
considers the wisdom of the Greek leaders to be acquired; we may 
then assume that even Odysseus was taught wisdom, he did not owe 
it to his nobility. G. is here an iconoclast of the first rank (note that 
Andromache attributes similar virtues to her husband in Eur. Tro. 
673-4: ae 0', JJ cPt.A' "EKTOP, e1xov avop' dPKouvTcf. IkOL / fuvEaeL 
YEveL -rrAOVTqJ Te Kdvope£q. Ikeya.v). 
q,t.>"OV(KOU q,t.>..o'Tt.!-LLas: for an antithetical usage of these words see 
PI. Parm.128e 1-2: on OUX' v-rro VEOV cPLAoVLKLac; OreL a.UTO 
yeypcf.cP8a.L, ill' v-rro 1Tpea{3vTepov cPLAMLlkt.a.C;· 
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5 
OO"T't.S \-Lev OUV ••• ou A~W; a rhetorical aposiopesis; with this phrase 
G. brings the praise of Helen to an end. MacDowell (1982, p.35) 
holds that the person referred to here is "Menelaos" who "married 
Helen and succeeded Tyndareos as king of Sparta". However, the 
construction is ambiguous; the participle AUf3WV may refer both to 
marriage ('I will not mention who ... fulfilled his desire for Helen 
after his marriage with her'), and abduction ('I will not mention 
who ... fulfilled his desire for Helen after having carried her of£,). 
Specifying Auf3wV, would be tantamount to the involvement in an 
unpleasant and degrading narration. Both husband and lover receive 
G.'s bitter neglect. 
TO ')lap TO~S €Uio<Jw ••• oU <pEp€I.; 'to say known things to those who 
already know them. carries conviction to the speech, but it does not 
carry pleasure' (KOp0S" is a recurring theme in encomiastic poetry; 
cpo Pindar O. 2. 95; P. L 82-3, 8.28-32; N. 10. 20-2). Untersteiner 
(1961, p. 62) glosses TEp,pI.V: "motivo edonistico della dottrina 
estetica di Gorgia: l' artista e un giusto ingannatore ... al servizio 
della T€P,pI.~;". This view unjustifiably systematizes scattered 
evidence. The metarhetorical axiom serves as an explanation: 'I do 
not mention the person ... because it will be unpleasant for my 
audience, although it would add credibility to my speech'. It is 
interesting that G. concedes that information on known things adds 
credibility to the speech, but he does not at the same time say that 
sacrificing things already known for the sake of pleasure detracts 
from the credibility of the speech. Is this mere flattery, or a 
statement of the self-consciousness of the rhetor? 7rl.fJ"rL<; and TEpcjJl.<; 
are inextricably interwoven. Pleasure leads to persuasion, and 
certainly unpleasant speeches are unconvincing (see 13 ET€pcjJ€ KU~ 
e7r€I.(],€; notice that Philostratos Test. 1, 2 holds that the stylistic 
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devices of G.' s style amount to a ADyOe; which -ryo[wv ea.v-rou 
yiYVETa.1. Ka.1. o-O{3a.pw"Epoe; cpo Isok. 5. 57 AOyOI. -ryo[ove; Eiva.l. Ka.1. 
-rrL(j'jO-rEP0I.; for the victimisation of audiences through pleasurable 
speeches in Thucydides and G., see Hunter 1986). In later rhetoric it 
becomes a topos (cp. for instance the opening lines ofDemosthenes' 
On the Crown); in Segal's words, "through the artistic elaboration 
of the logos as a form of poiesis a chain of emotional reactions will 
occur leading from the aesthetic TEp!ne; to the final dvaYK7J of 
7TEl.eW .. .• The aesthetically satisfying logos ... has great practical 
implications which lie within the form itself' (1962, p.127; for a 
different view, see Verdenius 1981, p.1l8 n. 17). Since known 
things are boring, we may assume that G. now widens our horizon 
of expectation. Something new (in Pal., novelty is considered as a 
merit in speech, Ka.I.VOe; <5 Aoyoe; 26) is about to be said: a new 
method of rational approach replacing the linear, mythical narration. 
TOV xpovov ••• u1TEp~a.s: an abstruse construction; TOV xpovov - TOV 
TOTE, TciJ AOYCP - vuv. G. is able through his speech to create a speech 
diachronically valid, unbound by the reality of the events of the past. 
€..m. -rT)v cipx.f)v: the transition is once more clearly indicated (cp. the 
beginning of the syllogisms in Pal. 6). 
a.Lna.s: the reasons that made Helen desert her husband and fo How 
Paris to Troy will be presented in ch.6. 
ei.Kos 1)v: 'reasonable'; argument from probabilities does not play an 
important role in Hei. In fact, it is traceable only in the invention of 
the reasons that made Helen do what she did. The absence of this 
type of argument in Hel. should chiefly be explained by the fact that 
this speech does not seek to question facts or actions falsely 
attributed to the defendant, as is the case in Pal. In this speech it is 
admitted that Helen's departure to Troy is true (cp. E7Tpa.qev a. 
E7Tpa.qev 6). The demonstration of what might have happened and 
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not of what has happened gives G. the opportunity to create his own 
vital space. 
6 
Gorgias now presents the possible reasons for which Helen eloped 
to Troy. Norden, cited by Untersteiner (1961, p.93) has observed 
that Gorgias is the first to present his material in the order it will be 
developed in the main body of the speech. The reasons set forth by 
Gorgias are the following: divine power (developed in 6), 
represented by Tyche, the gods, and Ananke, (natural) violence (7), 
logos (8-14), and finally love (15-19). The argumentation will be 
apagogic: each one of them will be dealt with separately, and it is 
also noticeable that none of these reasons mutually excludes the rest 
of them. The list is also exhaustive, so that the recipient of the 
speech cannot easily conceive of any other possible a.l-rLa.I.. It is also 
true that "his four alternatives dissolve into a series of 
approximations and analogies. They are convergent to a point of 
analogy" (Porter 1993, p.274). A close examination of the four 
reasons shows that they have some common denominators: the 
compulsion imposed by the divine power is attributed to AOYOS; gods 
have supremacy over men in violence; love is a god with divine 
power, and it is natural for mortals to follow his commands etc. In 
Porter's words again (p.275), "If Gorgias is trying to keep his 
a.i-ria.1. apart, he is trying no less hard to make that text next to 
impossible. " MacDowell accurately observes that "the first reason 
is expressed by three phrases (each being a dative plural noun with 
a genitive), the other three by one phrase each (a participle with a 
dative), so as to produce a symmerry: three phrases precede and 
three follow the central E.1TP~E.V a. E.1TP~E.V" (1982, p.35). 
i1 yCp TUxlls ••• ~q,L<Jll.a.a1..: it is interesting that G. combines here 
divine power with secular processes of public decision-making. 
TUxlls ~OUAllf.La.a1..: -rUXTJ personifie~ "is a goddess with wishes of 
her own; cf. Pindar Olympian Odes 12. 1-2, Soph. Antigone 1158, 
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Menander Aspis 147-8, and Demosthenes Epistles 2.5" (MacDowell 
1982, p.3S). Pindar includes her in the Moirai (fr.21), and it is 
possible that even gods may submit to her wish (cp. Trag. Adesp. 
506 Kannicht-Snell: 1Tall7"WV ropavvoo; Tj Tuxry 'aTL TWV 8€wv). 
{3ov).:rjp.aaL denotes the 'wish'; its usage here in decision-making 
(cp. PI. Lg. 802c TO. TOU vop.08€7'ov (3ovA-rjp.aTa). ~OUAE{,!1-a.cr'I.: 
Untersteiner (1961, p.92) prefers X's reading, K€A€Uap.an, which, 
however, is not in accordance with the political vocabulary of the 
passage. {3ouA€vp.a, in political vocabulary denotes the decision of 
the {3ovA-rj, and generally a political decision (cp Hdt. 3.80 TOUTWV 0 
, ,,, tl. \' ~" " "A-.')!nth apxryv €X€L,Ov"eVILa-ra oe 1TaVTa €o; TO KOLVOV ava'f'€p€L • e 
plural it can also mean 'contrivances', as in Pind. Nem. 5. 28 (see 
also Sykutris 1928, p. 12). 
'Avci:YKllS *",4>LCI!J-a.cr'I.: 'AvaYK7J is here personified, though this is a 
rare instance (Smith 1999, p.130 argues that '<the only new 
personification in the early Classical period that represents an 
abstract concept is also a political entity: Ananke (Necessity) may 
be represented by a winged woman with a torch, on an early 
Classical lekythos in Moscow"); it is a power that forces men to act 
in a manner which is independent of their own wish (cp. Eur. Phoen. 
1000, 1063 aL EK 8ewv civaYKaL) .' Avci.YK7J and Tuxry are interrelated, 
since they are both superior to the gods (cp. Simonides 5. 21' AVci.YKq. 
8' ouoe 8eo~ p.axovTaL), and it is interesting that in Soph. Aj. 485 
they are conjoined: 1"ijs civaYKa[ao; ruxrys OUK €aTl.V ouoev p.€~~OV 
civ8pWrrOLo; KaKOv. tls.fJq,I.O}La.: a decree, a proposal accepted by the 
majority; MacDowell (1982, p.36) observes that the word is rarely 
used for decisions of the gods, although there is one occurrence in 
Ar. Wasps 376-78: LV' €L0-V / J.L7J 1TaTE~v 7'0. / TO/:V 8€oZv r/;7JCPiap.aTa. 
A very similar construction occurs in Empedocles (31B 115DK), a 
passage which G. probably had in mind: eaTr. 1"1.' AvaYKTf) xp7]p.a. 
e€WV t/n]cpLap.a 1TaAat.6v. 
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<€p<.m. a.Aouaa.>: the fourth reason, followed by most editors; 
Immisch added <l5tjJel. J.pa.a8eT.aa.>. His conjecture is attractive, 
because the development of the fourth reason is chiefly a 
theorisation of the function of Oo/IS ('vision'), and its impact upon 
r./roxfJ ('soul'). However, Immisch's proposal unjustifiably 
emphasises oo/I.S (notice that AOYos and ~[a. are in the dative followed 
by a participle), whereas it is clear that the fourth reason put forward 
by G. is love (cp.15 el yap epws- ~v <5 laura. -rrpd.~as). 
e.L iJ-h ouv ••• a:rroI..UTE.OV: G. passes to the discussion of the first 
possible reason; the argumentation here is apagogic: in the first 
instance it is maintained that if Helen was forced by divine power 
(3Lel. '10 -rrpWrov), the blame should be put on the blameworthy. This 
is followed by an argument concerning the right of might: the 
stronger leads and the weaker follows. Lastly, G. particularises: if 
god and Tyche are responsible (the stronger), then Helen (the 
weaker) should be exculpated. It is also important that the argument 
used here derives from or reminds of a major and recurrent 
discussion of the Sopbistic movement: the relation between VOf1-os 
and CPUals. It is impossible to present the whole issue here (the 
reader is referred to Heinimann, 1945, Guthrie 1971, pp.55-131, 
Kerferd 1981, pp.111-130, Kahn 1981, pp.92-108, esp. 105-108, 
Beikos 1991, pp.67-92). It will suffice to say that cpuaLS denotes 
'nature', whereas VOf1-0S signifies a human 'convention'. In the fifth-
century these two notions are polarised, and accordingly, in social 
matters, some intellectuals defend cpual.S, whereas some others VOf1-os. 
Some examples: does religion exist naturally, or is it created by 
men? Is the superiority of Greeks to Barbarians natural, or is it a 
matter of an arbitrary belief? This theoretical examination of the 
VOf1-0S - cjJuaLS polarity had an interesting implication for the ethics 
of power; evidence from several texts shows that a number of 
intellectuals gave a clear priority to nature. Callicles, in Plato's 
Gorgias, seems to hold the view that law is an invention of the 
weaker members of society, which is used so as to control the 
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stronger. An explicit demonstration of the 'right of the might' is 
found in Thucydides' description of the negotiations between the 
Athenians and the Melians, and in what followed after their 
dialogue: OL D€ a'lTEK7"€LlIUlI M7]AiwlI oaovs .f]{3wvrus €Au{30ll, 1TuZ8us 
De KU~ YVllUZKUS' T,lIDpu1ToDLaulI (Thuc.5.1l6). In Kahn's words 
"What is new is not the theoretical contrast between nomos and 
physis but the positive evaluation of the latter as freedom for the 
strong, as rule by those who are naturally superior" (1981, p.107). 
Justice, thus, applies to those who are equally strong; cp.Thuc.5. 89: 
D£KaLa Ell 1'"£!} all8pW'lT€£lfl AOYlfl am} rijS' rC17JS dlla.YK7]S Kpill€TaL, 
DVVU7"a. De ot. 1TPOUXOvr€S' 1Tpa.aaovat.. Kat ot. da8€V€LS' £Ur<wpoiJat.., 
the latter part being reminiscent of G.' s 7"0 D€ ~aaov €1T€a8Ut.. 
Should we then assume that G. was a supporter of the right of the 
might? Nestle (1940, p.229), based on this passage, asserted that G. 
was an immoralist, and admittedly he had several allies (a fervent 
one is Harrison 1964, p.192). However, the alleged immoralism of 
G. cannot be proved from this passage, and there is no supporting 
evidence that he encouraged it. Here the Sophist simply claims that 
generally it is natural (1TE<pVK€) for the stronger to impose his 
manners and his will on the weaker. In this case the stronger is the 
god, and there is no doubt that the majority of Greeks believed in 
the omnipotence of the divine nature. They appeal to their gods in 
order to support them in everyday life, they ask them to foresee their 
future, they stage them in a way that customarily accepts their 
unavoidable power. Accepting that divine power is superior to 
human, and using this disclaimer as an argument (G. is not the first 
to exculpate Helen on the basis of divine responsibility; cpo fl. 3 .164, 
cited by MacDowell 1982, p.35) is one thing, and using one's own 
superiority as an argument in order to justify one's ability to impose 
one's 0\VI1 brutality on others is quite another (see Tsekourakis 
1984, p.657). Athenians did not need G.'s Hel. to commit their 
atrocities in Melos. 
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1'tpOP.11et.~: it would be attractive to think that apart from the phonetic 
similarity with -rrpo8vp.Lq., there is a pun here with the name of 
Prometheus, the hero who was shackled by Zeus. 
eEO~ S' ... KaL TOtS OX\Of..~: 'god is superior to men in violence, and in 
wisdom, and in everything else'; the superiority of gods is well 
attested in literature, so that G.'s statement seems rather trivial; cpo 
Hom: Od. 10. 306 8€o~ be r€ -rrclllra bVllallraL. For the superiority of 
gods in wisdom see the recurrent: 8€d be r€ -rrclllra raaO'Ll! Hom. 4. 
379,468, and Heraclitus B78DK T/3os ya.p aIl8pW-rr€wlI p.ev OUK €X€L 
YVW,uas, 8€LOII be EX€L). 
1"'il~ SUO'KAeLa~ a:rroAU1"E:OV: cpo fr.22 where it is said that G. believed 
that a woman should not be known for her beauty, but for her good 
name CJJ.iJ r6 €Ioos cL'\Aa. riJv begav €Lllat. -rrOMOC:S yvWPLP.OV rils 
YVllal.Kos) . 
7 
~(q.: the second possible reason for which Helen might have 
travelled to Troy; in general, the one-paragraph argumentation for 
this possibility is marked by the usage of legal terminology. In 
Untersteiner's words, "Ie distinzioni sinonimiche di questo 
paragrafo (~[q.-U~pCcrB11' a.v6p.W~-a.OCKW~, aTEP118El.aa-opq,avLcrBEl.CTa) 
dipendono da reminiscenze giuridiche" (1961, p.97). It is clear that 
this terminology is anachronistic, since it is applied in a 
mythological context. 
U~PL~: the interpretation of UpPI.S is always a difficult task; G. 
surmises that Helen was seized, raped, and finally suffered hybns. 
Thus her sufferings form a climax: rape is certainly more serious 
offence than mere abduction, and practising hybns is worse than 
mere rape. It is probable, thus, that G. wishes to charge Paris with 
ill-motivation as welL If seizure is the first step towards violent 
sexual fulfilment, practising uppt.s implies an additional motive in 
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committing the act of rape: the humiliation of the sufferer. This 
reading is in accordance with some evidence that shows that J{3pt<) is 
an act through which one dishonours another. In Demosthenes' 
Conon we learn that the defendant was attacked by a mob of 
youngsters, and that their act was not simply an act of brutal 
violence; the youngsters committed il{3ptS', because their intention 
was to ridicule him. il{3ptS' is thus distinguished from mere violence 
in that violence is used for humiliation (cp. Aristotle's Rhetoric 
1374a 13-15; for a full discussion of il{3ptS' see MacDowell 1976, 
Cohen 1995, pp.145ff., Fisher 1992, and Cairns 1996). 
&r\AOV o11. .•• eoua-nlX11O"ev: G. turns the first and the last verbs of the 
preceding period into participles, and the adverb d.8I.K~ into a verb; 
the only new word is Eou<rT"1Jx"O"ev. 
~ci.p~a.pOS ~ci.p~a.pov: a polyptoton; the first word is a noun and it 
refers to Paris, who was not Greek. The second is an adjective, and 
it refers to his brutal deeds. The construction clearly underlines that 
his deeds were in conformity with his origin. We may safely assume 
that G. shared the idea that Greeks are superior to barbarians, and 
that the Greeks should unanimously fight against them (cp. fr.5b). 
KaL AO'Y~ KaL vO(-L~ KaL €P'Y~: see MacDowell (1982, comment ad 
loc.); he rightly observes that "the use of KaL does not mean that 
Paris actually used all three methods .. .it is just 'by any possible 
means', just as QtKaLW<) KaL d8iKW<) means 'by fair means or four. 
Cf. the oath quoted in Andokides 1. 97: KTEVW KaL '\6ycp KaL epycp 
KaL !fn7cPCP KaL rij ep.auTou XEI.pl., UV ouvaT<JS" 0, ik UV KaTa.AVa7J ..,ryv 
o",p.oKpaTtav. ,. 
AO'Y~ (-LEV ••• -ruxELV: the repetition of the datives stresses that the 
wrong-doer should suffer exactly the same sufferings suffered by 
the victim. G. asks 'a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye'. 
dTI.p.LaS' and ~",p.La<) can both be legal terms. The first means 
'disfranchisement', loss of rights, whereas the latter is used of 
150 
'punisbment' (cp. Dem.19. 126: TWV TOI.OUTWV 0 v6p.o~ ecfVUTOV ri]v 
~TfP.£uv eivul. KeAEUEI.). The usage of technical forensic wording 
within the frame of mythological material adds verisimilitude to the 
speech, and brings it closer to every day city-experience. 
€i.K6~; 'reasonably'; from the aforementioned it follows that Helen 
should be the object of our pity. 
OLKULOV OUv: 'it is appropriate to sympathise with her and to hate 
him'; this emotional reaction will be in accordance with our sense of 
justice, if, of course, we are ready to accept the possibility set forth 
by the rhetor. The second possible reason thus transforms Helen 
from a notorious trouble-maker into a sufferer. The following 
reason, namely "\6yo~, is hardly less violent. Violent compulsion 
colours the whole attempt of Helen's exculpation. 
8 
Et oe Ao')'os ••• a.mI:rllous: the third possibility; 'if logos persuaded and 
deceived the soul'. G.'s speech becomes now impersonal (no doubt 
G. still defends Helen, but he deliberately avoids using the pronouns 
of the preceding paragraph referring to Paris and Helen, and Helen's 
name is hardly mentioned in 8-14; notice that where passive voice 
predominates in 7, the opening lines of 8 place the emphasis on the 
active logos). The theorisation about "\6yo~ has just commenced. 
AO')'OS: a polysemous word (see LSJ), as can be attested even 
through a rough examination of its occurrences in He!. It would be 
convenient to render the word as 'speech', for logos is still 
unspecified here, it is speech in general. 1TELOUS KUI. -rTJv ~~v 
a.=-nlous: cpo 12 ;\6yo~ yap r/roxilv 0 rrEl.au<;, a context that makes it 
clear that persuasion is a violent power with effects similar to that of 
divine will and natural violence. In this relation Wardy (1996, p.35) 
is acute in saying that "A conventional piece of forensic rhetoric 
would plead compulsion on Helen's behalf; if she were forced to go 
with Paris, she deserves to be exonerated, maybe even pitied. What 
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one therefore anticipates is an argument that she did not yield to 
persuasion. Then standard polar opposition between force and 
persuasion entails that succumbing to a merely verbal seduction is 
altogether blameworthy. Instead ... he [G.] unnervingly collapses the 
polarity". Persuasion will be examined in 12-14 (on 7TEL8w see 
comments on 12). Verdenius (1981, p.12S) has claimed that G. 
identifies persuasion with deception; this is not true. From the 
discussion of persuasive t\6yoS' that follows, it emerges that t\6yoS' 
might be deceptive on some conditions only. It is equally wrong to 
ascribe to G. theories of deception, because they are unjustified and 
unsupported from other evidence. Kerferd's view (1981, p.81-2) 
that, for G., t\6yoS' is always deceptive because human knowledge is 
incomplete is a dangerous use of evidence from ONE. The same 
holds for Rosenmeyer's view that the Gorgian concept of deception 
lies in the fact that speech is not representational. In fact, 
Rosenmeyer's analysis illustrates the unjustified, modem 
systematisation of G.' s views on apate, when he maintains that, "the 
term apate became prominent in the vocabulary of G. because he 
placed a positive accent upon what prior to him had been regarded 
as a negative situation: the frequent discrepancy between words and 
things" (Rosenmeyer 1955, p.232). The word d7TG.T7J is not frequent 
in G.' s vocabulary (in Hel. it occurs twice: 8, and 11 d7TG.T7JP-7"U, in 
Pal. once 33). Much has been said about fr.23 in relation to G.'s 
'theory of deception' as well (see for instance Untersteiner 1961, 
p.98), a fragment preserved by Ploutarkhos, where G. is said to have 
claimed that in tragedy, 'he who has deceived is more just than he 
who has not and he who has been deceived is wiser than he who has 
not been deceived'. This fragment may clearly be used as evidence 
against those scholars who commit themselves to the view that it is 
methodologically safe to use scattered evidence on G. as the basis of 
interpretation of his texts. Fr.23 clearly refers to tragedy and only to 
it. If by generalising we venture to apply it to every kind of speech, 
then we should be ready to accept that Paris was more just than a 
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person who has not attempted to deceive Helen through speech (and 
in 19 every effort is made to establish that Helen's eye -not Helen 
herself - was seduced by Paris' body), and accordingly that Helen 
became wiser after her deception by Paris. But this is obviously the 
opposite from what G:s intended us to understand. 
AO,,!OS QUvcl.O"'M'\s ... e"m.-reAei.; a famous description of '\0"105"; there is no 
doubt that '\6y05" is here personified. It clearly acquires a physical 
substance (we may note that in Sextus' account of ONE (86) '\0"105" 
is presented as having its own ontological independence), for he 
possesses a body (uwJJ-a; see Guthrie 1969, vol ii, p.ll1 n.2). The 
incarnation of logos is not a Gorgian novelty; it is as old as the 
Homeric poems, where €7T€a (words) possess wings (7T"T"€po€vm), 
with which they travel from the speaker's mouth. The word 
Dvvaa-rrys denotes the ruler, the person who concentrates power, both 
secular and divine. The super-human power of '\0"105" implied by the 
word Dvvaa-rrys is in harmony with the nature of the deeds it 
accomplishes (e€LOrara). To the all-mightiness of '\0"105" is opposed 
his minute body, and this establishes a further antithesis: '\6y05" is as 
effective as natural violence, which however presupposes a physical 
superiority. The personification is so strong that it almost compels 
us to visualise it: a small, physically unimpressive ruler, who is 
paradoxically proved to be extremely threatening. Buchheim (1989, 
p.164) cites an interesting parallel from the corpus Hippocraticum, 
where Dvvaa-rrys is also involved in a rationalistic, physical 
explanation: miro5" De (sc. <> a.-r,p) JJ-Eywr05" EV rol.G'I. 7Tam 1"WV 
1TaV1"WV Dvvaa-rrys EG'1"£V, JI€P~ 1>vuwv 3. Another interesting 
implication of the description of '\0"105", is that it is associated with 
deeds; '\0"105" and epyov are normally construed as two antithetical 
notions in Greek literarure (see note on 1; the opposition between 
them amounts to a rhetorical tapas: it is impossible to express 
through words the honourable deeds of important men; cpo Thuc. 
2.35.1-3, Lys. 2.1-2). G. seems to have remarked that speech may 
have a function equivalent to that of acts: speech acts, it does divine 
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things. In connection to the divine accomplishments of .\6yoS' Segal 
(1962, p.121) is telling: ''The significance of the attribution of 
divine qualities to the logos is twofold. First, it continues the line of 
poetic tradition (e.g. Iliad 2. 385 ff) which regarded the power of 
artistic utterance as a divine gift ... The second significance .. .is the 
power thus assigned to it and the emotion it created. The association 
of 1"'0 eeLov with sheer physical force of irresistible intensity appears 
in the three other places in the Helen where G. refers to the divine" 
(namely 6, 19,20). When G. explains the 'divine deeds' of .\6yo5" we 
soon find out that they all are related to human emotions. 
ouva.-ro.1. -y<lp: a schema etymologicum; logos is a potentate (dynas-
tes) because it has the potential (ovvu-rUI.). Adkins (1983, p.109-10) 
observes that "etymologically speaking, a dynastes is simply 'one 
who can'; and what G. says logos can (dynatai) do is 
uncontroversial and based on empirical observation. But since the 
'for' clause is an explanation of dynastes, and follows it, the 
incautious reader may suppose that G. has justified his use of 
dynastes in the full sense of 'potentate'; as the reader will certainly 
have interpreted it, since dynastes never occurs in its etymological 
sense". 
Ka.L q,6~ov ••• k'1TCLu~-Tlaa.I.: at the beginning of the paragraph, G. 
alleged: 'if it was logos that persuaded and deceived the soul'; now 
he explains what .\6yoS' can do in the emotional world, and he thus 
justifies his characterisation of .\6yo5" as ruler. The demonstration of 
the impact of .\6yoS' upon the soul is being developed. The emotions 
invoked by the omnipotent ruler are divided in a balanced manner. 
The first two, fear and misery are negative, the second two, joy and 
sympathy, positive. It should be noticed however that at this stage 
'\61'05" is presented as a consolatory power, for it removes fear and 
misery, and it instils joy and sympathy. Segal (1962, p.124) holds 
that '1:he order is perhaps deliberately varied, for joy and pain 
belong together as the passive effects, fear and pity as the active 
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ones", and he compares the construction with 19: rox:rJS 
aypevp.ueJ'{ .... 1TupauKevuLs (pp.149-50 n.97), where the two inner and 
the two outer elements also "correspond in meaning". His comment 
on J,\eov E1TUVfijo-Ur. (p.126) is too subtle to be true. Based on the 
usage of the verb E1TUVfijo-ar. ('to augment') Segal assumes that G. 
assigns to the soul the existence of a certain amount of J;\eos before 
the coming of '\oyos to it. But MacDowell (1982, p.36), who claims 
that ''the verbs are varied for the sake of rhetorical balance, not 
because of any difference of meaning between the first two or 
between the second two" seems more realistic to me. For an 
analogous presentation of the relation between logos and emotions 
cpo Soph. 0. C. 1281-3: 'Ta. 1ToMa. yap 'TOI. PTJP.UT' iJ 'Tepo/UVTa 'TT., / iJ 
, A.. ~ , U'f'WV7]TOI.S 'TT.VU. 
AU1M'\V d.<I>~ELV: although G. has not mentioned poetry yet, it is not 
irrelevant to observe that this phrase brings us very close to the 
power that Hesiod recognises in poetry (see Heath 1987, p.6). 
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1"UU1"a oe .• J)EL~w: G. devotes the passage to the demonstration of the 
power of logos, a demonstration which consists in two examples: 
the :\0Yos of poetry, the :\oyos of incantations. In He!. proof-
through-examples plays an important role ill the overall 
argumentation, especially ill passages where 'theorisation' is 
employed. 
OEl. 3E KaL..axouovm.: an obscure construction on which both Mss 
agree; some emendations: coqar. [cELqal.] Diels, Ka.coqa cELqal. 
Immisch, coqal. oELqal. Sykutris. MacDowell rightly observes that 
'"no explanation or emendation so far suggested is quite convincing" 
(1982, p.36). Moreover, the agreement of the Mss suggests that our 
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efforts should be based on the text as it stands. There have been two 
discrete manners of interpretation: a) oofv is an indirect object 
governed by OE~,fa.L (Untersteiner 1961, pp.98-9); this view is weak, 
for the syntax: would require a genitive (a.KOVOvTWV), whereas the 
existing aKOVOVC7I.. clearly serves as the object of the infinitive. b) 
80fTJ is a dative denoting the instrument (N1acDowell 1982, p.36 'by 
opinion', Kalligas 1991, p. 223 'IJ-€CTqJ -riis 1rE1roU111O'i]S '). The latter 
is the only possible way of explaining the function of the dative in 
this context. However, the meaning ('to show it by the means of 
opinion') is unclear. The difficulty is primarily because G. wishes to 
add something new, which remains unclear. In the last sentence of 8 
he says: I will show that this is the case. He then goes on to put 
forward something programmatic, as is clearly shown by OE~ oE. 
The following Ka.i is an obvious indication that what follows will be 
an addition of a new element to his discourse, and it goes without 
saying that G. intends us to become aware of it, because the whole 
construction is otherwise redundant (the example of three different 
situational contexts which prove the ability of persuasion to mould 
the soul in 13 is introduced without any announcement; the same 
holds for 16, where the example showing that vision affects the soul 
is there introduced with a.vTiKa. yap). Which is then the meaning of 
this self-referential sentence? One should turn to the meaning of 
80,f0.. Throughout He!. the word 'opinion' (for the belief / truth 
pseudo-distinction see comments on 11) is attributed either to the 
producer of a logos (not necessarily of G. himself; see 13), or to the 
recipients of it; we may call the first as 'active', and the second as 
'passive' opinion (see also Segal 1962, p.l11). In our context, 
according to the syntax we have adopted earlier, it is a form of the 
'active' opinion that we have. 'It should be proved by the means of 
doxa to the hearers'. I suggest thus that oo';a. here is nothing but the 
rhetor's 'opinion'. But his 'opinion' is admittedly very different 
from any other opinion. It is not simply his own opinion; his opinion 
aspires to be uttered in a general enough manner, so as to acquire a 
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universal, 'theoretical' verification. If we were not in danger of 
indulging in anachronisms, we would happily render 80fry with the 
word 'theory', in so far as this term can denote a discourse which 
tends to universality. In this light, the whole sentence may acquire a 
fresh, interesting implication. Apart from being construed as a self-
reference, or as an expression of self-awareness of how the speech 
should proceed, it can also be seen as a clear indication that the view 
that Gorgian teaching of rhetoric is based solely on model-speeches 
which should be reproduced by students of rhetoric is too simplistic. 
If He!. is a model-speech, it notably encloses some theoretical 
prescriptions addressed to his students. The present sentence, 
impersonal as it may be taken to be, can be read as advice: 
persuasion should use theorisation, because it impersonalises a case. 
The way in which this 'theorisation' proceeds (or should proceed) 
will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs. 
Ka.t VOJ.LL~W Ka.t ovoJ.La.~w: a pompous introduction of the definition 
of poetry; vop.£~w emphatically stresses what he, the speaker, thinks 
of poetry; it introduces a convention, in the way that a law (vop.- os) 
can be considered as a convention. 
TIJv 1rot'T]O'l.v ••• ll-€'·Ypov: a definition of poetry, which introduces the 
first example; scholars, by paying too much attention to the meaning 
of the definition, have not realised that the definition itself has its 
own independent value. Schiappa has recently observed that "Helen 
may be our earliest example of the practice of explicating precisely 
what a particular word means in one's own discourse" (1999 p.127). 
It is the last part of Schiappa's statement that interests us more; for 
in his "own discourse", G. wishes to show that poetry is primarily a 
kind of .\oyos-. Metre then is not a determinant factor as far as the 
raw material of poetry is concerned; it is simply the formal element 
that turns a speech into poetry. That the emphasis is placed here 
upon speech also emerges through the analogous wording in the 
discussion of incantations. There, as here, it is the verbal aspect of 
spells that preponderates (8~d. .\oywv). At any rate, it is the drastic 
157 
impact of AO')'OS upon the soul that G. wishes to exemplify through 
the paradigms of poetry and incantations. An unavoidable question: 
does the confinement of poetry to mere metrical speech entail a 
scornful view of poetry on the part of G.? Is he deliberately - and 
this is perhaps more serious - unqderestimating poetry, so that the 
new genre represented by him should emerge (as Dodds explicitly 
states 1959, p.325)? My view is that G.'s line of argumentation does 
not require here a distinction between genres on the basis of the 
presence of the absence of a formal element such as metre. 
Although from the phrase 'poetry is speech with metre' one may 
infer (if metre is taken in the wider possible manner, so as to include 
poetical mannerisms in general, see Segal 1962, p. 150 n. 102, who 
allows for that possibility) that poetry is nothing more than a kind of 
speech, there can be no better demonstration of how other kinds of 
speech can partake of poetical formalities than one's own 
participation in the performance of He!. itself Acute, or even 
commonsense hearers of He!., could hardly overlook G.'s poetical 
style, as it is well attested by later literature (see Introduction; 
poetical style is explained by Aristotle as an effort of ancient 
speakers to balance the unimportance of the subject-matter with 
poetical expression Rhet. 1, 1404a24-27). There can be little doubt, 
then, that G. aspires to invoke through his speech (or rather through 
this form of speech) the emotions that he will soon present as 
invoked by poetry. In Segal's words (1962, p.127) "Gorgias, in fact, 
transfers the emotive devices and effects of poetry to his own prose, 
and in so doing he brings within the competence of the rhetor the 
power to move the psyche by those supernatural forces which 
Damon is said to have discerned in the rhythm and harmony of the 
formal structure of music". It would not be surprising, though this is 
mere speculation, if some day we learned that apart from reading 
and commenting on poetry (cp.frs.23-25), G., by practising his 
compositional skills, composed some poetical pieces as well. 
A similar conception of poetry to the one depicted here occurs in 
Isokrates' Evagoras 10-11, where it is claimed that if one does away 
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with J-LErpOV in poetical language, then our esteem for poetry will 
soon be seriously undermined. Another similar context is to be 
found in Plato's Gorgias 502c5-7; there, it is also stressed that, if 
one strips a piece of poetic creation of melody, rhythm, and metre, 
what is left over is speech (cp. also the description of lyric poetry in 
Rep. 398d1, and the interesting experiment performed by D. Hal. in 
De Compo 26 on Simonides 543 PMG). The view that poetry is 
merely speech wrapped with formal elements is refuted by Aristotle 
in his Poetics 1447b 13-16: 7TATJV oL Q.VeplIJ7TOi yE avVc1.7TrOVrEe; rqJ 
J-LErpov ro 7TOLE~V, eAEYEL07ToLOve;, rove; Se €7T07TOWVS- OVOJ-Lc1.~OV(7LV, 
OUX We; Kura ri]v J-LiJ-LTJow 7ToL7J'T'(l.e;, aAAa KOLVfj KUTa ro J-LErpov 
7TPOOUyopEvovrEe;. , on the count that although both Homer and 
Empedocles composed texts in verse, TOV J-Lev 7TOL rrriJv SiKULOV 
a7ToKuAE~V, rov Se </JVOWAOyOV J-LiiAAOV 17 7TOLTJT-ryV 
It is also worth mentioning that several scholars (pohlenz, 
Rostagni and most importantly Cataudella. all cited by Untersteiner 
1954, p. 127 n.53, who follows them) have thought that Gorgias 
does not refer here to poetry as a whole, but solely to tragedy 
(contra Lanata 1963 and Bona 1974). This view, which is certainly 
rooted in the verbal similarities of the following lines with some 
passages of Aristotle's Poetics (some scholars have actually thought 
that G. anticipates in He!. 9 Aristotle's theory of Kc1.8upOLe;; see 
comments ad loc.) is obviously wrong. First, because tragedy would 
normally be expected to be described as a spectacle, whereas G. 
immediately after the definition of poetry uses the participle 
aKOVOVTae; (as far as I know, this conspicuous point has never been 
detected so far). Secondly, because in the definition of poetry G. 
explicitly says 'poetry as a whole' (Ci7Tuauv), which means poetry in 
its entirety, poetry in its different kinds (cp. PL Ion 532c 8-9: 
7TOLTJTLKTJ yap 7TOV eonv ro OAOV). Thirdly, because the emotions 
invoked by poetry in the human soul, as they are described in what 
follows, are not the monopoly of tragedy, unless one considers 
superficial word-affinities with the Poetics as a fum ground for 
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valid comparisons. Fourthly, I do not see why tragedy, and only 
tragedy, should be described as 'speech with metre', when it is well-
known that every single piece of ancient Greek poetical creation is 
metrical. The identification of G.'s general reference to poetry with 
the genre of tragedy is clearly another concomitant of the view that 
he is putting forward theories which are not otherwise discernible in 
his texts. 
One more view should be added to what has already been said; 
that of de Romilly (1973; see also Segal 1962, p.128: "the divine 
inspiration of the poet ... plays little part in the actual poiesis for 
Gorgias"). Through a thorough examination of earlier tradition, de 
Romilly concluded that a change m the standpoint from which 
poetry was traditionally viewed IS observable in He!. More 
particularly, she points out that poetry is depicted in He!. as the 
product of human craftsmanship (r€xV'']), it is not inspired by divine 
powers or the Muses. This view has been refuted by MacDowell, 
who claims that "the inference [sc. de Romilly's] is shaky, because 
the words EVe€O~ and r€xvu~ 10 show that, for Gorgias, a T€XV7J is 
not incompatible with divine inspiration" (1982, p.37). It should 
also be noted that ,\6yoS" is not presented as the product of human 
skill before paragraph 11 (from this point, and until paragraph 14, 
several kinds of speakers emerge: abstract reference to those who 
persuade 11; Paris implied 12, astronomers, 'rhetors', participants in 
philosophical conflicts 13). Before 11, it is logos in its endogenous 
potential that is focused on. 
aKOlJOV'TUS: poetry is, of course, m Greek culture primarily 
performed and recited, not read in libraries and studies (see Gentili 
1998, pp.4-5; cpo PI. Rep. 603b 7-8 7] KUL Kurd. ri]v ciKO-r,V, 7]V 8-r, 
1TO£7]a~v OV0f-La.'0f-L€V,-). The oral performance of poetry, usually in the 
form of 'folk-songs', was still current in Greece - and elsewhere of 
course - until very recently; one may be reminded of Erotokritos, a 
composition still recited by older people in Crete. 
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ei.<TilA8€: throughout He!. a common pattern is used when emotions 
are described; here words penetrate into humans and they affect 
their souls. This pattern, anachronistically speaking, is basically 
'behaviouristic', in the sense that the words of poetry represent a 
stimulus which bring about certain psychological reactions, which 
manifest themselves through physical "symptoms" (shuddering, 
tears etc.; see Segal 1962, Lanata 1963 note ad loc., pp.107f., 
Mourelatos 1982, 229-230, the first to use the term 'behavioral' in 
explaining He!. 14, although he fails to observe that the same pattern 
is used in 15-19). This 'psychosomatic' pattern (to indulge in 
modem medical terminology) also recurs in the discussion of the 
impact of vision upon the soul in 15-19 (see Introduction), so that 
we may safely claim that it forms the foundation stone of G. 's 
'theorisation' in Hel. In connection with this structure we should 
examine the verb €lcrijAe€, in relation to other expressions describing 
the S + soul process. In 1 ° the incantation 'meets' or 'is unified 
with' (au'YY~yvop.€v7J) the opinion of the soul, in 13 persuasion 
approaches to logos (7Tpoawuaa); in 15 vision 'moulds' (nJ7Tou-rar,) 
the soul, in 16 vision 'proceeds', 'comes' (€AeOuaa) presumably to 
the soul, in 17 vision 'engraves' (€veypaz/1€v) the images of things 
seen on what we may roughly render as mind (<ppov7Jp.a). As far as 
AOyoS' is concerned, there is always a mobile element (poetry, 
incantations, persuasion) which tends to approach the soul and enter 
it, whereas in the case of vision there is a more static process of 
stamping. This is understandable if we are reminded that the 
flexibility of AOY0S', indispensable for his mobility, is guaranteed by 
G. in his definition of AOyoS' in 8: speech is an all-mighty ruler with a 
minute, almost invisible body. AOYoS' then enters the human body 
physically, carrying emotional load. 
q,PLKl1 1t'epLq,O~OS ••• q,I.A01t'ev&rls: notice the sound-play. With a 
construction of three nouns with three adjectives G. brings out both 
the emotions and the physical manifestations evoked by poetry (see 
Segal 1962, p.124-25). It has been though that G. here anticipates 
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Aristole's Poetics; there is little doubt, that prima facie terms used 
in this context are reminiscent of Aristotle's Poetics. In 1453b 4-5 
for instance cppiTTELV Kat. eAEE'iV coexist, whereas in the 'definition' 
of tragedy he claims that Ka.eapO'LS is attained through €AEOS and 
cpo{3os. The superficial wording similarities being asserted, we may 
move to the examination of those who move a crucial, if dangerous 
step further. Pohlenz (1920, p.142-78) pointed out the affinities of 
the description of poetry here with tragedy. Anticipation of the 
'Ka.eapO'Ls-theory' by G. is also accepted by Duncan (1938, p.412) 
and Nestle (1908, pp.561-62). A clearly circular argument can be 
traced in Untersteiner (1961, p.99) when he maintains that through 
these words it becomes evident that "G. pensa alIa tragedia" (he 
cites S ss, p.85). Wollgraff (1952, p.93 n.5) seems to be able to 
reach the conclusion that Aristotle makes use of G.'s cpo{3os (=cppLKTJ) 
and EAEOS, and not the word 7TOeOS. This summary of views is enough 
to show the fragility of the arguments put forward by scholars. 
Furthermore, they all postulate that G. is referring to tragedy, which 
as we have shown is shaky, to say the least. Similar emotions to 
those presented here can be invoked in human soul through other 
kinds of poetry as well. Let us compare Hel. with Plato's Ion 535c-
d: 
The performer 
EyW yap o-rav EAELVOV -n AEYW, oaKpuwv Ej1-7TLj1-7TAaV'TaL j1-0V ot 
OcpeaAj1-o[' (hav 'TE cpO{3EPOV 7] OELVOV, OpeaL at 'TpLXES Za-raV'TaL V7TO 
cpo{3ov Kat. T, KapoLa 7TT]Oq.. 
Sokrates then asks Ion the rhapsode if he has realised that he 
provokes within the audience the same emotions; here is Ion's reply: 
The audience 
KaL j1-aAa KaAWs- oloa' KaeOpW yap €Ka.a-rO'TE aV'TOlJs avw8Ev a7TO 'TOU 
{37}j1-a'Tos KAa.OV'Ta.S 'TE KaL OELVOV Ej1-{3AE7TOV'TaS KaL O'Vveaj1-~ouv'Tas 
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T07s A€yOP.€VO~S. O€'i yap P.€ Kal. aq;oop' aVTo'is TOV vouv 7TpOaEX€~v' 
Ws ecl.v p.ev KAaOVTas athovs Kae[aw, aUTOS y€Aaaop.a~ dpyUpwv 
>..ap.{3avwv, ecl.v oe Y€>"WVTas, aUTOS KAavaop.a~ dpyVp~ov d7TOMVs. 
In this dialogue Sokrates talks with Ion the rhapsode about 
poetry; a few lines earlier a clear reference has been made to the 
contents of Ion's repertory: recitation of Homeric epic and 
explanation of it. There is nothing then obstructing us from 
contending that it is epic that may create the same emotions and the 
same reactions. As Heath (1987, p.7) has pointed out, in Hei. 9 
"there must be a tacit limitation to the 'serious' forms, tragedy and 
epic". 
Those entertaining the hypothesis that G. anticipates Aristotle's 
Kaeapa~s are manifestly on the wrong, because they explain it by 
projecting on it a notion whose meaning is still unknown to us: 
unfortunately, Aristotle never explains what the meaning of 
Kaeapa~s is. There is only one element that both G. and Aristotle 
have in common: the emphasis that they lay on 'pity and fear' as 
emotions that are distinctly engendered by tragedy (and according to 
G. poetry in general; cpo Russel 1981, p.23). But the emphasis laid 
on this pair of emotions (along with 7TOeOS q;~A.07T€Ve7JS) is not 
inaugurated by G. Homer is certainly aware of the power of poetry 
to offer pleasure by making people experience negative emotions 
(cp. Od. 15.339-400,23.301-8; see also Heath 1987, pp.11-15, esp. 
p.11, and Macleod 1982, pp.4-8). 
q,ptK'TJ 1Tepl.q,O~os: the first word literally means 'shuddering', and it 
thus denotes the external manifestation of fear (cp. Soph. E1. 1408, 
Trach. 1044; for occurrences of the words of this context in prose 
cpo Thiele 1901, p.238). The adjective, normally attributed to 
humans to denote intense fear, is attested combined with fear in 
Aiskh. Supp. 736, as MacDowell observes (1982, p.37; 7T€p£q;O{3ov 
p.' EX€~ Tap{3os). 
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EAEOS 1TOAU SaK pUS: the nOlID signifies the emotion of 'pity', 
'sympathy' for the sufferings of another person. In Ion 535c6 EAEOS 
also brings tears (cp. 7 where G. invites us to 'sympathise' with 
Helen). For 1TOAVOUKPVS cpo Eur. El.126: 1TOAVOUKPVV aooveiv. 
1To8os <pI.A01TEvth1S: MacDowell defines the nOlID (folIDd only in A, 
which is of course correct; X has ~£AOS) as "longing for a person 
absent or dead" (1982, p.37; for a longer discussion see Segal 1962, 
p.124). For this function of poetry cf. PI. Phil. 48a5-6 'leis 'IE 
note supra. MacDowell observes that the word is lIDparalleled 
elsewhere before Ploutarlchos (1982, p.37). 
, , ,'\ '\ , ,I~_" ' , , ", " ' th E1T a.J\AO'TPI.WV",,\,,v;(11: E1TL governs EV7VXWLS KUL OVa-rrPUYLULS; e 
meaning is that through poetic discourse the soul experiences 
emotions of its own in the joy or the sorrow of strangers. Poetic 
speech thus makes us react as if the sufferings of others are our own 
sufferings and more importantly it forces us to partake of their 
emotional state. It reminds us thus of the Platonic idea of jLE8E~LS, as 
it is presented in Ion 535c, where the rhapsode admits that when he 
recites a passage from the epics he has the feeling that he is situated 
in the place where the action recited by him takes place. We may 
also compare the Republic 605d 3-5, where we read: olae' on 
XU£POjLEV 'IE KUt. €VOOV7ES ryjLfis UV70VS E1TOjLE8u O'UjL1TCl.axOV7E') KUt. 
a-rrOVoa.'OV7ES €1TULVOUjLEV Ws- ayu80v 1TOL7]7TJV, OS av ryjLfis 0 n 
10 
a.t 'Yap ev8EOI. ••• 'YI.Vov-ra.l.: 'divine, word-incantations, bring pleasure 
and remove misery'; G. turns to verbal magic. According to de 
Romilly (1975, ch.1) the function of poetry, as it is developed by G., 
is analogous to that of magic and she goes on to suggest that "he 
was deliberately shifting magic into something rational" (p.20). 
MacDowell (1982, p.38) claims that the "the connection between 
them [sc. poetry and magic] is somewhat overstated by de Romilly" 
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(criticised by Wardy 1996, p. 161 n.24). It is certain that poetry and 
incantations are connected in the respect that they both exemplify 
the power of their vehicle, that is ,\6/,0s-; they both affect the human 
soul, and they both are divine, as far as their deeds are concerned 
(this is guaranteed in 8 and at any rate this is G.'s demonstrandum). 
That poetry employs incantatory tropes is shown by de Romilly, but 
it is otherwise not explained or even implied by G., unless we are 
ready to commit ourselves to de Romilly's view that G.'s style is a 
rationalised use of magical features, serving his practical need for 
persuasiveness. This, although it is not unlikely, cannot be proved in 
any way, and it is wise to bear in mind that Plato frequently presents 
rhetoric as a kind of incantatatory speech (see below). Magic was 
largely used by people with the purpose of attracting the attention of 
their beloved, or of destroying a love-affair. When compared to the 
paradigm of poetry, incantations could have been closer to the 
knowledge of G.'s audience concerning practices followed by 
everyday people. €1Tcpa'lj ('incantation') belongs to magIc 
terminology, it denotes the 'spell', and it is Ev8eos- because it appeals 
to divine power (Segal, however, 1962, p.128, based on the 
repetition of the word r€XV7] in 10, 13 - see notes on 9 as well -
emphasises the effects of ,\6/,os as a human product; see also de 
Romilly (1975), but I doubt that G. denies here the divine origins of 
spells; human ability to affect the soul in the (divine) way that 
incantations do is one thing and their divine nature quite another). 
For one more time G. insists on the power of speech to act, and 
interact with the human soul. Incantations may be curative: cpo PI. 
Charm. 155e5, auro J.LEV eL7] <pUMOV n, €mJ,Jo-ry O€ ns E1TL r0 
<papJ.LaKqJ d7], 7}v ei J.LEV ns €1TCi·ool. aJ.La KaL xp0ro aur4), 
1TaVra1TaaI.V vYl.a 1TOW!. ro <papJ.LaKOV avev OE rijs- E1TqJOf]S ouoev 
o<pe'\os eL7] rou <pu'\'\ov; opposed to drastic curative methods in 
Soph. Aj.581-2; for their use by the Pythagoreans, cpo 58Dl,13DK. 
Affinities with He!. 's wording, in connection with the function of 
incantations see Eur. Hipp. 478-9 elaLv 0' €1Tcpaal. Kat. '\61'01. 
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8EAK-rr]PW~' / 4>aVfpETa[ n ripOE 4>a.Pf-LaKOV voaov; this passage 
integrates terminology which appears in the final paragraph on 
AOYOS (14), which explicitly brings in medicine and which largely 
draws upon what is said here. Plato uses €1Tq;O-r], so as to describe the 
impact of rhetoric on audiences; cpo PI. Euthyd. 290al-5, where 
incantations are classified: some of them appease the beasts and 
cure, whereas some others appease (K-r]ATJa~s) and console audiences 
in civic congregations: T] f-LEv yap TWV E1T(pOWV EXEWV TE Kat 
4>aAayyiwv ... i] OE TWV O~KaaTWV TE Kat. EKKATJaWaTWV Kat. TWV 
aAAWV 0XAWV K-r]ATJaLs TE Kat 1Tapaf-Lv8£a TVyxa.VE~ ovaa; SO 
Thrasymakhos is said (Phdr. 267c=B6DK) to have had the ability to 
control the emotional reactions of audiences: opyLaa~ TE av 1TOAAOVS 
af-La 8E~VOS aVTJp yeYOVE Kat 1Ta.A~v WPYWf-L€VO~S E1TC;1.0WV KTJAE7.v; cpo 
also Xen. Mem. 2.6.12-13: aMas OE nvas oIaBa E1T(poaS; OUK aAA' 
7]Kovaa f-LEV on [JEP~KM7S 1TOMaS E1TiaTaTO, as E1T4owv rij 1TOAE~ 
E1TO£E~ aUTTJv 4>~AE7.V aUTOV (on magic and G. see Parry 1992, 
pp.151-153) 
cruyywop.E.V'T\ 'Yap ••• -Mjs E'Irq>Of}S: 'when the power of the incantation 
meets the opinion of the soul'; the incantation comes close to the 
soul in a rather physical manner, as the participle attests (the 
possibility that the imagery draws upon sexual intercourse cannot be 
ruled out). For ovvaf-L~S of incantation, cpo PI. Charm. 15Th; see 
Untersteiner 1954, p.128 n.60. The word is picked up in 14, as AOYOV 
ouvaf-L~S' in an analogy with medicine. In the light of that context, 
ouvaf-L~S can denote the action, the potency of incantations, in the 
way that we are referring to the action or the potency of a drug. 
E.ee.A~€: a gnomic aorist; Verdenius observes that "when Homer uses 
the verb 8eAYE~v of human beings, it refers to skilful speeches 
usually consisting oflies" (1981, p.122 with examples). Note that in 
Eur. Hipp.478 we find the expression A6yo~ 8EAKTT,PWL. 
'YO'TJ'T€Lq.: 'sorcery'; we have doubtful evidence (Test.3) that G. was 
initiated in the art of magic by Empedocles (aUTOS 1TapEiTJ TqJ 
'Ef-L1TEOOKAE7. y07]'TEVovn). 
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,),O'Tl'T"EI.a.S ••• EUfY11V'Ta.I.: a demanding construction; Segal (1962, p.112) 
takes it with ifmx:fJs ... a-rran7f1-a:ra. Another line of inquiry suggests 
that o~aaal T'€XVal. are particular arts of f1-aYELa and YO'TfT'ELa, and they 
define them through speculation (i.e. Untersteiner 1954, p.116; see 
also p.128 n.64 'poetry and artistic prose' and so Lanata 1963, 
p.201; this is refuted by Bona 1974, p.20. Verdenius takes it to refer 
to "the art of E"lnp06s and that of the orator" 1981, p.122 n.37). 
MacDowell (1982, p.37) gives the most satisfactory solution: "the 
two genitives define the two T'€XVal.: i.e. 'there exists an art of 
sorcery and an art of magic"'. According to this reading G. says: 'In 
addition (DE), two arts, that of sorcery (Y07JT'ELa), and that of magic, 
have been invented'; the rest of the construction explains the two 
arts. If this explanation is to be accepted, the presentation of YO'TfT'ELa 
along with f1-aYELa may seem rather abrupt, and the information that 
two arts have been invented may appear as a redundant and 
incoherent insertion. But one should bear in mind that they are both 
now elevated to arts, and that f1-aYELa is an uncommon word in 
Greek literature (this may be the first occurrence of the word, unless 
Timotheus 51. 102) antedates G. At any rate, G. says here 
something new, for he classifies both sorcery and magic as arts, 
although the fact that this is a novelty is not prima facie 
understandable. This formal classification is stressed by owaal. 
T'€XVal., (which shows that these two T'EXVal. are distinguishable, but 
G. does not bother to explain why they are); G. is fond of using 
D~aaoS', and then explaining it (cp. Pal.: Dwawv DE T'OV'TWV QVT'WV 2, 
D~a o~aawv Vf1-LV €7Tl.DE£~W T'po-rrwv 6, o~aawv yap T'OVT'WV EVEKa 
-rra.VT'ES' -rra.vT'a -rrpa.T'ovaal.v, :ry KEPDOS' T'l. f1-ET'l.0 VT'ES :ry ~77f1-£av 
cPEVYOVT'ES' 19; Epitaphios: Kat owaa aaK7}aaVT'ES' f1-a.;tI.O"T'a wv OEI., 
yvwf1-7]v ... ). 
11 
oaol. oe o<Yous ••• -rrt..a.aa.ViES: 'how many have persuaded how many 
people ... ', not 'all those who persuade ... '. G., in this particular 
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case, does not generalise, as some modem scholars do; it is wrong to 
see a Gorgian 'theory' of deception everywhere, especially when G. 
makes careful announcements: some persuaders prefer falsification, 
some do not; in any case G. seeks to show that Helen was the victim 
of a malicious persuasion, and it would have been foolish to 
emphasise the honesty of her seducer's speech (MacDowell 1982, 
note ad lac., compares the construction with Palatine Anthology 7. 
740. 6 yui~ D(T(r7]S oaaov €xc:r.. JJ-0PLOV and Soph. Aj.923 OLOS" WV oZws-
€Xc:r..S", to show that "subtler authors employ this exclamatory 
polyptoton ... to express a contrast"; but it is a contrast brought out in 
Pal. 22 .. . TOWVTOS" WV TOLOVTOV KUT7JYoP€ls' a~wv yelp KUTUJJ-u8C:LV, 
OLOS" OLU Aeyc:r..S", Ws- dva~wS" dvu~£qJ). With the repetition of DaoS" G. 
refers to the-speech maker, the recipients of his speech and to the 
subjects of the speech itself. 
el. \-L€V 'Yd.p ••• ~v: <JvVOLaV> is Reiske's satisfactory addition; A has 
0JJ-0wS" ~v, and X DJJ-0WS" wv; in either case DJJ-0WS" does not give an 
appropriate meaning. G. clearly intends to contrast what happens 
(Tel vvv), that is lack of memory, judgment, and prognostication, 
with an ideal situation in which men, by possessing these qualities, 
would not have been the victims of a false speech. MacDowell 
(1982, note ad lac.) gives the simplest and thus more economical 
solution; he takes DJJ-0WS" as a dittography from the preceding 0JJ-0£WS-, 
and obelises it; 0JJ-0[WS- then gives the meaning 'not with the same 
intensity'. Sauppe' s ipraTu (after ° AOY0S") certainly smoothens the 
meaning, but it is palaeo graphically unjustified. Kerferd (1981, 
p.81), who seems to accept 0JJ-0r..oS", claims that "if men did possess 
knowledge, the logos would (visibly) not be similar (to that of 
which they possess the knowledge)". This thesis has been refuted by 
MacDowell mainly on the basis of textual points; but apart from his 
valid arguments, one should also add two more: a) Kerferd 1981, 
pp.81-2 (for scholars before him see Untersteiner 1954, p.128 n.65) 
foists on G. a distinction between 'opinion' and 'knowledge' 
(Untersteiner 1954, p. 116: " The contrast is not, as usually 
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believed, between truth and opinion ... but rather between two ways 
of knowledge: on the one side stands doxa ... on the other side is 
logos" and ''thus [logos] overcoming by an irrational ct the 
impossibility of acquiring objective knowledge ... "), which does not 
appear in Hel. (though it appears in Pal. i.e. 3), and which is a 
systematisation of scattered evidence (the opposition knowledge-
opinion is of course traced in Plato's Republic, for which see Annas 
1981,pp.190-216, and Plato elsewhere concedes what he calls 'true 
opinions', SagaL aJvrf1E'!s for which compare Menon 97 e-98a). In 
Pal. the distinction merely develops the argumentation and it is 
intended to question the reliability of the opponent (thus in 24 it is 
called a7TLO'"TafraTOV 7Tpayp.a), who relies upon Saga. Moreover, Saga 
is presented here as the common, not the only, existing human 
condition, as it is frequently taken to be. b) Kerferd (1981, p.80) 
transfers evidence from ONE, where it is admittedly claimed that 
A.ayoS' is different from things; but conclusions based on comparisons 
of G.' s texts are not safe. 
When we tum to the actual argument we find out that G. here 
clearly sets forth the state of mind of the audiences so that a 
deceptive A.ayoS' may be established. The potential of logos to 
persuade is not solely an intrinsic characteristic of it; audiences play 
an important role as well. But why the absence of these three 
abilities leads to the evil of Saga is not clarified. Probably G.' s 
thought is as simple as the following: most people lack critical 
approach to reality which is attained through memory of events of 
the past (offering a ground of experience), ability to judge present 
conditions, and finally the possibility to foresee possible 
developments of a certain issue on the basis of what given and 
present information dictates. 
a.Ma. vUV 'YE: MacDowell's aMG. vvv yE, which is closer to the Mss, 
gives the exact meaning. 
EU'TrOPWS €x.EI.: a further proof that G. does not mean that the 
acquisition of these qualities is unattainable. 
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introductory sentence becomes now 'most people on most issues'; 
again G. avoids saying everyone. The person who persuades is here 
absent, for he is the one who compels most men to resort to 06~a.. 
~v oo~a.v: 'opinion', for which, as Segal (1962, p.ll1) remarks, no 
alternative is offered. 
o-UIJ-~OUAOV: 'counsellor'; oo~a. is almost personified. 
€lhuX£a.LS: a lectio recentior for a1'1JX[a.~S", AX; Untersteiner (1961, 
p.102) prefers the latter reading and explains: "vuol dire che l' 
opinione porta a ou 'T'UX€iv, di modo che questo ou TUX€iv risulta 
<Tq,a.A€POV Ka.L d.~€~a.LOV, cioe i due aggetivi presentano valore 
prolettico"; but G.'s argument is that those who employ 86~a. as the 
product of misjudgment provides those who employ it with tentative 
and lame success. EU1'1JX[a.~S" has been accepted by Sykutris and most 
ofthe editors. 
o-UIJ-~OUAov ••• 'Tt'a.PExOV"ia.L: cpo Isok. 8.8 aAA' Ws- OO~7J p.ev xpwp.€vovS", 




a.L-n.a. ••• Ex€L: the text is heavily corrupt; only an ad 
sententiam restoration is possible. G. clearly seems to introduce the 
subject of persuasion, which according to him is as effective as 
natural violence and compulsion. I render this portion of the text as 
follows: 'what reason disallows us from believing that Helen has 
come because of speech, equally unwillingly, as if she had violently 
been seized? Persuasion makes one lose one's own reason; for 
although persuasion does not have the form of compulsion, it 
[persuasion] is as strong as it [compUlsion] is'. Some points: I 
remove vp.vovS" and I replace it with AOYWV because G. a few lines 
later says 'if it was speech that persuaded her. .. ', which seems to 
expand the analogy between persuasive speech and compulsion. I 
prefer oUX EKOV<Ta. instead of UKOV<Ta., because it fits better the MSS' 
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senseless reading UV ou veav ovuav. For efrJAae7] and v07]JLa instead 
of Al a De vovS", cpo 17 effJAauEv a 1>o{3oS" TO v07]JLa). 
Persuasion according to Buxton (1981, p.31; readers are referred 
to his detailed discussion of peitho; in this context only relevant 
aspects of it will be developed) "is a continuum within which divine 
and secular, erotic and non-erotic come together"; this dualism is 
apparent in Hel. (for depictions of her in art where Peitho is also 
present see Shapiro 1991, pp.190-8): speech is a great ruler who 
accomplishes divine deeds 8, persuasion is equally effective with 
'compulsion', already personified in 6, where it is listed among 
other divinities, but in 13, persuasion's potential to mould the soul 
will be exemplified through purely "secular" (to use Buxton's term) 
paradigms. 
A vital aspect of G. 's discussion of persuasion is that he equates 
it with violence (fi£a as opposed to 1TELeW is also discussed by 
Buxton, 1981, pp.58-62; see 0' Regan 1992, p. 14-5). This equation 
is rather radical (but see Pindar P.4.216-9 J1-aun~ 1TELeOVS", Aiskh. 
Ag. 385 (3LiiTal. TaAaLva IIELew, Eur. Hec.816 IIELew De rTJv 
rupavvov dVepW7rOLS" J1-ov7]v), because normally persuasion is viewed 
as a civilized, non-violent way of trying to make others consent to 
your intentions, whereas natural violence is considered as a means 
of making someone follow you unwillingly (see Aristotle's 
Eth.Eud.1224a 39 1] 1TELeW rij (3£q. Kat dvaYK7J dVnT£eETaL; notice 
that he places both 'violence' and 'compulsion' in opposition to 
'persuasion' as G. does). In Lysias 2. 19 it is the decisive element 
that illustrates the superiority of men over the conditions of the 
beast: 87]p£wv J1-Ev EPYOV Elval. iJ1T' dU7]AWV {3£q. KpaTE£.aeaL, 
dv8pW7rOI.S" De 1TPOa7JKELV VOJ1-lfJ J1-ev opLual. TO D£Kawv, AOYW DE 
1TELuaL; see also Isok. 3. 6, 4. 48, 15. 254; see also PI. Kriton 4ge-
51e, Xen. i\1em.1.2.10., Soph. Ant. 354f. Soph. Phil. 102-3 reads: TL 
D' ev 36AlfJ DE£. J1-c1.AAOV 7} 1TE£uavT' ayE LV; / ou J1-iJ 1T£87]Tal.· 1TpOS" 
{3£av D' OUK UV Aa{3oLS", where Odysseus seems not to recognise any 
effective way of taking Philoctetes' bow other than either 
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persuading or forcing him to surrender it. Herodotos brings evidence 
that when the Andrians refused to contribute money to the 
Athenians during the Persian Wars, Themistokles claimed wS' 7]KOLEV 
'Ae7]VUZOL 1TEP~ €WVTOVS' EXOVTES' ovo eEOVS' J1-EyaAovS', llELew 'IE KUI. 
'AVUYKU£ 7]V (interestingly enough Ploutarkhos Vito Them. 21 has Biu 
instead of 'AvaYK7]). 
It is clear, I hope, that persuasion in Hel., is not the civilized, 
non-violent and human canonical persuasion. Persuasion through 
words can be seen as a civilized means of making people adhere to 
one's views if and only if one is prepared to racognize in the 
recipients of logoi the possibility of free will. G., by equating 
persuasion to avaYK7], ultimately rules out the existence of this 
possibility, because, as Ostwald observes, "they [sc. avaYKuL] exert 
compulsion only because those affected by them perceive no viable 
alternative course of action is open to them" (1988, p.19). 
Persuasion is an art that 1TavTu yap v<p' UVT7] OOVAU OL' €KOVTWV, 
aM' ou oLa {3t.uS' 1TOLOZTO (PI. Phil. 58a-b; note that the emphasis is 
not on oLa {3t.uS' through violence, but on the enslavement). The 
willingness of the persuaded person to be persuaded can be opposed 
to the unwillingness of the victim of persuasion in Sappho PLF 
1.18: T£VU 07]i5TE 1TE£eW / .].auY7Jv [ES' aav <pLAOTaTU; T£S' a' IJJ / 
tJ/a]1T<p', aOLK7JEL; / KU]~ y[ ap ui <PEVYEL, TUXEWS' OLW~WL, /< ui OE 
owpu J1-TJ OEKET', aAAa OWaEL>, <at. OE I1-n dJ£AEL. TUXEWS' dJLAT,aEL / 
KOUK EeEAOWU>. The meaning is that persuasion is the only other 
power that can be equally effective as natural violence, not that 
persuasion is not violent. Plato (Phlb.58a-b) admittedly corresponds 
to what may be considered purely Gorgian: persuasion has the 
compulsive effects of physical violence. In Buxton's words 
"Gorgias propounded what amounts to the most radical confession 
of faith inpeitho known to us from Greece" (1981, p.53). 
(, 1T€l.aas ••• 1TOI.OU\-LE.VOl.s: no English word can accurately render the 
meaning of 1TE£eELV. Buxton (1981, pA8) observes that "the middle 
1T€t.6o\-Lul. can usually be translated by one of the three English words 
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'obey', 'trust' or 'believe'. All three have in common the notion of 
acquiescence in the will or opinions of another. Correspondingly, 
the active 1TEOl.8w, conventionally translated as 'persuade', can 
perhaps best be understood as a factitive, meaning 'get (someone) to 
acquiesce in (some belief or opinion)', or, more explicitly, 'get 
one's way over someone in such a way that they 1TE01.8EOoBUL'" (see 
also MacDowell 1982, p. 39). Persuasion is thus here presented as 
making the persuaded soul consent to what is said and act in the 
manner dictated by the persuader (since there is a chiasm avval.VEOUL 
- AEYO/kEVOI.S - m8Ea8al. - 1TOI.OV/kEVOI.S expressing the standard 
antithesis between word and deeds). ilv E1TEOLO'EV: G. theorises about 
A6yoS', so that generalisation is necessary; every persuaded soul is 
enslaved and bound from necessity. -TtVcl.'YKaO'E: cpo PI. Sph. /kETO. 
1T€1.80Vs dvaYKa£as. 
/) !-LEV ot;v 1TEOLaas ••• KaKws: G. reuses the passive/active VOIce 
interchange: passive voice for Helen (the victim), active voice for 
Paris (the wrongdoer), which further stresses the affinities of 
persuasion with physical violence. In this context, the subject of the 
active verbs is speech, whereas that of the passive voice the soul. 
Wardy (1996, p.43, following Adkins: see n.26 on p.161) claims 
that the " 'he' and 'she' in the last sentence refer indifferently to 
logoslParis, soullHelen". This may be true, and there is nothing to 
suggest that G. did not intend it to be construed in this manner. 
However, his disclaimer "the deliberate feminisation of the psyche 
plays on the Greek cultural assumption that the female as such is a 
passive object shaped by a dominating masculine force. Thus, 
perhaps, every male citizen who yields to rhetorical logos is 
comparable to a man ... whose masculinity is thereby humiliated: the 
successful orator performs physical rape" is beyond my imagination, 
and does not add much to the interpretation. Wardy (1996, p.161 
n.28), in corroborating his view, cites Dover's statement that, "It 
seems to have been felt that the boy who yielded had assimilated 
himself to a hetaira" (1974, p.2IS). But when 1T€L8w, G.'s actual 
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subject, is brought in we find out that it can be exercised by a 
woman as well: "a number of scholars have persisted in identifying 
Peitho exclusively with the pattern: man persuades woman. This 
quite simply flies in the face of the evidence" (Buxton 1981, p.37, 
who compares a passage from Athenaios where a prostitute from the 
temple of Aphrodite at Corinth is named Peitho), and concludes 
"Peitho was thought to be operative both in this and the reverse 
pattern". One may also be reminded of how Menelaos was 
'persuaded' not to kill Helen, when the latter exposed her breasts. 
f,LcL'T'"!'\V: 'unjustly', 'undeservedly'. 
13 
on 8' -TJ 1TEL6w ••• E'TU1Tc.OOa.'iO: 'that when persuasion meets speech, 
the soul is moulded by it ... '; the description of the process of the 
'moulding' of soul is once more physical (see note on 9; for the 
nJ1TOS-- metaphor see Segal 1962, p. 142 n.44). E71J1TWO"UTO is an 
aorist of experience; G. frequently uses gnomic aorists in He!., 
especially in passages where he argues by using 'theoretical' 
generalisation (E1TOL7]O"uv, €T€p!f;€ KuL €1T€LO"€ 13, EAV1T7]O"UV .•• 14). 
)(p-TJ f,LU6ELV: 'one should observe' (cp. Hdt.7.208 0 De TOUS- €~W 
€J.Luv8UV€ ••• KuL TO 1TA7j8os- EJ.Luv8uv€ ... ). Dies' addition (p.U8€LV 
OpWIITU) is redundant. G. brings in three examples from three 
situational contexts: the discourse of the 'astronomers', speeches 
from court-rooms, philosophical quarrels. In all these types of 
discourse persuasion is involved. Even 'scientific' speculation 
involves persuasion, and we are almost invited here to be reminded 
ofParmenides' appeal to Persuasion in 2.3-4. 
1TPW'iOV f,LEV: introduces the first example (D€VT€POIl De...TpLTOV 
<De»; G. always indicates the structure of his arguments. 
f,LE'iEWpoAOywv: 'astronomers', 'physical philosophers'; though the 
emphasis is on those who observe the universe, it may also include 
wider, interdisciplinary speculation, including physics, cosmogony, 
mathematics etc. G. is not referring to an activity which by his time 
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had declined; for, in spite of the fact that Thales, the proverbial 
astronomer (cp. AI. Clouds 180) who is said to have foreseen a solar 
eclipse (Hdt. 1.74) belongs to the early 6th century, Anaxagoras and 
Hippias (to mention two prominent figures) developed astronomical 
theories in the second half of the 5th century. Aristophanes' Clouds' 
main theme is modern intellectual activity. Sokrates is there 
presented as the head of a Thinkery CcPpovna-rf]pwv) where several 
disciplines are taught, one of which is astronomy. When first 
Sokrates appears in the play he pompously states that he 'observes 
the sun', and when Strepsiades asks him why he is sitting in a basket 
hanging from the ceiling he replies: OU yap av 7TOT€ / Eg7]iJpOV op8ws-
Ta fl.€TeWpa 7Tpa.Yfl.aTa / €l. fl.'" Kp€fl.a.(Jas- TO v07Jfl.a Kat. r7JV cPPOVTLoa 
(see Dover 1968, esp. pp. xxxvi-xxxvii). 
1"0. a:m.(J1"a Kal. Ci3"t..a ••• E1Tot"rrav: 'they made that which is 
otherwise unbelievable and unseen visible to the eyes of opinion'; 
the 'eye of opinion' belongs to the recipients of the logoi of the 
astronomers, and the changeable opinions belong to themselves. 
Judging from the argument from antinomy in ONB G. must be 
pointing at the views held by different philosophers; with the 
development of astronomy, a new 'theory' takes the place of the 
prevIOUS one. Ci'TT'l.(J1"a Kat Ci3"t..a: what the opinions of the 
astronomers refer to; a passage from Anaxagoras' 59A42 reads: 
7j~wv oe Kat. (JeATJv7JV Kat. mJ.vTa Q.(JTpa ~f.8ovs- €lvaL Efl.mJpOVS-
(JVfl.7T€pL~7JcP8evTas- V7TO ri]s- a1.8epos- 7T€pLcP0pas ... €lvaL oe rryv 
(J€~TJv7Jv KaTW1"epW 'IOU TJ~£ov 7T~7J(JLWT€POV TJfl.wv. V7T€peX€LV oe TOV 
7j~wv fl.€ye8€L rryv JI€~07TOVV7J(JOV. TO oe cPWs- r7JV (J€~TJV7JV 1'-7] rOWV 
€X€LV, a~~a a7TO 'IOU TJ~[ov ... None of the remarks made by 
Anaxagoras can be ascertained through human senses; what he says 
can only become clear if one is ready to accept his rationalistic 
approach. The opposition between the a07J~a Kat. a7TL(JTa of 
intellectual rationalisation and commonsensical views is, of course, 
exploited in Aristophanes Clouds; in 376-78, for instance, Sokrates, 
the Aristophanic representative of intellectualism, 'explains' to 
Strepsiades how a thunderbolt is created: when the clouds are filled 
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with much water they collide with each other and burst forth. 
Strepsiades' 'eye of the opinion' is unskilled, and he offers his own 
explanation: XWrav XE~W, KOJ-LLMj {3povrq., 1Ta1Ta1Ta7T7T(i.~, 6'xrrr€p 
EK€ZVaL (when I shit, what a thunderbolt, just like they do 391). 
<jxz.l.ve:oBal.: 'to become visible', 'make something appear'; it would 
be tempting to assume that G. is playing with a second possible 
meaning of the infinitive, since cpa£V€a8aL can also denote the rise of 
a star (cp. Hom. n.1.477, 2.456, Od.2.1; Hes. Works and Days 598 
€vr' av 1TpWra cpavfj a8Evo~' Qp£wvos). 
'rous cLva.YKaI.OlJs ••• cLywvas: in this second example the agent of the 
speech is absent, so that the meaning of the word d.vaYKa£ou~ is 
unclear (cp. 10 a[ yap EVe€OI. DLa AOYWV €1TI:pDal.). Two lines of 
interpretation have been suggested (see also Buchheim 1989, 
p.169): a) 'the persuasive argumentation that compels the hearers to 
accept it' (Melikoff-Tolstoy 1929, p.28), or (b) 'argumentation used 
under compulsion' as opposed to the speeches of the astronomers 
and the philosophers which are unbound from necessity (Immisch 
1927, Sykutris 1928, MacDowell, 1982, pp.39-40, Gagarin 1994, 
p.67 n.26; Wardy 1996, pp.162-3 thinks that it affords an 
interpretation combining both meanings). (b) is also accepted by 
Diels who brings in Pl.17zt.172e aUK , ...... \ 1" ,., 
€YXWP€L 1T€PL au av 
, e ' , , ~ -LJ " " " " "''>' 
€1TL UJ-L7]o"(JJ(]'L rau~ /\oyau~ 1TOL€LauaL, a/\/\ avaYK7]v €XWV a aVrLoI.KO~ 
ECPEC1ITJK€V. (a) could be corroborated from 12, where persuasion is 
related to compulsion; but if we turn to Pal. 4, we find out that the 
situation in which the hero is entangled is described as 1Tapov~ 
d.v6.YK7]~, that is he is under compulsion to defend himself; moreover 
DXAO~ in this context can be something more than a mere mob, since 
in Grg. 453b6, 455a4 Plato refers, not without contempt, to juries as 
DXAOI.. Both intepretations are strong enough, although (b) seems to 
me to fit the context better. 
E.LS ••• OXAOV: a fine antithesis (cp. 4 where Helen's one body attracted 
many male bodies); speech has the power to unify people in a 
consent through pleasure. DXAOS" is unjustifiably taken by 
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Untersteiner (1961, note ad lac.) to refer to the Eliastai (see the 
preceding note). 
€.'Tept¥E Kal. E.1l'EL<TE: cpo 5. 
TExVTJ ypacf>eLs ••• Aex.8ELS: Immisch wrongly adopts ETPEif;E (see Segal 
1962, p.149 n. 93). The homoeteleuton underlines that T€XV7J in 
some cases is the counterpart of truth. The common assumption 
about G. is that he was entirely uninterested in truth. This is not 
correct; what G. says is that a realistic approach to common 
experience shows that in some cases at least the form of a speech is 
directly related to its persuasiveness (palamedes is the first obvious 
example). At any rate, even seen under the light of opportunism, 
factual truth provided chiefly by witnessess is undoubtedly the most 
convincing means of persuasion (see MacDowell 1982, pAO, 
Gagarin 1994, p.58). ypa<j>ELS: when G. was composing He!., 
writing was already used in law-court speeches' composition (see 
Gagarin 1994, p.60-3, and 1997, pA-5 and 32-4). In Against the 
Sophists, Alkidamas openly criticises the using of writing in early 
rhetoric; at any rate, G.'s teaching of rhetoric must have been 
considerably enhanced by writing, so that we can hardly be 
persuaded by Aristotle's disclosure that G.'s teaching was solely 
based on memorisation of model-speeches (see fr.14, with notes). 
Examination of structure and formal elements, emphasis on the 
arrangement of reasoning and the transition from the one argument 
to the other, these along with other technical aspects of rhetorical 
skill must have been taught more efficiently with the use of writing. 
<j>LAO<T6<j>wv Mywv cl.Jl-LAAaS: 'in the debates of philosophical 
speeches'; rfnA6aocpo<; qualifies A6ywv (cp. PI. Phdr.257b5-6 dAA' 
CbTAw<; 7rpo<; 'EpWTU f1-ETCl cpLAoa6cpwv A6ywv TOV {3£ov 7rOL frrUL). 
Several scholars have endeavoured to identify particular 
philosophers; Untersteiner (1961, p.105) follows Bux (1941, pA05) 
who thought that G. refers to the Eleatics. Dies (1913, p.205) and 
Nestle (1940, p.326) think that G. has in mind eristic philosophers, 
Diirnmler (1889, p.35) prefers Sokrates himself. But it is not 
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necessary to identify any specific philosopher; G. wishes to 
emphasise the readiness with which philosophers put one view aside 
and employ a new one in their discussions, so as to fulfil the need 
for new arguments (so correctly SUss 1910, p.S4, MacDowell 1982, 
p.40). 
YVWIl-1'JS Tci.xos: Immisch rightly suggests that YVWfl-TJ does not equal 
8ogu; it is the 'organ of thought' as in Heraclitus (1927, p.33; cpo PI. 
Lg. 672b). YVWfl-TJ can be construed as the process of the production 
of a view and the view itself Flexibility in thought is what really 
distinguishes philosophers from astronomers and the more static 
speech-makers. This suggests that G. has in mind philosophical, oral 
discourse. 
, 'Q' , 
€UIl-€Ta.t-'0I\OV ••• 1T1.CTTI.V: the attachment to a (still-born) VIew IS 
changeable because of quick thinking. The passage is reminiscent of 
Menon, in connection to what is known as 'true opinion'; in that 
context 'opinions' are compared to the statues ofDaidalos (97e-98a 
KUAOV TO xpfJfl-a Kat. 7TaVT' ayaea. €pya'oVTa~· 7TOAVV O€ xpOVOV OUK 
€e€AOVa~ 7Tupafl-€V€~V, aAAa. Opa.7T€T€VOVa~ €K rijs ifroxjjs rou 
aVepW7TOV). €U\-L€Ta.~OI..OV: a rare word, which is normally used of 
human character CIsok.IS. 243, Xen. Hell. 2.3.92; but cpo PI. 
Rep.S03c9: OUKOUV ra. f3€f3a~a 0.15 mura 7jeTJ Kat. OUK €uf-L€raf3oAa). 
14 
I..0'Y0V: the word is used twice in the sentence here it means 
'relation'. 'The impact of speech upon the order of soul is analogous 
to that of the order of drugs upon the nature of body' (drugs / body: 
logos / soul ). The comparison is more complicated than it appears 
to be; its second element could hastily be identified with medicine, 
but the shadow of magic has not been removed. The magical 
terminology of 10 is largely reiterated, especially in the description 
of the emotions experienced by human soul through speech. The 
<papf-LUKOv, a double-edged word, also attests to that, since it can 
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either be a medicine or a poison; the most poisonous function of 
speech is 'malicious persuasion' (1TELeOl. nVL Kwdj). To this respect 
l\oyoS' also acquires a double function: it is both a <j;apfl-aKov and a 
poison. So when Segal claims that "the processes of psyche are 
treated ... as being susceptible to the same kind of control and 
manipulation by a rational agent as the body by the drugs of the 
doctor" (1962, p.l04; see also de Romilly 1973, p.162, 1975, p.2l) 
he fails to see the other side of the same coin. A similar view is also 
traced in Demokritos' B31, cited by Segal (1962, p.l04): laTpLKij 
1TaeWV a<j;aLpEiTa£.. MacDowell (1982, p.40) cites Isokrates 8.39, who 
perhaps was influenced by G.: TWV fl-EV 1TEPI. TO o-wfl-a VOOlJfl-aTWV 
1ToM.al. 8Epa1TEl.aL Kal. 1TaVTOOa1Tal. TOl.S' laTpolS EVP7JVTaL, Tal.S' OE 
if1vXal.S' Tal.S' ayvoovo-aLS' Kal. YEfl-Ovo-aLS' 1TOV7JpWV €1T£.eVfl-LWV OVOEV 
eo-nv aNtO <j;apfl-aKov 1Tl\ijV l\oyoS', see 15. 180-5. l\oyoS' is still a 
fundamental element of psychotherapy, and Antiphon could have 
been the first to establish a clinic: En 0' WV 1TpOS' rij 1TOL'ljo-EL TEXV7/l1 
al\v1T£aS' avvEa-r7}o-aTo, WO"1TEP TOI.S' VOo-OVo-LV n 1Tapa. TWV laTpwv 
8 ' ~ I 'v 'e ' v, , Epa1TE£.a V1TapXEL' EV n.OpLV <p TE KaTaO-KEvaO-fl-EVOS' OLK7Jfl-a n 1Tapa 
-rTJv ayopa.v 1TpoEypmpEv, on ovvaTaL Totk I\V1TOVfl-EVOVS' OLa. I\oywv 
8Epa1TEvELv, Kal. 1TVVeav0fl-EvoS' Ta.S' al-r£aS' 1TapEfl-VeEI.TO TOVS' 
Kafl-vOVTaS'. vOfl-£~wv OE -rTJv TEXV7JV el\aTTw i] Kae' aVTov Elva I.. €1T1. 
P7]T0PLKijv a1TETpa1T7] (Antiphon A 6 DK). The analogy 
medicine/speech is obvious (WcnrEP TOI.S' VOo-OVo-LV ... ), and it is also 
clear that Antiphon focused on the cure of 'depressive syndromes'. 
Medicine is also used by Plato as the antipode of rhetoric; in Grg. 
456b Plato has G. claim that rhetoric is superior to any other art, 
because it is through rhetoric that he persuades the patients to accept 
the hardships of curative methods used by doctors. In 465el 
Sokrates concludes that rhetoric is for the soul what the products of 
unhealthy cookery are for the body, and this cookery has already 
been defined as the opposite of medicine, in the way that hair-
styling should be opposed to gymnastic ("Plato was not the first to 
draw analogies between the arts. But his conclusion stands in sharp 
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opposition to the view of the historical G., who claimed that rhetoric 
was to the mind what medicine was to the body" Dodds, 1959, 
p.227; but it escapes Dodds' attention that G. does not speak of a 
merely positive contribution of 'medicine' to the body; see also 
Phdr. 270b1ff, 17zt.167b-c; Aristotle Rhet.1355b8-14). For rhetoric 
as magic in Plato see n. on 10, and for the psychotherapeutic power 
of poetry 9). 
Tci.;t.V~ •• Tci.;t.S: speech affects the 'order' of the soul, the 'prescription' 
of drugs affect human body (cp. PI. Pol.294e TIJv 1"OU AVaL1"€AOUV1"OS 
1"OIS aWfLaaL 1TOL€La8aL 1"U~LV; see Segal 1962, p.141 n. 37, 
MacDowell 1982 p.40). 
ciMCL XU!-Lous: 'humours', a plausible emendation of cl.MaXOU (AX); a 
balanced coexistence of the humours in the body is a presupposition 
of health. Ancient medicine accepted the existence of four 
'humours' in the body: aLfLa, c/>M.YfLa, and the two kinds of XOA7} (the 
'yellow' and the 'black' one). 
KCLI. TO. !-LeV ••• 1TCLUEL: cpo Eur. Hipp.512 our' E1Tl. f3Auf37J c/>P€VWV / 
1TaVa€L voaov rijao', 7] aU fL7J yev7J KaK7}. 
OUTW KCLI. TWV :\o'Ywv: speech is a c/>upfLaKov; G. is attributing to AOYOS 
powers which are traditionally recognised as belonging to 'drugs'. 
In Od. 4. 220f£ Helen mixes wine with a c/>UPfLaKov, which is 
v7]1T€v8es 1"' axoAov 1"€, KaKWV E1Ti)':TJ80v a1TUV1"WV, in the way that 
AOYOS in the present context can bring pleasure and make the hearers 
take heart. But there are speeches that Ec/>apfLuK€VaaV (as we would 
say in modem Greek, speech is a c/>UPfLaKo and a c/>apfLuKL), that is 
they poisoned the soul, and they killed it, that is they made lose its 
independence through charming. 
ot !-Lev EAu1M'jaCLv ••• KCLTE.O"M"\<YCLV: positive and negative emotions; the 
aorists are gnomic. 
a.KOUOVTCLS: I suggest a semicolon after cl.KOVOV1"as; what follows 
should be stressed as it brings out the more destructive power of 
speech, in the form of malicious persuasion. 
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1TEl.eOI. 'TLV1. KaK-ij: 'with an evil persuasion'; this kind of '\'0Y0S' does 
not simply affect the soul in a positive or a negative manner. The 
ability of speech to invoke emotions in the soul is a milk-and-honey 
aspect of its action, when it is compared to the lethal dose of a 
malicious persuasion. The power of this kind of persuasion as a 
,papf.LuKov equals the power of the ,papf.LUKU used by Medea (Eur. 
Med.1l26, 1201); in her case death is brought to her own children, 
whereas 'malicious persuasion' kills off every soul. The acceptance 
on behalf of G. of the existence of this kind of persuasion is also 
depicted in Plato's Gorgias 457c, conveyed through a wrestling 
metaphor. The teaching of rhetoric, however, is morally neutral; the 
only person to be held responsible for its misuse is the one who uses 
it for malicious ends (see Dodds 1959, p.212). Plato in this case 
certainly does justice to G.; he certainly objects to the possibility of 
morally neutral teaching of rhetoric, and this is exactly why he does 
not need to misrepresent G. 'TLVI.: it is tempting to assume that it 
means a 'quantity' of persuasion (cp. '\'0YLaf.L0v TLVU 2), in the way 
that one would speak of the 'dose' of a ,papf.LUKov. 
k<papl1c1.KEUaaV Kal. k~E'Y0.ftTEuaav: 'they poison and charm the soul', 
not in the past, but achronically; Untersteiner (1961, p.107) thinks 
that Plato is parodying G. when he says that Love is D€LV(k y07]S' KuL 
,papf.LUK€vS' KuL aoqnaTIJS' (Symp.203d). 
15 
G. asserts to his audience that he has completed his examination of 
speech-persuasion as a possible reason for Helen's elopement, and 
proceeds with the fourth possible reason, namely love. This fourth 
reason corresponds to what may be called the 'traditional' 
mythological account; Helen fell in love with Paris, and for this 
reason she deserted Menelaos. By bringing love into his 
argumentation, he integrates in his speech the cornerstone of the 
poetical (2) accusations against Helen. Love, now, is undoubtedly 
an invincible deity, and one may have thought that G. could argue 
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in the way he argues in 6; in fact he partly does so, when in 19 he 
reminds us of the divine nature of love (€pwc;). The main 
argumentative line, is, however, different: love is elevated from an 
e.xcuse to a serious reason. This elevation is based on argumentative 
patterns which are very similar, if not identical, to those employed 
in the discussion of speech in 8-14. Instead of referring to love, G. 
refers to vision (and this mutantis mutandis reminds us of 
Lykophron, who, when he found it hard to praise the lyre as he was 
asked to do, praised a star bearing the name Lyra, cpo 83A6DK) by 
rationalising a common idea of Greek literature about how love 
springs (see Introduction). Once more the logic of the 
argumentation is based on analogy: ifvision affects the human soul 
in the way it is shown it does, then Helen's falling in love with Paris 
because of love is not surprising. The rationalistic approach to 
vision is built up as follows: the objects of our vision have their own 
nature and vision can affect our soul (15); this can be shown 
through the example of frightful images perceived by soldiers in the 
battlefield (16), and it can also be attested that shocking images 
lead to madness. Fine arts by contrast contrary provide us with 
pleasure (18); we should not then be surprised if Helen's eye fell in 
love with Paris. The argumentation here, as in 8-14, relies much on 
a behavioural examination of vision, as it is mainly shown in the 
example of soldiers which, of course, entails that psychological 
parameters play an important role. In short, in 15-19 G. attempts a 
rationalisation of a notoriously irrational emotion; this 
rationalisation is based on the demonstration of how and why love 
is an invincible power. 
-rTJv -ri1s AEYO!-LEV'Tls ••• aLnav: 'the accusation of the impropriety 
which is said to have been committed'; G.'s wording belongs to a 
cautious advocate. The name of Helen is not mentioned; it is not the 
accusation itself, but an impropriety which will be refuted; the 
impropriety has not been committed, it is said that it has been 
committed. 
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a. yap 0pW\LEV ••• ETUj(e: 'the objects of our vision do not have the 
nature we want them to have, but the one each of them happens to 
have'; the first step of the argument is an axiom. Vision is 
dependent on the nature of the objects we see, not on the person 
who perceives them through his senses. Early Greek theories of 
vision fall into three groups. "According to one the eye was the 
agent, sending out rays from its own 'fire' to the object; according 
to another it received more or less passively 'effluences' or 'images' 
directed to it from the object; in the third, both eye and object are 
active ... " (Guthrie, 1969, vol.ii, p.234). G. here clearly builds his 
argumentation by attributing a passive function to the eye, without, 
of course, putting forward or being himself committed to any 
'theory of vision', which would, anyway, fall short in the light of 
the SUbjectivism adopted in the second major part of ONE. He 
simply wishes to reach the conclusion that Paris, as an active object 
of vision, was perceived by Helen's passive and thus irresponsible 
eye. 
oLa oe ••• 1<J1T'OU'T'aL: the new information is that soul is 'moulded' by 
OrpLS. Psychological parameters of sense-perception are thus brought 
in, and the use of 71nrov-rUL further attests to the analogies between 
the discussion of love-vision and that of speech (cp.13). 'T'OLS 
'T'P01T'OLS: 'the character'; the values accepted by a person, and which, 
by and large, make him behave accordingly. It is better understood 
from the example in 16, where it is claimed that instances of 
deserting because of fear show the power of vision to make the soul 
adopt manners which normally are uncharacteristic of it (cp. PI. 
Leg.841c5: 'n5 TE 8EO(JE{3€S a.p.u KuL qnAcrnp.ov KuL TO p.TJ TWV 
(Jwp.aTWV aMQ. -rWV -rp07TWV rijs rpvx:fjs Ov-rWV KUAWV YEYOVOS EV 
E7T/.8vp.£q.). It is hard to see if Tp07TOS is a synonym of Ta~LS in 14, but 
at any rate both Ta~Ls and -rPWOL of soul are affected through 
emotions instilled through speech and vision respectively (cp. Segal 
1962, p.l04 "a term [sc. tropoi] which may itself have physical 
connotations like the taxis of the psyche in 14"). 
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a.unKa. ')'ap ... EK'1T"Aa:yEV'TES: the text IS corrupt, but the general 
meaning is clear; the textual problems have been discussed by 
Donadi, who, however, wrongly assumes that G. does not refer to 
real battlefields, but to a restaging of Aiskhylos' Seven Against 
Thebes in 405, which in this view serves as a basis of dating He!. 
The argument is too fragile (see MacDowell 1982, p.41) and it has 
not been influential. Some remarks about the reading I adopt: (a) E:1TL 
1TOA.ejJ-Lq. ()1TA.LaeL is Sauppe's good conjecture, for E:1TL 1TOA.ejJ-LoL~ 
()1TA.LaeL A, and €1Ti 1TOA.€jJ-L 0' 1TA.LaeL X, where an alternative 
()1TA.La7j is brought in, perhaps as a correction. In A, the function of 
()1TA.LaeL is unclear; Diels-Kranz (recently Buchheim) adopt ()1TA.La7j 
X , but the subject of the clause OTav ... remains unclear. (b) TOU oe 
1Tpo{3A.T]jJ-aTa AX, Diels suggests 1Tp6{3A.7]jJ-a, presumably because 
aA.eqL-rTJpLOv is singular. However, "since" 1Tpo{3A.T]jJ-a-ra "unlike 
aA.eqL-rTJpLoV is a noun, there is no reason to reject the plural as 
several editiors do" MacDowell (1982, note ad loc.; see also 
Sykutris 1928, p.16 n.2). (c) 8ecLa7]TaL: from Sauppe's eZ 8ecLa7]TaL, 
for el 8ecLaeTaL AX; Sauppe's emendation, with the omission of eZ, 
gIves a normal temporal clause. MacDowell conjectures 
E:1TL8ecL~aL, which is closer to el 8ecLaeTaL, but it can be the case 
that eL in both AX is due to the fact that the verb comes two lines 
after OTav. 
1rOAEtLLa. ••• 1rOAEtLLOV ••• 1rOAep.LQ-: a polyptoton, combined with an 
hyperbaton (1TOA.€jJ-LOV ... KoajJ-ov), stresses the intensity of the stimulus 
that makes an army fly. 
KOap.OV ••• aL07tpou: shields are made out of bronze, swords and spears 
are made out of iron (cp. PI. Lg.956a). 
'IOU tL€v ••• 1rpO~A-TJtLa.Ta.: MacDowell (1982, p.4l) compares the 
chiasm with that in 3 TOU jJ-€V yevojJ-€vov ... L1Lo~. 
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cr.A~·r\'T-T]pl.ov: 'something that keeps off'; it should be taken with 
KOcrp.oV, because it is the bronze and iron weapons of the enemies 
that keep the soldiers off them. 
1T'pO~A~p.a:rn.: cpo Aiskhylos' Septem 539-40 €V Xa;\XTJAa.TqJ cra.K€L, 
KVKAWTqi crwp.aTo<; 7Tpo{3A-ryp.aTL, which also brings out that a cra.KO<; is 
made out of bronze. 
hapa.x~ KaL E,..a.P~E: the subject is Otj;LS. The alarm caused in 
vision leads to the alarm of the soul. It seems thus that mpaxf] is not 
experienced only by the human soul, but by vision too. The external 
manifestation of this internal emotion is flight. 
<pEU')'OUcrl.V EK1T'Aa.')'EV'TES: the subject is absent, but a word denoting 
'soldiers' fits the sense; MacDowell plausibly suggests that 
"posssibly 7TOAAOI. has been lost from the text by haplography before 
1T'OAAO.KLS", Panic, as an emotion caused in battles, appears in 
Thucydides (see Segal 1962, p.108, 143 n.50, de Romilly 1988, 
pp.167-172). 
taxupa. ')'a.p ... etaqlKLa&r]: AX give TJ dA-ry8€La rou vap.ou, which does 
not make sense; several emendations have been proposed: crvv-ry8€La 
Diels, €7TLA7]8€La. Immisch. I prefer MacDowell's (1961, p.21) TJ 
dp.€/I'€La which gives good sense with the Mss' €lcrwK£cr87] (Diels 
accepts Reiske's €gwK£cr87]). The verb €lcrqJK£cr87] is also in conformity 
with the recurrent pattern of the physical entrance of an element into 
the soul (cp. €lafjAe€ 9, crvYYLYVOP.€V7] 10,7Tpocrwucra 13, EAeoucra in 
the following line; here it is fear through which the ignorance of law 
enters the soul). 
1'OV cr.1T'O TIlS otjse~: specifies the type of fear; another type of fear is 
the one caused through poetry 9, and generally speeches in 14. 
cr.P.Ei..llaa.L: for AX's dcrp.€V£craL (see Donadi (1977-78), p.58); AX's 
reading is absurd, since dcrp.€vicraL means 'to bring pleasure'. 
Donadi is however ready to accept it on the basis that it refers to the 
feelings experienced by the audiences of tragedies through their 
Ka.8apcrLS from the emotions of fear. But the thesis that G. has here 
tragedy in mind has already been refuted (a further argument against 
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it can be derived from the context of paragraph 17, where G. says 
that he will not mention any other examples of things causing fear 
because they are the same as those already mentioned; this clearly 
shows that the fear of the soldiers in battle is merely one among 
other possible examples demonstrating the potential of vision to 
evoke emotions in the souls). 
Ka.t. 'IOU ci:ya.8ou ••• 'YI.VO!-LEVOU: a symmetrical construction; the order 
after the verb is the same in both phrases: Object (genitive) + 
Prepositional Phrase (OLd. + accusative) + Participle (genitive). Apart 
from the homoeoteleuton the isocolon and the hyperbaton traced in 
both cases (rov ... KpLVOfL€VOV, rov YLyvOfL€1I0V), each partiCUlar 
syntactical entity contains the same amount of syllables in both 
phrases, and it is also worth noticing the correspondence of the 
syllables stressed. Moreover, a play with the sounds can hardly 
escape our attention. Two levels are discernible here: the public and 
the individual one. The Ka;\.ov refers to the responsibility of the 
soldier to defend the interests of his city as it is prescribed by 
conventional civic rules (KpLIIOfL€1I0V; for a similar use of the verb cpo 
Soph. Aj.443-444), and as a matter of fact it is related to the honour 
with which the city should embrace his individual efforts. The 
a.ya.86v on the other hand is associated with the personal gains of 
each soldier. 
17 
1\0"1 OE: 'in the past'. 
Kat. 'IOU 1i'a.pOVTOC; ••• xpov<.p: a hyperbaton which plays with the double 
meaning of the word 'TTapwv; psychic sanity is present ('TTap6I1ros-) , 
until a terrifying vision deranges it Ell rqi 'TTapovn xpOVCfJ (at this 
very moment). 
1i'OMOI. oe .•• 1i'EpLE1i'Eaov: an a fortiori arrangement of the results of 
the following sentence; all the three elements (unjustified labours, 
terrible illnesses and hard-to-cure insanity) refer to the aftermath of 
facing horrible images from the past. The observation comes from 
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common human experience (we all know that many people who 
fought in both W orId Wars suffered from nightmares, and that some 
of them ended up in clinics), but it is ingeniously integrated into the 
discussion of vision, as it forms the climax of the description of 
negative emotions experienced because of fearful visions. l-La:ro.(oI.S 
unlike Immisch and Untersteiner I prefer (with MacDowell) A's 
reading, because /LaTaf.o~<; 1TOVO~<; gives a better sense; it means 
'aimless labour' (for a similar use cpo PI. Tim.40d4-5 TO A.Ey€~v av€v 
similar wording is employed in Pal. 25, where madness is defined 
as accomplishing aimless actions (epyo~<; emx€~p€l.V aovvcfTo~<;, 
aav/upopOL<; .. . cp. also 68C3DK: eyw ... oe y€A.W TOV av8pW1Tov, avof.7JS 
, "-,, 'A-. \' '\' ", ye/LOVTa ..• /L 7]O€/L~ 7JS eV€KeV w't'e/\~ 7]<; a/\yeovTa TOV<; aV7]VVTOV<; 
',A d D 21 69 ' ,,, """ ' /LOxvOV<;, an em. . : /Lav~a yap Law<; ea'TLV V1T€P ovva/LLV 'TL 
1TOLel.V; see Segal 1962, p.118). 
ouma:ToLS !Lav(aLS: it is interesting that some kinds of madness are 
regarded by G. as not aVLaTo<; (incurable), but ovaLaTo<; (hard to 
cure). 
ELK6vas ••• kv€ypatjsEv: not the object of our sight itelf, but the image 
of what we saw is engraved on our mind. <ppovtl!LaTos: different 
from 'IOU 1TapovTo<; CPPovTJ/LaTo<;; it is closer to zf;vxTJ in 15. kV€ypatjsEv: 
is used metaphorically (engraved), as in Xen. Cyr. 3.3.52 el 
/LEA.Aova!.. To~aUTaL oLavowL eyypacpTJaea8aL av8pu'moL<; Kat e/L/Lova 
eaea8aL). 
KaL Tel. !LEV OELl-LaTouv-ra. ••• ro AEy6!LEva: 'many of the things causing 
fear are passed over, for they are similar to those which have already 
been mentioned'; it is reminiscent of the TcL /Lev aAAa Ka8cf1T€p •.. 
"the stock formula used in drafting amendments .. , etc., in order to 
avoid needless repetition" (Dodds 1959, p.199). 
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tiMe:. ll-.fJv: a new example is introduced. 
ot l'pa4>Eis: 'painters'; painting, as a form of art, also exemplifies 
how vision affects human souL In fact, paintings and statues have a 
very similar function with that of poetry, and generally artistic 
speech. According to Simonides painting is tacit poetry, and poetry 
speaking painting (0 .E~p.wvC87p TTJV P.EV ~wypacp[av 1To[7]a~v 
atW1TWaav 1TpoaayopEvE~, TTJv OE 1TO[ 7]aw ~wypacp[av AaAovaav), a 
statement which brings out the difference between the raw material 
of poetry and painting and the common effects they both achieve. 
Ploutarkhos, who actually preserves Simonides' remark, comments 
on it: UA7J Kal. Tp01TO~S P.~P.fpEWS owcpepova~, TeAos 0' dp.cpoTepo~s €V 
tmOKEtTal. (JIOTEPOV 'Ae7]vaLO~ KaTet 1TOAEP.OV 7] KaTa aocpLav 
€VOO~OTEPO~ 246F). This similarity between poetry and fine arts is 
also traced in Plato, in his more elevated theoretical criticism of arts 
(cp. Rep. 603b 6-7 P.1.P.7]T~KT] KUTa TTJv ol/nv KaL TTJv dKOTJV; Arist. 
Poet. 1447a 18-20 Wa1TEP yap Kal. xpwp.aaL Kal. axr7p.aaL 1ToAAa 
P.Lp.ovvTa[ nVES d1TE~Kcf.~ovTES ••. €TEPOL OE oLa TfjS cpwvfjs ..• ). 
01UV EK 1l'OAAWV ••• a.1l'Ep'Ya.awVTal.: the mimetic character of arts IS 
discernible in G.'s discussion of fine arts; in the process of the 
production of a work of painting, the painter chooses his raw 
materials from the real world, so as to make his work as similar to it 
as possible (cp. Dissoi Logoi 3,10 €1T1. O€ Tas Texvas Tpe1jJop.aL KUI. 
Ta TWV 1TOL7]TWV. EV yap TpaY<fl001Todq. Kal. ~wypacpiq. oans Ka 
1TAELaTa E~a1Tarij op.ow TOtS dA17tVOLS 1TOLewv, OUTOS apLaTOs). The 
mimesis-theory is fully developed by Plato in his Republic, 
especially in books 3 and 10. In Plato's view, the artist is twice 
removed from truth, since his work is a mimesis of the real world, 
which, of course, is not identical with his ideal world of Forms. The 
mimetic character of arts is also examined by Aristotle in Poetics; it 
is the mimetic chracter of works of art that gives pleasure to 
humans, for p.Lp.EZafJaL is inherent in them. Nevertheless, in the 
context of Poetics d1TEpyaa[a (the technique) is an alternative cause 
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of pleasure, which occurs when f-LLf-L7]O"IS does not offer any pleasure, 
because one has never seen before the object of the mimesis, that is 
the model of the artistic reproduction (oux fJ f-LLf-L7]f-La 7TodlaE~ -ri]v 
~oov-ryv, clMa oLa -ri]v d,7TEpyaaiav 7] -ri]v xpoav 7] OLa TOWV77JV nva 
a.M.7]v alT[av, Arist. Poet. 1448b18). Moreover OIj;L~ in Aristotle 
acquires a technical character (it denotes 'spectacle'), and it is one 
of the constituent elements of tragedy, but the one less peculiar to it 
(1450b17), for a good tragedy does not need any staging or actors 
and what is more KVpWJT€pa 7TEP~ -ri]v d,7TEpyaa[a nuv 15Ij;EWV ~ TOU 
Kat aW\La:rwv: it has been suggested (Nestle 1940, p.235) that G., in 
saying that a work of painting is produced by the use of several 
xpwf-LaTa and axiJf-LaTa, has in mind the case of Zeuxis's painting of 
Helen for the temple of Hera in Croton. According to the tradition, 
Zeuxis used as his models the most elegant parts of the bodies of the 
most handsome girls of Croton (cp. Pliny NH 35,64, Cicero de Inv. 
2.1.3; cpo also Xen. Mem. 3.10). This view cannot be proved on any 
possible basis, nor is it necessary to assume that G. has a real 
incident in mind, but it is a charming speculation. The basic colours 
used in contemporary painting were four (white, black, yellow, red; 
cpo Democritos A135DK = Theophr. de Sensu 73, and the rest of the 
colours KaTa T7JV TOVTWV f-L£g~v). It is not clear if G. refers to the four 
basic colours as 7ToAAa, but it is more likely that more than the basic 
colours are meant here. Empedocles (B 23 DK) describes the 
production of numerous elements with a painting-metaphor which is 
similar to G.'s wording: Ws- 0' 67TOTaV ypacP€E~ d,va8-ryf-LaTa 
7TOLKI.AAwaLV / d,V€PE~ d,f-LcP~ T€XV~ 1mo f-L7}TLO~ ED oEoaw-rE, / OLT' 
E7TE~ ODv f-Laplj;waL 7ToAvxpoa cPapf-LaKa XEpa[v, / apf-L0v[7J f-LE£gavTE Ta 
f-LEV 7TA€W, aAAa 0' €AaaaW, / €K TWV ELoEa 7Tomv d,ALYKW 
7TopaVvovaL, / O€VOpEa TE KTL'OVTE Ka~ d,v€pa~ ... (for the identity of 
the four basic colours with the four basic elements of Empedocles' 
philosophy see Guthrie 1969, vol. ii, p.148). 
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<i:rrEp'YaO"WV'Ta.L: 'to complete a work' (cp. PI. Soph. 235e1); Immisch 
(1927, p.26) translates imitantur, but this presses the point too 
much. That G. regards the arts as mimetic is simply implied here, it 
is not stated explicitly. 
TEp1TOUO"t. -M]v 0tPLV: it is interesting that, whereas AOyOS' has a psychic 
action, painting is pleasurable to vision: vision and soul can 
experience the same emotions (notice below eeuv ijOEI.UV -rrupeOXEro 
rol.S' of-Lf-LuaLv; see Segal 1962, p.106, 143 n.45). 
-Tj TWV aVOpLaV'TWv ••• ep.ya.aiu: G. brings in another kind of fine arts, 
namely sculpture. 1TOI.TJO"t.S: not poetry, but 'creation'. kp-ya.aia.: Plato 
would have probably called it reXY7J XELpOUpyLKT]; it echoes 
G.-rrEpyaawvruL. 
8ea.v: Keil's emendation (accepted by Diels) for the MSS oaov; 
Dobree reads voaov (followed by MacDowell 1982, p.42 who 
explains "there is something 'wrong' with one's eyes, because one 
seems to see a man when one is really looking at paint or stone"), 
which is undoubtedly very close to the MSS reading; but I prefer a 
more plain reading here. 
TEp1TELV: I accept MacDowell's emendation (Diels proposes K7JAELV), 
since it is likely that the MSS reading (-rr08EI.V) is due to dittography 
(1To8oS' in the following line). I also take it that ra. f-LEv ..• ra. oe refers 
to fearful sights (16-17) and products of art (18) respectively; G. 
nowhere seems to attribute negative emotions to the fine arts. 
1TOAAa. oe 1TOAAOLS 1TOAAWV: a polyptoton. 
1To8ov ••• aw\-LaTwv: Immisch (1927, 50-1) refers to the case of 
Pygmalion, the sculptor who falling in love with his own creation 
(Galateia) asked Aphrodite to put life into it. The active relation of 
the person who has before him a piece of sculpture is paralleled to 
the state of the soul when it is affected by poetry. Poetry makes the 
soul suffer an rowv -rrae7Jf-LU (9), whereas sculpure EVEpy6.'ErUI. 
longing, it makes you feel that the lifeless material which stands 
before you could be (or actually is) the obj ect of your passion. This 
is the climax of G.'s description of the emotional response to 
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illusions: T€pr/JI.';, l..{rrT7j, xap6., EI..€OS-. <jJpiK7j, <jJo{3os-, EI..€OS-, -ryoov-r], 
e6.paos- are all strong emotions; but nothing is like Epws-. G. could not 
have prepared more efficiently the passage from the world of the 
artistic illusion to the particular case of Helen which follows. Now 
we know why love is a strong emotion. Helen's example will simply 
be one more example which shows that love-through-vision is 
unavoidable. 
19 
€t ouv: the passage to the particular case (see below as- El f.LEV 
eEOS- ... , EL 0' €O"Tl.v ... ); it marks the analogical argumentation: if 
Helen fell in love, this is nothing but another example that shows 
that vision affects us (see Sykutris 1928, p.16). 
T41 'TOU' AAE~6.vopOu ••• -Ttaee.v: only in texts of high-level diplomacy 
can one find such a circumspect wording: it was not Helen who saw 
Paris, but her eye (an eye can never be held responsible). It is the 
eye which is emphasised here, because it was the function of vision 
which was being developed from 15 up to this point. Helen is a 
sample in the laboratory of vision-experiments, not a morally 
responsible person. And the body of Alexandros (that is Paris) can 
double the pleasure (-rya8ev) that a lifeless statue can give. 
n 6a.ull-a.a'T6v: if this question had been posed at the beginning of 
this text it would have seemed absurd; after the theorisation about 
vision it is intended to be construed as a natural thing. 
6€os ••• ouva'T6s: the god is "Epws-, the winged divinity; G. reiterates the 
argumentation that he has already used in the discussion of the first 
reason ((; 7jaawv is a generalisation, 'the inferior', as is made clear 
from the neuter TO ~aaov in 6). Different authors attribute Love's 
parentage to various divinities: v ApTfS' - 'A<jJpOOLT7j, Ovpavo,-
'A<jJpOOLT7j - OVpavo, - TfJ. In Plato's Symposium 203b-203d his 
birth is rationalised; he is the son of JIopo, and JIEv[a and he 
becomes Aphrodite'S attendant because he was born on the day of 
her birthday. Like most (if not all of) the divinities mentioned in 6, 
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Eros can impose his will upon both humans and gods (cp. Hesiod 
Theog. 116-122, Soph. Ant. 787, but cpo a.vepc/rTnvov VOOiJp.u). 
eEO~ ••• <€x.wv>: another polyptoton; <Wv exeL> is Blass's emendation 
(followed by Diels; see also MacDowell 1982, p.42, and 1961, 
pp.121-2, whose conjecture disturbs the polyptoton). 
picks up OVVUP.LV (cp. 8). 
8t)va'io~: 
vO<TT]t-Lu: from this point until the end of the paragraph everything is 
expressed in isocola and homoeoteleuta; Untersteiner holds that 
"tale concezione dell' amore e in genere estranea al popolo ellenico 
e a soi poeti" (1961, p.119), but one of its standard adjectives in 
lyric poetry is II.v(JLp.ell:f]s. In Soph. Antigone 790 the chorus says that 
the person who has it is 'mad' (p.ep.7Jvev; cpo also Tr. 445, 491, 
544;see Biggs 1966, 227-31), and in Plato's Symp. 207a-b we read 
Ta. 7Te~a. KUL Ta. 7TT7JVcL, ~, , VO(JOVVTU Te 7TUVTU 
OLaTLeep.evu. Prodikos (B7DK) contended that emevp.iuv p.ev 
OL7TlI.u(JLua-8eL(Juv epWTu elvuL, eparru oe OL7TlI.u(JLua-8evTu p.uviuv 
yiyvea-8uL. 
~AeE ••• : gnomic aorist expressing a general statement about vEpfJ.JS, 
not Helen. The pairs that follow are antithetical: ifJUx:fjs a.ypevp.u(JLv 
and epWTos a.VcLYKULS are opposed to yvwp.7Js !3ovll.evp.u(JLv and TeXV7JS 
7TUPU(JK€VULS to the extent that the former are beyond human 
manipulation, whereas the latter are deliberate actions. 
tJsux1i~ a.YPEUt-LU01.: 'snares of the soul'; cpo Aiskh. Cho.998 aypevp.u 
87Jpos; Reiske's emendation TUX7]S is not irrelevant, since the 
wording throughout this paragraph picks up that of 6, but there is no 
other reason to suggest changing the MSS' reading. 
~Ot)AEUt-LU01.: cpo 6 
€PW'iO~ a.va.')'KaL~: 'compulsion oflove'. Indulging in love is not thus 
solely a matter of personal ignorance (dyvo7J/Lu), but a matter of 
succumbing to a super-human, uncontrolled power. 
1TapUO'KEUaL~: 'premeditation'; the point is that there was no 
intention, and consequently that Helen is free of responsibility. The 
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word has forensic overtones, as many examples illustrate; cpo 
Antiphon 6.19 JL7]8' EX 7TapaaK€vfjs Y€V€afJaL rov eavarov rqJ 7TaL8£; 
in the hands of orators it becomes a tapas for the speakers to claim 
that they have not prepared a speech, that they are a7TapaaK€VoL. 
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1T~ OUV wil: Bona (1974, p.1l) rightly maintains that XPTJ is related 
to that in 1. The refutation of the responsibility of Helen has now 
been completed, and G. is now able to claim that it is just to hold 
Helen as a reprehensible person. 
EL'iE ••• : the reasons that made Helen depart are repeated here in the 
reverse order of that in 6. The end of He!. indicates that G. intended 
his work to be cyclical. In the beginning of his speech G. sets out 
the task he hopes to undertake, he then argues for it and at the end of 
the speech we find ourselves once more at the starting point (for 
ring-compisition see Groningen 1958, pp.51-56; for a discussion of 
the use of this technique in a prose author, see Herington 1991, 
pp.149-60). 
€7Tpa~eV a €1Tpa~e: cp.5 
1TaV'iWS: "not just 'completely', but 'in all four cases'" (MacDowell 
1982, p.43; cpo Pal. 12). 
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ci.CPELAOV: the self-referential conclusion is stressed by the fact that all 
the verbs expressing what G. has done are placed at the beginning of 
the clauses (EV€JLELva, E7TELpae7]V, E{3oVA:f]87]v). 
'it{} VO(.Lt.p OV ••• AO"!OU: X MacDowell emends it to T'ij yvwJL7J 7]v, but 
X's reading makes sense. G. (as Bona has shown, 1974, p.12), in a 
self-referential statement (AOYCfl refers here to this particular speech), 
claims that he 'stuck to the conventions' he laid down at the 
beginning of his speech (the enactment of a law is regularly 
expressed with the verb rie7]JLL e.g. Dem. 18. 6). This convention is I 
think the programmatic announcement in 2, that the same man oUght 
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to say what ought to be said, and refute those who blame Helen. 
Untersteiner (1961, p.lll) associates the word with the rhetorical 
law "fonnulata, per Gorgia, da Plat. Phaedr., 267 A ... e da Cicerone", 
but this seems very unlikely. G. surely refers to something which 
should be traced in his own speech. 
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11 a The Defence of Palamedes 
I. The Myth 
Homer has nothing to tell us about Palamedes; I the earliest source of 
information is the Cypria, followed by the preserved fragments of 
the tragic poets. As a matter of fact, our knowledge is chiefly 
formed by texts of later antiquity, which obviously involve a good 
deal of repetition and which occasionally drift into interpretative 
approaches of the mythological elements. 
In this chapter I shall present the mam incidents of 
Palamedes' life,2 that is his birth, the unmasking of Odysseus' false-
madness and his contributions to the Greek army, his unjust death 
and finally the manner in which his father sought to take revenge. In 
addition, some light will be thrown on his inventions, which 
establish him as one of the most resourceful (1TOPL/LOS) heroes of 
Greek mythology.3 
I cpo Arist. Poet.1451a26; in Phi1ostratos' view, had Homer integrated in his 
narration Palamedes he would have unavoidably given a degrading image of 
Odysseus (Life of Apollonius 4.16). 
2 The fullest survey on Pa1amedes can be found in Lyra (1987). A critical 
approach to the sources has been attempted by Scodel (1980) 43-63, esp. n.7 (see 
also Jouan 1966, pp.339-363). For the needs of the present dissertation, a linear 
narrative order will be sufficient. 
3 Stanford (1954), p.2S7 n.8 calls him "a kind of superfluous Prometheus in his 
inventiveness and a superfluous Odysseus in his prudent counsels". 
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a) The hero's birth 
Palamedes' father was Nauplios, the son of Poseidon and 
Amymone; 1 however, we cannot be certain about his mother, since 
according to Apollodoros (Bibl.ii.1.5) there are three different 
versions: the tragic poets make Palarnedes' mother Klymene, the 
daughter of Katreus; according to the author of the Nostoi it was 
Philyra, and if we adopt the version of Kekrops his mother was 
Hesione. Palarnedes' mother - whoever she was - also gave birth to 
Oiax and Nausirnedon, of whom only the former plays an important 
role in the myth of his brother. 
b) Palamedes' inventions 
In Aristophanes Frogs 1451 Dionysos sarcastically compares 
Euripides to Palamedes, the wise man, obviously with the purpose 
of mocking him. Apart from the possibility that this may be an 
allusion to Euripides' play Palamedes, the obvious point of the joke 
is that Euripides' foolishness is opposed to the proverbial wisdom of 
Palamedes. 
If one were asked to describe Palarnedes' personality with one 
single word one should surely chose the word resourcefulness 
(€trTTop£a). This hero should be considered as the archetype, the 
model of a hero who - by the means of his resourcefulness and his 
wisdom (ao~£a) - sacrifices his life for the sake of the development 
of the community in which he belongs. However different the 
inventions attributed to him, their common denominator is that they 
all contribute to the development of an already civilized community. 
As M. Detienne has accurately pointed out "Palarnede ne se signale 
pas par la decouverte du feu, des vetements ou de la nourriture qui 
viendraient separer les hommes et les betes"? 
I Virgil Aen.2.82 says that Palamedes belongs to the family of BelliS (Belidae 
nomen Palamedis), for Amymone was the daughter of Danaos, the son of Belos; 
see also Phillips 1957 p. 267-8, esp. n 4. 
2 Detienne (1986), p.1228. 
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This characteristic of his inventions is explicitly expressed in 
G.'s text; in Pal. 30, the hero lists his inventions as a further proof 
of his morality and as a justification of his self-characterisation as a 
great benefactor of the Greeks and of humanity in generaL All the 
inventions listed there - with the exception of the battle lines - are 
followed by a short comment on their significance in the 
development of the community: laws are the written guardians of 
justice, letters serve as the tool of the ( collective) memory, weights 
and measures make commercial transactions easier, numbers are the 
guardians of money, the beacons are the more powerful and the 
fastest messengers, and lastly, games are the best preoccupation 
during leisure. 
Generally the inventions of Palamedes can be sub-divided into 
the following categories: 
1. Writing; this invention should be associated with the art of 
numbering! and with the board-games,2 since in Greece the basis of 
arithmetic is the knowledge of the alphabet and the art of the 
numbers uses the same tools as the action of counting,3 Palamedes is 
1 Alkidamas, Od.22, Soph. Nauplios (fr.432 Radt), adesp. 470. 
2 Sopholdes Nauplios (fr.429 Radt) Kai. 7TEO'O'o. Kai. 7TEvTaypafLfLa Kal. i<V{3wv 
{3oAa£, Palamedes (fr.479 Radt) 7TEO'O'OVS Kv{3ouS TE, TEp7TVOV apy£as aKOS; SchoL 
Eur. Or. 432 Kv{30US, 7TETTOVS, Myth. Vat.35 tabulam. The difference of the games 
of 7TETTO£ from that of the i<V{3o~ is explained by Hesylchios: o~a</J€pE~ OE 7TETTe£a 
-rei> t/rq</Jous fLETaK~voiJO'L (see note in Jebb - Pearson 1917, p.85). Suidas s.v refers 
to the invention of these games by Palamedes with the word Tci{3Aa. Both the 
calculation of numbers and the games described here were based on 'fij<Po~; "En 
Grece, Ie calcul se fait communement avec les jetons, appeles psephoi qui 
designent a la fois les cahiers de comptes, les jetons de vote, les pieces de jeux et 
encore des ossolets utilises dans des pratiques divinatoires, dans des consultations 
oraculaires" Detienne 1986, p.1129. 
3 In Plato's Phaidros 274d. we are told that the Egyptian god Theuth invented 
numbers, arithmetic and geometry, astronomy and the game of draughts and dice 
and above all letters. All these inventions are attributed by different authors to 
Palamedes as well. That the art of arithmetic presupposes the existence of the 
alphabet is shown in Plato's Gorgias, where Sokrates points out that the art of 
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not the only mythical person considered as the inventor of the Greek 
alphabet or the transmitter of the Phoenician one. He is sharing this 
invention with Orpheus, Cadmus and Linus. In some versions, 
Palamedes appears as the inventor of letters; 1 from several other 
authors we can draw the conclusion that he was thought to be either 
the transmitter of the Phoenician alphabet,2 or the person who was 
credited with the addition of several letters. 3 
ii. The organisation of the Greek army; the military hierarchy is 
attributed by Aiskhylos to Palamedes Cfr.l82 Radt): KuL TugLapxuc; t 
KuL aTpUTapxuc; KuL €KUTOVTapxuc; t ET.agU ... The invention of the 
tactics of the army is also important (jJ.€'YLaTOV Elc; 7TI..EOVEKrrlJ.LUTU in 
G. 's words, 30), since before Palamedes' inventions the soldiers 
acted like animals. 4 
Palamedes is also said to have invented the system of watches;5 
moreover, when the Greek army was in Aulis, and the soldiers were 
'arithmetic' uses logos, and Aristophanes' Wasps 960-1: eyw if e{3ouII.6p.7JV av 
otille ypap.p.aTa, / Zva p.7J KaKoupywV eveypa(j/ ",plv TOV 1I.6yov; moreover, the 
Scholiast on Eur. Or. 432 says that by inventing letters, Palamedes made the 
distribution of food easier. Since the computation of equal proportions of food 
should naturally be based on arithmetic, we may assume that when the Scholiast 
links the distribution of food to the invention of letters he brings out the 
association of the arithmetic with the use of letters. Detienne (1986, p. 1129) says 
that "La notation numenque utilise les signes de l' abecedaire: connaitre ses 
lettres, c' est deja savoir ses nombres. Et entre les nombres et les jeux de loisir ... 
comrne tous les Grecs, Platon n' etablit pas une difference radicale". 
I Stesichoros PMG 213, Alkidamas Odysseus, 22, Chrysostom XII.21, 
Philostratos Heroicus X.I, Tzetzes Antehomenca, 320. 
2 Schoi. Eur.Or. 432. 
3 Euripides Palamedes (fr.578) iirf>wva Kat. rPwVOVVTa (]'lJMa{3a, TE BEL, ... ; a full 
discussion of the letters added by Palamedes can be found in Berard 1952 - 1953, 
p.76; see also Philips 1957, pp. 277-8. 
4 Dio Chrys. 13.21 links the invention of numbers to the subordination of '~EL" 
since until then the commanders were not able to count their soldiers, as the 
shepherds count the sheep of their flocks. Cpo PI. Rep.522d. 
5 Sopholdes' Nauplios (fr.432 Radt; see Jebb - Pearson 1917, note ad loc., p.89), 
Schol. Eur. Or.432, Eustath. ad Il. 2.308. 
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quarrelling about the proportions of food provided to them, it was 
Palamedes who made the distribution impartial (dV€1TDI:Tf1TTOV). 1 
Sophokles2 also credits Palamedes with the invention of the Greek 
wall. 
iii Communication through signs; cppuKTwp£a3 is the beacon by 
which the soldiers could make signals to each other. It is exactly by 
means of this invention that Nauplios avenged the death of his son, 
by drawing the Greek fleet returning from Troy on the rocks of 
Caphereus. In addition, Palamedes taught men how to use the 
observation of the stars for the needs of navigation and he is also 
depicted in some sources as a connoisseur of astronomy.4 
iv. Weights and measures; this pair is associated with numbers and 
this triad (dpLef.LoL, f.LETpa, crraef.La) is probably a locus communis of 
the Greek world. 5 
v. It is worth mentioning that Palamedes was also considered a 
poet; in Eur. fr.588 he is called 'the nightingale of the Muses' and in 
fr.580 he is called a friend of music. This aspect of his personality is 
also reinforced by Suidas according to which Korinnos composed 
an epic poem under the title fliad, dealing with the Trojan War, 
which was still in progress. This poet appears as a student of 
Palamedes, who used the alphabet invented by his teacher. 
I Schol. Eur. Or.432; Aiskhylos (Palamedes fr.182 Radt) says that a third meal 
was given to the soldiers a'iTOV 0' eiOEVo.L oLciJpLao., / apLaro., oel:1TYo. 06p7To. e' 
o.i.peLaeo.L TpLTo.. 
2 Nauplios (fr.432 Radt); see also my note on Pal. 12. 
3 Soph. Nauplios (fr.432 Radt) and Schol. Eur. Or.432; G. Pal. 30 and Alkidamas 
Od.22 are using the word 1TVpaoL 
4 Soph. Naup/ios (fr.432 Radt); in Phil. Her.II.3 we learn that Palamedes 
explained an eclipse; see also Jebb - Pearson, p. 89. 
5 Genzmer 1952, p.482; Sopholdes Nauplios (fr.432 Radt). Eur. Palamedes (fr. 
578) XP7Jf.LaTWV f.LETpOV; the Scholiast on Eur.Or.432 and G. 30 combine the f.LETpo. 
with aro.8fLa, whereas Alkidarnas accumulates the inventions separately. 
Philostratos (Her.II.l) says that before Palamedes, ouae VOfLLafLo. 7Jv ouae aro.8fLd. 
Ko.i. {.LETpo. ouae dPL8f.L€l:v. According to Aristoxenos the musician, the fIrst to 
invent weights and measures was Pythagoras (fr.12 DK). 
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Moreover, Suidas on Palamedes says that he was himself a 
composer of epic poetry (€7r07rOLOS) and that his poems were 
destroyed by the descendants of Agamemnon. 
c) The Trojan Expedition and the Madness a/Odysseus 
According to Dictys (I.4), when the Greek commanders received the 
news that Helen had been seized by Paris, they were in Crete. 
Palamedes then took the initiative to organise the Trojan expedition 
and he suggested that some representatives should visit Odysseus in 
Ithaca and persuade him to join the Greek army. 
When the commanders arrived in Ithaca Odysseus, not willing to 
join the Greek army,l pretended that he was mad.2 There are two 
versions concerning his madness: Odysseus either yoked an ox with 
a horse (or an ass) 3 or he started sowing his land with salt. 
Palamedes, unlike the other leaders, was not deceived by Odysseus 
and thus unmasked his stratagem. He threatened Odysseus that he 
would kill T elemakhos, either with his own sword or by putting him 
in the way of the plough.4 Odysseus then admitted that he was not 
1 An explanation of his keeping back is given by Hyg.Fab.95 si ad Troiam isset, 
post vicesimum annum solum sociis perditis egentem domum redierunt. The 
Schol.Od.24.115 says that Odysseus reluctance was not due to cowardice, but to 
his awareness that the expedition would be hard. His reluctance is hinted at in 
Aiskhylos,.Ag. 842 and Sophokles, Phil 1025 (see n.2l). 
2 This must have been the content of Sophokles' tragedy 'OovuueuS' Ma~v6f1-evoS' 
(see Jebb - Pearson 1917, p.115-ll8). Cicero de OffIII.26.97 claims that the 
madness of Odysseus is an invention of the tragic poets. 
3 Hyg.Fab.95, Pliny NH 35.129 a horse; Lykophron 815 and Schol. Lykophron 
815 an ass. Loukianos 10.30 does not specify ('TO 'TWV lJ7re~evYf1-EvWV a.aVf1-c/xvvov). 
It is striking that both Aiskhylos (Ag.842) and Sophokles (Phil.l025) present 
Odysseus joining the Greek army ~uyeLS' exactly as he yoked two inappropriate 
animals. 
4 Apollod. £pit.III.7, Luc.lO.30; Pliny HN XXXV 129 says that Parrhasios had 
painted in Ephesus a picture, depicting Palamedes threatening to kill Odysseus' 
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insane, and this was the beginning of a passionate hostility. It seems 
that Odysseus never forgave Palamedes for making him desert his 
home and his beloved land for twenty years. 
d) Palamedes' Death 
In Polygnotos' 'Nekyia' Palamedes was depicted with Thersites and 
Ajax of Salamis playing dice, while the other Ajax was watching 
them. I All of these heroes were some of the victims of Odysseus' 
maliciousness, but we should preferably make a distinction between 
Palamedes' case and all the other ones, since it is clear that our hero 
was the victim of a personal and abysmal hatred. As Stanford put it 
"other ruthless actions (sc. of Odysseus) ... had at least the excuse of 
being pro bono publico".2 The cause of this particular hostility was 
of course Odysseus' resentment. But whether Odysseus' decision to 
kill Palamedes was due to the fact that the latter unveiled the 
pretence of the former in Ithaca or to his resourcefulness remains 
unclear, for some authors attribute Odysseus' plot generally to the 
resentment caused by Palamedes' incomparable wisdom and others 
to his unmasking of Odysseus' 'madness', and as a consequence to 
his obliging him to part from his family. 
There are several different versions concernmg the plot 
employed by Odysseus. The Cypria tell us that Odysseus 
accompanied by Diomedes killed Palamedes while they were 
fishing by drowning him.3 A very cruel version is given by Dictys:4 
son (cp. Plout. Mor.lSa). The plough-version is preserved by Hyg.Fab.95 and 
Servius ad Aen.lI.Sl. 
1 Pausanias X.31.1. Sokrates, in Plato's Apologia 41 b 1-2 says that in Hades he 
will meet Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, who were the victims of an 
unjust verdict. 
2 1954, p.S4. 
3 Jouan (1966, n.6 p.357, with further reference on this issue) maintains that, since 
Homeric heroes did not normally eat fish, the fact that they went out fishing is a 
sign that there was a famine in the Greek camp. 
4 Belli Troiani lI.5. 
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Odysseus and Diomedes lured Palamedes by telling him that they 
had found a treasure in a well; they then asked him to go down, and 
when he reached the bottom they stoned him; this very well became 
his tomb. 
The most famous story is that Palamedes was the victim of a 
stratagem conceived by Odysseus. Hyginus says that Odysseus told 
Agamemnon that he had a dream that the camp should be moved for 
just one night. Agamemnon, following Odysseus' advice, moved the 
camp and it was then that Odysseus buried some gold in Palamedes' 
tents with a letter ostensibly sent by Priam to Palamedes, written by 
a Phrygian captive. The following day the letter and the gold were 
found in Palamedes' tents and Agamemnon was persuaded that 
Palamedes intended to betray the Greeks to the Trojans. l The end of 
all these stories is common: Palamedes was found guilty and put to 
death.2 
e) The revenge 
When Nauplios, Palamedes' father, learnt about the unjust death of 
his son he sailed out to Troy to obtain justice for the killing of his 
son.
3 The Greeks treated him scornfully and he left unsatisfied, 
I The same account is given by Apol!. Ep. III.8; Eur. Or.432 is slightly different: 
Agamemnon and Diomedes are presented as accomplices, and the Phrygian 
captive, after writing the letter is killed and the task to place the letter with gold 
under Palamedes' bed is undertaken by a slave. See also Phillips (1957, p.271 
n.22). 
2 This intricate plot is an invention of the tragic poets. Polyaenus LProhem.62 
says that this stratagem was related (g.Qovcn) by the tragic poets. See also Koniaris 
1973 pp.8S-112, Scode! (1980), Sutton (1987). Scodel (p.140; with bibliography) 
thinks that Euripides' Palamedes was referring to the prosecution of Anaxagoras 
and Sutton (p. 133-142) to the trial ofProtagoras. 
3 Naupliosmust have appeared in Aiskhylos' play (see Jebb-Pearson 1917,vol. ii., 
p.133, Scodel 1980, p.52 and Woodford 1994, p.165). That Nauplios went to the 
Greek camp in Troy is attested by Apol!. 6.8 and Scho1.Eur.Or.432. Pearson also 
suggests (1917, p.133) that Nauplios' arrival occurred in Sophokles' Palamedes 
as well. 
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smce the army preferred to obey Agamemnon. 1 But how did 
Nauplios learn about the killing of his son? Apollodoros and the 
Scholiast on Euripides' Orestes do not give any explanation. On the 
other hand, the Scholiast on Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazousai 771 
provides us with the information that Euripides in his Palamedes 
presented Palamedes' brother Oiax writing on oars what has 
happened to his brother, in the hope that they would reach his father 
Nauplios. 
No matter how Nauplios found out about the shameful death of 
his son, he certainly decided to take revenge. Again, there are 
several versions about the manner in which Nauplios avenged the 
death of his son. The most famous one is that when the Greek fleet 
was returning to Greece, Nauplios used false beacons so as to draw 
the ships onto the rocks of the extremely dangerous cape of 
Caphereus in Euboia. This version can probably be traced back to 
the Nostoi and according to Tzetzes to a poem by Stesichoros,2 and 
it was certainly lrnown during the fifth century. 
According to several other sources, Oiax spread the news to the 
wives of the Greek commanders that their husbands were unfaithful 
to them and as a result they deceived them with several lovers. 3 
1 Both Apoll. 6.8 and Schol.Eur. Or.432 say that every man in the army agreed 
(Apoll. Xap~~op.€VWV, Schol. Kexap~ap.€vov) with the king. Jouan (1966, p. 353-4), 
says that Agamemnon probably did not allow Oiax to bury the corpse of 
Palamedes as he had not allowed Teukros to offer a funeral to his brother Ajax. 
2 Posthomerica 750; at any rate it is certain that the fIrst to use this story in the 5th 
c. BC is Sophokles (cp. Jebb-Pearson 1917, p.80); in Euripides' Helen 767 we 
read: Tcl Nav7Tl..£ov T' Euf30~Kcl -rrvp7TOI..7)p.aTa (cp. also 1125f.; see Woodford 1994, 
n.29 p.166). The stratagem of Nauplios can also be found in Strab. 8.6.21, Verg. 
Aen.l1.260, Lykophron 384-386, Phil. Her.1l.15, Apoll. 6.11, Loukianos 45.46, 
Hyg. Fab.116. 
3 Clytemnestra with Aegisthus etc; see Apoll. Epit.6.9-11, Hyg. Fab.l17, Dictys 
6.2. In Euripides' Orestes 431-4 is said that Oiax persecuted Orestes so as to take 
revenge for the death of his brother: Tive, 7TOI..LT(VV €~a!-U)../..WvTaL ae yfj>; / or~, 
TO Tpo£a, pIao, dvatj>epwv 7TaTpL / avvfjKa' llaAap.7)oov, ae TLp.wpei <jx5vov. 
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Nauplios is also said to have pwrished Odysseus by throwing 
Penelope into the sea, or by causing the mother of Odysseus to 
commit suicide, by spreading the false news that Odysseus was 
dead.! 
II. Gorgias' Defence of Palamedes and the myth 
G. does not make ample use of the mythical elements; his own 
method is chiefly based on a logical argumentation which develops 
with the invention of probabilities substituted for the facts as they 
are known from the myth. For instance, in the first part of his 
reasoning, instead of trying to prove that it was Odysseus who 
placed the gold and the letter ostensibly written by Priam in 
Palamedes' tent, he presents the preparatory stages of an alleged 
treason. 
At first sight the defence of a mythical person in the fifth 
century, who as everyone knows has already been condemned to 
death by mythical judges, is a paradoxical composition and it is 
difficult to find a parallel example from the literature of our times. 
How would the listeners or the readers of The Defence of PaZamedes 
have perceived the resuscitation of a hero defending himself in the 
first person and addressing his opponent in the second person? 
Which was their reaction when Palamedes states that the trial has 
nothing to do with his death, but with the manner of his death? How 
did contemporary legal terms uttered by a mythical person sound to 
their ears? All these questions justify our description of this speech 
as a paradoxical composition. 
It is clear that two levels are discernible in Pal., the one 
contrasted with the other: the first level forms the background of the 
speech; it is the level of the tradition. The second level is the logical 
1 Penelope: Eustath. Od.p.1422,8; Anticlea: Eustathios on 1. 202, but this is not in 
accordance with Od. 1 1.197ff. 
204 
argumentation which develops in a hypothetical courtroom of the 
fifth century. But this contrast is superficial, for however 
paradoxical the title of the speech may appear, the argumentation 
developed in this speech does not distort the myth, not at least in the 
form(s) preserved to us. G.'s persuasiveness does not rely upon a 
selective presentation of the mythical events; the narratio (CJLm(n~) 
is totally absent from his speech. On the contrary the basic mythical 
motifs serve as a presupposition of our understanding of his 
argumentation. The characterisation of the opponent for instance 
does not include any reference to his pretence of madness in Ithaca; 
it is merely based on the demonstration of the logical 
contradictions of his accusation. I 
Palamedes serves here as a symbol: he is the best example of a 
just person who by supporting the community becomes its victim. 
Palamedes' personality is the contrasting background, which 
manifestly brings out the injustice of his accusers. But the case of 
Palamedes is for an additional reason advantageous to G.'s forensic 
skill: the opponent is the symbol, the archetype of eloquence in 
Greek mythology? In other words, G. - by defending Palamedes -
implies that rhetoric is not a malicious art by its nature, since one 
may use it as a 7TULYVWV so as to write an encomium for a notorious 
woman such as Helen, but one can also use it so as to defend a 
tragic victim of a knavish plot. Moreover, he implies that if one -
like himself - were to use speech effectively, one should not 
abandon oneself into despair, even if his opponent is a man as 
eloquent as Odysseus.3 
1 Stanford 1954, p.260 n.18 says that "nothing noteworthy is said about Odysseus 
elsewhere in this excessively stylized speech"; but G. 's intention was not to 
compose a biography of Odysseus. 
2 See Stanford 1954, pp.71-2, p.255 n.10. 
3 Long (1982, p.238) is certainly right when he points out that "Gorgias could 
make the worse appear the better cause, but he could also apply equally strong 
eloquence to an innocent man's defence, a point often overlooked in assessments 
of the Sophists which reflect the bias of Plato". Poulakos (1983), who read the 
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Before we examine the elements of the myth used by G., it is 
worth making a distinction, which will save us from a serious 
misunderstanding. The Defence of Palamedes is in part a more fact-
bound speech than the Encomium of Helen. This is understandable if 
we consider that in the former G. attempts to acquit Palamedes of 
the charges brought against him, whereas in the latter he intends to 
offer a logical interpretation of the acts of Helen. I But the term 
'fact-bound' when applied to speeches dealing with mythical 
persons is probably misleading, if we do not make it clear that by 
using this term we do not mean the 'facts' of the myth, but rather the 
facts invented by G. with the method of probabilities. Seen in this 
light, the term 'fact-bound' does not mean that G. - who is not 
under the same constraints as an orator like Lysias or Demosthenes 
who defend real persons - has to refer to or be conscious of the real 
facts. It means that G., by the invention of probable facts, intends to 
proceed with an argumentation less theoretical than the Encomium 
of Helen, an argumentation that substitutes the 'real' facts of the 
myth with the probable factuality of a hypothetical case of treason. 
The presentation of the necessary stages that Palamedes should have 
employed if he had wished to give away his compatriots, for 
instance, not preserved in any mythological narration; they are not 
'real' mythological facts, but facts invented by G. for the purposes 
of his argumentation. 
The most abundant use of the mythological elements is made by 
G. in his presentation of the inventions of Palamedes; all this part 
(30) of the self-characterisation of the hero is intended to show that 
the defendant was a person of high moral standards. The inventions 
mentioned by G. have already been discussed and generally they are 
Encomium of Helen as a metaphorical defence of rhetoric, might have found more 
explicit arguments in The Defence of Palamedes. 
1 In He!. 5, G. says that Helen did what she did (€1TP~€V a €1Tpag€v), whereas in 
Pal. the facts are disputed; in this respect he seems to be conscious of the (rrcz(],LC; 
theory of Aristotle (see Introduction). 
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in accordance with the inventions attributed to our hero by other 
authors. 
It is also interesting that some inventions of this hero are 
mentioned as the means that he might have used, so as to ferment 
treason. In (6) we are told that it is impossible to send a message 
without the use of letters, which as we know is one of his most 
important inventions and in (9) he concedes that he might have 
made a pledge with Priam by obtaining an amount of money. In (10) 
he says that there are many sentinels in the camp, so that the 
transportation of money was impossible and in (12) he holds that it 
was impossible to climb the wall of the. Greek camp, because it was 
full of watches. The letters, the money, the system of watches are all 
mentioned in 30, among his inventions, and even the wall, 
according to Sophokles (fr.432 Radt) was his own invention. It is 
difficult to say whether G. deliberately used these aspects of the 
resourcefulness of his client or not. But even if this is a mere 
coincidence it still adds much to the persuasiveness of this part of 
the speech, seeking to prove that it was actually impossible for 
Palamedes to perform the actions that he was accused of. Everyone 
could recognise that these inventions were originally intended to 
support the Greek anny and one could hardly imagine the great 
benefactor of Greece using his inventions as a tool for malicious 
ends. 1 But even if some judges failed to grasp this obvious moral 
antinomy, Palamedes, by implying that even his inventions were not 
of much help, reinforces the argument at stake: that is the 
impossibility of the commission of the actions that he is accused of. 
The most important aspect of the use of the myth is probably the 
regular use of the notion of resourcefulness (Ev7Top£a). This is a 
recurring theme in The Defence of Palamedes, which establishes the 
tragic profile of the hero. In the prologue of this speech the 
lOne should note that Palamedes at the end of the recitation ofms inventions (31) 
declares that the only reason he refers to them is to prove that it was impossible 
for a man who engages in those tasks to perform any immoral actions. 
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defendant admits that he is in a situation of a:Tropia, for he does not 
find a way to express himself. The hero, who was traditionally 
deemed as an example of resourcefulness (who made the life of men 
-rroptj.Lov E.g a.-rropov 30), is now found, compelled by a situation 
externally imposed on him, in a state of great difficulty in helping 
himself. The man who by his talented nature was the benefactor 0 f 
the community is compelled to defend himself against the 
accusations levelled by the same community. In his own words, his 
opponent accuses him of wisdom and resourcefulness (25). Even the 
judgment is not €v-rropo~ (35), because it is not possible to reveal the 
truth with words (especially words which are the products of a 
situation of a.-rropia). 
G. is deliberately playing with the word a.-rropia; should a man 
like Palamedes be in such a situation, then anyone within the frame 
of the polis, whether it is a benefactor of it or not, could be found in 
his place. Men involved in political intrigues - inspired by the 
irresistible lure of political vainglory - always found a way into the 
arena of politics through conspiracy and detraction. Even at the most 
humble level of personal animosity men sometimes prefer to settle 
their disputes by mud-slinging tactics. Within a social frame where a 
man might be brought before a court of law any number of reasons 
(political antagonism is just one obvious one), everyone, even a man 
of Palamedean morality, should, in one way or another be able to 
defend himself efficiently through words. But this is exactly what G. 
professed to do. 
III. The argumentation 
The opening paragraph of Pal. presents the three main stages of a 
trial: the prosecution, the defence and finally the judgment are 
presented in their natural order. The defendant makes it clear that 
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the trial has not to do with dea~ since nature (<jJU(ILS) has decreed 
death for all men with an open vote. As a matter of fact, the raison 
d' etre of this speech of defence is not merely death, but the manner 
of it, that is a DLKal.OS or {3[al.Os (violent) death. The overall result of 
the opening phrases is two-fold: on the one hand from the very 
beginning of the speech the orator G. interprets in a relativistic way 
the consequences of the charges brought against his client so as to 
create the frame in which he will develop his argumentation - and he 
thus indirectly underrates the power possessed by the jurors; on the 
other the sophist G. is trying to remove from the minds of his 
audience the mythical account that presents Palamedes' death as a 
fact and he thus prepares the transition from the realm of myth to the 
real world of courtrooms. 
The argumentation develops with a disclaimer referring to the 
aforementioned notions of {3£a and OLKTJ (2); the defendant states that 
the jurors totally control {3La, whereas he rules over dike. This seems 
natural since he recognizes that the jurors have the power to work 
their will on him (f3ovA6p.€vo~ ovv-r]CJ'€a8€), whereas his only power is 
OLKTJ, that is the knowledge of his innocence. The power of the jurors 
is more than enough to put him to death; the knowledge of his 
innocence is not enough at all. What he (and every man in his place) 
is compelled to do is to prove with words that he is innocent, since a 
mere statement of innocence would hardly convince the jurors. 
The notions of knowledge (€1TLcrrap.€vos) and opinion (oo~a~wv) 
are presented in the following paragraph as the only possible bases 
upon which Odysseus could have built his prosecution. What is 
surprisingly interesting is the fact that G. admits on behalf of his 
client that, if the prosecutor had relied on opinion he would have 
been a just man, as if he had relied on know ledge, provided that his 
motive was to save Greece, not to catch up Palamedes in a web of 
contrivance. I say surprisingly, because in (24) opinion is 
emphatically described as 'the most unreliable thing' (d-TncrrOTaTOV 
7Tpayp.a) and a common state of the human mind (KO~VOV a7TaCJ'L). Is 
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this a real contradiction? The answer is given by G.: Odysseus does 
not rely on lmowledge because Palamedes lmows that he has not 
committed the crime of which he is accused and at any rate it is 
impossible to have lmowledge of something that has never 
happened; the only real possibility is that the prosecutor relies on 
opinion. But this is exactly what Palamedes has to show. 
With a string of rhetorical questions depicting his difficulty in 
expressing himself with words (4) the defendant states that he is in 
a situation of d:rropia.; unproved accusations lead to panic (€K7TA7Jg~~), 
and because of this embarrassing emotional situation Palamedes 
faces d7TOpia., a typical state of entangled tragic heroes. This tragic 
profile is reinforced by his statement that the only way to overcome 
his difficulties is to be dictated a solution by truth and the present 
compulsion (d.v6.YK7J) and by the fact that he (as well as the whole of 
humanity) is well aware that he is a resourceful (7TOpt.P.OS-) person par 
ex:cellence. But what do the words truth and compulsion mean in 
this context and why are they described as 'dangerous teachers'? 
Truth is the lmowledge of his innocence, that allowed him say -
although this is not a desirable privilege - that he rules over SiK7J; 
truth in other words is the presupposition of 8f.K7J, that now must be 
substituted by the argumentation (Jl.oyos-), which will not be truth, 
that is a mere statement of innocence, but an approximation of truth, 
that is to say a complicated process based on well-organised 
reasoning. Compulsion means the limits imposed on the defendant 
and generally on a speaker by the situational context of a court of 
law. Palamedes, like innumerable other innocent men, has to defend 
his own life and his honour not by choice, but is compelled to do so 
(for compulsion and probabilities see Introduction). 
The keystone of G.' s argumentation is stated at the end of the 
prologue (5). His programmatic statement runs as follows: if I had 
wished, it would have been impossible to betray the Greeks to the 
barbarians (6-12) and if it had been possible I would not have 
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wished to do it (13 - 21). It is clear that the schema followed here 
consists in a combination of opportunity and motive. 
The discussion of the lack of opportunity is by its nature 
associated with real facts. But this does not mean that G. constructs 
his argumentation on the basis of real facts. Palamedes is a mythical, 
not a real person. The myth provides G. with the raw material and to 
a certain extent it frees him from a fact-bound account. In other 
words the myth gives the teacher of rhetoric a way to demonstrate 
the effective use ofprobabilities (eLK07"a). 
This part of Pal. is based on a model combining probabilities and 
the process of elimination. The use of probabilities consists in the 
fact that G. does not present real facts. By using the basic elements 
of the mythical account he offers the necessary stages usually 
employed by a person who commits the crime of treason. The 
presentation of the sequence of the arguments and the way in which 
the coherence of the argumentation is maintained is perhaps more 
interesting than a detailed discussion of the stages recapitulated by 
G. with an asyndeton in 11 ('1 met him [ sc. Priam], we negotiated, 
we understood each other, 1 took money from the enemies and 1 
escaped from the watches, I hid it'). 
G. makes an abundant use of conditionals. Stage A was 
necessary for stage B, but stage A was impossible; but even if stage 
A was possible then stage B was necessary for stage C etc. In this 
way each conditional introduces a new argument (that is a necessary 
stage) and at the same time it highlights the presumptiveness of the 
previous argument. The same schema is used in the ONE, where G. 
argues that a) nothing is, b) if it is, it is not lmowable, c) if it is 
knowable, it is not communicable. The keyword for this kind of 
argumentation is concession. 
Palamedes has shown that it was impossible to betray the Greeks 
to the barbarians and the discussion of motives itself is introduced 
as a concession to the conclusion of the first part: "Even if it had 
been possible for me to perform these actions had I really any good 
reason for doing itT 
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The motives set forth are the following: power, financial gain, 
honour, security, helping friends and harming enemies, avoidance of 
a fear, or of a labour or of a danger. 
The main aspects of the argumentation dealing with motives are 
the following: a) each motive is treated separately, b) the motives 
are surveyed under the prism of popular morality and c) according 
to G.' s typology two types of motives exist universally: the positive 
and the negative one. 
We may start with the first aspect: I consider that the motives 
presented here are conceived of (as the stages of the first part of the 
argumentation) on the basis of probabilities, in the respect that they 
are derived from common experience. But each one is dealt with 
separately since the persuasiveness of the present argumentation lies 
in the exhaustive accumulation of motives gradually proved to be 
worthless. In addition the motives are not mutually exclusive and 
we can hardly add any other possible motive. 
This part is apparently a survey of popular morality that regularly 
appeals to traditional values. The intention of the defendant is to 
dispose the judges in his favour by showing them that he is a 
respectful man. Two examples will be enough: in 15 Palamedes 
suggests that one may claim that he betrayed Greece with the 
intention of monetary gain. But as he says 'I have a moderate 
amount of money, and I have no need for much. Those who spend 
much money need much, not those who are superior to pleasures of 
nature, but those who are slaves to pleasures and seek to acquire 
honours from wealth and show'. That self-restraint is a common 
idea of popular morality is shown by Plato's Gorgias 491 d9-11, 
when Socrates agrees with 'most people' (oL 7TO;V,\O£) that a person 
with self-control is the person who is prudent (aw<ppwv) and 
possesses self-restraint. A number of other texts are in support of the 
same idea. The second example is taken from paragraph 18, where 
Palamedes says "But was I anxious to assist friends or harm 
enemies? For someone might commit injustice for these reasons." 
We have evidence from Plato's Meno71e (= fr.19; see comments ad 
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lac.), and probably from Xenophon's Cyropaideia 1.6.31 that acting 
unjustly with the purpose of helping your friends is an idea put 
forvvard by G. 
Let us now pass to the third aspect; in a proverbial fashion G. 
maintains that human motives are divided into two discernible 
types: human actions are either the result of the pursuit of gain or of 
the avoidance of loss. Profit is elevated here to an absolute criterion 
of human action. Under this light, the means employed are of minor 
importance; what really matters is the attainable aim. The probative 
value of this generalisation is obvious: Palamedes has shown that he 
had not had any motive. The only thing that he would have achieved 
ifhe had given away his compatriots to the enemy, would have been 
to harm himself His life would have been unlivable. G., instead of 
making his client say that he is a just man (as he will do later), 
makes him say why he had no reason to be lUljust. Hence, my 
suggestion that the persuasiveness of this method lies in the 
exhaustive accumulation of motives. Now we can add the 
theoretical generalisation, which comes as a result of both the self-
consciousness of the rhetor and the knowledge of the devices of his 
art. 
The following part of Pal. is an examination of the credibility 
and the validity of the accusations. Palamedes now uses the second 
person, adding theatricality to the speech, and he begins with an 
interrogation (epcfrrryalS) of the prosecutor. The keyword of the 
opening paragraph is the word 'worthless' (dvC£gws-). But the 
characterisation of the litigant as dva.qwS' is not a mere description 
of his (ethos); in the case of the opponent, G. does not derive 
elements from the stock of mythology (although he could do so as 
he implies in 27: 'I do not want to introduce in reply the many 
enormities, both old and new'), as he will do later (30) in the short 
biographical account of his client, nor does he indulge in a general 
disparagement (oLU~oAf]). On the contrary Odysseus' ethos surfaces 
through a rationalistic examination of the groundless basis upon 
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which he has based his accusations. The argumentation is twofold: 
the defendant first (22-24) is endeavouring to prove that his 
opponent has based his accusation on an unproved opinio~ not on 
clear lmowledge, and he then (25-27) locates contradictions of logic 
in the argumentation of the opponent, which prove that he is a liar. 
Two points of the truth/opinion argumentation require scrutiny. 
Palamedes makes it clear to Odysseus, that if he really has 
lmowledge of the crime allegedly committed by him, this can be due 
to three reasons: a) he was an eyewitness, b) he was an accomplice, 
or c) he was told by an accomplice; the senses are here elevated to 
the sole vehicle permitting access to lmowledge; the value of the 
triple distinction is evident: it transforms the opponent from 
prosecutor into an accomplice or a witness. Not only is Odysseus an 
unreliable prosecutor, but he is also an unreliable witness.Unlike 
Odysseus, Palamedes is not able to produce even false witness. 
Therefore, it is evident that he does not possess knowledge of the 
real facts and that he trusted his opinion (ooqa.). But with regards to 
ooqa., no one is wiser than anyone else, since opinion is nothing but 
the common state of the human mind. 
The contradictory nature of the accusations and the inconsistency 
of the opponent are shown by means of a schema of logic as well; 
Palamedes complains: 'Where you [sc. Odysseus] say that I am 
artful (TEX77EV-ra.) and clever (OE!'VOV) and resourceful (7T6p~p.ov), you 
accuse me of wisdom, and where you say that I was betraying 
Greece, you accuse me of madness'. But wisdom and insanity are 
opposed to each other and they cannot coexist in the same person. 
He then (26) poses a question: 'do you think that wise men are 
witless (dvo+-ovS") or intelligent (cpPOVLp..OVS")?' If he thinks that they 
are witless, his argument must be merited as a novelty but refuted as 
untrue. If he thinks that they are intelligent, then Palamedes, as an 
intelligent person, would have never taken the risk to endanger his 
own life and act wrongly for the sake of precarious benefits. So ifhe 
is to be considered a wise man he has not performed the actions 
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accused of; ifhe had performed the actions accused of then he is not 
a wise man: in both cases Odysseus is not telling the truth. 
In the rest of the speech Palamedes addresses the jurors; this part 
can be divided into two sub-units: the first one (28-33) is self-
referential (to you, 0 judges, about myself) and the second one 
refers to the judges (to you and about you). 
The self-referential account is a short autobiography of 
Palamedes. After a statement that what he is about to say may 
inflame the resentment of the judges, Palamedes defines the account 
of his own life that follows with a legal term: 'For I am now 
undergoing scrutiny and furnishing an account of my past life' 
(€u8vva~ Ka~ t\oyov U1TExW). €U8vva. was the examination of a public 
official's conduct. Palamedes is a mythical hero, so the content of 
his account is his previous life and achievements. The legal term is 
deliberately chosen by G., since, what for others would be a 
compulsory examination, is presented here as a discretionary option 
of the hero in order to defend his own life. Palamedes is of course 
compelled by the present situation (d.vaYKaLOv) to refer to himself, 
but it is G.' s own choice to define this presentation with a legal 
term. 
The self-portrait highlights both the benefits he offered to the 
community and his incomparable morality. He first claims that his 
life is faultless (d.vap.cfp7IJTo~ ) and that he himself is a great 
benefactor of humanity, since through his inventions he made 
men's life resourceful (1TOpt..P.OV) and wellordered (K€Koap. 7Jp.€VOV ). 
After a presentation of his inventions (30), in an apologetic tone, he 
declares (31) that the reason why he reiterated all these benefactions 
to the judges was to make it clear that a man applying himself to 
such moral preoccupations is not to be considered capable of 
applying himself to such immoral actions as treason. The argument 
reminds us of the one used by Palamedes when he proved that 
wisdom and insanity cannot coexist in the same man. The last stroke 
of his brush creates the picture of his conformity to morality: he 
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does not offend the elderly, he helps the younger, he does not resent 
prosperous m~ he experiences sentiments of pity for those who 
suffer, he does not disdain poor men and he values virtue above 
wealth; he is a good citizen, he is obedient to his commanders, he is 
a conscientious man. 
And suddenly Palamedes remembers that he is not the 
appropriate person to praise himself; though he does have a good 
excuse: he was compelled to do so by circumstances (KaLpoS") and by 
the (unjust) nature of the accusations. KaLpoS" is a prominent notion 
of rhetorical theory; probably G. himself had written a treatise on 
KaLpoS" (see fro 12, with notes). But what does this term mean? It has 
been shown that the word does not obtain the meaning 'profit', or 
'opportunity' as usually translated. In the present context, the word 
means 'the present situation' , in other words it signifies the 
situational context and the pragmatic conditions in which Palamedes 
is defending his life (see also notes on He!. 2). In this light it is 
important that the word is combined with compulsion (1}vaYKaae); 
the rhetor composes his speech in a frame already created by the 
situations: the nature of the audience, the nature of the case, the 
personality of the defendant etc. Apart from being a skilful writer, 
he must also mow when and in which context an argument is likely 
to be demonstrated more effectively. 
His apostrophe to the judges develops with the presentation of 
the criteria upon which the judges must base their judgment so as to 
reach a just decision, and of the dangerous consequences of an 
unjust decision. Palamedes first claims that it is not appropriate to 
try to move them with lamentations and with the help of his friends. 
On the contrary, what he does is to try to show them the truth, not to 
deceive them. 
This is Palarnedes' responsibility; their own responsibility is to 
focus their attention on deeds, not words, to value the examination 
of truth above accusations, and to deliberate for a longer period of 
time so as to make sure that they will reach the proper conclusions. 
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This is what serious men do, when they recognize the seriousness of 
the situation and the definitiveness of their decision. 
Palamedes in a proverbial phrase declares that it is impossible to 
demonstrate the truth through words, because if it were so, then the 
judges would have already been able to reach a conclusion from 
what has been said. This is why they must keep him imprisoned, 
until they make up their minds. This will permit them to come up 
with the right decision. And then he claims that it is their reputation 
which is at stake. And a bad reputation is worse than death. So, as 
Odysseus had been transformed from a prosecutor into an 
accomplice or a witness, G. now claims that the judges' life is in 
danger, as is the life of his client. If they put him to death it will be 
they, not the prosecutor who will stain his good reputation, because 
the final decision belongs to them. 
With the statement that it is inappropriate to remind good judges 
of what has already been said, Palamedes concludes the case for the 
defence. We know that Palamedes was finally put to death; was it 




" fl-EV Ka.1'"T1'YopLa. ••• KpLa'l.c;: the words Ka...-rryopia., ci:rroAoyia and 
Kp£aL~ represent all the three main stages of a trial and it would thus 
be preferable to follow Deichgraber's <Kal. 1]> KpiaL~; Ka.rrrropLa is 
the speech delivered by the prosecutor and d-rroAoy£a the speech 
delivered by the defendant. From the very beginning of his speech 
G. uses legal terms; it is a common practice of G. to present 
mythological subjects in the legal phraseology of his time, as he 
intends to make his audience (or his readers) believe, that they are 
attending a trial of the fifth century B.C. G. 's Pal. is probably not 
the first d-rroAoyia of the hero in Greek literature: "a speech of this 
kind probably occurred in the Palamedes of Aiskhylos as well as in 
the play of Euripides bearing the same name" ( Jebb-Pearson 1917 
voLii, p. 132; cpo Aiskh. Fr.182, Eur. Fr.578). Plato also implies a 
speech of defence in tragedy: Lg.856c. llayyeAol.Ov yovv, e</n]v, 
a-rpa.rrrrov 'Aya.p.ep.vova €V raZ~ rpaywoialS llaAap.7Jo~ EKao-ror€ 
d-rrocPaiv€L. Polyaenus also gives the information that the tragic poets 
presented a trial in which Palamedes was defeated by Odysseus: 
olav O€ KdKELVO a-rparfnnlp.a 'Oouaaews- oL rpayqJool. ~8ouaL 
(polyaen. I prohoem.12) The word Kp£aL~ means 'the judgment of 
a court'. 
ou 1Te.p~ ea.va/rou 'YL-yv€.TCI.I.: 'the trial has not to do with a death 
penalty'; Y£yV€'TQ.L was proposed by Aldus, and given that G. defines 
the object of his speech the indicative expressing an irrefutable 
argument seems more likely than the inf. yLYV€afJaL. The disclaimer 
stated here is one of great importance because it does not merely 
mean that P. does not care about his life. The orator's intention is to 
remove from the minds of his audience the mythical narration that 
presents P.' s death as a fact, while at the same time to 'legalise' the 
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existence of his speech. The raison d' etre of his defence is not 
death as suc~ but the manner of this death (but when it comes to the 
responsibility of the prosecutor and the judges, Palamedes stresses 
that death is a serious and irrecoverable penalty: ro/l.p.us- avopa 1TEP~ 
8avcirou OUOKE'V; 24, orav avopEs- avopa 1TEP~ 8avcirou Kpivwu~v, 34). 
-iJ q,Ua1.s: 'nature'; the personification of physis in a context 
dominated by legal terms is a reminiscence of the nomos / physis 
controversy (Heinimann, 1945, Kerferd, 1981 ch. 10, 12, Kahn, 
1980 p. 105-108) and it is remarkable that the criminal proceedings 
of a court of law are instituted here by physis. Nevertheless, we 
should neither suppose that G. expresses his personal point of view 
nor that he declares against law. In fact, physis is used here to 
underline that what is at stake is not death itself, but the manner of 
this death (oI.KaiWS" / f3,aLWS", p.Er' OVE'OWV) and as a consequence the 
idea of 'natural death' is explicitly reflected in the word cpv(J~s- and 
not implicitly in the word OI.KaLWS" (Sykutris, 1927 p. 860). The 
association of the nomos / physis controversy with death appears in 
Antiphon: "<0 0' aJ> ~fjv €a-n rfjS' CPV(JEWS" Ka~ ro a:rr08avELv, Ka~ 
ro p.ev ~fjv aur<oLS-> €CJrI.V a1To rwv gup.cpEpovrwv, ro oe a7T08avELv 
a1TO rwv p.-r, fup.cpEpovrwv (DK87B44 coL 3). 
q,c.'VEpcl. -rU ljs.fJq,~ ... KaTE.t¥ll<l>ta-a.TO: 'physis has decreed death for all 
men with an open vote'; cpavEpa Ijsfjcpos- emphasises the 
definitiveness of the decision of physis, as it is usually associated 
with oligarchic governments: Lys.13.37 01. p.ev yap rpl.ciKOVra 
€Kci87Jvro €1TL rwv f3ci8pwv, ou VVV 01. 1TpurcivEI.S- KaeE~OVral.· 8150 8e 
rpci1TE~al. EV rqi 1TpoafJEv rwv rpl.ciKOVra EKE£afJ7JV· riJv 8E: r/Jfjcpov OUK 
ELS- KaoL(JKouS- at\.Aa cpavEpav E1Ti. ras- rpa1TE~as- ravras- EOE£. 
r£8EafJal.; Thnk.4.74. Kai. rovrcuv 1TEpl. avaYKcia-avrEs- roy 8fjp.ov 
r/Jfjcpov cpavEpav 81.EvEYKELv (cf. Xen. Hell. 2.4,10, and PI. Lg. 767d. 
Dem.19.239). 
1T'EpI. ok rijs a:np.l.as Kal.. rijs 11.p.iis: 'dishonour' and 'honour' not 
'deprivation of the civil rights'; anp.i.a was a penalty imposed for 
various offences; a case of hereditary ar£.p.£.a for treason is that 
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imposed on Antiphon, Archeptolemos and Onomakles who had 
been sent by the 400 to Sparta to treat for peace cPs.PI. Vita An. 
834a; cpo Thuk. 8.90.1-2). 
-rro-repa. fl.E ~ ••• ci:rro8a.vEl.v: G. now states the kernel of his speech 
by using an antithesis heavily weighed on the second clause, on 
which he lays the emphasis. 8t.KClL~ ci'TI'a8a.VEl.v: 'whether I will 
deservedly be punished', not 'according to nature'. The latter 
interpretation was proposed by Sykutris (1927, p. 860); Heinimann 
(1945, p.105) has shown that this meaning of O£XClI.OS" occurs in 
Solon (fr.ll) and in medical contexts opposed to {3£ClI.OS". 
Untersteiner (1954, p.138 n.l) follows Sykutris and compares 
U.XClLOS" with Aiskh. Chao 996 (€VO£XOv <pPOVTJP-ClTOS"), where €VO£xoS" 
seems to have a different meaning (see Garvie 1986, note ad lac; 
Soph. El. 37 €vS£xovS" IJ<pClyas fits better the present context). The 
interpretation of oLxaLWS- d1TOeaveZv as natural death especially in 
opposition to {3£al.OS" is apparently reasonable, but those who support 
it do not take into account the following sentence, where P. states 
that he rules over OLX7J (cp.36 €a.v dSf.xws- d1ToxTeiv7]T€ p-e); it should 
thus be preferable to see in oLxaLWS- its common meaning ('justly', 
'based on the right criteria'; see also note on 33). ~t.a.L~ 
a.-rr08a.VEl.V: a violent and udeserved death will be imposed on him by 
the jurors. To die with dignity is an archaic ideal regularly depicted 
in tragedy and associated with the fame of a hero after his death. A 
{3i.al.OS" 86..vaToS" will stain Palamedes' reputation for ever (cp. Soph. 
Aj.479-480 dN\ ':r, Xa.A.Ws- ~7]v :r, xaAwS" Te8v7Jx€VaL I TOV evyevij XPTJ)' 
2 
Tau fl.EV OAOU: we should take OAOV with ,OU /-LEV as well as with 
Xpa,el.Te, as P. and his jurors do not rule over the same OAOV; 'I 
totally rule over the one thing (OLX7]S") and you over the other (f3Lac;)'. 
-Mis fl.EV 8LK'ls ••• U!-'-El.S: P. rules over OLXTJ because he knows (5) that 
he is innocent, and jurors rule over {3£a because they can kill him if 




OUK <iJl.eYoV1"'es-). The opposition between 8f.KTJ and {3La. is emphasised 
by the chiastic arrangement of the sentence -which brings P. in the 
middle - and the repetition of the pronouns: vfJ-e'i)" •.• eyw .•. eyw ••. ufJ-e'i)". 
ci.-rrOKTELVa.l. ••• pa.OLWS: G. places the infinitive at the beginning of the 
phrase to emphasise its violent meaning and creates a hyperbaton 
that binds together the verb with the participle. 'Yap fl-E: the 
sentence explains the meaning of rij)" fJ-€V 8f.K7]S' .•. UfJ-e'i)", so A 2, s fJ-EV 
is not necessary (Skouteropoulos p.231). OUvTJ<TEa8E ~oUA6fl-EVOl.: 
the combination of the two verbs will be the basis of P.'s 
argumentation (ouTe yap {3ovA:ry8eIS eQVvclfJ-7JV av OUTe 8vVclfJ-evo)" 
e{3ovA7fJTJV epyoL)" e7nxel.pe'iv TOWVTOLS" 5). What for his jurors is an 
indisputable right, becomes for him the object of his speech. In other 
words, the jurors have the right to use violence in order to work 
their will on him and he has to prove that he is not a traitor. 
Potential opposed to truth is frequent in prose (cp. Hdt 7.15; TI1UC. 
3.39.3,6.34.1,6.57.3; Isok. 20.2, 12.143). 
3 
o Ka.-n1'Y0pos' OOU<T<TEUS: The only reference to the name of his 
prosecutor; Ka.TWOPO)" is used here as an adjective. It is remarkable 
that G. uses only one qualitative adjective to characterise Odysseus: 
TOAWTJPoTa.Te (24). 
i1 <Ta.q,~ kmO'Ta.~EvoS ••• i1 Oo~~(1)v: Knowledge is opposed to 
supposition; but in 5, P. claims that he is well aware of the fact that 
Odysseus does not rely on knowledge. Coulter suggests that "It 
should be noted that at the very beginning of the defense the 
familiar and important distinction between doxa and aletheia is 
introduced" (1964, p.280), but the emphasis here is not placed on 
the knowledge / opinion antithesis, but on the motives of the 
plaintiff. In both cases - if his motives were moral - he had a good 
reason to accuse him. 1TP00l.OOvra.: One of the few elements from 
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the myth that occurs in Pal. is that Palamedes had been accused by 
Odysseus of having attempted to betray Greeks to the Trojans (see 
Introduction). ~v' Ex\cl.oo. -nns ~a.p~ci.pOl.s: 'EMas is repeated 
three times, probably because P. wants to proclaim. his patriotic 
feelings. As far as we know G. shared the traditional ideas about the 
superiority of Greeks to barbarians: -reI. p.ev Ka-reI. -rwv j3ap{3a.pwv 
-rpo7TaLa Jp.vovs a.7TaL -rEi: -reI. oe Ka-reI. -rwv' EM-ryvwv ep-ryvovs Cfr.Sb); 
probably he was pushing through the idea of Panhellenism as well 
(fr.8a). 
y' a.p:Tj: 'in a certain way' (LSJ); the manuscripts have oo~a.~ov-ra. P.E, 
but Diels' correction maintains the symmetry between the 
participles (J(l<jJOk bncrra.f-LEvoS and oo~a.~wv in the nominative, both 
of which refer to Ka-njyopos. 
miis ya.p ~Ux.> ••• 11.l.I-wpou\l-evoS";:<oux> is necessary because the 
sentence expresses a positive statement (Denniston 1954, p. 86; cpo 
for instance PI. Soph. 240c2). The passage explains in detail the 
phrase 01. 'EVVOl.aV rijs '.£.\AMos. The accumulation of the benefits is 
expressed with an asyndeton. 
eL. OE <pe6v~ ••• ~v a.L.-n.a.v: the second probability; the motives of my 
accuser are immoral. The three motives - expressed by three datives 
- are not mutually exclusive. <pe6v~: the first probable motive is 
envy, which was caused either by P. 's inventiveness or because of 
the stratagem he had used in order to reveal the 'madness' of 
Odysseus (cp. Xen. Mem.4.2.33. -reI. De JIaJ..ap.-ryoovs- OUK a.K-ryKoas 
-rou 'OOVUUEWS" Schol. Eur Or. 432 , , E7Tt. 
-rOt.OVOE n UKEVWPOUUt. Ka-r' au-rou). KaKO'T"exv£q.: 'the suborning 
of perjury', 'conspiracy' (LSJ) is a very rare word; the latter 
meaning is more reasonable in our context. 7TCLVOUPY£q.: 'knavery'; it 
denotes a degraded form of uo<jJf.a (cp. PI. }vfenex.246e -rraua. -rE 
E1T'(.rrrr]f-L7! XWPL~OP.EV7! ot.KaLOaUv7]S" Ka~ -rijs- aM7!S a.perfjs- rravovpyf.a. 
ou uo<jJLa <jJaLvE-rCLL; cpo also Lys. 22.16 and rravovpyeL at Pal. 18). 
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O"I.lVefl-rtK€: 'fabricated the charges'; P. deliberately does not use 
the verb €7ro~eZ'T'o (as at 3 and 5), as he implies that Odysseus made 
the charges up. 
ux,..m:p ••• av eL'T}: 8~' €x€Zva refers to ei. p..ev .•• T'Lf.LWpovp.eV05"; the 
antithesis is symmetrical both in form and in content (the opposites 
Kpa7"La-r05" / Kr1.KLa-r05" along with the last words of each sentence 
create an impressive assonance). 
4 
a.V€·rr£(lEI.KTOS-: 'unproved'; it was probably G. who coined this 
compound word (see Introduction), which is unattested elsewhere in 
the prose of classical times. G. implies that Odysseus has not 
brought evidence against him. EK1TA'T}~I.V: "the result of a 
groundless accusation" (Segal 1962, p.1l7). The same word is used 
in He!. 16 to describe the terror created by apsis. Groundless 
accusation causes panic (€K7rA7]gL5"), leading the defendant to d7rOpLa 
(cp. Antiphon 5.6. 'T'au'T" oJv EK7rA7]gLV 7rOM7]V 7rapeX€LV dvaYK7] 
EG'Ti. 'T'q; KLVOVV€VOvn). ci.1TOpELV T~ AO')''!!: P., in the psychological 
state of EK7rA7]gL5", is helpless because he is in need of words, and his 
d7rOpLa is only superficially opposed to 7rOp~p..f.JJT'EpWV, because 
'compulsion' and 'truth' are dangerous teachers (cp. Aiskhin.2.41: 
av'T'ov p..ev eaKlJ.YTTT'€ Ka~ rryv d1TopLav rryv EV 'T'q; AOYCP avp..{3aaav 
eavTq;; for a different context see PI. Ion 536c 7r€P~ p..ev' Op..-rypov 
OT'aV T'L5" p..v7]a8fj, eV7ropeZ5", 7rep~ oe 'TWV aAAwv d7ropeZ5"). 
av \l.~ n ... \l.a80): The only way to overcome his difficulties is to 
learn something from truth and compulsion. ci.A~8EI.a.: in He!. it is 
defined as the virtue of iloyo5": Koap..05" ... AOycp OE dATj8€l..a (1); the 
word is associated with O~Ka£W5" and 8£K7] of chapters 1-2. P. knows 
the truth because he is aware of the fact that he has not committed 
the crime with which he is charged (for knowledge see Hel.11). -M)S-
-rra.pouOils ci.vci."fKl1S: 'the present compulsion'; dvaYK7] describes the 
situational context of the trial. P. has to defend himself in a court of 
law, and thus create a speech dictated by dvaYK7] in order to prove 
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that he is innocent (32 <> oe 1rapwv Kal.pO~ TJvaYKaU€ KaL -mvTa ••. ) . 
In He!. 13 we find the phrase Totk dvaYKa£ov~ ol.a AOYWV dywva~ 
opposed to the speeches of philosophers. So a speech delivered by 
someone because he is compelled to do so dvaYKaLo~ is dvaYKaLo~. 
Diels compares this passage with a passage from the Platonic 
dialogue Theaeretus (172e) oi. oe ell dOXOAL~ T€ de~ Aeyoval. -
KaTE1TELyel. yap uowp pEOV - Kai. OUK eyxwpeL 1repi. ou av 
emevp.f]awal. TOVS" AOYOVS" 1roLeiafJal., d,\.,\' dvaYK7]1I exwlI <> dVTl.OI.KOS" 
ecpEUT7]KEII . 
SLi5aG1<a.Awv ••• TUXwv: OI.OaUKaAoS" is the 'teacher', and the words 
d,\f]8e 1. as" and dllaYK7]S' are thus personified (cp. Lys. 12.78. 
Oel.VOTaTWv epywlI OI.OaUKaAoS" KaTaa-raS") E'TTLKLVOUVO'iEpwv il 
1rOpLI-LW'iEpWV: 'more dangerous than resourceful teachers'. Why are 
truth and compulsion dangerous teachers? In the particular context 
the word dAf]8el.a does not strictly mean truth. If P. remained 
confident in his belief that truth can release him from the charges he 
would not deliver a speech of defence at all. Mere declaration of his 
innocence would have been enough. But the orator is well aware of 
the fact that judges are not usually convinced by truth; P. is not a 
witness but the defendant and he knows that his only hope of 
salvation is his speech. That is exactly why we should not expect 
him simply to state the real facts. Instead, he will substitute the facts 
of his case with probabilities (eLKoTa) and logical reasoning, because 
this is what truth means under the compulsion (dvaYK7]) imposed by 
the pragmatic situations of a court oflaw. So, in 33 where he claims 
that T(~ aacpeaTaTqJ ol.KaiqJ, ol.oaqavTa. TdA7]8eS" ... f-L€ oei ol.acpvyeiv 
TIJv aLTl.aV TalJT7]V, he means that he has revealed the truth, not 
necessarily that he has managed to do it by demonstrating real facts. 
In Phaidros 25ge, Plato attacks the probability arguments, because 
rhetors are not based on truth, but on what passes with their 
audience for truth, d,\Aa TO. oo~aVT' av 1TAf]8el. OL 1T'ep OI.KaaOvatV (for 
the Platonic polemic see Introduction). The difficulties provoked by 
dvaYK7] are better understood in the light of another Gorgianic 
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passage, which deals with the same problem; in He!. (13) G. 
proposes that in forensic procedures et5> 1\6Y05> 1TOAVII OXI\OIl ETeptPe 
KaL E1TeuTe T€xJnJ ypatj;e£s. OUK d)"'T]8ef.q. l\ex8ef.5> (see note ad lac.): 
the defendant knows that he delivers his speech 'under compulsion', 
and the speech of the prosecutor will probably be proved more 
effective (for a different discussion of the passage see Coulter 1964, 
p.280-284, who focuses on the doxa / alerheia antithesis). 
5 
on \-LEV OUV ••• TO \-L" I'€VO\-L€vov: P. claims that Odysseus does not 
rely on knowledge (of truth), but bases his accusations on opinion 
which is defined as a1TLaTOTaTOIl 1TpaYf-La (24). Untersteiner 
compares the idea expressed here with G.'s ONE: "This proposition 
seems to be universally valid, but in fact it is not so, as G. will 
prove, not only at the end of this speech but also and especially in 
his great epistemological work [sc. nep~ TOV f-L7J 5111"05>]" (1954, 
p.33). I am not convinced that this passage should be examined 
within the scope of that text, since first the reading of the latter 
depends much on the intention attributed to it, and secondly because 
it is evident that by polarising opinion and knowledge Palamedes 
provides himself with the opportunity to employ an argument from 
antinomy (see Introduction). The structure of the period is an 
example of the style of G.: the chiastic arrangement is emphasised 
by the striking repetition of cognitive verbs, underlying P. 's 
conviction: ou aatj;ilJ5> <el'8w.;>/aatj;ilJ5> oi'8a - aVlIoL'8a yap €f-Lau1"0 
aatj;ilJ5> /ou'8' EOLX' 01TWS" all el'8ef.7]. The repetition of the adverb 
cYatj;ilJ5> offers added emphasis to the cognitive verbs. ~i.o~>: in a 
context dominated by cognitive verbs the suggestion of Reiske 
seems reasonable. OUO' EOI-X': Radermacher's emendation is closer to 
the Ms' ou'8€ OUX, than Diels' ov'8€ oia '. OV: Diels is perhaps right in 
adding all after eiaeL7] ns, since the phrase does not mean ignorance 
of the 'existence' of that which has not happened, but that one 
cannot claim that he is aware of the truth of something that has 
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never happened (this use of the Greek verb 'to be', which Kahn 
(1966, p.249) terms veridical, is, of course, frequent in the ONE). 
€t oe otO\-LEVos ••• Ka'M1"Y0p[av: this sentence picks up the wording of 
3. 
01.0. (lLau-tiJv u\-L~v km.oo.;w Tp01'T'ttlV: 'I shall demonstrate in two 
different ways that he does not tell the truth'; it is a common 
practice of G. to describe the stages of his speech and the transition 
from the one to the other (see Introduction). 
OUTE y2Lp ~OUA1'JeEI.S ••• Ef3ou;":~a"v: 'For if I had wished I would not 
be able nor I would have wished if I were able'. With the chiastical 
arrangement of rhyming words G. presents the keystones of his 
argumentation. The first part will be discussed in ch. 6-12 ( 12 
7T1J.VTWS" apa Kat. 7TaV'i7] 7Tav-m 7TpaTTel.V d.8vvaTov ~v fL0r.) and the 
second in ch. 13-21. 
The first part of the main body of the defence (6-12) is based on a 
model, combining probabilities (elKoTa) with the process of 
elimination (d.7Taycurr7J. The use of probabilities consists in the 
deSCription of the stages normally employed by someone who 
commits the crime of treachery and the use of the process of 
elimination in the fact that the defendant gradually demonstrates 
that each one of these stages would have been impossible, and as a 
consequence that even if he had wished, it would not have been 
possible to betray his compatriots. But the keystone of his 
argumentation is concession, which pushes the argumentation 
forward in two ways: on the one hand the conditionals introduce the 
new argument and on the other they underline the presumptive 
character of the previous stage (8 Kai7Tep ou yevofLEvoV, 11 Td. fL7] 
yevofLEva). The verbal e.xpression of this twofold concession requires 
attention since it is based on repetition: 7 ciMd. 87] TOUTO T4I '\oyq.t 
OVVUTOV YEvEa8Ur., 8 d.J\Aci. 87] Kat. -rOUTO YEVEa8W, 11 Kal. 07] Toivvv 
yevEa8w. Bux (1941, pp.394-398) suggested that G. '5 argument is 
based on the method of reductio ad impossibile (0 or.eL -rOU d.8vvaTov 
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O11Moytap.6s-) described by Aristotle in his Analytica Priora; 
Untersteiner follows him: "The argumentation in P. relies on the 
demonstration of logic " (1961, p. 112); so does Skouteropoulos who 
claims that "the schema used does not come from the dicanic action 
but from the logic of natural philosophy" (1991, p. 258, n.14). 
Long claims that Gorgias "proceeds by the 'Chinese box' 
sequence" both in P. and in his treatise ON'B (1982, p.l35) and he 
compares the method applied in P. with Se."Ctus Empiricus' method 
of eliminating alternatives and he considers that "it is likely enough 
that Se."Ctus Empiricus, or his source, were influenced directly by 
Gorgias in their method of eliminating alternatives" (p. 236). The 
same scholar takes the view that the method used here is radical: 
"In a casual way e."Camples of the technique can be found in the 
Attic orators, but I IolOW of nothing comparable to its use in the 
Palamedes" (p. 235, examples n. 5, p. 241). To sum up, 
probabilities and logic are both discernible in the first part of P. 's 
defence and they are both related to the nature of this part, that 
deals with real facts and not with motives (for the method of 
argument see Introduction). 
6 
AO"!OV: 'argument'; the word has a great range of meanings, but it is 
clear that here it means argument (note that ;\oyoS" in the following 
lines is used to denote 'oral communication'). The first argument is 
that he was not able to betray Greece to the Trojans (ciOVVUTOS" E1.fu) 
and it is reasonable to suggest that the word ;\0Y0S" includes the 
argumentation as welL 
11"PWTOV: 'first'; with a temporal adverb G. says what he is going to 
do first. It is interesting that the wording is arranged in a manner 
that harmonises the sequence of the facts with the stream of the 
logical reasoning attempted throughout this section (6-12) by G.: 
Err!. TOVTov ... rrp6Yrov, rrp6Yrov apx7Tv, TJ O€ a.pxT!, rrpo yap nuv 
iJ-E,UOVTwv ... rrpoTEpoV. 
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"1"0\3"1"0: Blass prefers TavTa; it is not necessary to follow him. since 
the plural epyocs (5) is pejorative. whereas in this context the word 
has a neutral sense. The repetition introduces us to the ;\6yoS' / epyov 
relation (TOVTOV TOV ;\6yov - TOVTO -:rpa.TTE!'V). 
AO')'OS; 'speech' generally; G. does not define here what kind of 
speech he means, because he states a general principle which is not 
confirmed by the real facts of this particular case. The ;\6yovS' and 
,\6yol. refer to the specific case discussed here and take on the 
meaning' discussions', or even 'negotiations'. 
l-L-rl'T"' EKE1.vou ••• kA8o\l"'rt)s;: Although the meaning of the period is 
generally clear, there are some textual difficulties. Two readings are 
worth quoting: (a) p.fr' €p.ov -rrpoS' €KELVOV €Ae6v"I"oS'; and (b) [.L7rrE 
<rov> -rrap' €[.Lov -rrpoS' €KeLVOV €Ae6vTOS'; The first is the reading of 
A (followed by Kalligas), and (b) was proposed by Blass, who 
adopts the -rrap' €[.Lov of A2. If we were to go with Blass then the 
meaning would be that P. did not send anyone to Priam, as Priam 
did not send anyone to P. The reading of the Ms. is slightly 
different: 'if he did not send anyone to me and if I did not go to 
him'. It does not seem necessary to correct the Ms .• since in 7- 8 G. 
discusses the alleged negotiations between P. and Priam. The 
symmetry is striking: both phrases end with participles that form a 
homeoteleuton; the symmetry is also supported by the pansosis. 
'Ypal-Ll-La:nuv: 'letters'; it is not necessary to read ypa[.L[.LarEl.WV with 
Diels (,tablet on which one writes', LSJ), since the emphasis is not 
necessarily placed on the writing techniques, but rather upon the 
impossibility of communication (cp. Eur. IT 594: KOVcPWV €Kan 
ypaf-Lf-La.TWV (jW'i7JpLav). The letter here is not the same with the one 
known from the myth. as the latter is a part of Odysseus' stratagem 
and ostensibly sent by Priam to P. with the gold. 
<iq>l.K'T"(1.1.: 'arrives'; this is an 'empiric perfect' that sets forth a 




a.M.a. &rt: "After a rejected suggestion" (Denniston 1954, p.241); cpo 
8, 18. 
~ AO,,),I.!> Ouva:rov ')'€VEaea.l.: Bekker changes the verb to YEvea8w; 
Long (1982, p.241 n.4) agrees with him: "Gorgias is not stating real 
possibilities, but conceding possibility for the sake of his argument, 
only to demolish it later". But the dative Tqi :toyq.J means 'for the 
argument's sake', 'supposedly' (cp. the beginning of6, where :toyov 
also means 'argument', and W<; dOVVClTOS", which has now become 
8VVClTOV YEvea8ClI.), and thus Bekker's alteration is unnecessary, 
unless a pleonastic expression is required here; but this is doubtful 
(cp. 11 KCl~ 8", TOI.VVV YEvea8w ••• , where the imperative is clearly 
meant to denote that what is said is for the argument's sake only). 
KClt O-Tt -ro~vuv ••• E")'W: KCl~ 8", TOI.VVV occurs mostly in Plato (cp. 11; 
see Denniston 1954, p.578 (2), n.l). The period - and generally ch. 
7 - is a striking example of the style of G .. It is remarkable that here 
the hyperbaton (aVvELJ.LL ••• KaKELvqJ EYW) creates two chiasms the one 
(external) containing the other (internal): 1. aVvELJ.LL - aUVECTTI. -
,..... " " "2 ,..... , ", KClKEI.VOS" EJ.LOI. - KClKEI.VqJ eyw, • KClKELVOS" - EJ.LOI. - KClKEI.Vq.J - EyW. 
The first obvious result of this arrangement is to isolate the persons 
from their actions. The second one is that due to the word-order the 
transitive verb a-VVELJ.L1. appears here as intransitive, and thus we have 
the impression that P. and Priam met separately 'he met me and I 
met him'; this idea is explicitly stated in the sentence 1TOTEPCl J.LovoS" 
j.Lovq.J; The overall result is that the form depicts the content, that is 
the impossibility of the alleged encounter. 
nvi. nS ... tL0VOs tL0vl.!>; This passage creates autonomous sub-units by 
using small sentences in an asyndetic arrangement which gradually 
reaches the main point, that is the impossibility of communication 
(cl:t:t ' dyvo-ryaDj.L€V Totk dM-ry:twv :toyovS"). 
~EM"I1V ~ap~cipl.!>: on G.'s opinions on the superiority of Greeks see 
3. 1TWs cl.K01JWV KClI. AE")'WV; The participle clKOVWV here means 'hear 
and understand' (cp. Aiskh. Pro 448 KAVOVTES" OUK 7]KOVOV). 
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Language is usually conceived as a strong criterion of nationality; 
Herodotos (8. 144) claims that the unity of the Greeks is reflected in 
four different aspects of their common life, one of which is their 
common language (o'u-Oy'\WO'aov). a.yvo~aofLE.V: the Ms reads 
ciyvof]aw,U-€v; but G. goes on (ci,.\Ao. p.e8' ep,U-iJvEWS:) with the 
discussion of the alleged '\oyo£. with Priam. 
illa. fLee' EpfL'T1VEws;: 'was it with the help of an interpreter?', a 
hypophora with cLVi.d.; the idea is that if their negotiations had been 
assisted by a translator, then the latter would have been aware of the 
content of their discussion. For EP'u-iJV€V~, cpo Hdt. 3.38 €rp€,O, 
1Tap€OV,WV ,WV 'EMf]v{JJv, KaL Q£.' /:pp.iJVEws p.av8avovTeJ)v ,0. 
Aeyo,U-€va. Hall maintains that "Gorgias ... exploited the problem 
involved in making mythical Greeks and barbarians communicate 
with one another" and compares "the argument invented for 
Palamedes" (1989, p.1l7 n. 56). The word /:PP:TJV€VS- is also applied 
to someone who can decode an intricate meaning (in relation to 
poetry see PI. Ion 534e4 o~ oe 1ToL7J7"aL ovaev aAA' 7} Epf.LiJV7j:; €laLV 
nov 8ewv). 
8 
fLE:ra. TOU-rOtlS: 'after the speeches'; the plural here refers to AOYOL ill 
the middle of 6, and not particularly to dAAf]AWV AOyov~, since G. 
simply intends to remind us of the general idea ofthe first argument. 
mO"TLV OOUVa.L ICa.l. 8E~a.aea.L: 1T£ans- is 'that which gives confidence', 
'a pledge'; the meaning is that after the discussion it would have 
been necessary for both parties to give a pledge. The 1T[aTe(.~ 
discussed in ch. 8-10 are the following: 1. an oath (8), 2. hostages 
(8),3. money (9,10; it is interesting that all of them would involve 
p.a.propes-, as Palamedes explicitly says when he mentions the 
possibility that he communicated with Priam by using an interpreter: 
rpL,o~ apa. p.a.p7lJs-..• 8). With his argumentation P. will prove that it 
was impossible to bind Priam with a pledge (cp. Pl. Phdr. 256d. 
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O€0Ext'al.). 
-rr01"epoV ••• E.p.eN..EV; The first possible pledge presented by the 
defendant is an oath; the untenability of this possibility is 
demonstrated on the basis of morality: in what way would the 
enemies have trusted the very person who betrayed his own 
compatriots? All the other arguments concerning 1T1.a-r€~~ will be 
attributed to difficulties provoked by the circumstances. The same 
idea recurs in ch.21, where 1T1.a-r~~ is presented as a prerequisite for a 
livab Ie life (cp. L ys.12. 77 1T1.a-r€~~ aV1"ot:s epYqJ O€OWKWs- Ka~ 1Tap' 
€.J<€1.VWV OpKOU~ €lJ...7]rpWs- and AI. Lys.1185). 
O!l-1']P0I.; 'hostages'; this is one more invented possibility (we do not 
know of any exchange of hostages from the mythical accounts) used 
to add verisimilitude to the speech. The exchange of hostages was a 
common practice during wartime and at the suspension of 
hostilities, and as a consequence the exchange presented in this 
context - initiated by a traitor - seems strange (see Amit 1979, p. 
129-147). But at any rate we have to suggest that it helps G. to 
develop his argumentation. 
olov E)'W ••• ,-wv UI.EmV 1"I.va: We know that P. had two brothers, Oiax 
and Nausimedon; we do not have much infonnation about the latter 
and we ought to suggest that G. here refers to Oiax, whose name 
appears in several sources. As far as we know, Oiax took part in the 
war of Troy and according to Hyginus (Fab.117) he was the one 
who infonned Clytaemestra about the relations of her husband with 
Cassandra and it was this news that led her to plot Agamemnon's 
death. He also tried to persuade the Greeks to banish Orestes after 
the death of his mother (Eur. Or, 430-4). The Scholiast of the 
Thesmophon'azousai tells us that Euripides ID his tragedy 
Palamedes presents Oeax sending the news of the death of his 
brother to their father, Nauplios: 0 yap EvpmC87]S EV '14) llaAafl·:fJ07J 
E1TOI.7]Ge TOV oraKa TOV aO€Arpov llaAafl:r,oous E1T~ypa!f;al. €[~ '1"a~ 
vaGs JOV 8avaTOV aVToG, Zva cP€P0f.L€VUI. aUTal. eAeWG'LV els TOV 
Na.U1TAI.OV TOV 1TaTepa. UVTOG Kat G.1Ta.yye£AlLXJL TOV eavaTOV aVToG. 
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OXnrEp orag -rcfj Nav-rrAf.lJ! ypa.CPEI. ev -rcfj IIa>..ap.-TJo7J Evpt.-rr£oov. <5 
ya.p orag e-yxapa-rrEI. -rroMaZs- -rrAa.Tctt.S- -ra. -rrEPi. -rau IIa>..OfI.-TJo7JV Kai. 
dcpLTj(jLV Els- ea.Jtaaaav, Wo-rE p.df. ye nvl. -rau Nav-rrA/.ou -rrpoa-rrEaE£.V 
(Schol. Ar. Thesm. 771). It would be senseless to mention Priam's 
sons, because they were no less than fifty (among them Hektor and 
Paris)! 
E.p.oL 'T'E. •• nu.p' o4Lou: the paris os is in combination with the -rE ••• TE 
structure (see Denniston 1954, p.503) sets off the fact that the 
exchange of hostages would have been a secure pledge in equal 
terms. 1Tt.O'TO"ra:ra.: The opposite word recurs in ch.24 attributed 
9 
<P-rlO'El. 'Tl.S: The future of the verb ¢>TJp.£ is used here instead of a 
potential mood and offers variety to the speech, as G. uses it instead 
of the constructions with Y£YVEdJat. (7, 8, 11) denoting the 
concessio, and it serves as an anticipation of a possible argument 
that could be used against his own reasoning (-rrpoKa-ra.ATjtPt.S-). In 
effect, no one claimed that P. was paid by Priam, and even in the 
mythical account the money placed by Odysseus in his tents was not 
a part of the preparations for the betrayal, but P.' s 'recompense' for 
a crime already committed. This suggestion is reinforced by the 
supposition in 10 (eyw 0' e';eAeWV ... €da7jAeEV); but the myth tells us 
that the money was brought to P's. tents by a slave bribed by 
Odysseus. The creation of alleged charges gives the orator the 
opportunity to demonstrate his skills, and thus offer rhetorical 
education. 
aUK Ei.KOS: 'it is not likely'; Untersteiner remarks that this is the only 
occurrence of the word in this text, because as he explains the 
argumentation here relies on the truth / opinion antithesis (1961, 
pp.117-18; for the probabilities see notes on ch.6 ). 
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trrrOUflY11tJ-a."!"OOV: 'services' . 
.,.{~ OUV ~v 'it KotJ-I.011; The question is adverbial: 'how could one 
transfer the money?', not 'Who was the go-between?' (Kennedy 
1972, p. 56). 
'TT'~ S a.v exO\J-l.o-EV <i1 ELS> i1 1TOMo~; Eis- was proposed by Keil, 
but it is possible that an 7] before it was ornmitted due to 
hap 10 grap hy. 
-rroMw -yC.p ••• cJ>EflO\J-EVOV -Tjv: the struCnITe of the antithesis is 
symmetrical; the two participles (KOI).L~6v-rwv - KOfJ-i~ov-ros-) are 
placed at the beginning of the sentences in the same place and the 
repetition of the quantitative words (notice that he does not write 
dltiyov but uses a litotes) bind the period together (1TOMWV - 7TOMOI. 
- €VOS- - OUK cr.v 7TOltV) chiastically. Il-Up-ruPES -Ml~ E.m.~oUA:iis: 
'witnesses of the plot' (for E1TL{3ovlt7j cpo Thuc. 4.77); G. was 
certainly aware of the use and the misuse of witnesses (see 23), and 
generally of what Aristotle later termed a-rEXV0l. 7Tio--rELS-. 
10 
'ittJ-Epa.~ i1 Vt.lK"O~; the genitives express time; note that G. passes to 
the discussion of the time that the alleged crime took place without 
indicating it (possibly the schema of 7TPOo-{30lt7j), but this may be 
explained by the fact that he goes on dealing with the same 
argument. 
ilia. <vuK,.6s>: it is better to make this a question corresponding to 
ill' 7JfJ-Epas-; 
ilici. ')'E ••• ,.OI.OU,.OLS: 'but the light is an enemy of such things'; ciMcl 
yE is very rare, 'objecting, in hypophora' (Denniston 1954, p.23). 
El.EV: the word is simply transitional, 'Well' (cp. Eur. Tro. 944); G. 
makes the assumption that P. finally escaped the watches in order to 
pass to the next argument. 
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a'U~A80I-L€V ••• EKp1)~U: With this chain of verbs G. summarises the 
stages of the alleged treason discussed in detail in 6-10; all these 
necessary stages invented by him with the assistance of probabilities 
(what a man who is planning to betray his country would be 
expected to do) have been proved logically impossible. This string 
is given in asyndeton (cp. 21 J.Ae€'7W, </JUlI-frrW, J.Lup71Jp7]aa,w), which 
introduces the last general argument of this part and consequently 
this is the last concession of the defendant. EAU80v AU~WV: cpo ReI. 
4: Au{3ovau KuL ou Aa8ovau. 
eOEL o~-rr01) ••• k,,/EVE'iO: 'I should perform that for the sake of which 
all these had been done, shouldn't I?'; 8frrrov is slightly ironical, and 
thus I render it with the expression 'shouldn't I?' (Denniston 1954, 
p.267). Palamedes now passess to the commission of the act of 
treason itself, as the repetition of 7TpaT7E~lI in 11-13 shows 
('TT'paT7E~lI, 'TT'paT7WlI 11; 'TT'pii~~~, 'TT'all,($ a.pu •.• 'TT'paT7E~lI 12; 
'TT'paT7E~lI ). 
'TOU'TO 'ToLwv ••• a.-rropW'TEpov: notice the allitteration. -rWV ELP1'\I-LEVltlV: 
refers to all the hypothetical stages developed in 6-10. It was even 
more difficult for him to commit the act (for the reasons that he will 
present in 11-12) than it was to prepare it. 
7Tpa:T"TltlV fLEv ••• l1 fLEe' €''TEpltlV; we should make this a question, 
because there is clearly another anthypophora here; the following 
construction starting with cLU' oUX is the answer that the rhetor 
gives to the question. 
'TWV a'UVOV'TltlV: Reiske's correction is preferable to the Ms' reading 
nuv VVV OV7WV; aVlIE~iJ-1. appears in the next line and probably G. 
indulges in another repetition here. 
ns UI-Lwv ~{,voL3E; AE,,/ETltl: the deed was not the work of one man; 
the meaning is, 'I could not perform this action by myself and thus I 
needed accomplices: they must be among you'. The same argument 
is used for the prosecutor in 22 EL OE J.LE7€XWlI ..• 
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OoUAOI.S OE ~ OUK a:m.a-rov;: 'How could one believe that I used 
slaves?'; the idea is expressed with a litotes. 
EKOV1"€S ••• KClT"Tl1'0pouow: <T€> Reiske; single TE IS rare In prose 
(Denniston 1954, p. 503; cpo Pal. 8, and Hel. 14), but it occurs in 
Antiphon (see Gagarin, 1997, p.27). E1r' EAEUeepl.~: 'so as to be 
liberated' (see MacDowell 1978, p. 83); Lys. 7.16 EV yap av 7]07] 
on Err' EKEI.VOLe;; -ryv KU~ J.p.€. np.wp-ryaCla8aL KU~ aUToLe;; p.-rpnJaaaLv 
J.AEv8EpoLe;; YEvEa8aL. XELj.L~Oj.L€VOI. TE 01.' ci.vci.1'K'TJv: 'forced by 
torture'; the phrase expresses the process of basanos, that is the 
statement given by a slave under torture (see MacDowell 1978, 
pp.245-247 and 1964, p.79 n.22, and especially Thiir 1977). The 
evidence given by a slave was taken into account only if it was 
given under torture and usually the courts trusted the veracity of 
their statements (cp. Isaios 8.12 Kai. orrOTav OOVAOI. KU~ J.AEV8EPOI. 
rrapayevwvTul. KUI. oe7J eVpEefjvaf. n nov ~7JTovp.evwv, ou xpfjaeE 
TULe;; nov J.AEv8epwv p.ap-rvpLuLe;;, dX\a TOlle;; OOVAove;; f3uaavf.~ovTEe;;, 
OUTW ~7JTELTE EVpel.V -n,v d:l.Tj8ELUV TWV yeyev7]f.Levwv). Nevertheless, 
it is wiser to assume that the orators had an opportunistic opinion 
about the reliability of slaves, that depended much on the 
circumstances of each individual case; Antiphon, for instance, in 
5.32 maintains that the statements of slaves are affected by what 
they consider as advantageous for them (00" av J.KEI.VOI.e;; f.LeAAW(IL 
XapLEl.aeUL) whereas in 6.25, he takes the view that torture compels 
them to tell the truth (KUI. EgEI.7] p.€V TOlle;; eA€v8EpOVe;; opKOLe;; KUI. 
rrLaTEO'Lv dvuYKa~Ec.v, a. TOLe;; EA€v8epOLe;; p.eyLaTU KUI. rr€p~ rrAELaTOV 
EaTLV, J.gE£7] oe Toue;; oovAove;; €TEpULe;; dvaYKULe;;, vq;' WV KU~ ~v 
p.eAAW(ILV a.rrOeavEZaeUL KUTEL7T<)VT€S", Op.ws- dVUYKa'ovTUI. TdA7]8fj 
AeYELV). OL' ci.vci.')'K'T]v: opposed to EKoVTEe;;. KClT"Tl1'Opouaw: 
'denounce', not 'bring charges against someone'; the verb is here 
intransitive (cp. Lys.14.46, Aischin.1.175). 
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KPEL1"iOVQ.s Up.Wv: 'the enemy in larger numbers than you'; the idea 
is that it was not practical for P. to bring in enough of the enemy. 
U1TEp 1"€'I.X€wV: an 'Ionic' form, instead of the 'Attic' TE~XWV; the wall 
of Troy was built by Poseidon and Apollo and it was app7JKToV (ll. 
21.447), whereas the Greek wall was constructed by mortals in the 
hope that it would protect themselves and their ships (ll. 14.67-68). 
a.1TQ.'V1"Il. yo.p 1Tt.."P'fl q,ut..<1Kwv: Diels prints CPUAUKWV; the same word 
appears in 10 but the meaning is there different. The word here 
refers to the guards of the walls, not to the watches. In the iliad 
(10.56) we learn that the Achaean wall possessed a CPVAQ.KWV tEpOV 
TEAoS" that counted seven leaders and one-hundred warriors under the 
supervision of each leader (9.80-88). It is interesting that a similar 
argument is employed by Helen in Euripides' Troades (955-8), 
where she claims that it was impossible for her to escape from the 
Trojans, and that the guards of the wall can serve as her witnesses 
(implying that each time she attempted to escape they stopped her). 
a.pQ.: 'logical' cpo 7TQ.VTWS" C1.pu ..• (Denniston 1954, p.40-1) 
u1TQ.(8pl.os yo.p ••• a.ouvQ.'iOV -Tjv \-1.01.: G. closes the argumentation of 
the first part with a striking repetition of 7TUV1'"-, that creates a 
remarkable alliteration. The repetition is not confined to the last 
statement expressed in the last line, but begins in the preceding 
period, which deals with the openness of the military life. The 
intention of the rhetor is to create a gradual intensity before he 
reaches the conclusion of this part. A parody of this kind of 
rhetorical expression can be traced in Plato's i'vfenex. 247a WV EVEKU 
KuL 7Tptirrov KuL UaTUTOV KuL o~ci 7TUV1'"OS" 7TCiauv 7TQ.VTi»<; iTpOeU}-LLUV 
7TEl.paa8E EXE~V, 07TWS" }-LciJ\~aTu ••• u1ToL8pl.os: 'outdoors'; cpo Xen. 
An. 7.6.24 U7TULepW~ 0' E~W EaTPU1'"07TEOEUE7'"E. }-LEaoS" O€ XELfJ-WV ~v 
<1Tcl.V1"€.S>: Reiske's suggestion is correct, because it adds the 
missing subject and maintains the symmetrical arrangement with the 
repetition of the same word (miV1'"ES") in the place of the subject of 
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the same verb (OpWaL / opwrrraL) repeated in the active and the 
passive voice; -rrav-ras-, proposed by Blass, seems unlikely as it does 
not give any solution to the missing subject and disturbs the 
symmetry. ml.~ cipa. ••• a.ouva .. rov -flv (.1.01.: the argumentation of the 
first part creates a circle, as the conclusion picks up the opening 
words. The defendant has just proved that even if he had wished to 
betray Greece to the barbarians he would not have been able to do it. 
In the second part of his speech Palamedes discusses in detail the 
second part of his programmatic sentence (5 oU.,-e. Quva.p.e.vos-
E.~ou>.:~~v); he argues that even if he had been able to commit the 
crime of treason, it would have not been advantageous for him. The 
examination of possible motives is presented as a concession to the 
first part. P. concedes - for the sake of his argumentation- that it 
was possible to perform actions, which have already been proved 
impossible (et (.I.cl.ALa-ra. 1l'a.v.,-wv e.ouva.P.l1v ..• ). The method of this part 
is a combination of probabilities, in the respect that he invents 
probable motives that would justify his action (notice the use of 
potential moods), and of a survey of a demonstration of an idealised 
morality, in the respect that our actions must be in accordance with 
what is commonly accepted. But we should not assume that Gorgias 
implies that a man should be moral just because this is a good thing. 
In the frame of the sophistic relativism he treats each motive 
separately (as the four probable reasons that made Helen follow 
Paris in Helen), under the light of the most important cn"terion 
expressed in a general and proverbial way in ch.19: men perform 
these actions either as they pursuit gain, or because they try to 
avoid a loss. Each individual action then should be judged In 
connection to the crup.<?€POv and the W¢E.A.LP.OV. The motives presented 
are the following: a) power, b) monetary gain, c) honour, d) 
security, e) helping friends and harming enemies or e) avoidance of 
a fear, or of a labour, or of a danger. Two types of motives are 
discernible: the positive, where a man takes active initiatives in 
237 
order to gain advantages and the negative where a man is 
compelled to act in a certain manner so as to avoid a loss. 
Untersteiner (1954, p.135) who bases his interpretation of this pan 
ofPalamedes on the 'epistemological' treatise of Gorgias. links the 
main idea of will to the knowability of the object that had been 
willed and suggests that "now the new pivot consists in the 
impossibility of knowing that which cannot have been willed. and 
therefore that which. since it does not exist as willed. cannot be the 
object of objective knowledge ". But I am inclined to believe that 
Long (1982. p.237) is on the right track when he claims that: "This 
is rhetoric at its purest. We are being told that Palamedes plays all 
the roles which should dispose the judges in his favour, and that it is 
their role. as judges. to expect to hear such a recital of virtues II and 
that he knows "of no more comprehensive survey of Greek popular 
morality ". The rhetor must be aware of these motives. so as to add 
credibility to his speech. One more point is worth our attention. Up 
to ch.19 Gorgias deals with the motives and he then (20-21) passes 
to the discussion of the unlivability of the life of a traitor. These two 
chapters undoubtedly belong to the second part of the speech as 
well, as they present the negative consequences of the immoral 
actions that precede and because Gorgias explicitly states that he 
has reached the end of his argumentation dealing with the 
impossibility of the e.xistence of such a will at the end of 21. 
13 
OKE.tfsaaBE KO~vij Kat ,.OSE: Reiske prefers -rOLIIVII, but the same 
phrase, as Diels has shown, appears in Plato's Protagoras 330b (see 
also Cr.48d, nIt. ISle, Alc.1l7c, 124d, Lach.I8/d, Gorg.498e), and 
it is not necessary to change the :vis's reading. The orator calls for 
the attention of his audience with a verb of thinking, as he does at 
the beginning of ch.20. 
1'Tp0cr-i1KE ~ou~"&TivaL ••• E;ouvci.~,,v; the verb 71pOafjKE introduces us to 
the discussion of motives; P. does not simply say 'for what reason 
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would I have wished', but 'for what reason was it appropriate to 
wish'. ei. P.cl.AL<TTCt: it is not necessary to add Kat. with Aldus, 
since fUlAurra expresses the needed concession sufficiently; what 
follows is a concession to what has already been proved impossible 
in ch.6-12. 
KCLK01"iJ"'TU: "wickedness'; the word is not very common: it has a 
considerable appearance in Herodotos (cp. 2.124,126,128, 3.80 and 
elsewhwere), and it appears also in Thoukydides (5.100) and 
Antiphon (6.1). 
1TpO~Ka.: 'without any gain', here adverbially; cpo PI. Ap.1ge OL~ 
Toue; p.£yl.O""I"Oue; ••• KctKLO""I"Oe;: f.L€yf.a-rou~ K!'VQVVOU~ refers to all the 
necessary stages for the preparation of the treason, as presented in 
detail in ch.6-12, and -rr,v f.L€yLa-r7JV KaKOrrrra to the crime that he 
allegedly committed. In this phrase Calogero (1976, p.413) discerns 
a prelude to the famous Socratic principle nemo sua sponte peccat. 
The admittedly impressive similarities between the Defence of 
Palamedes and the Platonic Apologia both in fonn and in content 
were first demonstrated by Gomperz (1912, p.9ff.), and discussed in 
detail in more recent articles (Coulter 1964 and Feaver-Hare 1981). 
Notice the schema etymologicon. 
a.M' E.V£Ka. TOUTCJ.lV; (Kat. a.u8Le; 1Tpoe; TOS' E.1TctV£1.P.L): Sauppe reads 
TOU, and the Ms TOUTWV; our decision depends much on the 
interpretation of the TOO€ in the brackets, which should be taken with 
the TLVOS" EV€Ka. of the opening sentence; however, the Ms' TOVTWV 
gives a clear meaning, as it is a specific reference to the detailed 
discussion of the motives that follows; it also makes easier the 
passage to the first proposed motive, expressed with the word 
-rrOTE:POV of at next line. 
""'pa.VV£LV: in a general sense 'gain dominion'. The first reasonable 
motive with which the defendant proceeds to the argumentation of 
the second part of his speech. 
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a.IJ\' U\LWV; a.IJ\' a.ouva:rov: Aldus deletes the second dMd, but it is 
preferable to retain it and add a question mark before it, and thus 
produce one more anthypophora, of which this part of Pal. makes 
an overuse. 
'7"OO'OU-rwv Kat -rOI.OU"iC!.lV ••• -mJI..EWV: this is a brief, indirect E7TaI.VOS- of 
the defendant's compatriots, who are presently his judges. The 
meaning is that it would be impossible to gain power over them, 
since they possess so many strengths. Some of the virtues cited here 
recur in G.'s Hel. 4, where he praises the suitors of Helen. But here, 
the main element of praise, that is CToq;La, is not mentioned at all. 
This fact is understandable, if we consider that P. has the monopoly 
of CToq;ia, and as all men aclmowledge his wisdom, which was 
proverbial (see note on ch.16). Furthermore, it was unadvisable for 
P. to stress his wisdom, for fear that envy might be felt by the juy of 
the Greek leaders (cp. note on E7T£q;eovov, 28). The E7TaI.VOS- is 
defined by Aristotle as AOYOS- €j.Lq;avL'wv j.LEYEeOS- apErijs- (Rhet. 
1367b28), and elsewhere he divides the ayaea into those acquired by 
our efforts (SvVaj.LEI.S) and those attributable to mere chance (ruX'lv 
1360b28); a typology of praiseworthy elements is presented in 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1440b: SEi: SLEAOj.LEVOV rijs apErijs ayaeel. 
Kat. Tel. EV avrV rV apErV aVTa. In Iamblichus' De Vita Pythagorica, 
we find that Pythagoras, in a speech addressed to young people, 
made a distinction of praiseworthy attributes, between those 
assimilated and those which are inborn (WCTTE TWV j.LEV cLUwv TWV 
E7Tal.VOVf.LEVWV Tn f.LEV oux OLOV TE Eival. 7Tap' eTEpov f.LETaAafkLV, 
oiov rryv PWf.L7JV, TO KaMos, rryv uYEiav, rryv avopEiav, Tel. OE Tav 
7TPOEf.LEVOV OUK EXEI..V aVTOV, oiov TOV 7TAOVTOV, Tas apxel.s- ETEpa 
7TO'Uel. TWV 7TapaAEL7T0f.LEVWV, rryv SE ovvaTOV eivaL Kat. 7Tap' €TEPOV 
f.LETa.Aa{3ELv, Kat. TOV SOVTa f.L7JOEV ij-rrOV aVTOV EXEI..V 8, 42-43). 
a.pl.CT1"El.al.: this is probably the only occurrence of a.purrEia in the 
plural, which is anyway a very rare word in prose (other occurrences 
include: Pl. Lg.942c, 943b; Lyk. Leokr.71.4). After apLCTTELal. Blass 
prints f.Laxwv, and although all the virtues are expressed with a noun 
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with a genitive, we should rather suggest that the symmetry is better 
maintained without Blass's addition: genitive noun, genitive no~ 
dPLOIE'iUI., noun genitive, noun genitive. 
14 
Eo\.<) wv 1'l'OMOUS; 'for I am one and they are many'; the author of the 
Anonymous lamblichi clearly allows for the possibility that one 
single man can impose his will on the majority, but at the same time 
he overtly stigmatises the means by wich this is achieved: oEL yap 
TOV avopu TOUTOV, oS" rryv OLK7]V KUTaAVG"EI. KUI. TOV vop.ov TOV 7T-G.G"L 
KOI.VOV KUI. G1JP.~€POVTU d~Ul.pTjG"ETa.L, doup.6.vTLVOV YEV€0-8UL, EL. 
P.€MEI. G1JII.TjG"El.V TUUTU -rrupa TOU -rrIl.Tj8ovS" 1"CtlV dv8pu'mwv dS" WV 
-rrupa -rrOMwv (7.15). 
12. 
1'l'e£(]"Q.s 'Tl ~t.a.oUtJ-evo<); see notes on He!. 
ilia. "Ie -ro.U-ro. ••• 3E1;a.a€ut.: 'but it is very foolish to accept and 
concede these things'; (.Lwp£a.s: Untersteiner (1961, p.120) explains 
that "il disprezzo comperso nella parola !J-WPLU corrisponde al 
criteria intellettualistico dell' epoca", and he compares the word 
with Anonymus lamblichi (7,13), where p.wpiu is attributed to those 
who believe that someone can become king or tyrant without using 
devious means (cp. also Soph. Ant. 469-470, G"O~ 0' €L. OOKW VUV 
Hdt. 1. 13 1, PI. Prot. 317a, Thuc.4.64.1, 5.41.3). 
SE~a.a€a.t.: Diels prints 7Tl.OI€UG"UL, but he suggests that 7Tl.OI(jjqUL 
would fit equally well, meaning 'ransom given for freedom', but the 
Ms' reading gives a very clear me3.Iling (TO-UTa.. internal acc.). G. 
simply states that it is not reasonable to accept that the barbarians 
would prefer slavery to power, just in order to recompense P. for his 
services. The infinitives are close synonyms, but G. uses the schema 
EV ol.a ovoLv. 
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15 
a.M.a. XP'llll-a.'TU ••• KEK'T"TW'CU.: Blass prints j.LErpLa. j.L€:v, but the contrast 
here is with the preceding clause. p.E.'TPI.a.: 'enough money' (cp. Xen. 
(vr.2.4.14. aM' el 8EAeL<;, e</nJ, Ej.L€: TrEj.Lr/JaL, LTiTiEa<; j.L0L Trpo08et.<; 
OTT"C)aOL oOKovaL j.L€7'pLOL). 
a.M.' oUX .•• ~Sovwv: self-restraint is connected to the popular view of 
aW<j;poaUv7J. As North (1966, p.93) puts it in her comparison of the 
moral aspects of Pal. to those of Hel., "such conformity to tradition 
is probably more essential in a juridical speech - even a model 
speech - than in epideictic". That such an expression was of 
common use is shown in Plato's Gorgias 491d ovoEl:v TrOLKi;"ov, aM' 
Wo-rrep o[ TrOMOl., aWcPpova QV-ra, KaL EYKparij avrov eavrov, rwv 
i]oovwv KaL ETiL8vj.LLWV apxovra rwv EV e<lvr4J (cp. Pl.R.430e-431a, 
Xen.Cyr.8.L32., Is.3.44; see Dover 1974, pp.124-6, 208-9). An 
echo of this kind of morality can be traced back to Hesiod's Works 
and Days (286-292). Schmid (1940, p.68) claimed, and Untersteiner 
followed him (1961, p. 122), that what is stated here contradicts 
G. 's aesthetic views, where hedonism is dominant. But if we believe 
the testimonia (T est. 13 ), the idea expressed here is in conformity to 
G.'s way of life; when asked to explain how he attained longevity 
he answered: 'because I did nothing for my own pleasure' (see 
Introduction). And what is more important, G. is chiefly interested 
in producing a perfect portrait for his own defendant, not in being 
consistent with his personal views. 
a:rro 1rAOU"T"OU ••• K-roa6<lI.: 'from wealth and showing off'; The same 
idea is found in Xenophon's Oeconomicus 14.10, where the 
difference between a greedy and a cPI..Mmj.Lo<; is that the latter wishes 
€Traivov KaL Tl.j.L7]s- €VEKa KaL TrOVE{;V 01TOV OEZ Kat. KLVOVVEVE1.V Kat. 
aLaxpwv K€POWV dTrExe08al.. 
fJoa.p-rupa. m..O"'TOv ••• €O"'Te: 'My witness is my life, and you are the 
wimesses of this witness'; the Ms reads 1Jre; but a hortatory 
subjunctive is more usual in the first person plural. Blass's €are, 
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setting off a real fact seems more likely (cp. And. 1. 37 EV up.Zv ya.p 
~crav 01. AOyOt.. Ka£ p.ot. up.e'iS" 'T'ov.wv P.c1.p7"VpES" Ecr'T'e, and 
Dem.21.18, Lys.10.1, 12.74) mtpol.x0p.e:vov ~(.ov: repeated in 22 and 
29. G. conceives of a stratagem; given the lack of witnesses 
(ouOE'T'epoS" -ryp.wv -rrapExe'T'at. p.c1.p7"Vpa 22) he transforms the judges 
into wimesses, as he will soon transform the prosecutor into his 
accomplice. 
16 
Kal. p.."v: 'progressive' (Denniston 1954, p.351) 
np.-Tis e:VEKa.: 'for honour'; this is the third possible motive. 
p.ecrws <j>pOVl.p.os: 'moderately wise'; but P. was not only a 
moderately wise man, but also a man chiefly honoured for his 
wisdom. Notice that </Jpovt.p.oS" recurs in 26, opposed to dvo-r]'T'ouS" and 
closely related to the concept of wisdom. 
Ka.K0'T"T1'TOS: 'wickedness'; see note on l3. 
Enp.wp.'llv ••• em. <1'O<j>(.~: With the chiastic arrangement P. 
characterises both the judges and his virtue with the same adjective. 
His intention is not merely to flatter the judges, but also to stress his 
own virtue, given that it is important to be praised for something 
honourable by honourable men. This is an indirect praise (as the one 
of the suitors of Helen in his He!. 4). The wisdom of P. was 
proverbial (cp. AI. Frogs 1451 ev y' W llaAc1.p.7]OeS", W cro</JW'Tc1.'7J 
</Jvcrt.s and PI. Phdr.261d). 
17 
a.cr<j>a.AeLa.s OUVEKa.: 'for the sake of security'; notice that the opening 
words of this paragraph (KaL. J-I-7Jv ouo') are identical with the 
preceding one. Blass rightly corrects ria</JaMs to dcr</JaAeCas and 
deletes wv. The insecurity of the life of a traitor will be discussed in 
ch.20,21, in terms of a {3£oS" d{3£W'Toc;. In Plato's '-vfeno (71e) the idea 
that the man who possesses dpe-rTJ takes precautions, in order to 
ensure his dcr</Ja.Ael.a. is attributed to G .. 
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,.oV (.LEV ya.p ... d.'Tt.ll-aJ;,€I.: the explanation of why one who betrays his 
country becomes an enemy of the law, of justice, of gods and of 
men is given with a striking repetition. Diels rightly proposes that TO 
O€ eeiov dnj-Lci.~EI. should be placed before TO OE 7TAfj80~ ow.c/>8e[pel., 
as G. would hardly avoid the creation of one more symmetrical 
period (cp. Hei. 7). 
ci~el.a.v: G. enjoys circular composition and thus he closes 
another paragraph with the word that he uses in its first sentence. 
18 
ilia. o..q <l>C\ous ••• ciOLK-TJO"€L€V: 'But was it because I wanted to help 
my friends and hann my enemies? For this is a good reason for 
someone to act unjustly'; this is a traditional concept. It is possible 
that G. himself considered that someone who acts according to this 
concept is in conformity with the requirements of dperr] (cp. PL 
Meno 71e TOV~ j-LEv cPLAOV~ ED 7TOI.Eiv, TOV~ 0' Ex.epOV~ KUKW~; 
evidence is also offered by Xenophon (Cyr.L6.31: OI.WPI.'E oE 
TOVTWV a. Te 7TpO~ TOV~ cPLAOV~ 7TOI.7]7"€OV KUt. a 7TpO~ Ex.ePOV~ ... KUt. 
TOV~ cPLAOV~ OLKUI.OV erT] E~U7TUTa.V E7TL ye dyu80 KUt. KA€7TTeI.V Tei 
TWV cPLAWV E7T!. dyu80) if, of course, we believe, with Nestle 1939-
1940, that the OI.Oci.o"Ka.AO~ of this passage is G. (more important 
information on this issue is provided by Ploutarkhos, for which see 
fr.21 with notes ad loc.) Helping friends and hanning enemies is 
presented as a justification ofan unjust act (cp. Dissoi Logoi 3.6; on 
the relations of this common concept and justice see Blundell 1989, 
p.SO). Untersteiner (1961, p.122; see also 1954, p.179) claims that 
the meaning here contradicts d~l.w in 31, and thus there is a 01.0"0"0s-
i\oyos- which is peculiar to G.'s ethics, and this can be explained on 
the basis of KUI.P(J,. This interpretation seems biased, since in 31 G. 
asks the judges to treat him exactly as he treated them, that is justly. 
a:ya.ewv ••• ~ 1T'pa.~t.s: The criterion upon which men should rely in 
order to reach a secure estimation of the effectiveness of their 
actions is the acquisition of a good. Up to this point G. deals with 
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motives related to the pursuit of gain'. E.")'K"I"'TlO"l.v: Reiske proposed 
K-rijaLv for the Ms' senseless €XnaLV, but since €YKT7pLV (adopted 
by Kalligas) is closer to the Ms' reading, which offers a compound 
word, it should preferably be adopted. It is certainly a rare word, but 
it is traced in Xen. Hell. 5.2.19, and Arist. Oec.1347a2. 
19 
TO OE AOl."rrOV eO"Tt.v ••• : In this paragraph the negative aspect of 
motives is discussed briefly; the phrase means that after the 
elimination of all the positive motives, what is still probable is that 
he performed these actions in avoidance of a loss (for a similar 
construction see PI. Soph. 219d5). 
Ei: 'T'I.Va. <!>O~OV ••• KI.VOUVOV: 'in avoidance of a fear, or of a labour or of 
a danger'; in this context the words may refer to military virtue. In 
Hel. 16 these words are used to describe the psychological state of 
fighters who face the armature of their enemies. m5vOV: the 
inconveniences of military life. A good soldier should normally be 
able to endure them and this was considered as a moral behaviour; 
cp. Xen. Hell. 5 .1.16: ED raTE OTT. Ta.ya8d. Ka~ 'Td. KaAd. €K-rrJaa-ro OU 
(the subj ect is TJ ·mJALS'). 
1Ta:vTES mlll'Ta. ••• q,EU"!OVTES: This is the definition of human motives: 
the actions of men obey this rule universally. What is said does not 
correspond to the conformity to tradition and common ideas of the 
preceding chapters. On the contrary, this economical formulation 
demands both the analytical skills and the accuracy in expression of 
an intellectual. And this potential is of course attributable to G .. 
oaa. oe ••. KaKWS ~a.UTOV E1TOI.OUV: It has been assumed that after the 
word 7TavovpYEI.'TaL there is a lacuna; the emendations proposed are 
the following: a) <p.aviaS' EaT1.V. oaa be>, proposed by Sauppe and 
adopted by Untersteiner, b) <KaKOI.S' 7TEPLf3a.AAELV ErwBEV P.Eya.AOLS' 
'T(JV 1Tpa.'T'TOV'Ta. Ws- De P.a.ALaT' av> Keil and Diels, and c) S ykutris 
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(1927 p.859) and Melikoff-Tolstoj suggest that it is not necessary to 
assume that there is a lacuna. Sykutris considers that G. could have 
easily passed from a general statement to the particular case of 
Palamedes; he thus adds oe after KrJ.KWs- and he deletes - with Aldus 
- yap, although he does not make up his mind whether it should be 
attributed to a dittography from the following rrpcl.TT'ELV, or to a 
misreading of an abbreviation added to the margin. Melikoff-Tolstoj 
(who inserts the necessary o·n) brings evidence that the stucture oou 
oe ... <on> KrJ.KOk ••• rrJ.vrrJ. [yap} rrpcl...-rwv, OUK aD7JAov is possible in 
prose. I consider that (a) and (b) presuppose a great dose of 
conjecture. (a) links this passage, with the discussion of madness 
(25-26) which seems to me irrelevant to the content of this passage. 
(b) renders a more neutral sense, but repeats what G. says after the 
lacuna. I think that we should follow Sykutris, as his suggestion 
does not affect much the reading of the Ms, and because G. could 
easily pass from a general statement to the particular case of P. (cp. 
HeL 8-9 TrJ.VTrJ. oe wS' OVTWS' €XEl. OE£~W. DeL De KrJ.~ oofrj oe'i~rJ.l. TO'iS' 
, , ) a.KOVOVUI. • 
~tW!l-a. 'TTpO,,!ovwv: 'the dignity of my ancestors'; cpo Dem.18.149 
TaS' oe KOLvaS' rrporJ.LpeueLS' ElS' Ta KOLva TWV rrpoyovwv a.~LWIl-rJ.T' 
LEfla. 'Tra,"rp4ia.: 'ancestral cults'; cpo Bekker, Anecdota 1.297 rrrJ.Tp(jjrJ. 
A€yOVUI.V 01. PTrrOPES' xpTJIl-rJ.TrJ. KrJ.L KTTJIl-rJ.TrJ. KrJ.~ TorrovS', rrcl.TpLrJ. oe 
Ta e87J KrJ.~ Ta V0Il-l.Il-rJ. KrJ.~ Ta Il-vaT7jpLa. KrJ.L TaS' €OpTcl.S', rrrJ.TpLKoV oe 
cpt.AOV .:ry exftpov, but hardly can the meaning be separated. We should 
suggest that at least the two first words take over different meanings 
in different contexts (cp. Dissoi Logoi 3.7, Is. 2.46, Din. l.99; see 
Strauss 1993,24-5). 
a. O£ "lTlicn. ••• ~Vexel.pLaa.: 'I would have entrusted what are commonly 
considered the most precious things to those who have harmed 
them'. ci.OLK-Tjaa.cn.V: Diels, for the Ms' a.ClLK7]8E'i(n; active voice is 
needed, because P. refers to the Trojans, and we do not expect him 
to call them a.OI.K7]8E'iUI.. G. attempts a reductio ad absurdum. 
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20 
O1(~.j1a.aBE OE Kctl.. -roSE: the phrase picks up the beginning of ch.13, 
as G. constantly invites the judges to follow his vivid reasoning by 
using their own minds. The idea of 20, 21 is that if P. had betrayed 
Greece, his life would have been unlivable both in Greece and in the 
territory of the barbarians. 
a.~LW"!"oS" 0 ~LoS": 'an unlivable life'; Untersteiner says that "this is an 
Empedoclean expression" (1961, p.124) and he compares it to 
31B2,3. But Calogero (1976, pAlS, n.14) has shown that this 
passage is irrelevant, and that the Empedoclean phrase, as given by 
Untersteiner, is a conjecture of Scaliger. He also points out that the 
same expression occurs in Plato's Apology 38a (there it is 
aV€;E'T'acrT"OS- f3Los- that is unlivable), to which we may add Antiphon 
2.2.10: €'TrL T€ yap rij TOLOVTOU ow.cp8opCf, af3LWTov TOV AOL'TrOV f3Lov 
oLCI;w (see also Xen. MernA.8.8, and Ar. Wealth 967-9). 
ci:rrEI.XE1"O !-L0l.: literally, 'hold oneself off a thing', but here the 
meaning is 'who ... would not have attempted to kill me' . 
Ka.MLO"'M'}S 1"I.!J-l1s: namely, (IoCPl.o,s- (cp. 16). 
1TCLfl0I.X0!J-EV<tl ~L<!.l ••• a:rroppLt/sa.V1U; These 'TrOVOL will be discussed in 
his brief autobiographical account of ch.29-32. The idea is that it 
would not be reasonable to reject his fame and all the efforts he has 
made in his previous life for ape-Til. 
21 
m.<I1"~ av 8I.EKEL!J-"T1V: it picks up ch.8, where P. claimed that even 
the barbarians would not believe him. The person who betrays his 
country to its enemies comes to be considered untrus!VIonhy by 
those same enemies as well. 
a:m<I1"01"a.1"OV Ep-yov: the action 1S called ci-m<ITOTo,-r-oV, but 
ci~LaJ61""a'ToS' is in fact the man who performs such actions 
(enallage) . 
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ci.1TO~aAOVTa. - EK1t'EaOVTa. - <P"I'OVTa.: Reiske reads d7rof3aAWV, 
€K7r€(JWV, cpuywv, and Diels follows him. Untersteiner (1961 p.124) 
on the other hand follows Sykutris (1927), who has shown that the 
verb dvaAci.{3ol. can take on the meaning CPt.AI.KWs- u7rooex€0'8al. and 
Cpt.Ao~Evf.av d7ToOI.OOval. (he compares the Plato's Epistle 7.329d) and 
that the phrase 0 oe 7TL(rnV instead of 7T1.a-rI.V oe is dictated by a 
reversal of the subject (cp. 7T€P~ 'TOtl'TWV oe Aeywv 4). 011. IJ-E:V 
ouv ... ou,.' av OUVcl.P.EVOS" Ej30UAOP.1lV: it is necessary to add a phrase 
repeating the keystones of his argumentation, since it is a common 
practice of G. to create circles. j.J.€'Td. 'TaV'Ta in 22 also indicates that 
G. intends to go on with a new argument. It would be better to 
adopt Leo's conjecture which corresponds to the order of the 
argumentation of 6-21, rather than Keil's, which reverses the order. 
In the following part of his speech 22-27, Gorgias addresses the 
prosecutor. He elaborates his argumentation with an interrogation 
(erotesis), which is addressed directly to the litigant. It is thus 
reasonable that this part of the Defence is written in the second 
person, which obviously adds theatricality to the arguments. But 
given that this speech does not refer to real facts the questions 
posed by the defendant are never answered by the prosecutor. The 
overall result of this interrogation is to cast doubt on the credibility 
of the prosecutor; this is achieved by two different ways. In 22 - 24, 
the emphasis is placed on the truth / opinion antithesis. In other 
words, Gorgias discusses in detail what has already been outlined 
in 5, namely the suspicion that Odysseus has based his charges on 
86~a. In 25 - 26 his efforts are concentrated on the demonstration of 
the contradictory character of the charges brought against him by 
Odysseus, who had claimed that in P. 's personaliry there is a 
coexistence of two opposite, and mutually exclusive characteristics 




-rrpO$ ,.ov Ka:rr]"}'OpoV SLa.Aex&Tlva.L: G. introduces the erotesis; 
Coulter (1964 p.276, p.302, n.23) notes that an interrogation of the 
opponent is also found in the Platonic Apology 24b-28a and that 
"although rare, is nevertheless found in three of the Attic orators" 
(Dem. 46.10, Lys. 12.25 and 22.5, And. 1.14). 
n.VL 'Tl'O-rE: 'What in the world do you trust then' accurately 
translated by Kennedy (1972 p.79); it may be that G. uses a 
prosbole, as he passes immediately to the question at stake. 'T£v~ is 
neuter and expresses both d.A#7e~a. and Soqa., and 7TO'T€ adds 
intensive force (cp. PI. Ap.21b). 
-roLOU'T"O$ ••• Ka.'Ml'Y0pels: the first 'TOl.oihos- refers to Odysseus and the 
second to P. himself and they have a bad and a good sense 
respectively; the alliteration of It I is worth attention as well (cp. 
Soph. Phil. 1049 ou yap 'TOI.OV'TWV 8ei:, 'TOI.OV'TOS- eliJ-' eyw). 
otO$ wv ••• a.vd.~1.a.: my suggestion is a combination of the emendations 
of Blass (ota. AeYElS ~) and Kalligas (oIoS" WV ,\EYE~S- dis dvciq~os­
dvciq~a.). The former emended the ol8cis- yE raws- of A, but the ora. 
,\EYE~S- can hardly be explained by ava.g£lP. Kalligas prints Blass's dis, 
but he does not adopt oia. '\€YE~S-, which creates a Gorgianic 
symmetrical chiasm. The sophist is well aware that the judges in the 
context of a courtroom consider the ethos (oIos- wv) of the litigants 
as presented in their logoi (oia. ,\EYEI.S"), and this is why he will not 
try to present the negative aspects of Odysseus as a 7TpoaW7Tov at all 
(cp. 27; see Introduction). Odysseus' ethos will be presented only in 
connection with the proportion of truth that can be traced in his 
words, whereas P. will fully discuss his own ethos in 28-32. 
€.i.o~ a.KPI..~~ i1 oo~ci.~U)v;: the idea expressed in 5 will now be fully 
developed. These are the qualifications that transform Odysseus into 
either a.qwS" or dvciq~os-. But as will be shown (22-24), the prosecutor 
is lacking the first and relying on the second; hence his 
chracterisation as avcigl.oS" from the opening lines. Oo~a.z;,U)v: IS 
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more emphatically opposed to an absolute knowledge than OOKEZV 
(Schmid cited by Untersteiner 1961 p.12S). 
a. !-Lev ya.p a.~: this possibility will be gradually refuted; the 
schema used for this refutation is based on a string of hypotheses 
(U3wv, jJ-ETexwv, 1T'IJ80jJ-EVOS'). The objective knowledge of a deed is 
presented here as much dependent on senses. G. is clever enough to 
transform the prosecutor into an eye-witness, an accomplice or a 
mere witness of the crime allegedly committed by the person he 
defends (see note on 11). 
TOU <p.E.T€x.OV'iOS">: Blass's addition of the participle contributes to 
the cohesion of the text, since the idea is-repeated (TOU jJ-ETexovToS' 
, , ) 
aKovaaS' . 
q,pO.aov ••• -rov xpovov: <TOV TPO-rrOV> is the conjecture of Blass; 
Radennacher's suggestion is rppa.aov TOUS TP07TOVS (1914 p.88 n.l) 
and he does not seem particularly interested in the number of the 
noun ("in irgend einer Form"). The suggestion of Blass is preferable 
since the singular corresponds better to the T07TOV and )(povov. 
Radennacher has also pointed out that the last two categories 
express the notion of Kac.pos. Kennedy, who follows him (1963 p.66-
7), holds that "Any given problem involves choice or compromise 
between two antitheses so that consideration of kairos, that is of 
time, place, and circumstance (e.g. Pal. 22), alone can solve the 
dilemma and lead to the choice of relative truth and action". This 
seems to me an irrelevant remark: literary Kac.pos (see fro 13) should 
be distinguished from the argument built on the examination of the 
circumstances in which the crime that Palarnedes is accused of was 
allegedly committed. Buchheim (1989 p.180, n.29) believes that in 
this expression there is something ("erwas") from the threshold of 
the philosophical categories of Aristotle (Categories IV 1 b25 ff). 
Kalligas maintains that this is the first time that a rhetor creates 
probable arguments based not only on the 7TpoaW7Tov as Cora.-x and 
T eisias did, but on the p lace, the time and the particular 
circumstances of the case he deals with (1991 p.259, n.21); cpo 
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Quint. Inst. Grat. 3. 15 sed quid res poscat, quid personam deceat, 
quod sit tempus, qui iudicis animus intuiti, humano quodam modo 
ad scribendum accesserimus. 
kAeETW ••• tLap-rup11oUTW; one more asyndeton creating a climax (cp. 
10 avv-rj1l.80fJ-EV ... ). 
ouoe:repos UtLwv: neither the prosecutor, nor the defendant have 
called a witness. P. has said in 15 that the most credible witness he 
can produce is his own life. 
23 
Wo; aU o/1:1s: the phrase refers to yevofJ-€VWV; P. has already stated that 
he has never performed the deeds of which he is accused (5). So the 
meaning is 'according to your account', namely that P. betrayed the 
Greeks to the Trojans. P. uses material from the opponent's speech, 
which was delivered before the speech of defence. But as this is a 
model speech, it is G. who creates the opponent's statementens only 
to be answered in the defence of the hero. 
-rn. \JoEV 'Yo.p ••• tLap-rtJp11&Tjva.l.: 'It is impossible to bring evidence for 
something that has never happened'; the Ms reads dyEV7]Ta. 7TlJJS" 
dovva:ra fJ-UPTlJp7]8fjVUL which makes perfect sense, and no 
emendation is required (7TWs- <OUK> dOVVUTU Aldus, 7TWS" av OVVULTO 
Radermacher, followed by Kalligas, 7Ta.VTWS" dOVVUTU Keil). The 
impossibility of having knowledge on the truth of something that 
has never occurred ( cpo 5), now turns into impossibility to 
communicate something that has never happened. This shift reminds 
us of the argument of the incommunicability of truth in ONB. 1rWs 
adds ironical tone to argument 
'TrepL SE TWV 'YEVO\-LE.VWV ••• EUPEI.V: The passage presents textual 
difficulties. The suggestions can be divided into two groups: a) 
Die1s and Reiske, followed by Kalligas (who prints Diels' addition) 
suppose that there is a lacuna bet\Veen clMa. and aof.; the former 
prints <KuL dVUYKUZOV' dMo.> ... <TE fJ--r,> fJ-0vov, and the latter <KuL 
8f.KULOV KuL 1ra.vu clVUYKUZOV> .. . ovv .ryv OU fJ-0vov, b) S ykutris -
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followed by Untersteiner and Buchheim - has shown that it is not 
necessary to assume the existence of any lacuna, for it leads to a 
misinterpretation of the phrase, and thus he prints 7Tep~ Se nov 
yevof1-€VWV ou p.ovov OUK d3UvaTov, dAAo. Ka~ pq.Swv, ouoe p.ovov 
pq.owv, dA.\o. ao~ f1-€V OUK ~v oiov <Te> f1-ovov p.cr.p'TVpa" elMO. Kal. 
tj;euoof1-aprvpa, eupe'iv (Untersteiner and Buchheim do not print a 
comma after the p.ap'TVpa,). I follow (b) because the necessity of a 
f1-ap'TVp£a in a context discussing the possibility of such a p.ap'TVp£a 
seems irrelevant (see Buchheim 1989 p.lS0, n.30). The equitability 
(raov) does not imply responsibilities, but the possibility (or the 
impossibility) for each litigant to bring witnesses. Odysseus could 
make his accusation more credible (7TLO'TOT€pav) if he called 
witnesses (22), and this implies that the use of false witnesses 
(which explains the pq.owv) cannot not be overlooked. And to put it 
in a more cynical way the one who is facing the dvcr.YK7J (defined in 
chA as a dangerous teacher) is P. who defends his life, not Odysseus 
who wishes to put him to death (see also Untersteiner 1961 p.126). 
ouo€.'repov: picks up ovoETepov of 22, where P. states a fact, whereas 
here it is explained why he is not able to bring witnesses of any 
kind. 
24 
on fl-EV ••• <J>a.vE.pov: the subjective lmowledge of 5 expressed in the 
first person (aaq;w, olSa) became through the argumentation an 
objective and obvious (q;av€pov) truth. 
TO o-q AovlTov ••• 3o~c1~e.I.V: given that Odysseus does not lmow the 
truth, he relies on doxa, et tertium non dalUr. TO 8~ AOI.7TOV: cpo 
19. 
e.L-ra: expresses surprise and sarcasm (LSJ); cpo .Ar. Wealth 79 EZT' 
eaiya" motho, wv; 
ToA~'T1pOTa.T€": with a negative sense (cp. Antiphon 2.3.1 civa~8-r" Kal. 
TOA.p.7JpO,). This is the only adjective used in the characterisation of 
Odysseus. 
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ei.~: Saga plays an important role in G.'s 
rhetoric. The word has both an active and a passive sense, as it can 
be used by the metor in order to impose his own opinion on his 
audience through the power of logos and at the same time it is the 
thing that men chiefly trust although it is a:lTLo-rOTaTOV. In other 
words a rhetor must be aware of the fact that men, unable to have a 
thorough knowledge of things, are condemned to rely on their 86';0., 
which in Hel. 13- is opposed to T€XV7J, not to truth as in Pal. (see 
Segal 1962, 145, n.59, and note on Hel. 11) and this knowledge in 
combination with the effectiveness of speech (.\01'0, T€XV7J ypacp€£, 
He!. 13 ) - defined as ovvucrM]S fJ-€yas in He!. 8 - is what offers the 
rhetor the possibility to mislead his audience (So';a is found again in 
35). 
'TTEpI. Sava:roll OI.WKELV: 'bring capital charge against someone' (cp. 
Xen. Hell. 7.3.6 £J allOp€, 1ToA'2TaL, ~fJ-€7s TovTovai. TaUS 
a.1TOKELvallTas Eucppolla OI.WK0fJ-EV 1T€pi. 8alluTov); it is interesting that 
the outcome of Odysseus' conspiracy in the myth is used by G. as 
the penalty with which P. is threatened. But betrayal was not always 
punished with death penalty (see MacDowell, 1978, p.177). 
T04~s: picks up TOAfJ-7JpO'T'aT€; his acts correspond to his character 
(ethos). 
-ro yE 3o~a.oul. ••• <70q,oYrepos: 86ga is something that all men are 
sharing (but in He!. 11, one finds a more elaborate discussion of it). 
This phrase creates a logical gap: how would Odysseus be able to 
approach and state the truth, since he, as everyone, is a victim of 
saga? The only way was to trust his senses (22) and then bring 
evidence of what he has seen or heard. But his intentions were 
obviously other than to produce an accusation on the basis of 
knowledge of truth. KOI.VOV a:rra.crt. 'TTEpI. 'TTa.v-rWV: doxa is here 
presented as the state of mind of all men, whereas in Hel. 11 some 
men, namely those who possess the .\6·ywv T€:XV7J, have freed 
themselves from the bonds of doxa. It is evident that doxa, 
conceived of as a universal state of the human mind, detracts much 
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from the prosecutor's credibility. ~ep05: the comparative is here 
ironicaL 
ill OU"T"E ••• SO~5: Goebel (1989 p.48-9) compares this passage with 
Antiphon 2.2.10 and says: "What is subjectively a conjecture is 
objectively a probability, and it is clear that G. is here exploiting the 
antithesis of truth and probability in the same way as Antiphon [ ... ] 
the 'knowledge' he claims is merely his own 'certain knowledge"'. 
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ao4>tav Kat !l.a.vtav: G. is using these antithetical notions, so as to 
prove that the prosecution is inconsistent (the so-called dillema or 
dillematon). It is impossible to give one definition of what G. means 
by the word aoo/La, since it is his common practice to describe the 
same notion in different ways (cp. Hel. KOOP_OC; rjJuxfj ••. aoo/La (1), 
aocpLac; €1TLKrfrrOU (4), cpLAoaocpwv AOYWV (13); in Pal. uo/' uJ-Lwv €1Tl. 
aoo/Lq. (16), rwv cLAAWV aOo/Wrepoc; (24); fr.23 <3 r' d7Ta-riaas 
oLKaLcYrepoc; rov J-L7J d7Ta'T'fJaavroc; Kal. a d7Ta"1"7j8€~c; croo/Wrepoc; rov p.7J 
ci7ra:rry8€.-vroc;). The discussion of the various meanings of the word is 
a very difficult issue (for a detailed analysis see G1adigow 1965; see 
also Kerferd 1981 pp.24-25). Buchheim has accurately stated that 
p.avLa and aocpLa are also traced in the Symposium, where Plato is 
trying to bring them together under the prism of Love (203e5; p.av£a 
and epwc; combined, in Phaidros 242a and 244aff See also Prodikos 
DK B 7: €meup.Lav p.€.v 6L7TAacrLaaee'iaav epaJ'ia eIvaL, epaJ'ia o€. 
OL1TAaaLaaeevra p.aviav yiyveaeal.). 
1"€XV-T1E'V'1"C1. 1"E ••• 7TOPI.+LOV: Buchheim (1989 p.180, n. 32) observes that 
these adjectives are '·sophistic" and can be found in the description 
of Love in the Symposium (203d5ff);vEpws- ... e7Jp€ur7Jc; oe1.VOc;, deL. 
nva, 1TA€KWV p.7JXavuc;, Kai. cppov-rycrews- E1TLeUP.-rrrT7' Kai. 7TOpLiJ-O" 
cpLAocrOCPWV OLd. 1Tavroc; 'TOU ~[OU, bel.vo, Y07J<; Kai. cpapiJ-aKeUC; KUI. 
aocpwr-ryc; (see also note onHel. 14). OEl.VQV: see Voit 1934 p. 10 
(cited by Untersteiner 1961 p.126). 7T6pl.tLoc;; in the Symposium 
203b3 II6po, is presented as the father of v Epwc; and can be 
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considered as the representative of practical wisdom (cp. Alkman 
fr.S Page with Most 1987). The idea of elJ7TOpia. is deliberately 
omnipresent in the Pal. (4, 10, 11, 30; see Introduction), associated 
with the wisdom (aoepia.) of P. G. deliberately repeats this word in 
all the possible forms, since he intends to underline the main and 
more important virtue of P. as known from the myth ( 30 -rev 
a.v8punnvov (3f.ov -rrOpLJ.LOV Eg ci.-rropou) and to present him as the 
representative of practical wisdom. At the same time he draws 
attention to the difficult position into which he has been brought by 
Odysseus: if a -rr6pLJ.LO~ man like P. is in a situation of a.-rropia., then 
what would have happened if one among us (or of the audience) was 
brought into the same situation? Could G. puff more effectively the 
crucial necessity of his art? 
p..a.vta. ya.p ••• Ka.'ia.a-n1<TEL: the definition of J.La.via. is given in three 
levels: a) madness is to perform impossible, disadvantageous and 
disgraceful deeds, which b) harm your friends and help your 
enemies and which c) will make your life ignominious and insecure. 
The dSUva.1"a. Jpya. is similar with the fJ-a.-ra.LOL~ -rrOVOLS" in Hel. 17. The 
second level picks up 18, where helping friends and harming 
enemies is presented as a good reason for someone to act unjustly. 
The (b) joined with (c) in their positive perspective are presented in 
Plato's Meno 71e (=fr.19; see notes ad loc.) as G.'s definition of 
dvopeS" a.pe-nj. Madness related to the helping friends and hanning 
enemies topos appears in Aiskh. Pro 975ff. (see Padel 1995, pp.206-
7). a<PaAEpov: cpo He!. 11 aepa.A.epa.lS eVruX{a.LS. 
OaTL~ 'iOV a.U'iOV ••• t..EYEL; Mazzara (1982, p.125ff) noticed that the 
argument follows a logical schema discussed by Aristotle in his 
i'vfetaphysica (IV 3-4); (see also Buchheim 1989 p.180, n.34 and 
Introduction). 
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'1TO'iEpOV 'iOU~ CTO<PoU~ ••• q,povtp..ous: with -rrO-repOV G. introduces an 
argument from antimomy (see Introduction); for this reason he treats 
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cPpovf.J.WV~ as a synonym of CTOcPOV~, which are distinguished by 
Aristotle in EN 6,7 1140a2S .. 28: OOKE~ oT, cPpovf.{J-ov ELVal.. 1"'0 
ovvaa8al.. KaJl.Ws" {3ov;\EvCTaa8al.. -rrEpL 1"'(:1. atmp dya8d Kat. CTV{J-cP€pOV1"'a, 
OU Kant {J-€PO~, orov 7T'oZa 7T'pO~ uyf.ELav 77 -rrpo~ lcrxr5v, Wd 7T'po~ 1"'0 
EV ~1jv o;\ws-; note that the characteristics that Aristotle attributes to 
cPPOVL{J-O~ are similar to those brought in by G. a few lines later. 
KaI.VO~ 0 A0'YO~: The Ms has KEVOS" which does not create the schema 
Kal"" a.PCTLV Kat. 8€CTLV that G. means to employ; from the antithetical 
structure (KaLVo~ .. . Wa) we may infer that G. probably merited 
KaLvo;\oyf.a (cp. He!. 51"'0 yeLp 1"'0~S" el86CTLv ... cPEpeL. and Pl.Phdr. 267 
KaLva l"'E dpXaLws- l"'a T' Evavna Kal..vcLis-). The same sylistic device is 
attributed by Aristotle to Theodorus Rhet.1412a26 1"'0 Kal..vd ;\€YELV, 
that means novelties in the style). But it seems that the criterion for 
an effective Kal..vo;\oyf.a was its truth or its verisimilitude (cLU' OUK 
d;\7]8-rj~). InHel. K6CT{J-O~ for ;\6yo~ is d;\-rj8ELa (1). 
iJ-a.M.ov atpELaBa.I. ••• ci.'Ya.ewv: 'prefer bad things to the goods that 
already exist'; Calogero (1976 p.414-5) has discerned here, as 
eslewhere, similarities between Pal. and the Platonic Apology. 
7TUpovrWV: -rrp61"'EPOV nov, Ms; my reading (based on Diels's -rrpo 
-rrapovTwv) requires less drastic alteration. 
01.' ci.iJ-cj>chEpa. ••• tjsEUO-TJ~: cpo PlApol.25e W<rrE crV yE Kal"" d{J-cPOl"'Epa 
o/EVCY'fJ. This is the 'logical' inferrence resulting from the use of the 
argument from antinomy. 
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a.v-n.Ka."1""Tl'Y0p-TlCTO.I. .... 1"'UU'Ta.: dvnKa7""1Tlopf.a. (what i\ristotle would term 
as OLa.f30;\f]) is just implied; G. with a rhetorical d-rrOCTLUrrrryCTts" (ou 
j3ov;\o{J-a.I..) avoids going into detail, and prefers to pass to the 
description of Palamedes' ethos (l"'oZS" €{J-o~S" dyaeo~S"; see Siiss 1910 
p.56, Untersteiner 1961 p.112, p.128). ~O{'AOiJ-a.I.>: Aldus' addition 
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of the verb is necessary before yap, and it is possible that G. himself 
meant to stress the d7TOUc.uJ.n-ryav; with an dvaa-rpo1rfl. 
In ch. 28 - 36 P. addresses the judges. His apostrophe is twofold: 
first (28-32) the defendant will try to draw their attention to his 
ethos, and then (33-36) he will proceed by explaining the criteria 
upon which they must rely, in order to dispense real justice. 
28 
-rrpo~ 15' {,I-La.~ ••• Et1TELV: G. juxtaposes the jurors and the defendant 
(7TpO~ 0' ufJ-as ... 1T€P~ €fJ-0iJ; cpo 1T€P~ UfJ-wv 7TpO~ ufJ-as 33). In this way 
he passes from the interrogation of the prosecutor to the apostrophe 
of the jurors. It is possible that this use of the pronouns is also 
suggestive of the u7T6KpL(n~. KpL'mL: rarely used for the jurors; it 
usually refers to the judges of poetic contests (cp. Lys.16.21). But 
G. is not bound by the situational context of a real courtroom and 
above all his intention is to provide rhetorical instruction which 
demands a more general and flexibly applicable wording (but in his 
conclusion he uses the word OI.Kaa-ras). 
€.-rrl.4>6ovov I-LEV ••• 7Tpoo-TjKOv-ra.: G. has in mind a general rule dictated 
by the context of a trial; the idea is that the speech must be in 
conformity with TO Deov. In other words he must say the appropriate 
things in the appropriate time (Kal.p6~), as P. will claim in ch.32. P., 
lacking witnesses, is compelled to offer an account of his previous 
life and to describe his €7TL€I.K€S ethos. But he also knows that 
speaking in praise of himself can be considered a sign of vanity. 
This is why he has to explain the reason why he indulges (llDI.a-rov 
fJ-0I.) in a self-referential discourse. Notice that the period 1S 
dominated bv antithetical clauses. €.-rrl.ch8ovov: 'invidious'; it 1S 
J • 
interesting that cf;e6vo~ and cna{3ol.:ry are also the motives attributed by 
Socrates to his prosecutors (pI. ApoL 18d, 28a). The defendant of 
Lys. 24 claims that he, a poor and disabled man is unjustly 
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prosecuted, as his life deserves more €1Ta.1.1I0~ than <P8fJllo~, which 
implies that men are prone to envy men of consequence (the same 
common idea is expressed adverbially in Soph-4j.157: 1TPO~ yap -rOll 
€xov8' 6 ¢J36vo~ Ep-rre~; cpo the Epitaphios). P. himself (3; see note on 
¢J36vo~) suggested that one of the possible motives of his own 
prosecutor is ¢J3611o~ and in his self portrait he will state that he 
himself is not ¢J30V€PO~ to prosperous men. Otll' a.VEK..a.: Diels 
emends the reading of the Ms to all elKo-ra.; but the word of the Ms 
is quite frequent in prose (cp.Pl. Lg.861d, Tht. 154c,181b), and at 
any rate I cannot see why G. should refer to probabilities in this 
context. Provided that we accept the minor addition <p.7J G.lI€K-rci.>, 
the reading of the Ms gives a perfect meaning: 'what for someone 
who is not prosecuted is not tolerable, this very thing becomes 
appropriate for someone who is prosecuted'. 
vUv yap ••• u'TrExw: P. briefly summarises what he is going to discuss 
next; G. deliberately integrates in his text an outline of this very 
text, as he intends to provide his students with general instructions 
concerning the structure of a persuasive speech. The wording here 
belongs to the legal terminology of Athenian public life; E1i8Uva. 
combined with A6you~ (notice that G. employs an ev 81.cL 8UOLlI) 
refers to the process of the examination of a public official's 
conduct as a whole (MacDowell 1978 pp.170 - 172; cpo Lys. 9.11, 
24.26, 30.3, 5; information on the process of the examination of 
public officials is given by Aristotle in his AP 48.3, 54). Here, P., a 
mythical hero, is going to give an account of his public life 
voluntarily. G.'s stratagem is one of high intelligence, as P. will not 
undergo this investigation, but he will create it himself (this is why 
it is 1l8w-rov for him to do so), in order to prove that he is a 
benefactor of the community. The overall result of this anachronism 
is to add verisimilitude to the text; a more important reason is 
perhaps that G. implicitly draws the attention of his students to the 
way in which such an account should be composed, so as to be 
effective. 
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q,80vlioul.: picks up J:rr[cp8ovov. 
a.va:YKaiov: P. is in a condition of dvaYK7J (4); it is the 'TTapovera 
dvaYK7J (namely that he is accused of terrible crimes that he has 
never committed, Ka77fYop7Jp.€VOV OE!.Vci. Ka.L tPEUOfj) that make him 
refer to his own merits (cp. Dem. 18. 4). P. defends himself by 
referring to acts (34), but he is also aware that the way (that is the 
time, the form of his speech etc) in which he is going to present 
them is more important than mere facts, hence the apologetic tone of 
this passage. 
EV e.i.OOC71.v ••• -ilSI.a-r6v Il-0l.: what for others, namely the process of a 
public examination, is an ordeal for P. is a pleasant process. The 
phrase EV EL06er!.v up.iv 'to you who are aware of these things' 
reminds us of TO ya.p To'iS' ELooer!.v ... ov CP€PEI. in HeI. 5 (see note on 
ch.26). The phrase is not in contradiction with what is said there, 
since the kairos has changed. Here the repetition of the defendant's 
benefactions (who has already explained why he is about to do 
something ?mLcp8ovov) corroborate his statement of innocence. 
29 
a.A1'J&Ti: Odysseus' charges have of course proved to be nothing but 
lies. 
'TrpOS ull-US 'TrEpt EIl-0u: picks up the first line of ch.28; but here he 
refers to the speech of the prosecutor. 
€LP1'JK€V WV €l.P1'JK€V: Kalligas, contra mundum, deletes Jiv Erp7JKEV; 
but the repetition is in accordance with the Gorgianic style (cp. 
E'TTpa~EV a. E'TTpa~EV ReI. 5, 20). 
oU"'W$ ••• ouva.,.al.: 'thus his speech has the power of an unproved 
abuse'; EAEYXOS' means 'proving wrong through an investigation', 




OUK (iv ~EUaul.P.'T1v ••• E.Ae'YXea.'T1v: the wording deliberately picks up 
the words used by P. in his criticism of the account of Odysseus. His 
Aot.Qopia. does not have e;\EYXos and the charges brought against him 
are QE£.va and tjJEVQfj, whereas he relies on real facts. 
eUEfry€"nlS: 'benefactor'; P. calls his inventions EUEPYE<Jial... This 
word expresses an important Greek value. The term in this context 
could be associated with the function of EUEpyE<Jia in the relations of 
states. Probably G. intends to place emphasis on the contribution of 
P. to the unity of the Greeks (as is shown by the word 'ElJ..Tjvwv; 
up.Wv refers to the judges who are the flower of the Greek army: 
cp.33 and ch.13). Karavites (1980, pp.67 - 79) discusses the term in 
the light of intercity relations and brings evidence from Herodotos 
and Thucydides; he concludes that "there were traditional 
assumptions which were expected to affect the conduct of the Greek 
city-states in their mutual relations [ ... ] the attitude of the Greeks in 
the Fifth century toward the principle of euergesia is indicative of 
the importance the Greeks attached to their traditional values. 
Furthermore, whenever infractions of euergesia were observed, the 
Greeks criticised the violators, regardless of the cause of the 
infractions" (p.79). Probably P. appeals to these common values 
shared by the jurors and this is why he refers to the Greeks 
separately. However, one may possibly see in this context another 
manifestation of G.'s Panhellenism, which was fully developed in 
his Olympic Oration (cp. Soph. Trach.1 045-1111, where Herakles 
presents the EUEPYE<Jl.at. which he 0 ffered to Greece). 
OU \l-0vov ••• <Ka.I.>: Reiske, followed by Diels and Kalligas; Sykutris 
(1927 p.862) suggests OUKOVV TWV VUV OVTWV, clJv\ci. <Kal.>; 
Radermacher (1941 p.175-6) follows him and prints, - Kal. TWV 
a:rrcLVTWV ..• , aUK OUV TWV VUV OVTWV cl,\-\ci. Kai. TWV f.LEMOVTWV ELvat.; 
-rropl.p.ov ~ a:rropou: the Leitmotif of the speech; G. has repeatedly 
used the 1TOP- words (see note on ch.25). Buchheim compares this 
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phrase with PI. Grg. 448c: ef.l:rrE~p£a p.EV yap 1TOl.a Tall alwlla iJ~1I 
1TopEVEatJal. KaTa TExrn7I1, G.1TELpl.a oe KaTa ruxrJV. 
KEl<0ot-L1lp.kvoV ~ cixoap.ou: K6ap.o~ is the first word of He!.; it is 
extremely difficult to interpret this word. Tne main meanings of 
KO(jf.l-O~ are a) order and b) ornament. The second meaning is 
irrelevant to this context (as in the context of He!.), because I do not 
understand how the invention of laws, letters etc can adorn human 
life. In this context the word 'order' seems more likely, meaning the 
order in a human community produced by the knowledge of 
practical wisdom (this interpretation is in accordance with fifth 
century theories of progrees, see Guthrie 1971, pp.60-3, and 
Introduction). But I am inclined to believe that the term remains 
uninterpreted and untranslatable and that all the interpretative 
approaches involve a great dose of divination . 
..a.~€l.s T€ 1rOAEtLI.Kc:'S ••• aAU1T'(>V ol.a'ipl.~.ftv; For a discussion of P.' s 
inventions see Introduction. 
31 
TO 'YC:.p EK€LVOI.S ••• a.ouva-rov: these are two contrasted and mutually 
exclusive things. The logical schema is similar to the one used by 
P., in order to show that the prosecutor's charges are contradictory 
and that the prosecution is inconsistent in 25 - 26. It is not 
reasonable to assume that an inquisitive man, whose mission is to 
help men, can also be prone to badness. 
a.~1.W O€ ••• d.SI.K1l81;val.: the idea that one should treat others exactly as 
one is treated by them can be found in several Gorgianic passages: 
Hef. 7 a.~r.o~ oVv ... ~1Jf.l-l.a~ ruXEZII; fr.6 vf3pLCT1"a~ EL~ ... €v TOLS' 8E~1I0LS'. 
Buchheim (1989, 181) has discerned that this attitude is censured in 
PL Rep. 359a-b. 
32 
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OUK a.v<Uc:j>eA~s: a litotes; cpo XfY17at(.LOV in 36, and oVTe ••• a:X1YT7O'TOS ill 
32. 
TOtS €u-ruxoU01.V ••• O~K-ri.PP.WV: cpo fr.6 eepa1TOVTe5: (.LEV TWV ci.8LKlIS 
8vOTtJXouv-rwv, Ko/l.a(j'ja~ o€ TWV ci.8£KlIS ev-ruxouv-rwv. 
OUT€ 1T€V£aS ••• 1Tpo"T1.P.WV: see note on 15. 
o 1TapWV KaLpos -Tjvci.-yKa.a€: it is wonh attention that the word 
ci.vaYKa.Zov is found in the opening chapter of this part of Pal., and 
the meaning of the whole phrase is very close to rils 1TapouO"T]S 
ci.vaYK7]S" at 4. The rhetor claims that he was compelled to proceed 
with a self-portrait because of the difficulties of his case. In other 
words it does not merely matter what one says, but it is equally (or 
more) important when (where, how etc) he is saying it. 
-ra.U-ro. Ka.'T'1'J'¥OP'llP.E.vov: picks up Ka-rrr;op7J(.LEVOV OeLVeI. Ka.~ tj;ev8fj ill 
28. 
33 
1Tept up.wv 1TPOS up.ci.s ••• -rils a.1TOAO'¥£a.S: from the 1TepL E(.LOU 1TpOS 
D(.Lci.s the defendant passes to the Tel. 1TpOS TOlls- OLKaO'Tas which is the 
last part of his argumentation. Once again G. gives to his audience 
(and to his students) the opportunity to notice what he is doing and 
with a proleptic phrase he announces what he is going to do 
(1TaUaO(.La.L rijs ci.1TO/l.oy£as), that is to end the defence. 
OtKTOS p.ev oUv ••• 1TCLpa.I.'T'1'J01.s: SUss (1910 p.56) has maintained that 
the rhetorical cornmon practice expressed here is taken from 
Thrasymachus' vEl.eoL; but since our knowledge of the content of 
this treatise (evidence is given in 85B5,6) is wanting, we can take 
the argument employed here as a rhetorical tapas. Antiphon (fr.lc in 
Gagarin's edition, 1997) follows the same trunk: line, 1Tepl. TOU (.L-T] 
E/l.eeZv D(.LclS e(.LE eoeTj87J oe£aas (.L-T] EYW oaKpVat Kat. LKeTial.S 
1TeLpW(.Lat U(.Lcl, ci.va-:reieeLv and Socrates, as depicted in the Platonic 
Apology, presents e;\eOL as a cornman practice in the courts of law 
(38e), and states that although he faces the heaviest penalty, he will 
not be tempted to employ them so as to be pitied (ibid 34c), eoeTj87J 
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TE Kat.. (.KET€Ua-E TOUS" OtKUO"'T'aS j.Lc:ra. 1TOMWV aaKpvwv, 1TULOtU TE 
a.ir,ou dva.{3,{3a.uafJ-€vo~, LVa. 0 1"L fJ-cf).La-ra. eA€-rfJ€£ 7] .•. eyw oe ouoev 
a.pa. 1"OU'T'WV -rro'-r7uw. Aristotle (Rhet. 1354a16-18) holds that ow{3oA-iJ 
ya.p Ka.L €A€O~ Ka.L om Ka.L 1"(1. 1"O,a.U'T'a. -rra87] rij~ ifrox:fJ~ au -rr€pt. 
1"OU -rrpaYfJ-a.1"o:;- ea-r1.v, dMa. -rrpo:;- 1"OV O'Ka.~V. O~K1"OS: here, 
'lamentation'; cpo And. 1.48 1]v oe {3o-iJ Ka.t. Oi.K1"O~ KAa.OV'T'WV Ka.t. 
OOVPOfJ-EVWV 1"a. -rra.pOV1"a. Ka.Ka. m::LpC-L'M'jO"l.s: 'entreaty', is a rare word 
(cp. Dem. Phil. 3, 37 Ka.t. 1"LfJ-wpLq. fJ-€YCC71"iJ 1"OV'T'OV EKoAa.(av Ka.t. 
-rra.pa.£ 1"7]U1., ou o€fJ-L ' 1]V ou oe uvyyv wfJ-7] ). 
€v OXA~ iJ-Ev ••• XP11al.iJ-a.: the word 0XAO, ill this context has a 
negative sense as it is opposed to the leaders of the Greek army, 
who will remained uninfluenced by emotionla appeals. In Hel. 13, 
-rrOAV, DXAO, is opposed to the power of one single speech and in that 
context it has a neutral sense, as in the Gorgias 455a3 of Plato ova' 
apa. O,Oa.UKa.At.KO:;- 0 pfJ-rwp ea-r1.v ot.Ka.a-r7JpLwv 1"€ Ka.t. 1"(OV a.MWV 
DXAWV. Untersteiner (1961 p.132) holds that this is an anachronism 
and that the word refers to the Eliaia that consisted of more judges 
than the mythical court of G. 's text. But we should not go that far 
since we do not have evidence that G. undervalued the Eliasts. We 
can preferably read this phrase as an example of how a rhetor can 
effectively dispose the judges in favour of the defendant and as an 
indirect praise to the ethos of P. who prefers truth to silly 
supplications (for a comparative approach of the word DXAO, and the 
semantic similarities in G. and Thucydides see Hunter 1986 pp.412-
429 esp. n. 6 and 38). 
1"OLS -rrpW1"OI.S ~Ual. 1"WV • EM-TJVtLlV Ka.l. OoKOUal.: the phrase is an echo 
of the ot.a. 1"0 €Lva.t. EOO~€V in He!. 3 and probably, though not 
necessarily, of sophistic relativism. The idea expressed here is in 
striking accordance both in form and in content with fr.26. Notice 
that the importance of the coexistence of ELVa.t. and OOKEi:v is 
reinforced by the. homoeoteleuton. 
ou q,o..wV .•• O~K1"OI.S: the repetition of words or phrases in reverse 
order is characteristically Gorgianic (cp. He!. 20, where he repeats 
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the possible reasons for which Helen followed Paris to Troy). In this 
way he creates a long chiasm which brings together the two opposed 
elements, that is the leaders of the Greeks and a mob: OlKTO~ KuL 
A~TUL KuL cPO .. wv 71'UpUl.rrpL~ - EV 0X;\.qJ - 71'Upd. 8' up.Zv TOZ,. 1TPW-rO~~ 
OVUL nuv '£Mf]vwv .•• - OU cP[;\.wv {307J8€£U~,. ... OrKTO~''. 
~ 0'0.¥a-rci.~ o"KaL~ ••• -rTJv aL..rf.av TaU'T'i\v: the wording of the 
phrase picks up the beginning of Pal., where 8£KTJ (2) has been 
opposed to {3f.a and a;\.7p€LU (4) described as dangerous teachers. P. 
has now shown the truth and it is not necessary to try to deceive the 
judges. For TO 8£.Ka~ov meaning 'criterion', 'test', cpo Antiphon 
6.24, Dem.S4.27. 
34 
uj.Lcis OE. XP11 ••• VOj.Ll.tEOLV: P. demonstrates - in the form of antithetical 
pairs - four different principles upon which the judges will have to 
rely in order to reach a conclusion that will be in accordance with 
truth. But at the same time these suggestions bring out the 
problematic of justice and pose the question whether a court of law 
can dispense real justice. Hence the anxiety of P. and the density of 
the text. 'TOLS AO"/O .. S ••• 'TOLS Ep,,/o .. s; it is strange that G. (through 
P.' s mouth) does not feel very confident and he asks the judges to 
pay more attention to deeds than to the (prosecutor's) words. How 
could this be justifiable for the man who claimed that A6'Y0~ 
8vvci~ p.€yu~ EG'TI.V, and who is presented as the first one to 
develop rhetoric? Untersteiner (1954 pp.137-138) interprets it (as 
always) under the light of the 'epistemological' treatise ONE. Long, 
(1982 p.237) who, I am inclined to believe, has more accurately 
than anyone else understood and interpreted Pal., is not on the right 
track when he says that "Undercutting his own rhetoric G. 's 
comments on the gap between eloquence and the perspicacity of 
truth are an ironical admission that he is only an advocate. His job is 
not the revelation of truth, but the provision of the best possible 
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arguments on his client's behal£'~ The case here is not the same as 
that in Hel.; Odysseus seeks to put P. to death, so a 1Ta.iyv,ov or an 
ironical tonality would have been extremely dangerous. I suggest 
that the answer to this question can be found in 35 (€i J-LEV oUv ... OUX 
ov-nJJ5 EX€L; see note ad lac.). , Tas a.i. -ri.a.s -rWV 
1TpOKP~VEl.V: it picks up 29 (OVTW'; AOLQOpia.v OUK Exovaa.v E),€yxov); 
the prosecutor's al T£a is nothing but mere AO,QOpLa., whereas the 
defendant's argumentation is an EA€yxOS- (29), based on probabilities 
and reasonable arguments. IJ.'TlOE -rOV oAl:Yov xpovov ••• KpvMlv: G. is 
perhaps referring to the time limitation imposed by the clepsydra; 
what is questioned with this antithesis is the possibility that the 
defendant can defend the whole of his life (TOU 1TOMOV) and the 
judges reach the truth in a limited period of time (oALyov xpovov). In 
Plato's Gorgias 455a5-6 Socrates says: ou yap o-0rov 0XAOV y' ClV 
ouvaLTo ToaOUTOV EV oAiyqJ xpovqJ OLQa.qa.L OVTW J-L€ya.Aa 1Tpa.YJ-LaTa 
(cp. PI. Ap.37a oALyov xpovov dM7JAOlS OLaA.€YJ-L€ea. and 19a; Tht. 
201a). This practice is characteristically depicted in fr.30; Antiphon 
(fr.79) in a more serious way claims that T€W'; J-LEV ya.p <5 1TOAVS-
xpovos- TOU oALyov 1TLa-rOT€POS- ~v (cp. also Aristophanes Aves 1694-
1701 = fr.Sa). 
expressed in a general way it refers to specific parts of the 
argumentation: oLa{3oA7J is an aLT£a on the level of AOyo, (p.7JOE Ta.S' 
alTiaS' ..• ), whereas 1T€l.pa is knowledge resulting from the scrutiny 
(€/\EYXWV) of epya (cp. Soph. Trach. 590-4: OVTWS' EX€L y' f] 1TLa-r,S', 
1T€LPWJ-LEV7J. 
TO'i.S a:ya.8o'i.s civopa.O'l.v: the phrase is deliberately repeated in 35. 
€UAa.~€i.a.S: the word, as Schmid (1940 p.S83, n.S) has first 
discerned, is a sophistic notion and it is related to KO-LPOS'; P. 
challenges the judges to think of their own avJ-L<pEpov by allowing a 
sufficient period of time (see n. on xpovoS'; cpo TOV OE 1TA€£W xpovov 
€1TLJ-L€£VaT€) and by using 1TPOVOLU until they reach a faultless 
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conclusion. eVII.ci.{3ew. can be defined then as the precaution taken by 
someone, in order to avoid being exposed to dangers or reaching 
ineffective decisions (for a similar forensic use of the word cpo 
Antiphon 2.3.11: 11'0l1.li.7] eVII.ci.{3ew. ufl-iv TOVTWV 1To~TJ'€a EO'Ti, and PI. 
Apol. 17a-b: J.Lcl.Aurra O€ aUTwv EV EeaVJ.Lao-a TWV 11'0MWV WV 
EtPeuaaVTO, TOUTO, EV 0 ElI.eyov Ws- Xp7] uJ.LaS" eVlI.a{3eiaeaL, J.L7] U1T' 
EJ.LOU E~a.1Ta-rrfJfrre, Ws- oeLVOU DVTOS" iI.€YELV). This rationalistic, and 
probably opportunistic way of thinking IS opposed to a 
straightforward heroism and it can be (under the oppression of 
authoritarianism it certainly is) perceived as cowardice (cp. TrGrFr 
3, 1052.7 oi. yap 11'0VO~ Tl.KTOVa~ -r7]v Euavop£av, / TJ 0' euil.ci.{3ELa 
aKoTov €XeL KaT' '.£Mci.oa, / TO OLCl{3LWVal. J.LOVOV c1.El. e7]pWJ.LEV7]). A 
striking example of the way in which the word can be interpreted as 
prudence, when the purposes of the argumentation alter is 
Demosthenes 19. 206 Tl.Va 0' OUTOL J.L€V aTOII.J.LOV Kat. OELII.Ov 11'pOS" 
TOt;' oXil.ovS" <paaLv Elval., eyw 0' Euil.a{3fj. 
, "" , I ,,\ \ Th d' I d' I 
'TO. OE aVTlKea1U ••• !l-Il.JV\Ov: e wor s aV7]KEO'ToS" an aKEO'TOS" mean 
'irrecoverable' and 'recoverable' respectively. Stephanus' 
emendation c1.KEO'TWV (for Ms c1.V7]KEO'TWV) is certainly correct, since it 
preserves the antithesis (cp. Antiphon 5. 91). G. is using three 
medical terms (c1.v-ryKEO'Ta, c1.KEO'TWV, c1.vl.a-ra.) linked to the idea 
expressed in 35: TJ O€ TqJ {3£qJ vOo-oS". In other words, the 
irrecoverable effects of their ill-decision will turn out to be their 
chronic ailment. Blass (1887, p.77) has compared 34, 35 and 36 
with Antiphon's 5.86, 91, 89, where the similarities both in form 
and in content are striking (cp. also Lys. 4.20 LKETEVW uJ.LaS" Kal. 
c1.vn{3oil.w, EII.E.ryaaTE J.LE .•. J.L7]O€ c1.V7]KEO'TqJ O"Ufl-<popij. 11'EPI.{36.'\TJ'e). 
'iWV OE 'iO~OU'iWV ••• KPL.VW<nV: the general ideas of the preceding lines 
are now brought to the very case ofthis speech. civopes civopa: one 
more example of the originally Gorgianic usage of repetition, where 
the subject and the object are juxtaposed. 1TEpI. 8ava:iOU: picks 
up the 11'EpL 8av6.Tov OWJKELV 24, where P. discusses the criteria upon 
which the prosecutor has based his Ka7IJYOpl.a (namely his ooqa), 
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whereas here he is discussing the criteria upon which the judges 
must (or must not) rely. 
35 
+ " OtlV, •• a:rro 'TWV €LfYTJtLE.VWV: this hypothesis has raised 
numerous interpretations; Untersteiner interprets the text under the 
prism of what has been termed as Gorgianic a:miTT] and of the "terza 
proposizione del trattato gnoseologico-ontologico" (1961 p.133). 
Kerferd (1981 p.81) links it to the truth / opinion antithesis and 
maintains that "What is needed is to attend not to logoi but to real 
facts. Earlier in the speech Knowledge of what is true is opposed to 
Opinion (par. 24) and we are told that logos by itself is inconclusive 
unless we learn also from actual Truth itself (par. 4)". Long, who 
takes a different view, criticises Kerferd's assumption and says that 
"on his client's behalf Gorgias, the orator, plays a part which his 
audience will recognize as quite self-conscious, stylized advocacy. 
The supreme irony and instance of this role-playing appears in 
section 35 [ ... ] I find no deep conceptual or epistemological 
significance in these remarks, nor am I tempted to see them as a part 
of a consistent Gorgian philosophy on the obscurity of reality". I 
consider that, as Long puts it, the meaning of this passage is 
perfectly clear and I doubt whether its interpretation is less 
sophisticated if we confine it to the particular context. But I do not 
follow Long in the respect that this is a 'role-playing' as the latter -
certainly traceable in He!., where combined with the 'self -
conscious stylized advocacy' appear in a more appropriate context-
would not be in conformity with the intentions of Pa!., that is the 
acquittal of P. G. is simply dealing with a fabricated charge which 
was solely based on words; he thus recognizes that the most 
effective (and tragically the only) weapon of his client is the logical 
argumentation that preceded. What is questioned then, is not 
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generally the possibility of the words to express the truth, but the 
impossibility of bringing the judges by means of argumentation to 
the same level of knowledge. the knowledge of something that has 
never happened (cp. 23). This is why d).7}8EW. (and d.va:YK7J) are 
described (4) as dangerous teachers. Since his words cannot make 
the decision of the judges easier, mere statement of his innocence 
would have been equally persuasive. But this is what d.va.YK7J 
means: the tragic d.7Topiu in endeavouring to prove your innocence 
by using words in a process which by narure is based solely on 
words (cp. PI Tht. 201 b-c o-rUV 8I.KUif.rJS 7TELa8WOW OI.KuO'"ra.L 7TEPi. ~v 
l06v·n fLoVOV E(]'1'W El8evuL, MAf.rJS 8e fLTJ' 'T'UV'T'U TO'T'E E~ dK07]S" 
KpivOV'T'ES", d).:r,efj 8o~uv AU{30V'T'ES", aVEV EmO"T'fJfL7JS" €.KPI.VUV, oped. 
1TEW8ev'T'E5, EL1TEP EV E8iKUaa.V,'). eihropos: G. deliberately picks up 
d.1Topiu of 4. His d7TOpiu of words is now an d.7Topiu of the judges 
who must not rely on words. His judges and himself have been 
brought to the same situation: he has to defend himself and they 
have to reach a decision for a crime that has not been committed. 
aWp.u: here it means 'life'; it is a frequent word in G:s preserved 
texts (Hel. 1, 4, 8, 14); P. asks the judges to use his 'life' as a 
pledge, until they reach their verdict (the word has recently been 
examined by Musti 1993, pp.853 - 864, but he does not discuss the 
meaning of the word in Pal. 35). 
<l>uA.ci~a .. re ••• Em.p.eI.Va .. re ••• 1T"OL-itO'a .. re: G. places the rhyming verbs at 
the end of the clauses adding emphasis to the stages that will secure 
real justice. 
oALyov xpovov. 
ui.perw-repos ••• a1.axPas: with a masterstroke G. - on behalf of his 
client - tells the judges that they are facing the possibility of a 
penalty worse than death. The phrase echoes the beginning of the 
speech (1), where P. had claimed that the very object of the trial is 
not merely death, but the manner of this death (seen note ad loc.). If 
they now impose on him a death penalty (1"'7jS" De (3f.u<; UfLEL<; [sc. 
KpU'T'ELTE] ), then they themselves should prefer death. 8O~s 
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a.Laxpa.s: a rhetorical topos; cpo Is. 4. 95 see Dover 1974 p.227 and 
my note on ch.1. Ill-reputation is here presented as an illness. 
36 
ea.v SE ... 4>avepOv: Socrates claims the same thing at PI. Ap. 38c: 
, ~ \', Cll. TI.ClV KClt. u1TO TWV ,BOUA.OfJ-€VWV ...ryv 1TOA.I.V 
A.OI.OOPELV tVS" l:wKpa:rry cl.1TEKTOVClTE. The argument that a death 
penalty unjustly imposed by a court of law is as wrong as homicide 
is found in Antiphon 5. 92 KClI. fJ-7]v ...ryv ra-ryv yE OVVClfJ-I.V EXEI., o(rnS" 
Kat. -r-IJV at-ria.v ••• o Ka"M)'Y0pos: cpo Antiphon 5. 89 Kal. OUK raov eO'"T"I. 
'T"OV 'T"E O/.UJKOVTa fJ-TJ op8es ClLnclaa8al. KClI. ufJ-aS" TOUS" OI.KClO'"T"C1s fJ-TJ 
op8w, YVWVClI.. T] fJ-EV yap 'T"OUTWV Cll'T"LClal.S" OUK EX€/' 'T"eA.oS", dA.A.' ev 
UIl-LV eO'"T"I. KClI. rfj 8£K7]. 
d6EOV, a.OLKOV, a.v0\-Lov: a striking asyndetic privative tricolon which 
G. probably borrows from poetry (cp. Hom. n. 9. 63: dcppTrrwp 
d8ell-l.O"1"oS" dv€O"1"l.oS" eO'"T"I.V eKELvoS", Soph. fro 4 Radt: w, wv a1Tat.S" 'T"E 
KdyJVClt.g KCl.V€O'"T"WS"; for a polysyndetic privative tetracolon, cpo 
Antiphon 1.22: d8€fJ-t.Ta Kat. dvoat.Cl Kal. d'T"€A.EO"1"a. KClI. dV-ryKOU(J7"Cl; 
al 1 71' '8 - "\ -) cpo so ._ . Cl EWS" Kat. ClKI\EWS" • 
• EMcioos,~EM'TlVES,~EM'TlVa.: one more striking repetition, combined 
with an anadiplosis, which brings together the Greek defendant with 
the Greek judges. 
37 
In a very short epilogue G. uses a statement that regularly occurs in 
oratory; before good judges it is inappropriate to summarise what 
has been discussed in detail. 




OLa. \-La.KpUiv eLp11\-LEva.: P.'s jury are not ordinary jurymen (OXA.l!J 33, 
<pClVA.OUS" o I.Ka(J7"clS") , and therefore the usual dVClKE<paA.Cl[uxnS" IS 
neither appropriate nor necessary. 
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TOUS OE -rrp<z'rroUS -rWv 1TpW1-wv: for a similar construction cpo He!. 3: 
on p.ev oov CPVU€L ••• To.. -rrparra. TWV -rrpan-wv. 
~EM"va.S 'EM~V(J)V: another anadiplosis with these words (cp.36), 
which amounts to a funher attempt on the part of the defendant to 
appeal to the patriotic feelings of the judges. 
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6 Epitaphios 
Several hypotheses have been put fo:r;vard about the date of G.' s 
Epiraphios. Blass (1887, p.62), who agrees with Wilamowitz, 
placed it in the second half of 420, almost immediately after the 
peace of Nicias (so Untersteiner 1954, p. 95; see also p.98 for a 
summary of suggestions). Schmid (1940, iii, p.75) proposed 412, 
whereas Aly (1929) thought that it was delivered by G. himself 
some time between 421 and 416. Mathieu (1925, p.24) entertains 
the view that it was composed after 382 and similarly Loraux 1986, 
p.431 n.32 claims that 'The epitaphios dates from the early fourth 
century" and she explains (p.382 n.72) that the datings of those who 
place it in 'The aftermath of the peace of Nicias ... rest on the 
interpretation of the text of Philostratos (the Athenians' eros for 
empire) as an allusion to Athenian ambitions before the Sicilian 
expedition". She then concludes that "it may also refer to the 
climate of the years following 395, when the Athenians were 
thinking of rebuilding their empire and were allied with the Persians 
against the Spartans. Indeed the Olympicus is incontrovertibly dated 
to 392. The similarity of inspiration in these two orations might be 
an argument in favor of a closer dating". 
It seems thus that scholars mainly tend to date the Epitaphios on 
account of historical events, which seem to them more or less fit the 
overt generalizations propounded in the preserved fragment. Before 
even asking ourselves if the present text 'reflects' the political 
environment in Athens of any given period (Untersteiner 1954, p.95 
takes it for granted that it does), we should first assess our feeble 
lmowledge about G.'s life. Untersteiner for instance contends (1954, 
pp.93-4) that after G. had visited numerous Greek cities, "he must 
have returned to Athens at the time of his Funeral Orarion", thus 
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providing us with a perfectly smooth sequence of events, which, 
however, relies heavily on a circular argument. 
To these views we should add Buchheim's hypothesis (1989, 
p.190) that the Epitaphios was actually delivered by G. himself; this 
scholar bases his speculation on TIlUC. 2.34: rJ.v-7p 1JP7JJ.L€VO~ U1TO -rijs 
1To;\eWS", ik <Iv yvWJ.L7J re aOKij J.L-7 rJ.~vero~ eIval. KaL rJ.g~WaeL 
1TPOTJK7J, ;\EyeL E1T' avrOL~ E1TaI.VOV r6v 1Tp€1TOVra, which, according 
to him, shows that the speakers of the Epitaphioi were not 
necessarily Athenian citizens. I find his contention inconclusive; 
firstly, because the passage he quotes does not explicitly mention 
foreigners, although it is well-known that Periklean rhetoric 
frequently stresses Athenian tolerance and openness, as opposed to 
the Spartan 'xenophobia' (cp. Thuc. 2.39). Secondly, G.'s 
Epitaphios, or the extant portion of it, has all the characteristics of a 
model-speech, and it serves thus more as an exemplification of the 
elements and the qualities that a speech that belongs to this genre 
should possess. 
My view is that the Epitaphios cannot be dated; it is a model-
speech with no specific references to historical events. In fact, there 
is no good reason to suggest that G. was actually in Athens when he 
composed the Epitaphios, and its affinities with later representatives 
of this genre ought not to be explained on this basis. This speech 
could have been composed anywhere, although it was, of course, 
designed to meet Athenian expectations. In fact, G. was a relentless 
traveller CIs ok. 15.155-6 = Test.18) and it is hard to decide whether 
he wrote the speech in Athens or elsewhere (Philostratos, Test. 1 , 
who says" DE E1TLr6.cpw~, OV aL7j;\eev 'Aef]V7]CfI..V probably did not 
have more firm knowledge than modem scholars who entenain this 
hypothesis do). G.' s Epitaphios combines, I am inclined to believe, 
both the qualities of a model-speech and the formulaic elements of 
the genre it purports to belong to. 
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NOTES 
-n. -yap a.~v ••• -rrpoaE.i.va.I.; the construction is picked up in Plato's 
lvfene.'Cenas 234c: oZ OU7'W Kci1Ws' E7TaI.VOVal.v, Wo-r€ Ka.1. 'lei 7TpOaOV7'a. 
7TOI.KiMOV7'€S" Y07J7'€voual.v ~p.wv 'leiS" <froxas. It has been shown (see 
Vollgraff 1952, p.5-7, Loraux 1986, p.313) that Plato intends his 
readers to construe this passage as an allusion to G. 's own 
Epitaphias, and it is worth pointing out that this is attained both by 
the citation of the Sophist's own words and mainly by the reference 
to the form of his speech; the charming of the audience (yo7J7'€ia is 
itself used in HeI. to describe the effects of Aoyo5"; see Vol1graff 
1952, p.5 n.2 and my comments on Hel. 10) is the result of Qvop.a.al. 
1TOI.KiAAov7'€S", as it is certainly true that the style of this sentence is 
even more Gorgian than that of the other texts of G .. Plato's point is 
that through Epitaphiai each and every citizen has his own share in 
a polished, if untrue, praise. But Plato is no less competent in using 
Gorgian style, for as Loraux puts it "parody is the only effective 
weapon against the mirage of the epitaphioi" (1986, p.312; cpo for 
instance PI. Menex.247a ilJv €V€Ka Ka.i. 1Tpw-rOV Kai. VOTa7'OV Kai. 81.0:. 
1TaV7'05" 1Ta.aav 1Ta.V7'WS" 1Tpo8u[.LLav 1TEl.pa.afJE EX€I.V 01TWS" [.La.AI.OTa [.LEV 
U1T€p{3a.A€T.afJE Kai. ~[.La.S" Kai. 7'ovS" 1TpoafJEv EUKAELt;z.). 
eL1T'el.V OUVa.L!-Lllv ••• oel.: another antithetical chiasm; it is a common 
Gorgian feature to oppose ability to willingness, and it may well 
have been that in view of its general applicability he had developed 
it to a tapas of argumentation. Having said that, we should bear in 
mind (as Loraux invites us to do) that this polarity is in the present 
context integrated in a text with its generic restrictions and 
peculiarities; in this light it should be seen in relation to the 
normative distinction of the £pitaphiai bet\Veen what can be 
expressed through words and the excellence achieved by the acts of 
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the dead. Loraux (1986, p.228, n.25) offers a good number of 
parallels from other exponents of the genre and concedes that 
"'whereas the epitaphioi oppose logos to erga, Gorgias seems to 
have no other aim but that of making a speech (€l1T€'i:lI 8vlIaLf.L1JlI) 
according to the 'rules' (a. 8€£:); there is no reference to 
'reality"'(1986, p.432, n.52), and she explains this deviation on the 
basis of the autonomous nature given to logos by the Sophists. This 
explanation draws upon a systematisation of what 'Sophistic logos' 
is and it seems to me unnecessary; when Palamedes gives an 
account of his achievements (30), no such distinction is discernible 
and he is there presented as being conscious that his beneficial 
activity may cause the envy (~e6vo~) of his audience. Similarly, the 
'human envy' that G. wishes to avoid will certainly be provoked by 
the excellent deeds of the dead, and at any rate a. 8€'Z, apart from 
referring to a speech in compliance with the 'rules' may also 
plausibly be taken to refer to 'words that are needed to do justice to 
the acts of the dead' (. At any rate a few lines later speech and acts 
are clearly presented as separate (Ka~ A.€Y€LlI Ka.~ ITI.YCiv Ka~ 1TO I. €'i:v). 
Aa.eWV j.LEV ••• q,eovov: G. wishes to avoid the divine punishment and 
the resentment or the envy of the living; Vollgraff 1952 (note ad 
lac.) explains the phrase as the concomitant of G.'s awareness of the 
"audace des theses qu' i1 va presenter". However, what G. intends to 
say is what he ought to say, which is dictated by the excellence of 
the dead and their acts. What lies behind his confession that he 
wants to avoid divine and human resentment directed at him is the 
implication that, if he is to praise the dead with words consonant 
with their qualities, this avoidance is almost impossible (envy is 
very common in encomiastic poetry; cpo for ecample Pi. 0. 6. 7-8, 
P. 1. 84-5,7. 18-9, 11. 26-9,1. 1. 43-4, and Ba. 3. 67-8, 5. 187-90). 
It comes as no surprise that this element can be traced in other 
preserved £pitaphioi; In Thucydides' 2.35 Perikles is presented as 
saying that 0 j€ a.1T€LPO~ E(jj'tV a. Kal. 1T)..€Ovci.~EoVal., 8i.a cp86vov, EL. 
n U1TEP rTJv au-rov cPVITLlI UxOU€L ..• -rcp 8€ U1T€pf36.M.ovn au-rwv 
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tjiJOVOVv-rES 7j07] KaL d-rnCTTovow (see Race 1990, pp.73-4). When 
Demosthenes is about to praise the dead for being 'the soul of 
Greece', he also expresses his hope that KaL tjiJovos p.€V d-rrE!.7] TOV 
'\oyov (Dem. 60. 23; cpo PI. Mene...r:. 242a4) 
~ve€OV IJ-ev ••• ro Ittnt-rciv: 'the virtue they possessed was divinely-
inspired', not 'they received virtue as a divine gift', because in that 
case EKEKT7]VTO would have been an inappropriate oxymoron (cp. 
CTocpLas €7nK-rrTrOV HeL 4, with notes); what they shall then be 
remembered for is a divine characteristic, though their mortal physis 
is a human one. Vollg:ra.ff's (1952, p.10) view that the virtue here 
has affinities with the definitions of it in Meno, namely the ability of 
a citizen to govern others, relies much on his presumption that the 
qualities ascribed by G. to the dead in the rest of the Epitaphios are 
peculiar to the teaching of the Sophists. 
-rroMel. IJ-ev 8-Ty ••• AO)'WV OpeO,"!1U: the two clauses are complementary 
and by and large they express a very similar pattern (this is 
highlighted by the chiastic arrangement); the invariable stability of 
(written) law represented by the two central phrases TOV av86.oovs 
OI.KaLov ••• llOP.OV dKpl.{3e£as is opposed to the variable, personal feeling 
of justice, inherent in every man, which takes shape after 
consideration of the existing individual situations of every different 
case in its own right (notice that this is almost explained by the 
TOVTOV llO/-LL{OVTEC; ••• , where a different, divine 'law' shared by all 
humans is said to have been the law that they established and 
respected). TO 1TI1POV e1Tl.€LKE.s: Spengel's correction -rrpq.ov distorts 
the emphasis that G. lays on Kal.poS"; -rrapov, the MSS reading, here 
takes on the meaning 'that which on each different occasion is 
€7nEI.KES"' as opposed to the rigid, and thus au8aoES" 8l.Kal.Ov. The 
E7n€I.KES" ('fairness') / 81.Kal.OV polarity is hardly restricted to G.; 
Herodotos 3. 53 already contends that -rroMoL nov OI.KaLWV 7"(1 
€7n€I.KECTT€pa -rrpoTL87]CTL and it also appears in a context where the 
notion is meant to be understood as Sophistic in Aristophanes 
Clouds 1399-1400 (see Pucci 1960, pp.13f.); Aristotle defines it 
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both in EN. 1137a31f, 1143a21-22 (see Gautbier-Jolif (1970), 
pp.432-3 and in the Rhetoric (1374a26-8) where he maintains that 
yeypufLfL€VOV VOfLOV 8L.KULOV, and he then (1374bf.) goes on to discuss 
E1T'LEl.KES' in more detail in connection with different types of human 
action by distinguishing between afLapT7JfLu and dOf.K7JfLU, afLapT7JfLu 
and druX'lfLU. and by explaining for whom it is to judge on the basis 
of e1T'LeLKES' and upon what criteria one does so by employing it (cp. 
also Isok. 7.33; note that at Soph. o.C 1127, Oedipus in praising 
Athens before Theseus, includes e1T'LELK€S" among other properties -
namely 'TO Evae{3€S", 'TO fL-r, z/1ev8oa'TofLe!.v - peculiar to this city). An 
exhaustive discussion of passages related to e1T'LeLKES" is provided by 
Vollgraff 1952, pp.10-20). A far-fetched, over-systematised 
treatment of 'fairness' in G. is developed by Untersteiner (1954, 
pp.176-8), who sees it as a solution to the problem posed by tragic 
dilemmas. Vollgraff(1952, pp.11-12) observes that the emphasis on 
e1T'LeLKES' and AOYWV op8o'T7]'Tu betrays G.' s intention to praise the 
characteristics of those who have received the Sophistic education, 
and therefore, that what is said here refers neither to the civic nor 
the military potential of the dead as it normally happens in 
Epitaphioi. It is possible, especially in view of the connection of the 
whole saying to kairos, that G. praises the opportunism of the dead 
and their rampant political ambition, characteristics which are 
readily ascribed to the Sophists (this is discernible both in 
Untersteiner's and Vollgraff s analysis; Loraux, 1986, p.228-9 is 
also ready to discern Sophistic relativism in the formula, her crucial 
opposi tion to V 0 llgraff s thesis being that G. "has turned to the 
advantage of his own thought themes proper to the funeral oration'). 
However, there is nothing to suggest that, when G. praises the dead 
for their preference for E1T'LELKES', he does so because 'fairness' (as 
opposed to rigid law) avails men with greater freedom in justifying 
acts that serve their own aufLcPEpov. As Loraux herself claims, it may 
mean that "the Athenians are on the side of the oppressed" (a 
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recurring theme in the Epitaphioi) or that "before being 'violent 
toward the violent', they are good at seeking agreement" (an 
element which she traces in Lysias' Epitaphios 20). In addition, they 
are 8€pa:rroVT€S' TWV a.8£xWS" oUo-rvXOUVTWV and Koil.ucrruL TWV a.O£KWS" 
€VTtJXOUVTWV, characteristics that necessarily go far beyond what is 
required for a person to be simply law-abiding. E1TL€I.KES' then is 
peculiar to active citizens, who are ready to act complementarily to 
the demands of the laws, when their conscience dictates otherwise. 
VO\-Lou clxPI.~ELus: the rigid 'accuracy of written law', as opposed to 
the flexible and creative attempt to achieve rightness in speech. In 
Aristotle (Rhet. 1374bll-12 E1TL€LXES' as fJ.7J 1TpOS' TOV il.oyov, ctMa 
1TpOS' rryv OL(IVOLUV 'IOU V0fJ.0eETOU opav) il.0Y0S' represents the exact 
words of the laws, in modern Greek TO ypa.fJ.fJ.U 'IOU VOfJ.OU ('the 
letter of the law'). Aristotle, unlike G., uses I.oyov to denote 'obey 
the laws to the letter without demur' . 
AE)'EI.V ••• m.'y<iv: 'saying and avoid saying and doing'; Sauppe and DK 
after 1TOt.€LV print xuL Eav, which is a plausible addition as far as the 
antithetical structure of the sentence is concerned, but which is not 
necessary for the sense, and since it does not appear in the Mss I do 
not see fit to include it in the text. Vollgraff (1952, p.22-23) 
provides evidence showing that oeov and KUt.pOC; can be treated as 
synonyms. However, his association of KUt.pOC; with opportunism is 
less happy (for a discussion of KUt.pOC; see fr.13 with comments). 
Knowing when to speak and when to remain silent is rather a 
common criterion for the evaluation of someone's respect for 
decorum (cp.Aiskh. Cho.582, Isok. 2.41; for l.eY€LV TO OEOV see He!. 
2). 
)'Vw\-L1'\v <Kut. pW\-L1'\v>: the phrase extends the distinction between 
speech and deeds; the addition has been proposed by Foss. nSI.f1:TJv 
could be an alternative, and one which admittedly disentangles us 
from the implications involved in the body / mind opposition. 
Nevertheless, combined intellectual and physical potential is a 
recurring theme in Epitaphioi; in Lysias 2 it appears in 41, 42 and it 
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undoubtedly dominates Perikles' one in Thucydides 2, especially in 
connection with the ability of the Athenians to enjoy an intellectual 
civic environmen4 while always being on a military footing (cp. for 
instance KaL p:iJv KaL nov 'lTOVWV 'lTAeLaTa, a.va-rrav;\.a, rij yvwfJ-7J 
E'lTOpw-6.fJ-E8a 38; (nacpepcwrClJl; yap 07] Ka~ -rOOE eXOfJ-Ev WaTE rO;\.fJ-iiv 
rE 01. aUToL fJ-cf.)..'aTa KaL 'lTep~ WV E7TLXELp-rya0fJ-Ev EK;\.oyL~Ea8aL 40). 
Similar views about the Athenians are expressed in the famous 
comparison of the Athenians with the Spartans, which Thucydides 
puts in the mouth of the Corinthians (1.70). Vollgraff (1952, p.28-
30) cites again a number of parallels, but most significantly one 
from the tragic poet Agathon: yvwfJ-7J Q€ KpELaaov EaTLV 7j pWfJ-7J 
XEPWV (fr.27); Agathon was one of G.'students, and he is presented 
in Plato's Symposium delivering a Gorgian speech on epClJl;, so that 
the line quoted probably supports the reading KaL pWfJ-7Jv, because of 
Agathon's familiarity with his master's works. 
6epa.1TOVTES ••• EUTUXOUV'iWV: 'compassionate to those suffering 
undeservedly, committed to punish those who enjoy undeserved 
prosperity'; the theme of compassion is too common in Epitaphioi 
for Vollgraff's (1952, p.31) contention that G. means that "l'advocat 
ou l'homme politique qui desire faire carriere ne doit pas se charger 
d'affaires de peu d'interet, genus causarum humile, mais aspirer a se 
faire en grand style Ie champion des pauvres et des opprimes et se 
poser comme denonciateur du vice et des actions injustes, pour que 
l' opinion pubIique Ie porte aux nues" to be true. His argument that 
what Aristotle names a.peraL Kae' ETEPOV are dealt with after aEfJ-vO~ 
fJ-€V 'lTpO, TOt), Beou" is an attempt to have what G. says here 
construed independently of what seems to be a locus in other 
Epiraphioi, presumably because G. was a Sophist. Nevertheless, if 
we turn to Pal. 32 we find that the hero contends that he is TOLS" 
€v-ruxovaLV au qiJovepo" TWV QUa-ruXOVVTWV OiKTLPfJ-WV, which shows 
that neither text is a basis for generalisations concerning "la pensee 
de Gorgias"; for it is appropriate for a defendant to claim that he 
does not resent the prosperity of others, whereas Epiraphios 
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provides a suitable context for the metor to counterbalance 
compassion for sufferers with the punishment of those causing the 
sufferings. In the former context. if the speaker had been presented 
as Ko:taa-rr]s-. he would have been in danger of being thought of as 
1TO:tU1TPa.yiJ-WV; in the latter. the dead being collectively characterised 
as Ko:tacrrai, they are elevated to public benefactors. This is not the 
only place where the Athenian dead are praised for this virtue: 
Lysias employs it repeatedly in his Epitaphios (Toue; j1-EV 
clO~KOVj1-€1I0ue; E:teouvTEe; 14 and 1TpOeVj1-WS" yap ToZe; dO~KOU/L€VOI.e; 
7jgoual. (307]8~aovTEe; 22; TOtJe; /LEV aMove; dOLKouvTae; €Ko:taaev 16, 
Toue; KaKoue; KO:ta.~OVTES"' 19), Thucydides 2. 40 Kat. j1-0VOL OU TOU 
gu/L~€pOVTOe; /Lillov :toYl.a~ 7j rijs Deveepiae; Tq) 1TLcrrq) doeWs-
nva. W~E:tou/Lev, and Mene.:"Cenos 244e3 Ws- del. :tLav ~1.:tOLKT£P/LWV 
EcrrL Kat. TOU 7jrrovoe; eepa7Tie; (referring to Athens; cpo also 
Isok.4.53 o~o 0", Kat. Ka'T7]Yopoua£ TLveS"' T,j1-wv Ws- OUK opeWs-
(30UA.EUO/L€VWV, on Toue; da8ev€aT€pove; El8£a/Leea eepa7TEveLv). 
au6cl.oELS npos TO O"UtL<pepov: it is far from clear what the exact 
meaning of the phrase is and how it should be explained. in the 
context of an Epitaphios; Vollg:raff's view that G. does not refer to 
the interests of the city as a whole is again based on his presumption 
that G. praises the virtues of the pupils of the Sophists, and thus 
their aptness to serve their own interests. This he thinks is also 
evinced by the absence of any reference to oLKaLov; more 
particularly he claims that "IT ne dit pas a l' eloge ... qu' ils 
pratiquaient lajustice dans 1'exercice de leurs fonctions publiques et 
dans Ie commerce avec leurs concitoyens" (p.36), and this absence 
is taken to confirm Plato's presentation of G. in Gorgias. But 
VoUgraff fails to observe that later G. says O£Kaw~ OEo 1Tpoe; Toue; 
clcrroue; Tqi LaC!J (although in his comments ad loc .• pp.73ff., he 
strives to show that o£KawL has nothing to do with 'justice'). I would 
prefer to take 1Tpoe; TO auf14€POV modally; this function is also 
acceptable for TO 1TP€1TOV, and I would consequently translate the 
phrase as follows: 'bold without going against the interest [of the 
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city]'. That G. does not imply the personal interest of each one of 
the soldiers should be taken for granted if we consider the 
restrictions imposed upon him by the generic characteristics of 
Epitaphios (aueao€l.a is a very negative characteristic); at any rate, 
such a vigorous polarity as the one between personal and civic 
interests cannot be appropriate in public epideictic or deliberative 
oratory. Was not it Perikles who reminded the Athenians that KaJ.clis-
P.€1I yap ~€POP.€1I0t; dv7jp 1"0 Kae' eav1"oll cna~e€l.pop.€lI7J<; r'iJt; 
7Ta1"pioot; OVO€lI ~UUOll G'VlIa7TOMV1"al., KaK071.JXWV O€ ElI €V71.JXovOiJ 
7ToM4J p.ii.J\).ov OLaUqJ(€1"aL? (Thuc. 2.60.3). 
e:uopyY]'T'Ol.: Aristotle defines it as follows: 1"0 yap €vopyrrrov KaL 1"0 
7TpaOll ElI P.€u6-rrrrL EO'7"LV opyfjt; KaL dvaJ.'Y77uLat; r'iJt; 7TpOt; omv 
eMM 1, 1186a23). It is a relatively rare word, but it occurs (in other 
forms) in Thuc. 1. 122: €V c[J 0 P.€1I €uopyr,1"W<; aU1"41 7Tpouop.Lkr]uat; 
j3€j3aL01"€pOt;, 0 0' opytu8€)s 7T€pL au1"'ov OUK EAauuw 7T1"aL€l. and in 
Eur. Ea. 641 and Hipp. 1039. 
'T'41 q,pov(p.q> TIjs yvwp.'T]s ••• <TIjs 'T'OAP.'T]S>: after a.~pov Sauppe printed 
<r'iJt; PWfJ-7J<;> , whereas Vollgraff prefers <r'iJt; oofryt;>, as he traces 
affinities with relevant passages in He!., and he concludes that 
"Gorgias exalte ici la puissance bienfaisante de la rhetorique". But 
he probably overlooks the importance of the opposition between 
deeds and thinking in Epitaphiol, as well as the effect resulting from 
such an opposition here. G., by referring to the dead as ave6.0€l.<; and 
EuopyrrrOL, increases the pathos of his speech, and now he wishes to 
revert to their prudence, before passing on once more to a fully 
emotional and somewhat aggressive tone. The meaning of the 
phrase is that those praised were brave enough to act boldly, but at 
the same time they were prudent enough to check violence for 
violence's sake. The recurrent distinction between nJAfJ-7J and YVWfJ-7J 
in Epitaphiol has already been discussed; we may now cite a 
sentence from Demosthenes' Epitaphios which parallels G.'s 




1"OUS" U~PLa-n:i.S": this is the first in a string of four 
anadiploseis, all of which are designed to express cases where 
reciprocity in behaviour becomes a praiseworthy element. Indeed, 
the phrase 'hybristic towards the hybristic', especially in an 
Epitaphios, which purports to elevate the dead to the heights of 
immortality, is prima facie appalling. It is not so much that it may 
irritate the (somewhat superficial) modern reader because of its 
bringing out a 'tooth-for-a-tooth and an eye-for-an-eye' pattern of 
thought and reaction, for this is not uncommon in the Greek code of 
moral values (for instance, paying your enemy(or your friend's 
enemy) with the same coin was for G. a perfectly acceptable 
reaction as fr.21 shows). Given that in no Epitaphios do the dead 
come second, this is not the place for G. to develop the passive-
sufferer / active-violator polarity, which he admirably expands in 
He!. 7 (notice the U{3PLai37J / u{3pr.aa~ repetition there). G. would 
preferably avoid saying that those praised suffered hybris, and it is 
reasonable to speculate that the hybris of the dead was directed 
against third parties (i.e. enemies) or against those in need who 
appealed to the Athenians (but see Fisher 1992, p.96 with his valid 
criticism of Vollgraff 1952, p.26 n.80). The meaning of the phrase 
may be very close to Lysias' formulation: TOV~ JLev a(5t.KOVJL€VOV~ 
EAEOVVTE~, TOV~ (5' u{3pr.'OVTOS JLt.aOVVTE~ (2.14). To these people the 
Athenian dead are u{3pt.ara.L, in a sense which cannot be very far 
from the KoAa.ara.1. of the a(5LKWS' EVTVXOVVTWV. 
OELVOLS": it is hard to decide if this is a neuter, but judging from the 
context it must be masculine. 
~a.p-rUpLa Oe TOU'TWv ••• oe cr.va..e,,~a7a: this sentence (and the one 
following it) have received an extensive discussion by Vollgraff 
(1952, p.58-71), who once more saw fit to propose textual 
alterations, so as to bring the sense closer to what he thought 
appropriate for a Sophist, both in form and in content. He thus 
281 
claims that LlLOS- p.ev ciyoAp.a:,a.. TOVTWV oe civa8fJp.aTa is an 
"antithese fausse, indigne d'un ecrivain de talent"; a.ya).p.G. certainly 
means 'something evoking pleasure', but even if the text requires 
emendation, I do not see how the eaUTWV oe ciytiJl.p.aTa (Ipsorum 
deC'dS p.60 n.1; the parallel he alludes to, Aiskh. Eum.920, seems to 
me irrelevant) is any clearer than LlLOS ciytiJl.p.aTa, meaning statues of 
Zeus (he himself admits that "Ie trophee eleve sur Ie champ de 
bataille ... est consacre a Zeus'), and eauTwv O€ civa8fJp.aTa (DK. 
instead of iOVTWV of the Mss), meaning 'their own dedications' 
(none of the parallels he offers refers to ciycL).p.ara). Moreover, d(.os 
dva8fJp.aTa is void of sense, since it means 'dedications of Zeus'; the 
phrase requires a dative. At any rate, the trophies of victory are a 
recurring theme in Lysias' Epitaphios, as they appear four times 
(20,25, 53 and 63), of which the last one is strikingly similar to G.'s 
phrase (Tpo7TaLov p.ev TWV 7TO).EP.[WV EGT7Jaav, P.cLpTVpaS oe rijs-
aVTWV dPErijS EyyVS QVTas TOUOE TOU p.vfJp.aTos TOUS AaKEOaLp.oV[wv 
TcLcpOVS 7TapexovTaL). 
OUK a.1TELpOL ••• eLfl11V'TlS: Vollgraff prints OUTE EP.CPUTOV EpLOOS ••• OUTE 
EV07T)./.OV a.PEOS, a correction which is characterised by Loraux as "ill 
founded to say the least" (1986, p.432 n.45). EWPVTOS" Ap7Js (Ares 
meaning 'war' is a common metonymy in Greek) Vollgraff found 
too bellicose, and thus out of place in a public speech. But EP.<pVTOS' 
denotes something 'inborn', and as such unavoidable, as opposed to 
the specific quality of the EPWTES that the dead turned to, that is a 
form oflove which is conventionally accepted. By thus defining war 
and love G. makes sure that the praised will not run the danger of 
being charged with excessive activity or that they possessed an 
overdeveloped aspect in their character. They are prone to war to the 
extent that physis privileged them with such a predilection, and 
similarly their love-activity does not overcome the established limits 
dictated by nomos. G. simply employs a common characteristic of 
the Epitaphioi, namely the distinction between peace and war, so as 
to claim that the praised warriors were competent in both situations. 
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One-sidedness is imputed by Thucydides to the Lacaedemonians 
(see 2.39), whereas the Athenians are dVE~fLEvas DLaL7"WfL€vOL, and at 
the same time ready for adventurous expeditions. But Athenian 
¢n)"oKaJ..f.a, G. implies, does not amount to feminization, and it 
would have been strange if he had not referred to the military 
aptitude. vop.Lf.LWv EpoYrwv: it is hard to see what G. has in mind by 
referring to 'legitimate love'; it certainly alludes to the activity of 
the dead in peace, as it is opposed to EfLcPV7"OV vApEO~, and Vollgraff 
(1952, p.65) renders it 'aspirations 16gitimes', which is wide enough 
to include more than sexual relationships. Vollgraff also cites 
Wilamowitz's explanation "Wlinsche und Aspirationen, die, so hoch 
sie gehen, doch nicht 1Tapavop.ou01.." (this extended meaning of the 
normal use of epas is very common in Pindar; a good example is 
traced in P. 10. 60 Kat. yap €7"EpOL~ E7"EPWV ep~ tJ7TEKVLO'€ <pp€va~. 
See also Carey 1981, p.87). A very similar expression is traced in a 
different context (Aiskhines 1.136 Epw-ra 3f.KaLov), which is 
discussed by Dover 1978, p.42, 45f. q,t.AoKclAou E.Lp-rlV'Tls: cpo the 
well-known phrase in Perikles' Epitaphias in Thucydides (2.40) 
<pL)"oKa)"oufLEv 7"€ yap fL€7" ' EV7"€)"€La~ Kat. <pL)"OO'0cP0UfLEV cLVEV 
J1-a)"aK£a~. 
<TE.ll-voL: Vollgraff is correct in translating 'respectueux' (1952, p.69 
with more translations cited; this active sense of the adj. is relatively 
lUlcommon, but cpo Isok. Evag. 44: O'EfLVO~ WV ou 7"aL~ 7"OU 
1Tpoac/nrov (]'VvaywyaL~, dMa. 7"aLS 7"OU {3£ov Ka7"aaKEvaLs). However, 
the opportunism that he locates in G. when he maintains that "ils 
[G.' s students] envisagent peut-etre que cela pourra leur etre 
profitable dans une autre vie, si toutefois les dieux existent" does 
nothing but betray his ill-founded views on the Sophistic movement. 
o 01.0 I. ••• 6epa1TE.£t;: the responsibility of children to look after their 
parents is a formulaic element in the Epitaphiai (cp. TIme. 2.46.1, 
Lysias Epit.75, PI. A1enex. 248e4-249c3). 
E.U<T~E.LS ••• -rij ma-rE.L: cpo notes on fr.2l. 
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1"01:yUpoiiV ••• tWVTWV: 'when they died the longing for them did not die 
with them, but it still lives a deathless life in bodies that are not 
deathless'; it is hard to say whether G. had in mind chro8avotriwv 
when he decided to create a paronomasia (and a parechesis) with 
1TOeO~ or the other way round. Vollgraff (who cites an interesting 
parallel from Ploutarkhos Oth. 17) concludes that 1TOeO~ expresses 
here "l'.enthusiasme, l' elan irresistible qui peut animer un hornme 
emotif' (1952, p.86) and that it does not have a specific object (88). 
It is true that the construction is complicated, but I think that the 
correct meaning is brought out if we take 1To8o~ (usually meaning 
longing for someone who is not there) with ou 'wv-rwv (a genitive of 
the object which comes too late by thus creating a hyperbaton): 'the 
longing ... for those who are not still alive'. This would bring the 
formula closer to something repeatedly traced in the Epitaphioi (cp. 
Lysias 2. 23, 24 and more markedly in 81, €1T€~87J evrrrwv O'w/-La:rwv 
ETUXOV, d8a.vaTov /-Lv-ry/-LTJv o~d. -r7Jv dp€-r7Jv -r7Jv aVTwv KaT€'\~1ToV). 
OUK EV deava:rol.S O'oJ~aa1. ~1j: probably a consolatory reminding that 
the tantalising 1To80~ will not last long, since the relatives (and the 
other members of the community) of the dead are mortal, and thkus 
their own death will soon bring an end to it. Perikles in Thucydides 
2.44 (00'01. S' ao 1TapTJ{3-ryKaT€, TOV T€ 1TA€OVa K€POO~ OV 1]VTUX€LT€ 
{3£ov W€LOO€ Kat. TOVO€ {3paxrJv €O'€ooa~) is more explicit, to an 
extent that, when I was being taught his Epitaphios as a school-boy, 
I found it almost macabre and rude; but it can simply be a verbal 
expression of the emotions of those (parents or partners) who, 
during funeral ceremonies, sometimes utter in despair their 
intention to be buried with their loved person. The modem Greek 
phrase that people address to the dead is also telling: KaA1] aVTa./-LW<rrJ 
('may we meet soon'). 
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3 On not Being 
1. Gorgias' IIEp~ TOU p..ry vOVTOS 
The interpretation of Gorgias' On not Being or On Nature (ONB) is 
an extremely difficult task. This is clearly brought out when one 
attempts to approach it through modem scholarly work. Robinson 
claims (1973, p.60): "I am quite willing to entertain the hypothesis 
that Gorgias took the work on nature seriously. What I am not 
willing to do is to take it seriously myself'; Kerferd is explicit as 
well: "Its general thesis might conceivably amuse those to whom all 
attempts at philosophy are inherently absurd, but such persons could 
hardly be expected to work through the difficult arguments which 
make up the contents of the work" (1955, p.3). Gomperz (1912, 
followed by others) thought that it is a piece of rhetoric, and others 
assumed that the theory about logos developed by Gorgias in this 
treatise, namely that logos does not represent reality, liberates him 
from the chains of truth: "Gorgias, penseur de la rhetorique, 
debarasse ainsi Ie langage de sa fonction d'information pour mieux 
degager sa fonction d' influence" (Brunschwig 1971, p.83; this view 
is very close to the conclusions that Rosenmayer 1955, p.225-60 
draws in his discussion of the role of a-rrcLT7] in Gorgias). For Guthrie 
(1971, p.193-4) it is a parody of Eleatic philosophy; this scholar 
reminds us that "it is a mistake to think that parody is incompatible 
with serious intention. Gorgias's purpose was negative, but none the 
less serious"] . 
1 Assessments of ONE are summarized in Untersteiner 1954, p. 163 n.2, Newiger 
1973, p. 1-8, Mazzara 1982, p. 13-18. 
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Far from intending to question the authority of scholars who 
have previously undertaken the task to shed light on ONE, I 
consider that this plethora of divergent views probably confums 
Gorgias' argument that due to subjectivism, it is impossible to say 
what is really true. Every text is open to interpretations, but in the 
case of ONE no agreement has been reached even on its 'narure': 
farce, parody, rhetoric, quasi-philosophical, pure philosophy. I take 
it that some of the disagreement is attributable to the fact that we do 
not possess Gorgias' original text. But even so, nothing guarantees 
that, if we possessed it, a consensus would have been attainable. 
That this is the case can be asserted by the unsolved problems of 
interpretation of the poem of Parmenides, of which an important 
part is preserved. It should be added, of course, that very little 
(probably nothing more than mere titles) of the argumentation and 
the problematic developed by the Sophists themselves is preserved, 
and it is thus impossible to examine ONE in its context!; as Kerferd 
has pointed out ONE is "probably the nearest we have or will ever 
have to a complete technical presentation of an articulated sophistic 
argument from the fifth. century B.C." (1982, p.93). The absence of 
any substantial comparative grounds admittedly obscures our view 
of this text. It should also be stressed that prejudiced assumptions 
about the sophistic movement and its leading figures have not 
helped much. The view that Gorgias was primarily interested in 
practical means of persuasion, in other words that he was a 'pure' 
rhetorician presupposes a clear-cut distinction between philosophy 
and rhetoric, inaugurated by Plato and uncritically adopted by 
1 We know that Protagoras wrote a text under the tide ilept. 7'"ov'Ov-rQS", the 
contents of which are unknown to us. It seems likely that this work included anti-
Elearic arguments, and it is thus possible that aspects of the reasoning developed 
there were slmilar to G.'s own text. Mansfeid (1990) lays much emphasis on 
PrOtagoras' now lost treatise, and he thinks that it influenced G.'s own polemic, 
as it is represented in ONE. 
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modem scholars!. It is more than certain that Sophistic education 
involved wider philosophical and 'scientific' activity, and this is 
well attested in Aristophanes' Clouds (Dover 1968, p.x..x.-DV-xx.'Xv); 
Helen 13 can also serve as evidence that G. was at least sceptical 
about the 'theories' held by natural philosophers (p.€TeWpOl\oy0l.) and 
about the role that the speech plays in their explanations of various 
phenomena. 
Having outlined the main lines of interpretation of ONB, we may 
now pass to the main questions: What does this text intend? In what 
manner does it fulfil its intention? And lastly, does the strategy 
followed in it secure its acceptability by its recipients? 
Paradoxically, I wish to start from the last question, because I 
consider that its answer may shed some rays of light on the other 
two as well. From the compendium of modem approaches presented 
above, it emerges that some modem students of this text are not 
ready to accept it as a serious piece of philosophy. Nevertheless, its 
meaning to us is one thing, and the way in whih it was perceived by 
later philosophers in antiquity quite another. For instance, those 
scholars interested in applying formal logic so as to demonstrate the 
flaws of argumentation in ONE are perfectly legitimate, as long as 
they realise that this is not a safe criterion for the assessment of its 
value and its position in the history of ideas. Should this have been 
the case, we would have to concede that some syllogisms that occur 
in Plato's texts are worthless. Any serious attempt to assess the 
perception of ONE should, I think, be based on a synchronic 
approach. The term 'synchronic' should not though be taken strictly, 
because there is only slight contemporary evidence. However, if our 
scope is to investigate the intentions and the perception of ONB we 
I Kennedy (1994, p.lO) holds that "there was. however. no sharp division benveen 
philosophy and rhetoric in the fifth cenrury and all sophists explored the themes of 
truth and opinion, nature and convention. and language and re:ility". The 
artificiality of this distinction bas been shown very recently by Schiappa 1999, 
p.7ff. 
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should necessarily tum to readings chronologically closer to it, those 
of Plato and Isokrates l . 
We may start with Isokrates; in his Antidosis 268 (=fr.l) he 
classifies the views of 'old intellectuals' (1TaI\.Cl~wv (jo<p~arwv) about 
the number of Qv'ra. Some (unidentified) say that they are infinite, 
Empedocles four (only two of them, veZx:oS' and ¢~:tLCl, are 
mentioned), Ion no more than three, l'\lkmeon two, Parmenides and 
Melissus one, and Gorgias none at all. It is interesting to observe 
that the string begins with an infinite number and is gradually 
reduced to nothingness represented by Gorgias. This passage is 
significant because Gorgias is listed along with a number of 
philosophers whose theories he himself criticises. In the second part 
supporting his first thesis (namely, 'nothing is') he examines the 
possibility that 'being' is either one or many, and he concludes that 
it is neither one nor many, so that 'being' is not. 
Isolcrates classifies Gorgias among a nmnber of philosophers in 
his Helen as well. In the opening lines he claims that some people 
grew old by denying the possibility of falsehood and by maintaining 
that it is impossible to utter two (contradictory) :t6yOl. about the 
same things. Isolcrates then goes on to say that these people do not 
realise that their activity is not radical, since earlier generations of 
intellectuals have produced more thorough treatises on the same 
subjects. Gorgias (among Protagoras, Zeno and Melissus) is one of 
them. This list is printed in part as 82B IDK, but the opening lines 
are omitted, and generally they have not attracted the attention they 
deserve. 
I Dodds (1959, p.7-8) claims that "Plato certainly knows nothing of the 
"philosophical nihilism" with which Gorgias has been credited on the strength of 
his notorious "proof' that (a) nothing exists ... ", and this is used as a proof that 
"equally dubious, in my view, is the now fashionable contention that Gorgias was 
an original philosophical thinker", But as we shall see, it is very likely that Plato 
was aware of Gorgias' "philosophical nihilism", whatever this means, and that he 
probably saw it as a threat to his own theory of forms. 
288 
The view that it is impossible to say anything false forms the 
central argument in the second division of ONE seeking to establish 
that 'if anything is it is unknowable', although l\E(G does not make 
it clear if Gorgias committed himself to this idea. Sextus certainly 
seems to understand that Gorgias claimed that false statements are 
impossible, as long as one conceives of a thing with one's mind. 
Argumentation from antinomy is the chief pattern of reasoning in 
the second part supporting the first major thesis ('nothing is') as it is 
clearly brought out by Anonymous' preamble, where we are told 
that Gorgias collected contradictory properties attributed by earlier 
philosophers to onta (979a13ff). There is no doubt that Gorgias' 
case is not unique. Protagoras' sUbjectivism undoubtedly entails the 
impossibility of falsehood, and antinomical argumentation had 
already been exploited by Zeno l . But still, how are we to interpret 
Isokrates' reception of ONB? 
It is true that in all the relevant contexts Isokrates' tone is the 
tone of contempt. Iso krates , far from intending to be descriptive, 
prescribes what young men should avoid. This disclaimer is useful, 
if we bear in mind that Gorgias' own classification of earlier 
philosophical activity is not neutraL Both of them object to abstract 
philosophical speculation. Guthrie (1971, p.195 n.1) has noticed this 
identity of feelings and maintained: "I confess to a slight feeling of 
uneasiness, because, if Isocrates knew Gorgias' s treatise as an 
ironical exposure of Eleatic reasoning, he would surely have 
claimed him as an ally rather than attacked him along with the rest. 
He was, however, above all things an advocate, ready to press 
anything into the service of his immediate case. His criticism of 
Gorgias would be that by bothering at all about the philosophers and 
refuting them with their weapons he put himself in the same class". 
Gutrhrie' criticism reveals, I think, the kind of conclusions reached 
1 For the affmities of ONB with Protagorean and Zenonean processes see 
Mansfeld 1990, p. 243-271. For the impossibility of falsehood see Palmer 1999, 
p.124-134. 
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when we apply ready-made categories. If we accept that Isokrates 
assumes that Gorgias ridiculed himself by refuting early philosophy, 
then why did Isokrates himself bother about Gorgias by writing 
Helen? Guthrie simply endeavours here to make Isolaates' evidence 
fit his own reading of ONE as a parody. An easier assumption 
should be made: Isokrates saw in Gorgias' ONE a continuum in the 
history of what we may now call 'philosophical speculation', and 
this is further evidence against those who tend to support the view 
that ONE is a work motivated by mere practical needs. Isolaates 
objects to the value of this speculation, but he is honest enough to 
say so. In his own mind ONE belongs to what we arbitrarily label as 
pre-Socratic philosophy. 
We may now move to Plato; Jaap Mansfeld has recently shown 
that some of the deductions in the second part of Plato's Parmenides 
are extremely similar to arguments put forward in ONB. It is not 
necessary to discuss them here (see comments), but we may simply 
quote Mansfeld's (1990, p.1l9) conclusion!: "If one does not want 
to assume that the 'special argument' is a historical fake, the only 
valid inference is that at Parm.162a Plato used Gorgias". What is 
perhaps more telling, is another passage from Parmenides135a., 
which corresponds to the three major theses developed in ONE. In 
Parmenides 135a., Parmenides warns Socrates that someone who 
has heard his reasoning about Qv-ra., might probably object and 
reason that a) they do not exist, b) if they exist they are unknown 
(ayvWO"!"'CL) , and c) that only a prodigy, after having investigated 
them, wi.ll be able to make them known to others. Gorgias is not 
mentioned here, but Hayes (1990, p.335) is right in concluding that: 
'"Plato was indeed aware of the ONE as were most of his educated 
contemporaries. Moreover, he knew that its arguments had posed 
formidable challenges to Eleatic philosophy, and that his own quest 
1 See also Palmer 1999, p.108-117. 
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for forms was particularly vulnerable to the same arguments because 
its ontological assumptions were similar to those of the Eleatics,.l. 
This evidence suggests, I t:hink, that ONE was a well-known text; 
it must have been influential, and this view is corroborated by the 
fact that its tripartite division with the well structured argument 
made it memorable. There is no evidence that it was perceived as a 
piece of hilarious philosophising activity. 
Given that ancient criticism seems to take ONE rather seriously, 
how are we to interpret it? What does this text invite us to 
understand? Wardy (1996, p.24) poses some important questions: 
"Was Gorgias a part time or erstwhile honest, and honestly deluded, 
Parmenidean philosopher? Or was he the sophisticated 'sophist' 
constructing an intellectual pitfall? If so, with what motivation? 
Without answers, in a quite serious sense we simply do not know 
what On What Is Not is saying. My suggestion is that this 
vertiginous uncertainty is itself the primary message (better, non-
message?) of the text ... Gorgias is deliberately transmitting a 
message which consists largely of noise; in so doing he gets us to 
think about what any act of communication must be like, and about 
what philosophers claim their messages are like ". Wardy's 
approach is promising because it does not seek to unveil a 'hidden 
meaning'. Most of the scholars have tried to identify the target of 
Gorgias' criticism by tracking down apparent similarities. So that 
Loenen (1959) reached the conclusion that Gorgias' target is solely 
Melissus. 
Gorgias does not put forward any theories; ONB is a text that 
examines the limits of philosophical speculation and of its methods2. 
1 Similarly Palmer (1999, 1'.117) holds that "The Pannenides' s First Deduction 
suggests that Plato saw reflections of Gorgias' anti-Parmenidean stance in more 
parts of his treatise than the personal demonstration . It is very interesting to see 
Plato giving Parmenides the chance to respond to Gorgias' attack". 
2 This does not entail that I adopt Blass's (1887, p49) point that it shows the 
uselessness of philosophical speculation. This view implies again that Gorgias' 
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Under this prism it IS pointless to make any assertions about 
Gorgias' philosophical views on the basis of this text. and what is 
more, it is methodologically unsafe to use it as evidence, so as to 
confirm 'theories' or ideas that emerge in his Encomium of Helen or 
The Defence ofPalamedes. 
ONE however is not as cryptic as it appears at first sight; the 
methods of argument that G. uses in this text are certainly not 
peculiar to it. He constantly argues by using antinomies, as he does 
in Palamedes. He certainly polarises 'being' and 'not-being' in the 
'original proof; similarly, he manifestly employs argument from 
antinomy in the section where he seeks to prove that 'being' is not, 
by showing that each member of the pairs one / many, generated / 
ungenerated, in motion / [at rest] when attributed to OV'rG. is 
impossible; the same polarisation is employed, according to my line 
of inquiry in the second division of ONE, where he distinguishes 
between sense perception and thought as vehicles through which 
one approaches truth (the same polarisation appears also in the third 
division of ONB, but it does not constitute there the foundation 
stone of Go's reasoning). In this respect thus, we should not allow 
G. or his summarisers to perplex us. 
This being the case with the method by which G. argues, one 
should address the problem of the theses that G. targets so 
subversively. Being, concepts and language form a triad that has 
unceasingly been investigated by philosophers throughout the 
centuries. That G. seeks to address all these three elements 
collectively, and that in many cases he does this with reference to 
aspects of the reasoning utilised in the other two, is undoubtedly 
amazing. His discussion of language, for instance, neglected until 
very recently, involves surprisingly 'modem' approaches to it. As 
far as r know, G. is the very first intellectual in the Western world to 
express the view that language and things are two distinct entities, a 
adopted the superiority of rhetoric to philosophy, but it has been suggested that 
this distinction is the product oflater 'epistemological' dichotomies. 
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view that brings us very close to the theory of the 'linguistic sign' 
put forward by F. de Saussure at the beginning of the 20 th century. 
And it is at least inappropriate to get: rid of these approaches by 
pointing out that they are simply employed in the course of an 
argumentation that seeks to establish the impossibiliry of 
communication or that they emanated in a social context in which 
the needs for 'practical' manipulation of speech were increased. Yet, 
however interesting the independent views developed in the ONE 
may be, the triad comprising the major theses that G. seeks to deny 
is clearly Parmenidean. 
Parmenides, in fr.6 says: xpi] TO '\€YE~V TE VOELV T' dov €J.LJ.LEVa~; 
this formulation, in the reverse order, is identical with the three 
theses ofG.'s ONE as they are encapsulated at the beginning of both 
Anonymous's and Sextus's versions. It is hard to believe that G. had 
anything else in mind when he decided to compose his text, but this 
does not mean that the ONE is simply anti-Parmenidean, because, as 
we have already seen and it will perhaps be made clearer when we 
will be concerned with the separate arguments, G. attempts an attack 
on philosophical speCUlation in generaL This Parmenidean formula 
probably served as the pretext for the composition of G. 's heretical 
text, which in all likelihood was meant to be perceived by men of 
high intellectual standards. 
ONE cannot and should not be evaluated on the basis of 
simplistic dichotomies; rhetorical or philosophical, this matters very 
little. What matters is that G. attempts to question philosophical 
speculation, for which he openly expresses his reservations in Helen 
13. In paraphrasing the three major theses of ONE we may say: 
philosophical entities do not exist; the conception of them either 
through the senses or through our mind is iinpossible; even if the 
conception of them were possible no one would be able to 
communicate them. One more point should be made; I take it that by 
the term aVTo. in the first division of ONE, G. refers to philosophical 
speculation, but in the two following ones the word is used to 
denote the objects of external realiry as welL If this is the case, is it 
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possible that in the second and the third theses G. has philosophical 
speculation in mind? I take it that the answer to this question should 
be positive. G. very frequently argues by using analogies (see 
Introduction), and it is safe, I believe, to assume that when he 
refutes the possibility of acquiring knowledge or communicating it, 
this refutation can be applied to philosophical speculation as well. 
TIlls is at least how Plato conceived ONE, as is shown in 
Parm.l35a. 
II. The versions: Anonymous'MXG 5-6, 979a12-
980b21 and Sextus' Adv. Math. 7, 65-87 
Unfortunately, Gorgias' original text under the title On not Being 
(ONB) does not exist; all the information we possess on its content 
is due to the accounts of the Anonymous author of the treatise De 
Melissa Xenophane Gorgia (MXG), and that of Sextus Empiricus' 
Against Mathematicians (VIL 65-87). The identification of the 
author of MXG goes far beyond the scope of this study, and it will 
suffice to mention that MXG has relatively recently been studied by 
Barbara Cassin in a massive volume under the title Si Parmenide: 
Le traite anonyme De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia (1980), and that 
Jaap Mansfeld has also attempted to investigate the text "in its own 
right" (1990, p.200). 
Another question, which seems more relevant to the scope of 
this study, is related to the reliability of these two accounts. Older 
generations of scholars have thought that priority should be given to 
Sextus' account (an idea strongly supported by Loenen 1959, 'The 
task before us is to reconstruct the meaning of Gorgias from the 
wording of Sextus" p.180; see also p.178 n. 7). The superiority of 
MXG has been defended by a number of scholars (for further 
literature see Untersteiner 1961, p.38), and Migliori went as far as to 
hold that Sextus is dependent on lv[XG (1973, p.54, a possibility 
hinted at by Kerferd 1955, p.4: "It has never I think been seriously 
294 
suggested that Sextus took his information from the author of 
lvfXG,). 
It is now true that ivfXG presents serious textual problems, which 
in some cases are insoluble. However, this does not entail that it 
should be rejected as a source of information (as Loenen, 1959, 
thought). NfXG is by far more economical in its demonstration of 
Gorgias'arguments and this might be taken as a first sign that it is 
unembellished (or at least that it is less embellished than Sextus' 
version) . It is also true that when Anonymous offers his own 
assessment of Gorgias' theses, he clearly states that he does so 
(e.g.979a35, where Anonymous clearly indicates that he provides as 
with his own criticism of Gorgias' 'orginal proof'). Moreover, there 
are some cases in which the two versions are so similar, that there is 
no point in trying to establish the superiority of the one to the other. 
Kerferd has clearly shown that the arguments supporting the first 
thesis "are in fact identical" (1955, p.9) in both summaries. From a 
methodological point of view this implies that a sober consideration 
of ONE should take into account both versions. The same, I am 
inclined to believe, holds for cases where the two versions are 
remarkably divergent. 
Thus, the line of inquiry followed here presupposes that -
especially in the absence of Gorgias' original text - we do not have 
the privilege of ignoring either of the versions. Any serious 
investigation of what G.'s ONE looked like should be based on a 
close reading of both summaries in comparison. Due to the 
economical description of ivfXG, our comparative approach will 
normally proceed by presenting first the separate arguments as they 
appear in this text. That this is methodologically preferable is 
corroborated by the fact that j\;fXG (especially in the first division) 
makes use of a terminology which is more appropriate for a Fifth 
century intellectual, like Gorgias (see Calogero 1932, p. 158 n.4, 
Kerferd 1955, p.14; contra Loenen 1959, p.178-79 n. 7), and by the 
fact that Anonymous provides us with a number of arguments 
unparalleled in Sextus. Because of the lack of direct evidence, the 
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degree to which both versions represent Gorgias' original arguments 
is for most of the time a matter of conjecture, and I consider it 
legitimate not to bring in any objections to the arguments as they 
stand in the accounts available (objections to particular arguments 
proposed by some scholars are discussed within the frame of my 
comments on these arguments). 
Both Sextus and Anonymous seem to agree on the tripartite 
character of ONE; nothing is, if it is it is unknowable, and if it is and 
it is lmowable it is impossible to communicate it [or: our 
lmowledge] to others (the passages recapitulating these major theses 
have been compared by Gaines 1997, p.1-12). The main difference 
is that Anonymous preserves the argument in indirect speech, 
whereas Sextus uses direct speech. 
Anonymous then continues with the announcement of the second 
set of arguments supporting the first major thesis. He informs us that 
Gorgias based his argumentation on a collection of contradictory 
properties attributed by earlier philosophers to QV1'"a., and that in 
some cases he argued against them by using their own arguments 
(the names of Zeno and Melissus are brought in). However, 
Anonymous clearly states that this set of arguments came after the 
'original proof', the demonstration of which follows immediately. 
This preamble is unparalleled in Sextus, who instead presents the 
structure of the arguments for the first major thesis: if anything is it 
is either a) being, or b) not being or c) both being and not being. He 
then commences the detailed demonstration of the arguments 
starting from (b). 
This discrepancy concerning the argumentation supporting the 
first thesis is proved to be puzzling, for prima facie Anonymous 
seems to provide us with !\Vo sets of arguments (the 'original proof 
coming first, and afterwards the argument based on contradictory 
properties), whereas Sextus prefers to offer a clear-cut distinction 
between three separate arguments. The location of this discrepancy 
between the sources led Gigon (1936, p.192-93) to hold the view 
that they differ to an extent that disallows us from saying which one 
296 
IS consistent with Gorgias' original arguments. Kerferd (1955) 
convincingly argued that the two sources are identical, and in fact, 
close reading of this first part of ONE points to that direction. 
Tne similarities emerge when one undertakes the task of 
examining the separate arguments: in the 'original proof' (in j\£YG) 
the first argument seeks to establish the possibility that 'not-being' 
is, by using the verb 'to be' equivocally. Sextus' text is more clear: 
'not-being' is and is not; in the respect that it is conceived as 'not-
being' it is not. But since we may say that 'not-being' is 'not being', 
then it is. But this is absurd, because it is impossible for something 
to be and not to be at the same time. It is obvious then, that the 
important point of this first argument is exactly the possibility of 
holding that 'not-being' is, and this is confinned by the fact that the 
second argument both in MXG and Sextus has as its starting point 
the hypothesis 'if not being is' (the only difference is that MXG uses 
the term tJ-iJ elvat., and Sextus tJ-iJ ov). Both sources then state that 
these two elements are contradictory, so that if we concede that 
'not-being' is, then it follows that 'being' is not. Which is the 
inference oftbis argument? Sextus says: 'in no way being is not, so 
that not-being is not' (or to make it more clear, it is not 'not-being' 
that it is not!). 
So far so good. But why then, if 'in no way being is not', does he 
immediately proceed (68) with the demonstration supporting the 
thesis that 'being is not'? The answer has been given by Kerferd: 
"the argument which Gorgias is using proceeds by a reductio ad 
absurdum" (1955, p.16). It is the elliptical wording in lvfXG that 
actually obscures the point (e[ yap TO tJ-iJ elvat. eo-n. TO eIvat. tJ-7] 
eLVUL 1Tpoa-r,KeL). Sextus, with the phrase OUX~ De ye TO av OUK 
eO'TLV, sheds a ray of light on what must simply be understood in 
lvf.XG. 
The last argument of the 'original proof puts fonvard the 
possibility that both 'being' and 'not-being' are. But in this case, 
'not-being' is not, as well as 'being' since it is the same with 'not-
297 
being'. This argument in Sextus comes after the arguments from 
antinomy (75-76), and it was exactly its place there that puzzled 
Gigon. Why does Sextus present it at this place? First of all it should 
be noted that Sextus' own account presents an internal 
inconsistency: in his outline he follows the order a) if 'being' is, b) 
if 'not-being' is, c) if both 'being' and 'not-being' are. In the 
detailed discussion of the arguments, (b) comes first, and (a) second, 
an arrangement which is in accordance with Anonymous, who 
clearly states that the arguments for (b) came after the 'original 
proof. This discrepancy between the outline of the arguments and 
their actual discussion may be explained onthe assumption that this 
was the arrangement in the summary he had before him (palmer 
1999, p.255). That (c) comes after (a) and (b), whereas in iv[XG it is 
included in the 'original proof is explained by the fact that Sextus 
simply reformulated the arrangement. All the chances are that he 
considered it more appropriate to present the arguments concerning 
'not-being' and 'being' first, and then to pass to their synthesis. The 
effort on behalf of Sextus to present a smoother and more 'logical' 
arrangement may be taken as a sign that M.XG is closer to the 
original, Gorgianic arrangement. 
In M.XG, the arguments from antinomy follow Anonymous' 
criticism of the 'original proof. Both versions turn to the 
investigation of the implications of the assumption 'if anything is'; 
although the separate arguments are not identical, it is not possible 
to maintain that the two versions differ to such a degree which 
prevents us from recognising Gorgias' arguments. The first obvious 
difference is that /v[XG includes an argument unparalleled in Sextus, 
namely the one about motion, although the latter, because of the 
irrecoverable textual difficulties in i'vfXG, is our only source of 
information on the antinomical pair one / many. 
Both versions begin with the pair generated / ungenerated; the 
terms used in A1XG are yeviJTov I dyev7JTov, whereas Sextus instead 
of dyev7JTov uses the word d£C5I.ov. It is also worth stressing that 
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Sextus thought that an argument combining both properties (d£o(.ov 
cIj;.a Ka.L YE"lf7JTOV) had its place at this point. The demonstration in 
MXG takes as its starting point that if it is ungenerated it is 
unlimited, a thesis based on an (undefined) axiom of Melissus. This 
axiom, never stated explicitly in this version - which however has 
already dealt with Melissus in its first chapter, is voiced in Sextus: if 
it is eternal, it does not have a beginning (dPX17v), which entails that 
it is unlimited. The implications of this difference have been 
explained by Mansfeld (1990, p.1l4): "this proves that MXG 5-6 
cannot have been Sextus' source, because apX17v is not fOllild there 
and because it is unlikely that Sextus would have 'translated' 
Anonymous' reference about Melissus into an argument which only 
dealt with apX17". 
From the assumption that being is unlimited both versions infer 
that it is nowhere. Once again, Sextus' accollilt is more detailed; for 
in MXG it is merely assumed that it cannot be either in itself or in 
anything else, because in that case there would be two things, the 
container and the contained. Sextus on the contrary, examines the 
inferences of these two possibilities: a) if it is anywhere, it is 
different from that in which it is, so that the contained is not 
unlimited. In that case, the container will be bigger than the 
contained, which is absurd because nothing is bigger than the 
unlimited. Conclusion: the unlimited cannot be anywhere. b) it is 
not self-contained; if it were self-contained the contained and the 
container would have been the same thing, so that being will 
become two things, a location and a body_ But this is absurd. It 
seems that in Anonymous' version the argument 'one would 
become two' covers both possibilities: 'being' is in itself or 'being' 
is in something else. This corresponds only to the second argument 
in Sextus, namely the one examining the possibility that 'being' is in 
itself. This discrepancy illustrates once again that Sextus did not use 
lvIXG (Mansfeld 1990, p.116). 
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Both versions then conclude that if it is nowhere it is not at 
alL In MXG this is the third step of the arguments supporting the 
thesis that 'what is' is ungenerated, and it is based on what 
Anonymous calls 'the argument of Zeno concerning space' (see 
comments ad loc). In Sextus this conclusion is the final element of a 
string recapitulating the steps of the argumentation concerning the 
'ungenerated': 'if being is eternal, it is unlimited, and if it is 
unlimited, it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it is not at all'. 
Both versions proceed with the discussion of the alternative 
hypothesis: if the assumption that 'being' is generated is to be 
confirmed, then 'being' has generated either from 'being' or from 
'not-being'. Anonymous introduces his arguments more 
straightforwardly, whereas Sextus begins with a hypothesis: 'if 
being has generated, it must be either from being or from not-being'. 
The arguments against these two possibilities are not the same in the 
two accounts. Anonymous contends that 'if 'being' changes into 
something else, then it is not 'being' anymore', and this seems to be 
elevated to a rule, for he is too ready to assert that the same applies 
for 'not-being' as well, before he actually passes to the refutation of 
this second possibility. Sextus on the other hand, prefers to say that 
'if being is, it has not been generated - it already existed'. 
Anonymous then goes on to give the reasons why it cannot be 
generated from 'not-being'. This is due to that a) 'if not-being is not, 
nothing is generated from nothing, and b) 'if not-being is, for the 
reasons that it cannot be generated from being, from the same 
reasons it cannot be generated from not-being' (that is in that case 
'not-being' would have to change). Sextus' argument against 
generation from 'not-being' is conspicuously out of key with what 
might be considered as Presocratic terminology. 'Nothing can 
generate from 'not-being', for that from which anything generates 
should itself partake of existence'. The discrepancy has been 
explained by Kerferd (1955, p.ll): "Both these arguments are 
attributed by Aristotle to early philosophers in general terms (Phys. 
191a 23-31). This suggests a possible answer to the discrepancy 
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between the two versions - it may be that Gorgias gave a series of 
arguments to establish each point, and as the theme was a well worn 
one, only one argument is reported in each case". 
Sextus now in a passage which is unparalleled in MXG, goes on 
to investigate the possibility of attributing both properties to au at 
the same time. He says that 'being' cannot be both eternal and 
generated, because these two elements are mutually exclusive. 
Calogero (1932, p.182) thought that this argument is spurious (for 
further literature see Untersteiner 1954, p.169 n.43; see also Loenen 
(1959), p.189, Migliori 1973, p.58). The view that it is merely an 
encapsulation of the structure of the antinomical argument, which 
corresponds to 979b34, where Anonymous summarises this first 
argument, is attractive, especially in the absence of an analogous 
argument in JvfXG. Moreover, Sextus is prone to dialectical 
synthesis, as the demonstration of the third argument of the 'original 
proof' shows, and it is hard to explain why he omitted such a 
dialectical synthesis in the context of the following argument 
concerning the pair 'one' and 'many'. However, it is worth noting 
that this "synthetic" argument is announced from the very beginning 
(17 ciLowu up.a KaL yev.,,-rov 68), and this programmatic 
announcement probably entails that what we have here is not an 
enlarged version of a phrase simply summarising the argument in 
Sextus' source. The easiest assumption is that a mere recapitulation 
in Gorgias' original text was elevated in some versions which, of 
course, we do not possess now, to a separate argument, and Sextus, 
who had before him one of them, proceeded analogously. A 
comparison with Palamedes 26 can perhaps serve as demonstration 
of what this summarising fonnulation looked like. In that context 
Palamedes concludes, that if he is wise he had not committed the 
crime, and ifhe had committed the crime he is not wise: 
Palamedes 26 Sextus 72 
Ka.t. el. ci1.01.0V €O"T"L 1"0 QU, au y€yov€V, 
\ " 'v...! ~~ ~ YEYOV€V, aUK eO"T"LV w,ol.OV. 
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Any comparison of the passages demonstrating the arguments 
about one I many, and in motion I at rest, is impossible. The first 
argument is practically preserved only in Sextus, due to the bad 
condition of the text in l\1XG, and the second is totally absent in 
Sextus. 
We may turn to the second major division ('if it is it is 
unknowable'); again the condition of the text in k!XG is bad, and to 
some extent its interpretation should necessarily be dependent on the 
readings one is ready to adopt, and for the same reason the 
comparison with Sextus' account should necessarily be tentative. 
MXG is again shorter, but probably more accurate, than Sextus; 
at the beginning of MXG (980alO) there is a lacuna, which I think 
has been satisfactorily reconstructed by Palmer (1999, p. 257-58). In 
Sextus there are two main headings: a) 'if objects of thought are not 
[or: are not the case)', and b) 'if objects of thought are [or: are the 
case]'. Palmer must be on the right track when in his reconstruction 
of the lacuna in MXG he brings them in. His reconstruction runs as 
follows: a) if it is, says Gorgias, it is unknowable. b) if objects of 
thought are not [or: are not the case], what is the case is not thought 
of. c) If this is the case, being [or: what is the case] is unknowable. 
d) if objects of thought are [or: are the case], what is the case is not 
thought of. 
There are two main points that afford comparison; the first one 
concerns the (im)possibility of falsehood. Anonymous (980a12) 
claims that 'all things that are objects of thought should be, and 
what is not the case, if in fact it is not, should not be an object of 
thought'; he then suggests that if this is true then no one would utter 
a false statement even if one held that there are chariots racing on 
the sea. Sextus on the other hand, argues that 'if objects of thought 
are the case, then all objects of thought are true'; he then brings in 
the example of chariots so as to show that the preceding syllogism is 
absurd, and he concludes that 'objects of thought are not true' (79). 
The arrangement of argument in the two versions differs 
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significantly; where Anonymous with the suggestion that 'no one 
would utter a false statement even if one held that there are chariots 
racing on the sea' allows us to think that this might well be a valid 
statement, Sextus clearly uses it as a proof that the suggestion 'all 
objects of thought are true' is absurd. 
The possibility of thinking of things that are not true is covered 
by Sextus in a context investigating the consequences of the 
statement 'if objects of thought are the case, what is not the case 
will not be an object of thought' (80). This argument is supported by 
the fact that these two elements (what is and what is not the case) 
are antithetical. But again this results to an absurdity, because some 
things which are not true (he adduces the example of Skylla and 
Khimaira, unparalleled in MXG) are thought and conceived of by 
human mind. From that, Sextus infers that what is the case is not 
thought of - presumably because things that are not the case are 
thought of, so that their opposites, namely things that are the case, 
are not thought of The argument has been refonnulated by Sextus; 
one should notice the we; 1Ta.pa.crrf]O"O{.L€V at 78, which is then 
followed by the conclusion OUK apa. 'TO OV <PpOV€7..ra.~ (picked up at 
80, that is in the conclusion of the demonstration simply announced 
at 78). 
The second argument in MXG980al4-19 is related to the 
acquisition of knowledge through senses. The view I tend to take is 
that this second argument (corresponding to Sextus 81-82) deals 
with this alternative means of attaining knowledge (see Levi, quoted 
by Untersteiner 1954, p.IS5), an argument which gains ground, if 
we consider that the distinction between the senses and the mental 
or noetic processes is a recurrent theme in earlier philosophy, and 
consequently it is likely that Gorgias, a thinker prone to arguments 
from antitheses, would not have failed to argue on the basis of this 
intellectual conflict, so as to prove that both senses and noetic 
processes are unreliable. 
I believe that Sextus' representation of this argument is far from 
what Gorgias might have said. That he has misunderstood the 
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argument can be brought out by comparison with what we have in 
Anonymous' account. At .MX"Ga14 we are told that things seen and 
things heard are true, because each one of them is conceived of by 
our mind. Intellectual activity is now considered as a means of 
testing the truth of things perceived through senses. It is held that, in 
the way that what we see (vision represents here sense-perception) 
is not [true], in the same way what we see is not more true than what 
we conceive through our mind (noetic processes). This is reinforced 
by the observation that (and here the synthesis of the two opposed 
elements is brought about) many people might see other things and 
some others conceive of different things, and it is impossible to say 
which of them are true and which are not. Both the first step 
(knowledge through noetic activity), and the second (knowledge 
through senses) are shown to be invalid on the basis of SUbjectivity. 
Sextus construes the argument differently; he seeks to establish 
the ontological independence of each one of the senses, as well as 
the independence of mental perception in relation to senses as a 
whole. This independence is said to be due to that each object of 
sense is perceived through a different organ, appropriate to it. As a 
matter of fact, objects perceived through the mind, such as chariots 
racing on the sea, should exist, even if one does not see them. What 
must have been an argument from antithesis, now takes the form of 
a reductio ad absurdum. 
The third division of ONB puts forward the idea that if anything 
is knowable, it cannot be communicated to others. In this context, 
the differences between the two accounts are considerable, in 
Kerferd's words (1982, p.215), "in the third section, at least for the 
greater part, we have two quite distinct sets of arguments ... the two 
sets must be treated as complimentary if we are to recover Gorgias' 
original argument". 
In 1\£{G980a20-b2 it is maintained that it is imnossible to convev 
. . 
through words things perceived through our senses, because 
different objects are perceived through different senses. Sextus 83-
85 makes exactly the same point (his account is more detailed), and 
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it is safe to assume that a similar argument must have been put 
forward by Gorgias himself, of which a shorter version has been 
preserved to us. Both versions thus make it clear that in the first 
instance Gorgias proceeded by establishing a gap between .\oyoS" 
and senses. Both versions conclude that .\oyoS" is different from 
things (iviXG980b2 Ka.~ AEYE!- <5 AEywV, aM' ou xpwf-l-a ouoe -rrpa.Yf-l-a.; 
Sextus 85 f1-1] WV oe AOyOS" OUK av ~)'7J.\w8€£7] E-rEPCP)' 
l\1.G'G980b3-9 offers an argument unparalleled ill Sextus (see 
Kerferd 1982, p.219); this argument turns to the relation of senses to 
thought (that Gorgias argues both from senses and thought in this 
third division of ONE is a further argument in favour of our view 
that in the second division he proceeded in an analogous manner as 
well). The first point is that a thing that does not exist in one's own 
mind cannot be conveyed to him by another. If the first is to 
conceive of it, then he should perceive it through his senses. The 
second point, complementing the first, is that a colour (that is an 
object of a sense) cannot be conceived of through mind, but seen. 
This second point, is an objection to what can be labelled as 
conceptual theory of meaning (see comments ad loc.). From this 
standpoint, it can be claimed that Gorgias refutes the idea that if 
someone utters the word 'red', then the hearer will necessarily 
conceive of this colour. 
The following steps in the two verslons are entirely different. 
MXG980b3ff. examines the problems of communication (discussed 
in my commentary). Sextus 83-851.1 on the other hand "feels the 
need to deal with two possible objections" (Kerferd 1982, p.218) to 
the main argument 83-85 1.1. The first one (85), which is attributed 
to Gorgias (~7J(j£v), maintains that it is the objects of the world that 
invoke logos and not vice versa. The second one puts forward the 
view that logos has an ontological substance, as objects of 
perceptions do. But logos differs from them, in the way that each 
one of them differs from the others (see comments ad lac.). 
305 
NOTES 
lvlXG: Anonymous' Introduction (979a12-24) 
9i9a12-13 
These are the three divisions of the O:t\iB; the ei. oe ... el oe Kai. .•. d.NI.ei 
construction makes it clear that the argumentation is based on a 
concessio, and we thus have a chain of three consecutive arguments. 
(1) G. first shows that nothing is; (2) he then concedes that it is and 
shows that it cannot be known, and finally, (3) after conceding both 
that it is and is knowable, he says that it cannot be communicated to 
others. Apart from (1), which at any rate is the starting point of the 
argumentation, the second and the third steps (2,3) presuppose the 
denial of accuracy of their preceding arguments (1, if not 1, then 2, 
but if not 1 and 2 then 3). This argumentative process in its general 
features is adopted in The Defence of Palamedes, although there are 
some differences in the details (see Introduction). 
The full arguments supporting the first thesis are glven ill 
979a23-980alO: first we have the r81.OS' d:mJ8€L~LS' of Gorgias 
(979a24-33), followed by its criticism by the author of MXG 
(979a34-b19), and then the second argument of the first division 
(979a20-980a9). The second thesis, concerning the unlrnowability, 
is dealt with in 980alO-980a19 and the third thesis concerning the 
impossibility to transmit our knowledge to others is developed in 
980a20-980b19. A general statement of the author of iYfXG is 
closing his own version of the arguments of Gorgias. 
A strikingly similar parallel for the three stages of argumentation 
in the ONB can be traced (see Hays 1990, p.335-337, Palmer 1999, 
p. 108-110) in Plat. Parmenides135a3-b2, which runs as follows: 
"As a result, whoever hears about them [sc. the e~o7J and the 1.8eaL 
of Tei oV'ra] is doubtful and objects (1) that thev do not exist [sc. iUs-
OVTe E<1'TL lau-ra] , and that, even if thev do [sc. eL Te on p.a.Aurra 
eL7J] , (2) they must by strict necessity be unknowable to human 
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nature [sc. uyvCtJO'Tcr.]; and in saying this he seems to have a point; 
an~ as we sai~ he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very 
gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kin~ 
a being itselfby itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will 
discover that and (3) be able to teach [sc. oL3cfgcu] someone else who 
has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself' 
(trans. M. L. Gill - P. Ryan, Plato, Parmenides (1996), p.138; the 
underlining is mine). What is at issue here are the possible 
objections that Socrates may have to face in bis attempt to define the 
fonns and the ideas of the QV'ra.. These objections would be that (1) 
that it does not exist (<.Us OUTE Ean Tcr.iJ-ro. = OUK Elvcr.£. 1J'rya'LV ouoev 
MXG, on J-L€V ouv OUO€V €(rnv Sext.66), (2) that even if they do (EL 
TE on J-Lc£ha-ro. EL7] = El 0' Ea-rC.V MXG, El Ko.L €a-rC.V Sext.66), they 
must necessarily be unknowable (UYVWOTcr. rij avepam!.vT} rpV(J"EC. = 
uyv<.tJO-rov MXG, aKo.Ta.A1J1TTOV avepc!nrcp Sext.66; cpo also the 
impossibility of having noetic access to Tel QV'ra. in Parm.133b4 ) 
and that "even if a very gifted man can come to mow ... " (avopcJ<, 
YVWOTOV MXG, El Ko.L Kcr.Tcr.A1J1TTOV Sext.66), (3) "only a 
prodigy ... will be able to teach someone else" (en O€ 
ecr.UP.o.a-rOTEpOU ..• Ko.L UAAOV ouv7]aOJ-LEVOU Ol.Oa.';O.l. = aM' ou 07JAWTOV 
UMOI.S" MXG, aMel TO£ ye avegoLa-rov Ko.L avepp..ryvEuTOV Tqi 7TeAo.S"). 
Stage (1) is conceded in both Plato and the two versions of Gorgias' 
treatise, so as to give way to the second stage (2); though this is not 
conceded with a clear hypothesis in Plato, it is nevertheless 
presupposed that only a very competent man will be able to reach 
knowledge (a point which is not found in Gorgias) and what is 
more, (3) only a really extraordinary man will be able to teach it to 
someone else. 
The use of the vertebral arguments of Gorgias in the text of Plato 
show that the latter was at least aware of the ONE (Hays 1990). Tnat 
they are presented as the possible knocking over of Socrates' theory 
about the QV'ra. is perhaps more interesting, especially under the light 
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of what is said at 128c6-dl; in that context Zenon tells Socrates that 
he wrote his treatise (which is read before the dialogue starts, 
though it is not quoted by Plato) with the intention of defending 
Parmenides against those who made fun of his arguments 
concerning the One. Is Gorgias one of them? And if so, did Plato 
read the ONE as a mainly anti-Parmenidean text? 
Nestle 1922, p.551-62 has argued that Gorgias antedates Zenon 
and on the grounds of this chronological manoeuvre he reached the 
conclusion that Zenonn's treatise was pointing at Gorgias' text. 
Nthough the transference of the date cannot be accepted, it should 
be noted that the connection of Gorgias with Zenon's arguments -
in Plato's book - acquires an interesting implication. As Palmer 
(1999, p.l09; for a general discussion of what he calls the 
"sophistical appropriation of Parmenides" in 110-117) has pointed 
out, "the Gorgianic scepticism ... should be compared both with the 
antagonism of Parmenides' detractors in the earlier portion of the 
dialogue and with Gorgias' own personal demonstration against 
Parmenidean Being in 'On What-Is-Not"'. It is possible that Plato 
saw Gorgias' arguments in the ONB as a threat against him (see 
Hays 1990, p.335) and this is why he gave Parmenides the 
opportunity to answer Gorgias ( or even Gorgias as the 
programmatic opponent of the anti-Parmenidean or the anti-Eleatic 
conclusions). In Hays' (1990, p.336) own words "he knew [sc. 
Plato J that his own quest for forms was particularly vulnerable to 
the same arguments because its ontological assumptions were 
similar to those of the Eleatics" (the italics are mine). 
OUK €.l.va.L <fnlO1..V OUOEV: the first thesis of Gorgias is given in indirect 
speech, hence the infinitive EIvo,£ (instead of the OUOEV EIITl.V, Sextus 
66). It should be noted, that Isokrates He!.3, Ant.268 depends the 
word Ov'ra. from OVO€V (He!.3 OUOEV 'l""WV OV'l""WV E<rrl.V, Ant.268 
7TaV'l""eAWS- ovoev); OVOEV should be taken in a general way and it "can 
include Being, Not-Being and particular existences in its negation" 
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as Levi (1941, p.13, cited by Untersteiner 1954, p.166 nolO) has 
pointed out (also Migliori 1973, p.26 n.4). Gorgias does not 
undertake the task of attacking solely the Being of Parmenides - he 
has a wider scope. The 'nothing' of this first phrase implies a total 
denial of the theoretical constructions of the philosophers and it 
must be related to the subject of the rowS" cL1TOOEL;LS": OUK EarLV OU-rE 
eivuL. OU'TE J.LTJ eLva!.. Both 'being' and 'not-being', together with 
what may be attributed to them as their characteristics by 
philosophers, are described by this perileptic ouoev of the opening 
lines of MX:G. That the word includes both being and not-being is 
also brought out by the contexts of 979a30 ouoev uv EL7] (the result 
of the second argument of the LOI-OS" d:rrooEL;LS") and 979a32 OUK UV 
eL7] ouoev (the result of the third argument of the LOWS" a1TooEL;LS"), 
where oucev expresses the impossibility of the existence of either 
being or not-being, if those were identical (-rau-rov; see Palmer 1999, 
p.70). It may be added that oucev, meaning the impossibility of 
attributing a specific characteristic to ov-ra without contradictions 
resulting is brought out in 979a20. 
979al4-18 
This short passage (unparalleled in Sextus) is an example of what 
may be called early, or sophistical doxography (see Mansfeld 1990, 
p.22-28, 59-64) and it is not paralleled in Sextus' version. It would 
probably be more accurate to say that we have a classification of 
doctrines of earlier philosophers, an outline of their fundamental 
credo, which - it should be noted - in the case of Gorgias is not 
intended as a neutral accumulation of their ideas. It is clear that 
those doctrines quoted here, will be the very target and the very 
weapon of Gorgias' attack. The refutation of the premises of earlier 
philosophers is based on their contradictory character (,\Eyov-re; 
. ') 
.. UVUV-rLU . 
In addition we know that Protagoras had written a book under the 
title (?) JJEp~ .. oU v Ov-roS", where he argued against the monists (1TP0S" 
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'TOUS ev 'TO OV Ei.CTa:YOV'Tas, cpo Porphyry (B2 DK)). It must then be 
safe to conclude that in this treatise Protagoras had also collected the 
ideas of the monists with the purpose of attacking them (see 
Mansfeld 1990, p.62, who holds that Gorgias was inspired by 
Protagoras and - with less certainty - that he combined the 
arguments of Protagoras against the monists with those of Zenonn 
against the pluralists). 
It seems that Hippias had also composed a collection of earlier 
ideas, which according to Athenaios had the title Luva.ywrrl 
(86B4DK); in 86 B6 DK we read· 'TOV'TWV LCTWS ELp7J1"a.L 'TeL jJ-Ev 
, Opq;El., 'TeL De MOtJCTa.i.lfI Ka.'TeL ~pa.xU rulfl cL\,\a.xov, 'TeL DE 'HCTLODlfI, 
'TeL DE 'OjJ-fJPlfl, 'TeL DE 'TOLS ruOLS 'TWV 7TOL7J1"WV, 
CTUyypa.q;a.7s 'TeL jJ-ev ".EM.7]CTt. 'TeL De ~a.p~6.pow eyw De , I EK 7Ta.V'TWV 
7TOAtJEt.D77 'TOV AOYov 7TOt.fJCTOjJ-a.t. (for Hippias as a common source of 
Plato and Aristotle see Snell (1944), reprinted in Classen 1976, 
p.478-490, Classen 1965, p. 175-181, Pfeiffer 1968, p. 52, Patzer 
(1986), Mansfeld 1990, p. 84-96, with more references on p.71 n.9; 
contra Stokes 1971, p.282 n.106; see also Guthrie 1971, p.282-283 
and Kerferd 1981, p.48-49). 
The summary of the arguments given in the form of antithetical 
pairs are not presented here in the same order as that in the second 
part of the first division (that they were presented in the second part, 
that is after the LOWS d7TOOEt.~t.S, is made clear from three passages: a) 
979a24 jJ-E'TeL rTJv 7Tpc!n-ryV LOWV a.V'TOV d7T()OEt.~t.V, b) 979a33 OU'TOS 
jJ-EV ovv <5 7Tpw-rOS AOYos EKELVOU - if Diels reading is adopted - and 
c) 979b20 jJ-E'TeL De 'TOV'TOV 'TOV '\cyov q;7]CTLV). The counter-arguments 
about the (1) one and many dichotomy (ev /7ToAAeL), which comes 
first in the summary, are discussed after the arguments concerning 
the pair (2) generated-ungenerated (ciyEV1"a. / /,ElIOjJ-EV'Ta.); both 
arguments are followed by an argument concerning [3] motion, 
which is not included in the summary (unparalleled in Sextus). 
Schematically, in the summary we have (1)-7(2), whereas in the 
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second part of the first division we have the converse order with the 
addition of the argument about motion (2)-7(1)-7(3). 
On the basis of obvious similarities with a passage from Xen. 
Mem.I.1.14, we could safely draw the conclusion that Gorgias' 
classification as it is given in the version of l"\1.J(G had an impact on 
Xenophon (see ~1ansfeld 1990, p.59-61, 99-101, with references to 
others p. 80 n.193, and p. 81 n.197), when - for the needs of his text 
- he summarises the ideas of some of the Presocratic philosophers. 
TIlls summary follows the statement that Socrates neglected the 
philosophers, because of the fact that they had different views. The 
summary of their premises, as it is given by Xenophon is the 
following: 
TWV 'IE 7TEP~ rijs TWV 7TaVTWV <pUO'EWS J1-EP~J1-VWVTWV TO!:S' J1-€V OOKE!:V 
(a) EV J1-0VOV TO OV ElvUL, TO!:S' 0' a.7TELPU TO 7TAfj8oS', 
(b) KU~ TO!:$" J1-€V dEL 7TCJ.VTU KLVE~a8U~, TO~S' 0' OUO€V a.v 7TOTE 
(c) KU~ TO!:$" J1-€V 7TaVTU Y£YVEa8u£ 'IE KuL d7ToMva8u~. 
TOL$" oe OUT av yEvea8u£ 7TOTE OUO€V OUTE d7ToAea8uL. 
Some remarks: (1) the order in which the premises are listed in 
Mem. 1.1.14, is not the identical with that of the summary MXG. 
The order of the arguments in both summaries is the following: 1:a, 
0:b, 2:c. (2) It is safe to conclude that Gorgias' original summary 
also contained the pair motion/rest. (2a) The pair motion / rest, 
which comes second in Xenophon (and is missing from the 
summary of wiXG) shows that it may also be safe to deduce that 
Gorgias, in his argumentation, had also included an argument 
concerning rest. (3) Both Gorgias and Xenophon do not name the 
philosophers to whom they attribute these premises. 
Under this light the passages from Isokr.Ant.268 (=86B IDK 
where only the last portion of the passage is printed), PI. Soph.242c-
243a and .A.rist.Ph.184b15-25 and Met.1028b2 seem to have a 
common denominator: they are all related to the first element of the 
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Gorgianic summary (the one/many dichotomy) in the respect that 
they all classify the several views of the early philosophers 
concerning the number of the o[nta. In Isokrates' classification 
Gorgias himself is included (he is the last one in the list: some 
(who?) say that the o[nta are infinite, Empedocles four - the two of 
them mentioned, i.e. veLKOS" and cP~;\[.a. - Ion no more than three, 
Alcmeon only two, Pannenides and Melissos only one) for-
according to the orator - he held that the number of o [nta is oujdevn 
(Gorgias is also mentioned in Isokr.He1.3; see Mansfeld 1990, 
p.l 00-1 01; for others who have discerned those similarities, 
Mansfeld 1990, p.71 n.9) 
a1.,.v8ets -nl. hepol.s eLfl'TlIJ-Eva.: The participle O1.Jv8e/s (which is also 
used by Porphyry to describe the collection of earlier views by 
Hippias) shows that the summary that we have in MXG existed in 
Gorgias' original text. The 'others' of the text are not the Eleatics 
exclusively. Gorgias is interested in a total attack upon the abstract 
philosophical speculation as a process. That he does not have only 
the Eleatics in mind is shown by the fact that pluralism is also at 
stake as opposed to monism. It is the philosophical argumentation as 
a process - which compensates philosophers with contradictions -
that Gorgias wants to bring to the surface. 
'lTEflI. 'iWV OV'itllV: the abstract and fundamental being(s) of the 
philosophers; it is the first occurrence of the term 1"0 QV in the text. 
In Helen 13, we are told that physical philosophers, by substituting 
the one view for another make unbelievable and hidden things 
visible to the eyes of their minds. This passage (cited by Mansfeld 
1990, p.99; see Introduction) is, if nothing else, an indication that 
Gorgias had remarked - and what is more, he was able to integrate 
these remarks in his argumentation- that philosophers have a great 
flexibility in their argumentation and that he was aware that in 
philosophical conflicts, there are always disagreements and a great 
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stock of (flexible) ideas. These very unbelievable constructions and 
those disagreements are now his target. 
The first occurrence of Tci. OVTa. m a context where the 
predominant theme is the ascertainment that philosophers have 
expressed totally controversial ideas about it is a sign that Gorgias' 
polemic has as its object all the theoretical conceptions of being 
(Levi 1941, p.32-34, Lloyd 1966, p.119 n.2). That OVTa. signifies the 
philosophical constructions is also shown by Isokr. Ant.268, where 
Gorgias is mentioned along with other philosophers (the way that 
Faggi 1926 puts it is remarkable "e questa l' Essere solitario, 
schematico, astratto, geometrico, inerte e senza vita, che Gorgia 
nega", p.227; see laso Rensi 1938, p. 99 n.1; Guthrie 1971, p.199; 
more recently Mansfeld 1990, p.102-103 and Palmer 1999, p. 67). 
The plural should not be considered as an exclusive allusion to the 
pluralists. The OVTa. is the intersection where the different 
philosophical speculations about the being arrive from opposite 
directions. 
This passage shows clearly that Gorgias does not intend to 
discuss the phenomenal world, the phenomena (as Calogero, 1932 
first thought, followed by Kerferd 1955 and Newiger 1973). 
'Td.vo;v-n.a.: in a way it foreshadows the method that Gorgias will use 
in the second portion supporting the first thesis; this method can be 
labelled argument from antinomy. Cassin (1980, p.436) rightly 
concludes that the antithetical views of the philosophers "forment 
ainsi, face a. Gorgias, un bloc contradictoire qui aneantit son propre 
dire". This strategy is used again in The Defence of Palamedes (25-
26), where Palamedes addresses his opponent, Odysseus and he says 
that his accusations are contradictory. In that context we have a man 
(Palamedes) who is accused of two opposite things (OVO Tel. 
Eva.vnw-ra.Ta.): wisdom and madness. In this context we have a 
ftmdamental philosophical notion (being) predicated with opposite 
(Tava.vTLa.) characteristics: one/many, generated / ungenerated, 
motion I rest. In addition, in both texts, it is postulated that only one 
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characteristic (979a21 TOUTWU au ed.Tepa er7]) can be attributed to 
one given thing without contradictions resulting; but the 
examination of each alternative (avMoyL~E'T'a1. KaT' a.p.q;oTepwu 
979a18, cpo 01.' dp.q;Crrepa av Etrr.; if;euo-f;s The Defence of Palamedes 
26) leads to the conclusion that none of those characteristics can be 
attributed to it. In the same manner the two major arguments of 
Palamedes already mentioned have the same character. Facing the 
question 44Has Palamedes perfonned the actions accused of T, two 
alternatives are given and both of them are proved to be groundless. 
The same holds for the exhaustive argumentation showing that he 
was not able to perfonn the acts accused of (did I commit the 
treason alone or with accomplices, was it night or under the 
daylight); two alternatives are given and then it is shown that both 
were impossible (for this pattern of argumentation see Introduction). 
Schematically: suppose that something exists x (er n EO'n); if it 
exists it must either be y (€v) or -y (rrol\l\d.) , q (yevop.evou) or -q 
(dyev7]7"ov) ... But neither y, nor -y, neither q nor -q ... exist, so -x 
(980a9 elval. oJu ovoev). 
, , J..~ , '+ h ' . t' t ' " G Ka:. a.~'r''T'EpWV: KaTa. gen. ere agams ,no concernmg; . 
argues against both members of all those pairs of characteristics 
attributed to GU'T'a. 
919a 19-24 
choiv: After the summary of the premises of philosophers, we have 
now an outline of Gorgias' own refutation. 
EL n €a-n ••• YEVOf.LEVa.: Bonitz; er n EO'n <~ €V :r, 'TrOMeL eLVal. Kal. ~ 
dyev7]7"a :r, yevop.eva. EL ouv p.-ry Eo-n> P.frrE ... is Diels' reading 
(followed by Levi 1941, p.IO), but it cannot be accepted, because 
Gorgias, in the second portion of his first thesis (979b20ff.), does 
not discuss the possibility of p.-ry EO'TL (see Untersteiner 1954, p.166 
n.24, Cassin pA37-8, 443-4); on the contrary, by tracing the 
antinomies of the arguments of philosophers about being he 
concludes that there is OVOEV (cp.979b20, 979b35). 
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\Jo~-re a:y~'Ta. \Jo~-rE j'ev0\l-EVa.: Note that in the discussion of this 
pair (979b21) we read dy€1I7{T'ov / yevop.evov in singular (see 
Mansfeld 1990, p.l13 and my comments ad loc.). 
6ci.-repa.: It is clear that if something exists, then a choice should be 
made; for these pairs include MO antithetical notions which cannot 
be attributed to one single thing. Consequently, the following step 
will be the proof of the impossibility of either entity of each pair. 
O'Tt. <5'> OUK €O""M.V ••• j'Ev0\l-eva.: <0 '> Untersteiner 1961, p.58 (citing 
HeLl3 on 0' Tj 7Te~eW); all the characteristics attributed to being 
(with the exception of motion) are repeated here paratactically, since 
the idea is that none of them can even separately describe it. 
m \JoEv Ws MEALmroS ••• OE.LKWew: 'a la maniere de'; the author of 
MXG means that Gorgias in the argumentation following the rowS" 
d.7T60e~g~S" picks up and combines arguments and argumentative 
processes used by those philosophers. Hence the ro~oS" d.7Tooe~g~S" is a 
contradistinction to this method. m \JoE-v ••• m oe: they should not be 
taken strictly as an anaphoric reference. They should be taken with 
the more general meaning 'some ... and other', because otherwise 
what is said here would be inconsistent with the contents of the full 
discussion of each one of these premises (Calogero, cited by 
Untersteiner 1961, p.59-60). 
\Joem -rT)v 1I"pw1"'Tlv ••• a.'1T'OSeL~I.V: 'after his first original proof 
(equivalent with the AoyoS" of 979a33); the 'original proof of 
Gorgias comes first, though the summary of the arguments of the 
second part in favour of the first thesis has already been given by the 
author of MXG. Several translations have been proposed for the 
rOLOS" d.7TooeLg~S" ('special' demonstration: Kerferd 1955, 'originale 
dimonstrazione': Untersteiner 1961 and Mazzara 1982, 
'spezialbeweis': Newiger 1973, 'demonstration bien a lui: Cassin 
1980, 'special proof, 'particular proof: Mansfeld 1985, 1988, 
'eigenen Beweis': Buchheim 1989, 'personal demonstration': 
Palmer 1999). Wesoly (1983-1984, p.23), has rather recently argued 
(Palmer, 1999, p.69, also adopts her view) that the 'argomento 
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proprio' of Gorgias owes its name to the fact that it is an original 
(,originale') refutation ofPannenides, whereas the other arguments 
are based on the contradictory character of the arguments of his 
successors. Her disclaimer is clearly feasible and it is reinforced by 
the argumentative process of Gorgias, who - to an extent and in a 
specific way - is using Pannenides as an intertextual presupposition 
for his own proof that nothing is (see following notes). 
O~ OUK E.a-nv ••• tL~ ei,va.t,,: both 'to be' and 'not to be' are the target 
of Gorgias original demonstration. Kerferd (1955, p.19 -who 
endeavours to reconcile the version of .M.XG with that of Sextus) 
took this phrase as a quotation of Gorgias own words by the author 
of .M.XG. In other words he (mistakenly) thought that Gorgias was 
repeating at this place his 'whole thesis', so as to make feasible his 
interpretation of the LOLOS' d:lT68eL~LS' as an exclusive refutation of 
'not to be' (-;0 J1-7J elvuL). But that the text is clear and in his own 
words sound (p.6) is shown by the repetition of the whole phrase 
later (979b 1). What is more the author of .M.XG emphatically states 
(€V ~ AeyeL) that in his 'original proof' Gorgias maintained that both 
'to be' and 'not to be' are not (contra Kerferd see Mansfeld 1990, 
p.215-6 n.58). Despite this point, the interpretation of Kerferd is not 
without interest. For the starting point throughout the 'original 
proof' is not 'to be' or 'being', but its opposite 'not to be' or 'not-
being'. But evidently saying that Gorgias is refuting solely 'not to 
be' or 'not being' is one thing and saying that he is starting from 
'not to be' or 'not-being' with the intention of objecting to both 'to 
be' (and 'being') and 'not to be' (and not-being) is quite another. 
The First Thesis (979a25-980a9) 
The 'original proof' (979a25-33) 
The 'original proof' is perhaps the most demanding part of the ONE, 
as it is given in MXG. This is not due to textual difficulties (with 
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only one exception; there are other parts of this version whose 
content is practically based on conjecture), but to the extremely 
economical manner in which the author of iv[XG decided to preserve 
it. If one wishes to appreciate the argumentation of this part one 
should not be oblivious of the fact that what we have here is a short 
summary of an original Gorgianic argumentation. This entails of 
course that we do not possess the form in which Gorgias expressed 
his complicated ideas. The very intricate content of this part - with 
the antithetical notions of 'being' and 'not-being', the necessary 
repetitions, and the logical transitions from the one argument to the 
other - is enough to make even the most naive reader of Gorgias 
realize that the original text, especially here, would have been full of 
stylistic devices ('"we do not have this proof in its original and 
majestic Gorgian form" Mansfeld 1990, p.218). 
The 'original proof is developed in three stages or rather we have 
three arguments closely related. The whole argument runs as 
follows: 
(1) a. eZ P.€v yd.p TO P.7T eLva!. €(J"n P.7T elvar., 
For, ifnot being is not being, 
b. otlO€V av '7rr0U TO P.7T QU TOU aUTOS- eL7J. 
not being would be no less than being, 
c. TO T€ yd.p P.7T au €(J"n P.7T au Ka~ TO au au, 
because not being is not being, and being [sc. is] being 
d. [Wo-re auoev p.u)..)..ov dvar. :ry aUK elvar. Td. 1Tpa.yp.aTa] 
[so that things no more are than they are not.] 
(2) a eZ 8' op.WS' TO p.1] eLva!. EO"'T'L. 
But ifnot being is, 
being - its opposite - , he says, is not 
c eZ yd.p TO p.1] elvar. EO"'T'L, 
Because if not being is 
d TO elvar. P.7T eLvar. 1Tp0a-r]Kel. 
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(3) 
Then it follows that being is not. 
(1)+(2) 
So that in this way, he says, nothing would be, 
(-73) €i p.-r, Ta.VTOV €~va.1. TE Ka.~ p.-r, E'Vo.l.. 
unless being and not being are the same. 
a 
But if they are the same, 
even in this way nothing would be; 
ovn. 
because not being is not, and the same holds for being, because it 
is the the same with not-being. 
Some remarks: it is clear from the words signifying transition 
(the underlined words) that both the first two arguments are 
structured in the same way. There is an hypothesis (Ia, 2a) followed 
by a logical follow on (lb, 2b); then there is an argument (Ic, 2c) 
and finally a conclusion. The discussion of the first and second 
arguments (1,2) is followed by a general disclaimer or conclusion, 
which I take it to be deduced from both of them, and not merely 
from the second one. The third argument is announced by a phrase 
combining both elements (being and not being), which is picked up, 
so as to fonn the assumption of it (3a). It is then asserted that even 
in this case nothing would be (3b), because, as it is argued, not-
being is not and being, being the same with not being is not as well. 
An objection to the translation of the passage as it is cited above 
would probably be that it renders almost everywhere €Zvo.,. p.-r, €Zva., 
with the tenns 'being' and 'not-being', which would nonnally 
correspond to the alternative tenns TO OV, TO p.-r, OV also traced in the 
text. But I take it that the syntax of an iniinitive with an article (a 
very important property of the Greek language in terms of 
description of abstract notions) does justify this choice, which - and 
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this is perhaps more important - clarifies the opposition of 'being' 
with the negative 'not-being', as two contrasted terms. 
Putting these details aside, we can now pass to the interpretation 
of the 'original proof as a whole. Gorgias seems to make 
experiments with the double semantic value of the verb eIva.t. ('to 
be'); ONE is the first extant work where the route designated by 
Parmenides, the great father of ontology, is seriously questioned. 
Gorgias' strategy has, it appears, as its starting point the observation 
that the verb 'to be' has a double function: it can be used either 
existentially or as a copula. In the latter case it can also be used so 
as to assert the identity of two terms, as happens in the case 'X is 
X', or 'Y is Y', where 'Y is -X'. In modem terms he presupposes 
the implication of existence in a rather functional linguistic element 
(the 'copula' of the traditional grammars). According to Gorgias 
thus, 'X is X' implies that 'X exists'. 
One may object here that this interpretation, by usmg the 
distinction between 'existence' and 'copula' does not take into 
account the modem surveys on the Greek verb to be, and more 
particularly the influential conclusions of Charles Kabn. In many 
articles this scholar has shown that the 'copulative' / 'existential' 
dichotomy - as far as the Greek verb 'to be' is concerned' - is an 
artificial one, and that it originally does not exist in the Greek 
language. He mainly argued against the concept of 'existence', as a 
separate category of the Greek language, and he thus proposed -
among others - the 'veridical' use of the verb 'to be' (though he 
concedes that "when we are talking about truth and reality, the 
existential and copulative uses 0 f be are never far away" Kabn 1979, 
p. 330). The point cannot be fully discussed here; what may be said 
is that without denying the predominance of the veridical usage of 
'to be', we may feel free to use the term 'existence'. We are not here 
beginning our interpretation with the presupposition of a separate 
'existential' meaning of the verb 'to be'. We are simply realizing 
that Gorgias does presuppose that such a distinction exists (and it is 
recognizable by the recipients ofms argumentation), just in order to 
319 
make use of it. Under this light, we can compare the words of Kahn 
(ibid, p.329) with the use of the verb 'to be' made by G.: 
"Of course, we can easily see how the existential and copula uses of be 
will also turn up, if we think of the reality in question as expressed by a 
subject-predicate sentence -for instance by the sentence 'The sun is 
shining'. For if this sentence is true, then its subiect (the sun) must exist. 
And the sentence uses the conula verb is to medicate something of this 
subject, namely that it is shining, or that its light reaches us." 
(the underlining is mine). G. presupposes that the sentence 'not-
being is not being' is true and he thus "shows" that 'not-being', 
namely the subject of the sentence, exists. Whether this kind of 
argumentation is logical and productive (plato would certainly have 
his objections) is a debatable point. 
It has been almost unanimously accepted that the 'original proof' 
is - in one way or another - related to P armeni des , concept of 
being. Nestle 1922, pp.551-62, Calogero 1932 and Broecker 1958, 
425-438) all thought that Parmenides is the exclusive target of G. 's 
criticism; Cassin (1980) saw it as a "catastrophic repetition" of the 
Pannenidean argument and Kerferd - in the phrase announcing the 
scope of the 'original proof' (919a24) - saw an obvious parallel 
with fr.2.3 and 6.23 of Parmenides ("it is likely that Gorgias had 
these phrases of Parmenides in mind"; more recently Palmer 1999, 
p.71, argues that G. chose Parmenides, because, by attacking him, 
his argument would acquire a more general application to all the 
philosophers putting forvvard different fundamental entities). 
Whether G. had in mind Parmenides cannot be certified directly; 
we can only rely upon suggestions. We have already said that 
probably the rOt-oS' cL1TCJO€l.ql.S' in a contradistinction to the second 
portion of the argumentation supporting the first thesis (where other 
philosophers were at least used, as the summary of li-fXG witnesses) 
owes its name to the fact that in this part G. offers an original attack 
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on Parmenides. But still Parmenides IS not mentioned by name 
either in the A1XG, or in Sextus. 
That Parmenides is probably the target of G. gains credence by 
the striking similarity between the arguments used in the 'original 
proof and those used in Plato's Pannenides 162a. Guthrie (Hist. 
Gr.PhiI. voLV, p.55 n.4) saw a 'close parallel' and Cornford (1939, 
p.226) thought that 'Gorgias might be directly answering the 
argument of G.'s (see also Brumbaugh1961, pp.21-22 and n.4; a 
detailed discussion in Mansfeld 1990, pp.264-5). The passage from 
Plat. Pann.162a is the following: 
the one is a not-being ... So if it is not to be, it must have being a 
not-being as a bond (o€(]'f-L6~) in regard to its not-being, 
just as, in like manner, what is must have not-being what is not, 
in order that it, in its turn, may completely be. 
(transL M. L. Gill - P. Ryan) 
Mansfeld (1990, p.265) concluded that "at Pann.162a Plato used 
Gorgias ... [sc. who] anticipated one of Plato's major contributions to 
philosophical discussion".l So, if it is the case that we have here an 
adaptation of the Gorgianic argumentation concerning not-being, 
then the suggestion that G. is attacking Parmenides is strengthened; 
in other words it is likely that Plato in this context has Parmenides 
using the very arguments employed by G., so as to show that it 
cannot be claimed that not-being is not at all (notice that 
Brumbaugh, ibid., pp.21-22 n.4 uses the term 'double irony' 
concerning the relation of Plato to G.). 
The conclusion that the specific target of G. in the 'original 
proof is Parmenides may be tantalising; for it is well known that 
despite the progress in the interpretation of Parmenides' ontology, a 
point of common consensus has not yet been reached. His poem, 
I He rightly, of course, points out that G. did not go so far as to show that not-
being is relatively not - as Plato did - but he was content to adopt the ide~ that it 
does not exist at alL though we should not accept that while G. merely played 
with a consciously ambiguous use of the words. and saw not being as "a sort of 
toy", by contrast Plato was much more profound in trying to deflne why "words 
have different meanings" simply because G. is an earlier philosopher, or what is 
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partly because of its poetical fonn, is too open to various 
interpretations. One would now think that the interpretative 
difficulties become more intricate if one realises that our task is not 
merely to unlock Parmenides' text, but also to scrutinize the relation 
between this text and a secondhand account of the criticism of a 
later sophist. I wish to take a more optimistic view by suggesting 
that apart from the variety of modem readings of Parmenides we 
possess the reading of a person who was (chronologically at least) 
closer to him, that is the reading of G. himself. In saying this, I do 
not, of course, mean that G.'s approach is the key to our 
understanding of Parmenides, for G., or what we have from G.'s 
original text, is an attack on Parmenides. What I mean is that the 
obscurity of Parmenides' passages which are related to the 
interpretation of ONE should not prevent us from reading it as its 
intertext (as Kerferd thought, 1955, p.7), because G.'s criticism 
unavoidably integrates and incorporates a discernible manner of 
perception of his target. 
It has already been said that G.'s programmatic phrase 
announcing the agenda of his criticism in the 'original proof (OUK 
E(nW OUTE Elva!., OUTE J-LTJ ELva!. 279a24) can be related to 
Parmenides' two routes of inquiry fr.2.3,5: 
3.1] J-L€V 01TWS" ea-nv TE Kat. ~ aUK ean f1-TJ ELva!., 
5. 1] 8' ~ OUK Eanv 'T'E Kat. ~ XPEWV Ean f1-TJ ELva!.. 
G.'s experiment in its process clings to the second route and objects 
to both the alternatives 'it is either for being (1] f1-€v) ... or for not-
being (;, 8'). This serves perhaps as a further argument that the 
'original proof can be read as anti-Parmenidean: had G. intended to 
deny merely the controversial entities of the philosophers, a 
declaration that 'it is not for being' in the programmatic phrase 
would have sufficed (see Palmer 1999, p.70). But since he wants to 
more, because Gorgias is Gorgias and Plato is Plato; it might be more rewarding 
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address Pannenides, he includes both 'being' and 'not-being', that is 
both the routes ofParmenides. 
If this analysis is so far correct we may now see how G. is 
organising his argument against Pannenides. G. is making a choice: 
he is taking p.TJ €LVUl. (the second route) as his starting point. In other 
words, facing two alternatives, the positive 'being' and its negation 
'not-being', he chooses the second. 
I consider that the argumentation of the 'original proof can be 
elucidated if we use two tenns of modern linguistic theory, that is 
the tenns 'marked' and 'unmarked'. It is of course impossible to 
discuss fully those tenns here, but for the purposes of our discussion 
some examples will suffice. A characteristic of an unmarked 
category is that it can be traced in contexts where the unmarked 
category would not be nonnally expected. For the words 'long' and 
'short', both denoting 'length' we can say that 'long' is the 
unmarked category, for in our possible question concerning the 
length of a given object we nonnally ask "How long is it", rather 
than "How short is it?" The same generally holds in matters 
concerning gender: we may say "What a nice dog!" (and nonnally 
not "What a nice bitch"), without knowing whether the dog we are 
referring to is male or female (a discussion of gender in relation to 
marked/unmarked categories can be found in Lyons 1977, 
pp.30Sff.). So generally (the subject is of course more complicated) 
the category male is the unmarked, whereas the female is the 
marked one. In those tenns negation - which interests us here - is 
the marked category, as contrasted to non-negative statements. 
men we want to take information concerning the content of a box, 
we normally ask "What is in the box?", instead of asking "mat is 
not in the boxT', though the latter is of course grammatically 
acceptable. 
It is clear then that G. proceeds by using as his starting point the 
marked 'not-being'. This allows him in the first argument to 
to take into account that their intentions are different. 
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predicate not being with itself and thus to conclude that "it is no less 
than being". If he had. chosen the unmarked category 'being', then 
the predication (<4ifbeing is being'') would have been useless (in fact 
he predicates 'being' of 'being' in 979a27: Ka.t. .,0 av ov; but no 
argument can be deduced from this phrase, which at any rate offers 
an analogy to the "0 .,E ya.p f1-7J ov Evn f1-7J av. One may also 
observe that the latter sentence is stressed by the use of the verb 
EO'"Tr.., while the former is given elliptically). For the affirmation 
'being is' does not serve as the necessary presupposition for the 
desired consequence on, that is 'if not-being is', then 'being' being 
its opposite is not. G. then, by using the marked 'not-being' both as 
subject and predicate, infers that 'it is' and he thus passes to the 
second argument (2), by taking for granted the conclusion of 
argument (1). In the third argument (3), he presupposes that the 
alternatives are identical. Having done away with the difficulty of 
the non-existence of 'being' he can easily and without any 
compunction assert that 'not being is not' (979a34) - this has not of 
course been prove~ but it is axiomatically asserted - and also that 
'being' is not - this has been proved on the basis of the assertion 
that 'not-being' is. 
Has G. succeeded in his attack? Is his argumentation coherent? 
Very recently, on the basis of logical analysis of the arguments of 
G., Palmer (1999, p.73, whose analysis - in my view - is otherwise 
the most economical and the most accurate one) has concluded that 
"Gorgias' personal demonstration ends up confirming Parrnenides' 
injunction against the second path ... thus confirming the value of 
Parrnenides' original injunction to stay on the first path". This may 
be true. It is also clear that G.'s 'original proof is panly 
inconsistent, and we have already pointed out that in the first 
argwnent he establishes the existence of 'not-being' and in the third 
one he takes it for granted that 'not-being' is not (aUK (gun). Without 
having any intention to vindicate the sophist, I should like to insist 
on the point that if the 'original proof has any value, we will not 
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trace it in its coherence or in the cohesion and the accuracy of the 
arguments. Even if G. did not succeed in knocking over 
P anneni des , point, however flagrantly inconsistent his 
argumentation may be, the value of his proof lies elsewhere. It can 
be traced, I am inclined to believe, in the contribution of G. to the 
history of ideas. What is important is that he did not hesitate to take 
the Eleatic bull by the horns, and he thus gave scope for an 
elaborated discussion of not-being by Plato. Mansfeld (1990, p.119) 
concludes: "What Plato did with it is what really matters to the 
history of philosophy ... this ancestor really was begotten by his 
offspring". But what might have happened if this ancestor had not 
existed? 
979a25-29 
eL fLEV yap ..• p.-TJ eLva.L: Kerferd (1955, pp.8-9), eL fJ-EV yap ro fJ-7J 
ELva/. < eO'·n v> , .ry eO'-n fJ-7J elva/., reading .ry for:ry, R; the reason is 
that the final sentence of this argument Wa-r-E ... ra. 'lTpaYfJ-ara (see 
notes ad loc.) creates a non sequitur. He thus translates "For if it is 
possible that it should not be, inasmuch as it is (possible for it) not 
to be ... ". Though his remark that the last sentence is a non sequitur 
is correct, I prefer to bracket it because I am inclined to agree with 
Mansfeld (1990, p.219) who entertains the hypothesis that Wa-r-e ..• ra 
'lTpa.Y/Lara is an interpolation. In this first sentence G. predicates 
'not-being' of itself, so as by using the verb 'is' as a copula to infer 
that 'not being' or 'what is not' is. 
OUOEV av l1'T'Tov ••• eL1'J: 'not-being would be no less than being' 
means that 'not-being' is; G. has shifted from the identity of 'not 
being' with 'not being' ('Y is Y') to the attribution of ELva/. to 'not-
being'. Hence the criticism of the author of J1XG that there must be 
a distinction between a a.'lTttWs" and a O/LOI.~ ELva/.. This distinction is 
made by Aristotle, who claims that the 'dialectical paralogism' of 
the obfuscation of the ELva/. a.'lTttWs" with the ELvaL -n is peculiar to the 
eristie (Rh.1402a3-6 E-n Wa-rrep EV rOLS" EPUrT"LKOLS" 'lTapa ro a.'lTttwS" 
Kat. /L7J a.'lTAWs", aMa r£, Y£YVETa./. cpa/.vo/LevoS" avMOYLO'/LOS". oLov EV 
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JJ.€v TaL~ OLa).€KTLKOL~ OTT. €OTl. TO jJ.7J OV [OV j, EOTT. yap TO jJ.7J OV jJ.TJ 
Ov; see Wesoly 1983-4, p.28. Kahn (1966, 263-264) maintains that 
€ival. a1TAWs in Aristotle does not generally mean 'exist'; it is 
"ultimately synonymous with the old Homeric (and post-Homeric) 
use of EaTi for 'is alive"', though he concedes that at Aristotle's 
So ph. E1.l67 al-4 "an existential nuance is possible"; see Mansfeld 
1990, p.l18 n.66). In this light the avoidance of the use of EaTi by 
Lykophron, as it is attested by Aristotle (=83 B 2 DK) so as to avoid 
confusion (A€A€VKWTaL, instead of A€VK6~ EaTl.V) is very interesting 
(see Kerferd 1955, p.25). 
Wa-r~ OUOEV ••• 1Tpci"yp.a:rn: Mansfeld's (1990, pp.l08, 219) suggestion 
that the final phrase is an interpolation of the author of MXG -
equivalent to auoev TWV OVTWV €iVaL - seems correct. This sentence 
is unparalleled in Sextus and it creates a non sequitur. From the 
preceding sentence G. adduced that 'not-being', like 'being', is. By 
inferring now that 'things are no more than they are not' is a 
contradiction which, I think, is not committed by G. (De Lacy in his 
survey on au jJ.aMov, 1958, pp. 59-71 casts doubt on whether G. 
used this phrase). Palmer (1999, p.72) thinks that from this 
conclusion we must infer "that they are not, which is tantamount to 
the conclusion in the two subsequent arguments that nothing is". 
But this conclusion does not result from the dubious usage of the 
verb 'to be' so far. The case may have been then that G. is taking 
from the first argument the necessary conclusion of the possibility 
of the 'existence' of 'not-being' (without at this stage confirming its 
'non-existence', as he does for 'being' at 979a31), which at any rate 
is the most difficult task. Having set out this ground, it is easy for 
him in the third argument to postulate that 'not being' is not (the 
arbitrariness of this syllogism is depicted by the phrase OUK OV 
Vo€i:.-al. in Sextus). Mansfeld's correction thus admittedly has the 
advantage of creating a logical passage to the second argument 
(979a30ff). But his suggestion to transpose the sentence after 
979a24, that is after the programmatic announcement of the scope of 
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the original proof, is not necessary (though he himself admits that 
such a transposition would be made if we wanted to preserve it "at 
all cost'). 1Tpa:yp.a:ro,: has been interpreted in various ways; 
Calogero (1932, p.197), takes it to mean the "molteplicita empirica 
del reale"; he is followed by Kerferd (1955, p.5, 1981, p.96), who 
thinks that in the first part of the ONE G. is also concerned with the 
phenomenal world (" .. .is also concerned with the status of objects 
of perception" and he claims that Tci. 1TpaYJ.La.m "makes it clear 
that. . .it is not the existence of Being or Not-Being which IS m 
question, but something wider"; the same view is taken by Newiger 
1973, pp.21-22). Both Kerferd's and Newiger's arguments are based 
on the passages from Isok. Ant.268 and He!.3, for which we have 
already adopted a different interpretation (see notes on 979al4-18). 
Levi (1941, p.15 cited by Untersteiner 1954, p.167 n.27) goes too 
far in saying that Tci. 1TpaYJ.La.Ta. refers to "the particular things that 
arise either from a single first principle or also from the peras and 
apeiron of the Pythagoreans, or from the many first causes of 
pluralism, things which by this very derivation involve change and 
Becoming, and therefore aspects of Not-being" and Untersteiner's 
(1961, p.60) connection of the word with xp7}P.a.Ta. of Protagoras is 
not likely. Migliori (1973, p.30), attributing to it a more general 
meaning by suggesting that "si puo, quindi, considerare la frase 
nella sua generic ita, ritenendola una conferma dell' acquisita 
identita tra essere e non essere", is more accurate. However, I 
consider that the view taken by Mansfeld, that Tci. 1Tpayp.a.Ta. is a 
general term - which in this first major thesis of ONE represents Tci. 
Dvm (1990, p.l02 and Palmer 1999, p.72 and n. 32) - is the most 
convincing. It is not necessary to repeat our argumentation 
concerning Tci. OVTa. (see notes on 979al4-18, and Introduction). We 
can simply add here that the word 1Tpa.YJ.La.Ta. is used by the author of 
j\;fXG at least once to denote the fundamental entities of 
philosophers. This passage can be found in the account concerning 
Melissos in MXG 975a2: Ka.1. p.it 1ToMci. elva./. Tci. 1Tpa.YJ.La.Ta., 
327 
meaning that "things that are cannot be many ... " (as it is rendered 
by Mansfeld 1990, p.207; the italics are mine). TIlls does not of 
course imply that all the occurrences of -rrpaYfLa-ra in the MXG 
replace ,ei ov-ra. 
e!. 8' op.~ ••• a.VTt.Kel.p.Evov: the argument is characteristically 
Gorgianic; facing the question of 'existence' of both 'not-being' and 
'being', and having (for the time being) answered positively to the 
first, he adduces that 'being' is not. Why is it not? Because it is the 
opposite of 'not-being', the touchstone of 'existence' and because 
(as G. knows very well: cp.The Defence of Palamedes 25) two 
opposite qualities cannot be attributed to one single thing. G. in the 
first argument singled out 'not-being' and in the second he excludes 
'being'. Everything is ready to deny both of them in the third 
argument. op.~: Mansfeld (1990, p.219 n.73) suggests OfL<O[>~, 
because of the distinguo made by Anonymous in the criticism 
(979a36, b5), and because the transmission from the prevlOus 
argument is in this manner smoother. I do not find it necessary to 
contaminate the demonstration of G. with a tenn which was later to 
become technical, especially when the tradition of the text does not 
demand it. The transition with the <3 ' ofLWS- on the other hand is rather 
satisfYing, as it does not obscure the fact that the assumption of the 
second argument is based on the argument of the first one. 
o:'VTt.KEI.P.EVOV: "the Stoic tenn for a member of an exclusive 
conjunction .. .it fits the context ad sententiam" (Mansfeld 1990, 
p.219). 
'TTP0<n1KEL: 'it follows' from what has been shown In the first 
argument. 
OUOEV av €L1'J: the conclusion of the second argument. 
eL p.1, Tau-rov ••• p.1, ELvaL: Reinhardt (1916, p.36-39) thought that this 
third argument makes a triple analogy with the three arguments of 
Parmenides (B 6, 8-9). This is not accepted by Palmer (1999, p./2 
n.36; see also Untersteiner 1954, p.167 n.30). 
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OUK aV EL'T] OUOEV: the conclusion of the third argument. Notice that 
this is an alternative form of the conclusion of the second argument . 
.,.0 'TE yc:1p p:Tj ov ... -rq; p:Tj OV'Tl.: the argument proceeds again by 
starting from 'not-being'; the present statement that 'not-being' is 
not, and which in fact contradicts what has been said in the first 
argument, is in formal conformity with Parmenides' second route. 
But instead of predicating 'not-being' of itself G. absolutely claims 
that 'not-being' is not and then - by following the opposite method 
of the one used in the second argument - he says that 'being' is not 
either, because it is the same as 'not-being'. Schematically: 
Argument 2: {+} 'not being':;::'being-7{-} 'being' (where {+} for 
'is', {-} 'is not'); Argument 3:{-} 'not-being'~ 'being'-7{-} 
'being', ('not-being'). 
1Tpoho~: instead of aUTOS" of the Mss; the suggestion of Diels has 
been followed by Kerferd (1955), Untersteiner (1961), Newiger 
(1973, p. 33 n.64), Buchheim (1989). aUTOS" 6 Foss, , ,~ o aVTOV 
Mullach. Cassin's reading, who accepts the Mss' 6 aUTOS", is 
consistent with her view that the anonymous author of MXG is 
actually giving the exact words of G. ("l'identite du sens n'est 
garantie que par l'identite litterale" p.447); this is wishful thinking, 
not a realistic approach. 
Anonymous' criticism (979a34-b19) 
The following paragraphs are devoted by the author oflv1XG to his 
criticism of the 'original demonstration' of Gorgias. The arguments 
of this criticism will not be discussed in detail here; this is the task 
of those who are concerned with the assessment of MXG as such 
and for the identification of its author. In any case, the text of:VlXG 
as a contribution to the history of ideas has thoroughly been 
e.xamined by A1ansfeld (1990, pp.200-237) and Cassin (1980), to 
whom the reader is referred (Kerferd 1955 has also commented on 
the criticism). Notes on te'Ctual problems are unavoidable due to the 
obscurity of the text (in some cases at least). 
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cl<MO~> d1TOOe~KvUOVaW Diels (followed by Untersteiner 1962, 
p.60), KU' d.<VTu>TTooe£Kvvu~ Kassel, KUi. U<UTCls- a.>:rooe£Kvvu~V 
Kerferd. The reading of R must clearly be accepted. G.'s 'original 
proof has already been distinguished by the author of lvfXG from 
the second part (979a14 Ta. ETEPO~<; eLp7]J1-EvU). Moreover TOUTO at 
979a37 is referring to the corrupted 77 Eunv ... p.7J av, which is an 
economical modification of something clearly attributable to G. (see 
Cook-Wilson 1892, pp.441-2, and Kerferd 1955, p.9). Kerferd's 
addition of UVTO<; is unnecessary, since the reference of the verb 
a.1TOOeLKVVULV to the 'original proof is clear. OLaAEI'ETUL: 
'examines', is also sound (oLe.AEyxeTUL Wandland, adopted by 
Untersteiner, a concomitant of the cl<MO~> a.1Tooe~KvuovULV). 
eL TO I.I.-TJ QV ea-n.v: Anonymous' starting point is the same as that of 
G.; he has remarked that G. singled out 'not being' and that he 
argued that it is. So at this point he merely repeats the hypothesis of 
the first argument of the 'original proof (cp. 979a25). 
i1 a.1TAWS ebrE'i.v <av> eLT( <i1 > KUL ea-n.v 01.l.0LOV I.I.-TJ QV: 
Untersteiner's reading is preferable, as it is economical and closer to 
the reading of the Mss. (77 €anv a.1T.AWs- el1TeLv eL7] KUI. €unv eL7] KUi. 
€anv op.owv p.7J av R, 7} c1.1T.Aws- eL1TeLV eL7] KUI. €unv op.owv p.7J av 
L); €UT~V c1.1TAWs- el1TeLv KUI. €UTLV op.oiws- p.7J QV Foss, 77 €UT~V c1.1TAclJ<; 
eL1TeLV 77 KUi. €UTLV op.oiws- p.7J av Diels, 7] €UTLV c1.1TAWs- eL1TeLV 7} -V 
KUi. €UTLV 7"0 p.7J QV p.7J QV Apelt (see Cassin 1980); Mansfeld reads 
it d1TAWs- eL1TeLV <av> eL7] <iJ> KUI. €UTLV op.oiws- p.7J av. The whole 
period is a perileptic repetition of G. 's own distinction: if we say 
that 'not-being' is, then this 'is' can either denote 'existence' 
(ci1TAWs-) or a 'similarity', such as 'Y is Y' (op.owv). 
TOUTO OE. ... a.vci.J'KT(: 7"OUTO refers to the preceding sentences; 
Anonymous is stating that G.'s double function of 'is' as either 
existential or 'similar' (as 'being is being' in the 'original proof) is 
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not feasible (for <paLVeTaI. and a.vaYK7] see Mansfeld 1990, p.220 n. 
80,81). 
<.OO-rrepEI. O"O~V OV'TOI.V: 'as if there were two things'; Kerferd 
suggested that OVTOI.V shows that it is not 'being' and 'not-being' 
that are considered, but 'things in general' (1955, p.ll), for 'not-
being' "would not be included under OVTOI.V". However, Anonymous 
is here assuming that we have a pair of two opposite things in a 
general manner. It is not necessary then to think that he is strictly 
referring either to 'things' (according to Kerferd meaning the 
'phenomenal world') or to 'beings' (namely, the fundamental 
philosophical entities). The meaning is made clear from the 
following sentences. 
TO\) Il-EV ••• Il-EV Il--TJ Ov: L, OOKOUVTOS" R (Apelt, Newiger (1973) pA2, 
Cassin (1980), p. 455, 461-3, Mansfeld (1990), p.220); Anonymous 
establishes a distinction which is distorted by the OOKOUVTOS" (though 
the latter is a lectio difficilior). He says: 'as if there were two things, 
the one being, the other not-being', then the only thing we can say is 
that the first is true (TO I-'-€V €(rn, 'veridical' meaning of the verb 'to 
be', note the opposed OUK a.A:rIlES") and the second is not true (it is 
false), that is 'not-being' is not in an absolute way (cp. that the 
statement TO 1-'-7] QV €(rnv is eaVl-'-aawv and merely conceded at the 
context of 979b7). So, the first argument of the criticism is that the 
existential use of the verb to be does not equally pertain to both 
'being' and 'not-being'. 'Not-being' then is not, unless one feels 
free to use the verb 'to be' equivocally. 
01.0. n ... Il--TJ elval.; Anonymous is picking up the announcement of 
the 'original proof and is making it a question. 
TO OE UIl-<!>W 11 TO ETepOV OUK €O"T1.V; TO oe L, TO R; T£ oe UI-'-<PW <7]> 
OUeETepOV OUK eanv Diels, TL oe al-'-<pw ouoe eaT€pOV OUK eanv 
Kassel, TO 0' al-'-<pw aue' €TepaV aUK eanv Cook-Wilson, TO oe 
al-'-<pw, aue' ETepov, aUK eanv; Calogero 1932, p.174 n. 2 (and 
Untersteiner 1962 p.63), TO oe UI-'-<pw 7] TO €TepOV aUK eanv; 
Kerferd (1955 p.12 n.1, cpo PI. Hipp.Min.376a3), TO oe al-'-<pw 
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OVO€'TEPOV , OUK €crnv Cassin (1980, pp.455, 463-4) nioE ap.<pw 
OV8€'TEPOV OUK €a'TLV, Mansfeld (1990, p.221 n.82). I follow Kerferd 
('TO E'TEpOV could also be 8a'TEpOV as we have 8a'TEpa at 979a21) 
because the second member of the disjunction - corresponding to p.iJ 
ElvaL - is answered by the argument of Anonymous (introduced by 
yap) which is identical with the first argument of the 'original 
proof. 
ouoev 'Ya.p <~'T"'iov> ••• 'TOU ELva!.: Foss's Trr'TOV IS necessary; 
Anonymous by repeating the basis of the first argument of the 
'original proof is reaching the opposite conclusion. Having posed 
the rhetorical question' ... why is it not either the one or the other' 
[sc. Elva!. /p.iJ Elva!.] he is saying that according to G. (cfnJuLv) 'what 
is not (or 'not-being') is no less than what is ('being')'. 
Consequently, the second alternative (E'TEPOV) is - as of course and 
by definition 'what is' is (979a39). 
El oe KaL..'Tl{) [!-L-I]] OV'T1.: p.iJ does not belong in the text because it 
makes the statement senseless. 
E'T1.: where 'not-being' is only if predicated of itself, 'being' is by 
definition. So as to infer that 'Y is' (Y being 'not being' and X 
being 'being') we have to say 'Y is Y', whereas for X we can either 
say 'X is X' or 'X is' in an absolute manner. 
El oe ••• ciA1'\8es: the opposite of the preceding argument; "if we 
concede that not being is" in an absolute manner, that is if we 
attribute to it an exclusive property of 'being'. 
(<.Os 0-1] 8au!-LcLO'1.ov ••• ): explicitly shows that the hypothesis Ei 
8E ... d.)..7]fJe~ is hardly accepted even as a concession. 
1TO'iEpOV <Ou>: Kerferd's addition is accepted, because it ascertains 
that the only logical answer is a:rraV'Ta ElvaL. 
'iouvavnov: the opposite of what G. inferred (ovoev for which 
Anonymous has 1TcLV'Ta; see Mansfeld 1990, p.222). 
OUK civa.')'K1'\ ••• I-L-I] ELva!.: Anonymous picks up the hypothesis of the 
second argument of the 'original proof and claims that 'if not-being 
is, it does not follow that being is not' which is the exact opposite of 
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the conclusion of that argument (TO elval.. hai. OUK ian. TO 
avnKEip.EVOV 979a30) . 
<n>: Foss; it specifies that there would be 'something', namely 'not 
being'. 
KaTa. TOV EK€LVOU AOYOV: Anonymous is using afresh an argument of 
G. which he has already rejected (see Mansfeld 1990, p.222 and 
n.84). 
€L oe TaUTOV ea'nv: a straightforward attack upon the third and final 
argument of the 'original proof. 
cLVTl.<TTpetjsaVTl.: self-referentially Anonymous makes his tactic in this 
argument explicit. G. said (tlls yap KaKEivo~ AeYEL) that 'if not-being 
is the same (muTov) as being, both being and not-being are not' (a 
slightly modified version of that at 979a33-35, in the respect that 
here it is not explicitly said that 'being' is not, because it is the same 
as 'not-being' which is not) and he concluded: warE ou8ev earl.v 
('nothing is'; cpo 979a33 OUK av EL'T] ou8€v); Anonymous from the 
same argument feels free to infer the opposite position ("all things 
are"). Anonymous reaches the opposite conclusion because he takes 
the conclusion of the first argument of the 'original proof ("not-
being is") and he asserts that 'being' is. 
The antinomies (979b20-980a8) 
The second portion of the argumentation supporting the first general 
thesis of G. is developed with the process of arguments from 
antinomy; in order to show that ou8ev EarLV (a recurring phrase in 
this second part) G. expresses the hypothesis 'if it is' (and by this 
something we still mean the fundamental theoretical constructions 
of the philosophers, oaol. 7TEPI. TlVV QVTWV A.€YOVTE~ TavaVTia 
979a15) and he then attributes to this 'something' properties such as 
generated / ungenerated, one / many, in motion / at rest. In its tum, 
now, the examination of each one of those properties proves to be 
fruitless so that in all the cases the hypothesis el 8€ Earl.V is 
rejected. Schematically 'Ex' (x is) presupposes either Fx or -Fx, Yx 
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or -Yx, where F / -F, Y / -Y ... represent the antithetical pairs of 
properties attributed to Ov-ra.. The examination of each one leads to 
the conclusion that the hypothesis 'x is' is not feasible, so as to have 
-Ex. 
Two interrelated questions arise here: who is the target of G. and 
why is this argumentation from antinomies necessary at all? G. has 
already proved his first thesis (auK €illa.L auo€lI) in the 'original 
demonstration', but now it seems that this was not enough. Should 
we then draw the conclusion that this second portion is redundant? 
We have already argued that the ONB is a general attack on the 
theoretical constructions of the philosophers. It should be added 
now - and this is perhaps more important - that the ONB (especially 
its first part) can hardly be interpreted us a direct attack upon the 
premises of the philosopher as such. In other words, the reading of 
the ONB which aims at the identification of the philosophers 
criticised by G. - which undoubtedly is a part of our task - is, in my 
view, heading for failure (see Introduction). 
G. is not putting forward a new theory of his own, in preparation 
for whose announcement he has first to do away with the theories of 
others. On the contrary he is an intellectual who knows that every 
single idea acquires substance by the means of linguistic utterance 
and that from the moment that something is argued in words the 
relentless activity of interpretation is about to be launched. What is 
questioned thus is not primarily the feasibility of the one or the other 
theory, but the possibility of establishing a firm theoretical system 
which aspires to partake of the absolute truth. Under this prism the 
part of the ONB under discussion is not - strictly speaking -
intended to knock over any theory of any philosopher. By using the 
argumentative tools of philosophers, G. is seeking to show that once 
one is using arguments to support one's thesis, one should be aware 
that there are other arguments (sometimes one' s own) that can 
potentially be used against oneself. Hence the pastiche of a variety 
of contradictory (and incompatible) attributes, whose common 
denominator is that they have been used inflexibly by various 
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philosophers, as the only true properties of their theories. Each one 
of these (indispensable) properties contradicts another and so 
infinitely. 
Putting those programmatic remarks aside we may now pass 
to the presentation of the arguments as a whole (see also notes on 
979al4-18). 
L The first notional pair is that of ungenerated / generated. The 
argumentation against those alternatives (A, B) is the following: 
(A) , , , " KG.l. El.. JJ.EV aYEVTfTOV, 
if it is ungenerated 
he takes it to be unlimited in accordance with the premises of 
Melissos. 
b) Tb 0' G.7TELPOV OUK Civ elva£. 7TOV. OUT€ yap €V aUT(/), OUT Ci v EV 
, " '!' KaL TO €V <po 
But the unlimited is nowhere. For it is neither in itself nor in 
anything else; in this case it would have been two or more, the one 
that in which it is and the other that which is in it. 
c) p:TJoaf-LOu OE OV ouoEv elvaL KaTa TOV TOU ZfJvwvos 1\6yov 7TepL ri]s 
xwpas. 
But if it is nowhere it is nothing according to the argument of Zenon 
about space. 
The arguments about generated follow a transitional phrase which 
announces them: 
Transition: d.yev7JTov f-LEv ovv OLa TaUT' OUK €IvaL, 
For those reasons it is not ungenerated, 
(B) OU f-L-TJV ouoe y€v6{1:€vov. y€veaeat. youv OUOEV Civ OUT g 
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b) 
allTOS' OUT' EK yjr allTOS'. 
as it is not generated either; for nothing can be generated 
either from being or from not-being. 
because if being underwent such a radical change, it would 
not be being anymore 
" "," ~" ",., V \ 
wo-rrep y €~ Kat. TO /.L!{ Oll y€VO~TO, OUK av €Tl. €~7J Y::!l 
as, if not-being came into being, it would not be not-being 
anymore. 
Transition: OUQE JL7]v ovo' EK </.Li,> aVToS' all y€lI€a8a~' 
But of course nothing can be generated from not-
being 
for if not-being is not, 
nothing can be generated from nothing; 
b') el .1' €(J"TLlI (aJ) TO JLTJ Oll, 
but again if not-being is, 
ot.' a:TT€p ovo' EK TOU OllTOS', 
for the reasons that hold for being 
for those very reasons it cannot be generated from not-
being. 
Some remarks: the argument against non-YElI€a~S' proceeds in 
three steps; the first one (after the hypothetical 'if it is ungenerated') 
is assuming (rather arbitrarily by appealing to the authority of 
Melissos) that if it is ungenerated it is unlimited; from that (b) G. 
deduces that it is nowhere, that is it cannot be spatially (?) located. 
And he concludes, on the ground of the argument of Zenon that if it 
is nowhere it is nothing or it is not at all. 
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The argument about generated is developed in two parrs of 
arguments (a-b, a' -b'). The second step of the first pair (b) presents a 
problem: if the meaning is 'if not-being changed into being', then it 
is a repetition of b' - where we have the discussion of the coming-
to-be from not-being - with the additional problem that in the 
context of b' we are told that nothing can be generated from not-
being, for the same reasons (that is because it would change into 
something different) as for being. The problem has been located by 
Cook-Wilson 1892, p.445-6) and Kerferd (1955), who posits a 
reasonabe explanation. He says that the "comparison between the 
.two halves [sc. a, bJ is simply formal". So from (b), we may 
generally infer that if a thing changes into something else then it 
ceases to be the same as that which was before. Generally the 
second members of each pair (b, b') remind us of ajoketo be found 
in Plato's Euthydemus 283d: Kleinias' friends, we are told, wish to 
make him wise, and to make him not be an dJ-Lue7js-; that is they wish 
to make him what he is not, and to make him not be what he is now. 
But what kind of friends are those who want to kill their friend 
(E~ol\wMvUL )? 
II. After a general conclusion pertaining to the first argument as a 
whole, the author of MXG gives the second pair, namely one / many. 
The text is preserved in an extremely bad condition, full of lacunae 
and our knowledge about it is practically dependent upon the 
version of Sextus. The first phrases are announcing the notional 
pair, and in the usual way, it is reported that 'if it is' it is either one 
or many, because if it is neither of them then there is nothing. 1 
1 Apelt has ventured a constitutio of the text, which runs as follows: Kai EV jl-ev 
OUK elvaL, on dawfLa'Tov o.v eL7J 'TO cOs d),:rf1bk €v, Ka80 ouoev €XOV jl-€ye8os. a 
dvaLpei:a8aL 'T41 'TOU Z7jvwvos .:\6yqJ. EVos oe jl-7] DV'TOS OUO' Civ OAWS elvaL ouoev. 
jl-7] ydp DV'TOS' EVos jl-7Joe 1To'\'\d elvaL oei:v. eL oe jl-frre €v, </npf.v, jl-frre 1To,\,\d 
€anv, ouoev €anv. 
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It is impossible to make any comments on this part of the 
argumentation, to which we shall tum in the discussion of the 
version of Sextus (we may point out here that Sextus devotes a very 
short part of his version to this pair). 
ill. Finally, the argument against motion (or / and) change - which 
does not appear in the general 'doxographical' preamble at 979al4-
18 (see notes ad. loc.) - is given briefly. It has plausibly been argued 
that it followed an argument against rest (see Untersteiner 1954, 
p.149 and p. 170 n. 56 with further references; more recently 
Sicking 1964, pp.225-47 and in Classen 1976, 384-407, Newiger 
1973, pp.87ff., Mansfeld 1990, p.263 and Palmer 1999, p.115 and 
n.35; contra Gigon (1936), p.200. Loenen 1959, pp.191-2 thinks that 
the argument about motion is a "personal addition on the part of the 
Anonymous"). But even the argument against motion (or / and 
change) that Anonymous decided to include in his text is obscure. 
All we can say is that it seems that G. makes a distinction between 
motion as qualitative change and locomotion. The two arguments 
that we have are the following: 
ouo' cl.V KLV7]8fjVU£ CP7]ULV ouoev' 
Nothing, he says, would move; 
a) hypothesis el y?J.p KLv7]8e[7], 
because if it moved [sc.changed] 
argument [,,] OtiK cl.V J:r' eL7] WaUVTWS" €Xav, 
it would not have been in the same state any more, 
conclusion d..U?J. TO p.Ev <ov> OUK QV €L7], TO 8' aUK QV yeyovos- eL7J. 
but, instead, on the one hand being would be not-being, and 
not-being would acquire existence. 
b) hypothesis ETr.. 0' el KLVeLTaL KU~ €V < QV> [.L€TucpepeTaL, 
Futhermore, if it moves and being one it changes place, 
argument 
338 
being, not being continuous any more, is divided and it is not 
at the same place. 
conclusion Wa-r' €l -rrav7IJ KLV€LTaL. -rrav7IJ (n'{jP7JTaL. 
so that if it moves everywhere it is divided everywhere. 
The argument is rather difficult to follow. First of all as it stands 
it does not show - as the other arguments do - that 'if something is' 
it cannot be in motion, so as to conclude that it is not at alL On the 
contrary it is prima facie a refutation of motion as such. For this 
reason Foss suggested that at the beginning (and at the end) of the 
argumentation there must be a lacuna. But suggesting a lacuna is an 
easy way to pass over the problem. The problem is, I am inclined to 
believe, linked to the fact that the author of MXG records only the 
argument against motion and not that against rest. Discerning the 
reasons why he did not include the latter in his version is based on 
speculation (for possible answers see Palmer 1999, p.1l5 n.35), but 
it is certain that in each case G. argued from both alternatives (see 
Sicking 1964, p. 230). The argument from antinomy is peculiar to 
G. and the systematic abolition of each argument occurs both in the 
first pair (A) as it is given by Anonymous and in Sextus' version (on 
whom we rely exclusively for the argument about one / many). 
Moreover, the argument against ayev7JTov implies an argument 
against rest, for both were attributed to the 'being' by the Eleatic 
monism. And it is also worth our attention that the pair at rest / in 
motion is found (among others) in Plato's Parmenides (the affinities 
of this part of ONE with this dialogue are discussed below). 
It is thus possible (though not certain) that a general 
announcement containing the hypothesis El 0' ean n ... followed by 
the two alternatives (at rest, in motion) was placed before the 
discussion of the first alternative (see Newiger 1973, p. 80). The 
phrase ovo ' av KwrfHjvaL frlaLv ovoev is thus introducing the second 
(that is the preserved) alternative about motion, which is similar to 
the transitional phrase with which Anonymous is passes from the 
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discussion about ungenerated to that about generated (au fJ-7Jv ouaE: 
yevofJ-evov) - with the conspicuous difference that here we are 
lacking an implicit reference to the (not preserved) preceding 
argument. 
A striking similarity should also be noticed; we have seen that 
the argument against yeveaL~ had as its starting point the hypothesis 
that if something were generated from either being or not being then 
both of them would have changed into something else - they would 
have been transformed into something different from that which 
they were before this change took place 979b27 -9. The first 
argument against motion (III a, which· deals with motion in a 
qualitative sense, namely change) obviously proceeds in a similar 
manner (cp. I a-b; at b, stating generally that if not being came to 
being then it would not be not-being anymore, occurs the verb 
yeVOtTO, and in the context of 980a3 we have the form yeyov(k eL7J. 
See Migliori 1973, pp.44-5). 
This similarity has an interesting implication for it is not unique. 
The second argument against change is based on the idea of the 
divisibility of being, which - as is attested by Sextus 73 - has also 
been used in the argument against One. Another similarity with 
Parmenides 139a2-b3 is also telling; at that point, Parmenides 
argues that the One (for which we have 'being' in G.) is at rest 
(aK£v7JTOv), on the basis that it is not "either in itself or in something 
else" (139a6-7) From this it is inferred that what is never in the 
same thing is neither in motion nor at rest, so that TO fEV a.pa ... OUTe 
EaT7JKEV OUTe KLVE"2-raL. But this argument (though more subtle in 
Plato) has already been used as a step of the reasoning against the 
possibility that being is ayev7JTov. 
If my suggestions are so far correct, it may be tempting to think 
(thOUgh for the lack of the original argumentation of G. we cannot 
prove) that the notional pair [at rest Jlin motion is not traced in the 
summary of Anonymous (979al4-18), because the arguments 
against each individual member of it were identical with or very 
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similar to those already employed in the preceding pairs. It may of 
course be objected that seeking to restore the text on the basis of 
what is said in Plato is methodologically unsound, but these 
similarities certainly merit our attention (they have undoubtedly 
drawn the attention of several scholars); that they do not reproduce 
the original argumentation is more than clear. 
We may now pass to a short examination of the similarities 
between this part of MXG and Plato's Pannenides. These 
similarities have been shown and explained by Mansfeld (1990, 
pp.112-18) and Palmer (1990, pp.111-7). The latter claims that ''the 
Pannenides's First Deduction suggests that Plato saw reflections of 
G.'s anti-Parmenidean stance in more parts of his treatise than the 
personal demonstration" (p.117). Apart from the verbal similarities 
or the discernible relation between separate arguments, both G., and 
Plato, in his first deduction, are proceeding with arguments from 
antinomy. Plato's argumentation is more exhaustive and a 
considerable amount of the pairs used in Pannenides do not appear 
in G.. However, it is interesting that the structure of the 
argumentation is methodologically identical. 
We may better turn to Pannenides and try to investigate these 
similarities, by examining the arguments in the order that they 
appear in MXG: 
1. The argument against dy€v7JTov begins with the assumption that if 
being is ungenerated, then according to the axiom of Melissos it is 
unlimited, and we also remember that Anonymous has already told 
us (979a23) that in the second portion of the first thesis G. proceeds 
in the manner of Melissos and Zenon. The same thing is asserted at 
the beginning of the first deduction of Pannenides at 137d7. This 
axiom is also traced at MXG 974a10 (30 B 5,9DK) d£owv oE QV 
o y~yvoJ.L€VOV €T'€A.€VT'7]O'€ 1TOT'€ (cp. Mansfeld 1990, p.114). G. then 
infers that if it unlimited it is nowhere, because it is not in itself or in 
anything else, for it would thus be two or more (the argument in 
Sextus is rather different and it corresponds better to Plato, see 
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Mansfeld 1990, p.116). In Parmenides now we are told (for the full 
argument see Palmer 1999, p.1l4) that the One being cannot be 
either (a) in itself or (b) in anything else. Both points are argued in 
Plato (whereas in MXG it is arbitrarily stated that it would either be 
in itself or in something else). From (b) Plato infers that the One, 
being contained in itself, would no longer be one but two, which 
corresponds to the argument of G., as is given by Anonymous. 
Argument (a), which is absent in MXG is given (not in every detail 
similar to Plato's) by Sextus (69). The third step, namely that ifit is 
nowhere, it is not at all, based - according to Anonymous - on 
Zenon is not attested in this context of Parmenides (see Mansfeld 
1990, 116-17), and what is more we do not possess his argument 
that if it is not somewhere it is nothing. We may then assume that 
our only source about this argument is Anonymous (although he 
does not record the argumentation by which Zenon reached this 
conclusion). But a famous passage from Timaeus 52B (cited by 
Kahn 1966, p.263, with more examples and a convmcmg 
discussion), puts forward the idea that if 721 OV is to be at all, it must 
be located in some place, and it seems that this idea was a locus 
communis of Greek thought. It is worth our attention that in 
Parmenides 138b5-6, when Parmenides says that the One is not 
placed anywhere - neither in itself nor in anything else - Aristotle 
(his interlocutor) simply retorts aUK €eYnv. It is safer then to 
conclude with Mansfeld (1990, p.1l7) that where G. merely 
elaborated a common assumption, "all Anonymous did was to swap 
this elaboration for a learned but utterly uneloquent reference to 
Zenon". 
II. The argument about one / many has been preserved in a poor 
condition and we cannot draw out much from it with any certainty. 
III. The argument against motion does not present the same degree of 
similarity. Plato's account (138b-139a) is more elaborate, as he 
clearly distinguishes between two distinct types of KLV7JeYLS: change 
and motion; motion is further divided into 'turning round in a circle' 
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or 'changing place'. The only argument in MXG which has affinities 
with Plato is that of change (dMOLW(TLS-; cpo 11zt.181b-c). At 
Parmenides 138c1-3 we read: dMoWVp,EvOV De ro EV eavrov 
dDvvarov 7TOV EV en EIva~, for which in iv[XG we are told that if it 
were changed it would not longer be in the same condition, and the 
same holds for not-being (see Palmer 1999, p.115-6). 
We may now move on to the identification of the philosophers 
attacked by G .. The target of G. is a general one, including both 
monists and pluralists (see Untersteiner 1954, p.147 and p.169 
n.36). In particular, it is clear that the Eleatics are still his target, 
because both the properties of non-generated and One are pointed at 
(along with that of rest, which does not occur either in MXG or 
Sextus). It should also be noticed that the first alternative of each 
pair is a refuted Eleatic attribute of Being (this is a further reason to 
suppose that the argument against rest preceded the argument 
against motion; on motion and Parmenides see Kirk-Stokes 1960 
answered by Bicknell 1967). Empedocles as a pluralist may have 
been included in the criticism of many, but the problems with 
interpreting his ideas concerning YEVECTLS- and death do not allow us 
to reach safe conclusions (see Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983, p.292; 
Empedoc1es accepted that his rhizomata are coming into being). His 
ideas about motion must have also been targeted by G. (see 
Mansfeld 1990, p.61). Mansfeld (1990, pp.61-2) adduces "physicist 
monists who did not deny Y€VE(J'LS- and motion" and Heraclitus's 
theory about motion. 
979b20-34 
!.LETa. ••• 4nloiv: after the 'original proof'; this is the beginning of the 
second portion of the argumentation supporting the first general 
thesis of G .. 
EL OE ~O"Tl.v: it introduces the first antithetical pair; the same phrase 
is used at the beginning of the second argument about one / many 
and it must have been originally used in his own text. It has already 
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been used at the introduction of Anonymous (979a19). Calogero 
(1932 p.177 n.l) saw a relation of 7TC1.VTa at the end of the criticism 
with the EL ea·nv (in the light of his belief that the point at stake 
throughout ONB is the phenomenal world). Anonymous has clearly 
finished his criticism and he passes to the argumentation already 
promised at the beginning of his version (see Migliori 1973, p.36 
n.38). 
a:YEvrrT"OV 11 YEVO\.l-EVOV: 'generated or ungenerated'; in the 
introduction, Anonymous presented this pair in the plural, and the 
following step will be the hypothesis that if it is unlimited it will 
then be two or more. Mansfeld (1990, p,1l3) argued that either an 
argument against "ageneticist pluralists such as Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras has been suppressed" ... or that "an argument against the 
ageneticist monists .. .implied one against the ageneticist pluralists" 
and he concluded that we cannot be certain of either of these two 
possibilities. 
a:rrELpOV ••• Aa\.l-~a.VEL: cpo DKJOB2,3,4 and MXG 974a9-10 (on the 
source used by Anonymous see Mansfeld 1990, p.114, Newiger 
1973, p.58-9); Nestle (1922, p.555) has imputed to G. that he is 
obfuscating spatial and temporal unlimited (as Aristotle does with 
Melissos, cpo Soph. E1.l67b13ff (=30A10DK) OLOV 0 MEAf.aa-ov 
AOY0S", on a7TELpov TO a.7TUV, Aa{3wv TO fLEV a.7Tav dyev7JTov (€K yap 
fL7J OVTOS" ouoEv av Y€Vea8uL), TO OE Y€VOfL€VOV eg dpx77S" Y€Vea8uL €l 
fL7J ovv yeyovEv, dpx:iJv OUK ggELV TO 7Tav, WG'T' G.7T€LPOV OUK dvaYK7J 
DE TOVTO G'VfL{3af.v€LV" ou yap el TO Y€VOfL€VOV a.7Tav dpx:iJv EX€L, KaL 
EL n dpx:iJv EX€L yeyov€v; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983, p.394, 
Guthrie 1969, vol. ii, p.109; various interpretations summarised by 
Reale 1970, pp.73-86). Untersteiner has argued that 'eternity and 
infinity' are inextricably interwoven (1954, p.l69 n.38, with further 
references and Migliori 1973, p.38). 
OUO 11 'TT'AELW: d7T€Lpw Bonitz; but the reading of the Mss is 
preferable. Anonymous has already used this formula (MXG 
974all-12) and his is now repeating it (see Cassin 1980, pp.488-9, 
Mansfeld 1990, p.124 n.54). The 'two' then refers to the case in 
344 
which 'being' would have been in itself (Sextus 70 ovo YEVf]a€'ra~ 
TO QV, see Kerferd 1955, pp.20-1). 
\-L1loa\-LOU ••• €LVaL: see the general introduction on this part of MXG 
above. 
KaTa TOV ••• xwpas: 29A24DK; but this is not a proof that what is 
nowhere is not at all. It is an argument showing that the place of DV 
is not, because it is in an other place, which again must be in another 
place and so on ad infinitum (cp. ouoev yap KWAvEL EV aAAcp /-Lev 
Mansfeld 1990, p.116-1 7). 
OLa TaUTa: for the reasons given in the previous paragraph. 
oiJoE y€v6\-L€vov: the other leg which will prove to be equally 
untenable. 
oilT' E~ OVTos ••• Wtl OVTOS: the argumentation is twofold; the two 
alternatives are presented in the order in which they will be 
discussed. 
\-L€Ta1T~<TOL: if it undergoes a change (cp. Melissos 30B8, ch.6: 7]v oe 
/ \,' , "\ , ~, , , \ I 1'1 l' /-LETa7TEOT/, TO /-LEV EOV a7TWI\ETO, TO OE OUK EOV yEyOVEV. OUTWS OUV, 
, \\'" ~ '1' i' ''') EL 7TOl\l\a E~7], To~aUTa XP7] E(,va~, 0 OV 7TEp TO OV •••• 
TO Ov: L, R; aUTO Apelt (follwed by Untersteiner); but the meaning 
is clear without the emendation. 
W<rrrEp y' €L..e'l.1l \-L-Tt Ov: it is an analogical formula; the full 
discussion of the change of 'not-being' is found in the following 
paragraph (see Kerferd 1955, p.22 and Introductory notes above). 
€t \-LEV yap \-L-Tt E<TTL: the first alternative; G. is flirting again with the 
ambiguities of the 'original proof. 
a~: it makes the necessary contrast to the preceding possibility; the 
'existence' of 'not-being' has been 'shown' in the first argument of 
the' original proof. 
~lL' a.1TEp ... TOU OVTOS: namely because it would change into 
something else (cp. OUK av ET' Er7], 979b29). 
€t O~V \-LEv ••• Kat €LVaL: explicitly shows the method of 
argumentation from antinomies; if something is, it IS necessary 
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(dvaYK7]) for it to be either generated or ungenerated. Since both 
alternatives are impossible (<dovvaTa>, following the reading of 
Newiger), it is impossible for it to be at all. 
979b35-980al 
€TI. €.L.1T€f> ••• 4krnv: <n, 7]> Foss (followed by Skouteropoulos), but it 
is not necessary; the comma should be placed after ean and a semi 
colon at the end of the sentence. 
€.t oe .•• ouoev av €.L.'TJ: again the argumentation from antinomy is 
made clear. 
Z"vwvos: cp.29 B2 DK. 
980a2-8 
tOOau-rws Ei)(ov: it would not be the same, it would alter. The 
argument echoes that against yEV€aIS. _ 
The Second Thesis (980alO-19) 
The second major thesis of the ONB is related to problems of 
cognition and reception of 'reality'; G. has now completed the 
arguments supporting the first major thesis, which is now conceded, 
so as to pass to the second one. Even if something is, it is 
unknowable. 
The account gIVen by the author of MXG is conspicuously 
compressed, and the textual difficulties make our understanding of it 
extremely difficult. The transitions from the one argument to the 
other are obscure, if they exist at all, and any reconstruction of the 
contents of the argumentation of G. is in many cases necessarily 
dependent upon the several interpretational approaches of its 
modem students. It is also unavoidable to conclude that G.'s 
original argumentation must have been more detailed, since 
Anonymous' account of it is disproportionally shorter than that of 
the other two major theses. 
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Let us attempt to present the arguments as they are given in 
MXG: the starting point (?) (a lacuna precedes this point, see notes 
ad. loc.) is that (1) the objects of thought must be (Mansfeld 1990, 
p.103, has plausibly argued that in this second thesis "the verb 'to 
be' is used both in the veridical and in the referential sense"), and 
that not-being, since it is not, cannot be the object of thought. This 
must have been the follow-up to something stated in the portion of 
the text which has not survived. From this it is inferred that the 
possibility of false statements must be excluded (and this is directly 
attributed to G.: <p7]uLv), so that one may justifiably hold that there 
are chariots competing in the middle of the ocean (the example 
occurs in Sextus also, and it must have originally been used by G.). 
Why is that? Because all those things would have been - that is they 
would have been the case, they would have been true (7Tcl.Vra yap av 
mvra eL7]). (2) Now, things seen and things heard (that is the 
objects of vision and the objects of hearing) are (true), because each 
one of them is conceived. But exactly as things we see (are not, i.e. 
are not true), in an analogous way things that we see are no more 
true than things thought. Because as in the first case many people 
may see the same things, in the second many people may think of 
the same things, but it is unclear which of them are true (7ToLa De 
raA7]8fj, aD7]Aov). (3) So that even if things are, they are unknown to 
us. 
The structure of the argumentation has been interpreted in 
various ways. Untersteiner thought that it is a tripartite argument, 
moving from philosophical doctrines (the first part of 1) to poetical 
creations, and finally to sense-perceptions. The last stage is further 
divided by him (he actually follows Levi, see Untersteiner 1954, 
p.155) into thought including sense-perception and the opposite of 
it, that is sense-perception distinguished from thought. I am not 
inclined to agree with such a formal division, which seeks to 
establish relations between this second major argument of G. and 
particular human activities; in the case of the 'poetical creations', 
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for instance, the identification of the image of chariots racing on the 
sea with Prometheus 129-30 (see Untersteiner 1954, p.171 n.71) 
does not offer a firm ground supporting the idea that G. really had it 
in his mind. 
A more auspicious interpretation is given by Mansfeld, who 
divides the argument into two steps; in the first one (in which he 
includes the sentences KaL yap 'To. 0pw/1-Eva ••• avTlvv) he saw echoes 
of the Protagorean doctrine homo mensura, whereas in the second 
he took it to be heavily reformulated in a Pyrrhonist way (he 
describes it as a "Pyrrhonist ring", 1990, p.264, though the ring is 
created by his adding of a word in the text; see notes on text ad 
loc.). The interpretation of Mansfeld (the same, basically, holds for 
Migliori 1973, p.63 n.llO) has the advantage that it does not 
presuppose a drastic emendation of the text, as does the one 
proposed by Newiger (1973, p.141) who thinks that the argument 
about the subjectivity of different opinions should (apart from 
980a26-17) also be placed in 979a15, that is in the context of the 
passage discussing the relations between thought and sense-
perception. 
Some points should be made about the first argument (1); it 
follows a lacuna and it mainly says that a possibility of false 
statements does not exist. If I think of chariots racing in the middle 
of the sea, then the truth of my thought cannot be obj ected to on the 
basis of an absolute truth which dictates that chariots cannot race in 
the sea. We have already argued that similarities with poetical texts 
do not support much the view that G. is referring to the truth of 
poetical activity (as Untersteiner thought; see supra). Is it then an 
example, which in virtue of its oddness is adduced to support a 
refutation of the thesis that what is thought of must be the case? In 
other words should we infer (a) that things perceived do not 
necessarily partake of truth, or on the contrary (b) that since a thing 
is perceived, it is true for the person who perceives it - and probably 
not true for a person who does not perceive it? Sextus, to name an 
ancient reader of G., prefers (a) (see 79; the same view is taken by 
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Newiger 1973, p. 137 and Sicking 1964, p.338); Mansfeld on the 
contrary prefers (b), in the light of Protagorean echoes, as he was 
the first sophist to put forward the idea of non-contradiction (1990, 
pp.104-6; see also Pepe 1985, p.503). Palmer has shed fresh light on 
the issue by comparing a passage from Euthydemus 286c, where the 
principle of non-contradiction is perhaps attributed to the Eleatics 
(palmer 1999, p.128 n.17). G.'s a7TUVTa OEL TeL CPPOVOVJ1-EVU EivUL 
reminds us of Pannenides' TO yap aUTO VO€LV €G"TLv -rE Ka~ eivaL 
and it might have been the case that a modification of this dictum 
fitting the purposes of the second major thesis of ONB had 
originally been employed. However, we must be cautious because 
we do not possess G.' s own argumentation, and as Palmer suggests 
"even if it [sc. our evidence for the original arguments of Gorgias 
and Prodicus] were better, it might still be unclear whether anything 
like an 'interpretation' of Pannenides lies behind their 
appropriations" . 
Taking sides ill such an intricate subject is unWIse; G. had 
probably argued in a more dialectical way than the version of MXG 
allows us to discern (see Palmer 1999, p.258). It may, however, be 
possible to reach a tentative conclusion on the basis of a Gorgian 
dictum preserved in Proklos (=fr.26): TO J1-EV EivUL dCPUVE:; J1-7] 'TUXOV 
TOU oOKELV, TO OE oOKELV daOEVE:; J1-7] 'TUXOV TOU ElvuL. This is a 
Protean formulation, for in virtue of its prophetic wording it can be 
interpreted in various ways; but for our present needs it is 
illuminating because, if it is originally Gorgianic, it shows that in 
G.'s mind reality (or truth) and thought have a mutually 
complementary relation, so that seeking to assert that G. is either 
refuting or supporting the possibility of falsehood is pointless. In 
Palmer's words (1999, p.258) "One should note that although 
Gorgias is prepared to employ an argument against the possibility of 
falsehood, the fact that it might have been embedded in this type of 
dialectical structure makes it unclear whether he felt himself 
committed to the thesis". The question may then be left open. 
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We may now pass to the second argument; its compressed form 
has given rise to a number of interpretations and consequently 
drastic emendations, which I find unnecessary. I consider that this 
second argument (2) can be read along the lines of the attack on the 
Presocratic philosophy and that it could have been put forward by 
G. himself (and I follow thus Buchheim, whose emendations are 
confined to merely linguistic points that do not effect the meaning of 
the text). Lloyd (1971, pp. 121-2) in what he names "typical 
controversies in the pre-Platonic period" includes 'reason' and 
'sensation' as two means by which knowledge is attained (though he 
concedes that they "do not involve pairs of opposite terms"; for a 
brief and learned discussion on the relation of the senses to common 
sense in Presocratic philosophy see Kirk (1961). 
This controversy - too complicated to be presented here in every 
detail, especially with regard to its relation to the several 
philosophical systems as such - has a very interesting implication, 
relevant to the argument employed by G .. My line of interpretation 
is that in this second major division of ONB G. attempts to make the 
most of this epistemological divergence between reason and 
sensation. This possibility is strengthened if we realise that the most 
fervent supporter of "thought" - with tantalising influences on the 
development of philosophy - was Parmenides, who accepted 
'reason' (AoyoS) as the only vehicle through which man can reach 
knowledge, and who repugnantly refuted the senses (cp.B 7.4,SB 
vw~av aaKO~OV o~~a Ka~ ~Eaaav dKOV~V / Ka~ yAwaaav, KpLva~ 
OE AOYCP ~OAV07]P~V EAEYXOV ... ). The same holds for Melissos 
(30B8.SDK; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983, pp.398-400) who 
maintained that we perceive things OUK opews, and partly for 
'obscure' Heraclitus who seems to say that senses are not of much 
use for men with 'vulgar soul' (fiap{3apovs if;vxas; the word soul 
represents here a rational function of man; see Kahn 1979, pp.l06-
7). 
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Philosophers after Parmenides did not readily accept this anti-
sensational dogmatism; Empedocles accepted the senses on the 
condition that men will learn through his teaching to use them 
efficiently (31B2,3DK; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983, pp.284-5, 
Guthrie 1969, vol. ii, pp.138-9). We may add the Atomists and 
especially Demokritos (B 11 DK) who held that knowledge through 
oLavow is genuine (yv7]aL7]), whereas the one through senses is 
'obscure' (aKorL7]), and he thus seems not to exclude sense-
perception. More examples could be added here, but what has 
already been said, with the addition of Protagorean relativism, is 
enough to show that this is what G. inherited from earlier 
philosophers. 
I take it thus that G. in this second argument supporting his 
second major thesis proceeds once more with an argumentation 
from antinomies. The one pole of his antithetical pair (knowledge 
through rationalistic approaches) is guaranteed by the special target 
of his 'original proof: Parmenides and the Eleatics; the other pole 
(knowledge through senses) is a neutralisation of theories 
'legalising' sense-perception under conditions. Their common 
denominator is that both fail to furnish knowledge, or that - in the 
phrasing of MXG - things perceived by the senses (represented by 
vision, a 0pWf.LEV) are no more true (ovoev f.Lat,t,ov) than things 
thought (a Owvoovf.LE8a). Why is that? Because as in the first case 
many people may see these (or the same) things, in the second many 
people may think these things (or the same things). Things seen by 
some people may conflict with things thought by other people, so 
that no firm knowledge can be established, on the basis of a 
relativism which applies both to perceptions and intellectual 
activity. Epistemological certainties about lines and methods of 
inquiry of truth have been overturned (as ontological certainties had 
been disparaged in the first major thesis). 
980a9-19 
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MYEL <,.a.~,.a.S> ••• EtVa.L: I follow Buchheim; Untersteiner (following 
Gercke and followed by Migliori 1973, pp.64-S) prints MYE~[V] 
Cl.7raTUV and he does not accept the existence of a lacuna, because he 
thinks that the absence of a phrase of transition indicating the 
passage to the second major thesis stresses "the close dialectical 
relationship between the theme of the first part and that of the 
second" (19S4,p.171 n.66); the argument is weak, because such a 
phrase marks the passage from the second major thesis to the third, 
which are related more closely (980a20). Hence he proposes 
a7TaTuv, which he includes in the conclusion of the first major thesis 
(the ontological one) on the basis that it is chiefly of gnoseological 
interest (1961, p.69). The point is far too pressed; throughout this 
part of MXG Anonymous makes the announcement of a new theme 
clear (cp. 979a23, 979a33, 979a20, 980a20, 980b17; note that this 
second argument in Sextus' version is formally introduced in the 
form of a concession 77). yap thus does not denote the transition 
from the first major thesis to the second, but rather a follow-up from 
something missing. Cook-Wilson, in order to make the text clearer, 
suggested that the phrase <el. TO OV cPPOVEI,Ta~> should be added 
either before a7TaVTa or after Elva~, and the second suggestion has 
been reluctantly followed by Newiger (1973, p.12S). The whole 
point has ingeniously been discussed by Palmer (1999, p.2S7-8). He 
proposes an "exempli gratia reconstruction" of what must have been 
in the lacuna, which fits the text ad sententiam. a) El DE Kat- ear~v 
cP7Ja~v ayvW<J"TOV elva~ b) El yap Tel. cPPOVOVf.LEVa OUK earLV QVTa, TO 
OV OU cPPOVEI,Ta~ c) Ei D' OVTWS, TO OV ayvW<J"TOV Ear[v d) en DE El. 
Tel. cPPOVOVf.LEva ear~v QVTa, TO OV OU cPPOVEI,TaL. The first addition 
makes the transition clear (analogous transitions had been proposed 
by Foss <elva~ ayvW<J"Ta 7TaVTa>; see also Apelt in Cook-Wilson). 
(b) he takes from Sextus (77,78), (c) is inferred from (b) and (d) is 
opposed to (b), followed by the a7TaVTa DEI,V yap ... This 
interpretation has I think the advantage of corresponding to G.'s 
common practice of putting forward antinomical arguments (see 
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Introductory notes also). (d) directly contrasts to (b) in a formulation 
reminiscent of the arguments of the first major thesis. 
TCLiJ-rCL: 'thoughts of this kind'; TaVT7J Apelt, but it is not necessary, 
for it refers generally to the example of chariots. 
,'\ '\,,, 0;:, 'e '\ \ ' /!! \ \' , '" ~ , CLIV\ WO""TTEp ••• Ol.CLVOOU!-LE CL: a/\/\ "'UT~ 'TTO/\/\O~ Ta aVTa opuxn, Ta 
OpWJ.LEva eanv,> OVTW y' ovoev J.LaAAov ... , Newiger 1973, p.141. But 
such an emendation is redundant (for the meaning of the phrase see 
Introductory notes). The criterion of intersubjective truth, that is of 
relative personal truth, is not necessary here, since the point at stake 
is that earlier philosophers' suggested methods of inquiry, reason 
(Parmenides and the Eleatics) or (rational and creative) use of the 
senses - as a quasi-antithetical pair - do not guarantee access to any 
kind of absolute knowledge. One may feel the need to object that 
both senses and thought are presented by G. as means by which 
men acquire knowledge in Pal. (23 for the senses, 35 for thought); 
but this is a text of a different nature, and I propose that 
comparisons between the ONB with any other text of G. should be 
made if and only if they concern argumentative patterns, or 
strategies of reasoning. This is why I do not agree in every respect 
with Mansfeld's analysis of this second argument, for which he 
largely relies upon Palamedes. The same scholar (1990, p.224 and 
n.90) maintains that the formulation is a Pyrrhonist ring, and he thus 
prints: aAA' Wa'TTEP ovoev J.LaAAOv [TO. CPPOVOVJ.LEvaJ <7]> a OpWJ.LEV 
eanv, OVTW <y' ovoev> J.LaAAOv a OpWJ.LEV 7] <Cl.> OLavoouJ.LE8a. But it 
is the word CPPOVOuJ.LEVa that makes the ring; without it there is 
simply an analogy of the truth of vision (representing the senses) to 
the truth of vision as compared to the truth of thought. 
TO otiv !-LaAAOV ~ ••• CL TOLa.8' ern: the meaning is clear with 
Mansfeld's (1990, p.224 and n.91) <Ta TO~6.>O' 7] <T>o. TO~6.0', 
who changes TO to TL (with Apelt). I propose a modification of this 
reading, which I think makes the passage to the next sentence 
smoother - the question introduced with TL is hardly answered by it 
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- and which brings out the antithesis more clearly: T<d.> ovv JLUAAOV 
< '>~ , " < >' I~" I TOLa a 7] T a TOLaa E(rn; 
The Third Thesis (980a20-bl6) 
The third major thesis of G. develops with the problematic of 
language. It is conceded now that knowledge is possible (though it 
has just been shown that it is impossible), and the new argument is 
introduced encapsulated in a question: "how can one make things 
clear (or communicate them) to another?" The answer is that this is 
impossible, for reasons developed in this third part and summarised 
at the very end of Anonymous' account on G. (980b18-19), namely 
because a) things are not AOYOL, and b) because no one understands 
the same thing as other persons. This perileptic reproduction of the 
arguments brings out the dual form of the (extremely interesting and 
in some cases very similar to modem) argumentation concerning 
language in this third thesis: language is discussed a) in its 
properties of signification, which implies an investigation of how it 
is (not) possible to refer to objects of the world, and b) in its 
function in inter-human communication, which implies an 
investigation of how it is (not) possible for one (the sender) to 
transmit new information to someone else (the receiver), and this 
information to acquire in the mind of the latter an identical meaning 
with the one that existed in the mind of the former. I consider that 
this descriptive model (provided by MXG) is economical and that 
the constituent arguments are embraced by it. 
The argumentation may now be presented, and a discussion of it 
will follow later. The arguments run as follows: 
Ai. If things are knowable, how would one, he [sc. G.] asks, make 
them clear to another? How would one, he [sc. G.] asks make clear 
what one has seen by the means of logos? Or how would this be 
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made clear to the hearer, who has not seen it? For, exactly as vision 
does not recognize utterances, in the same manner hearing does not 
hear co lours, but utterances; and the speaker does speak, but he does 
not speak a colour or a thing. 
ii. And that which one does not understand [personally], how is one 
going to understand it from someone else through words or any 
other sign that is different from the object, unless by vision if it is a 
colour, or by hearing it if it is a sound? For, truly, the speaker does 
not speak a sound, nor a colour, but logos; so that it is not possible 
to think of a colour, but to see it, nor [to think of] a sound, but to 
hear it. 
B i. But even if it is possible to have knowledge of a thing and to 
speak this knowledge, how will the hearer understand the same 
thing? For it is not possible for the same thing to be in many 
different people; in this case a thing which is one would be two. 
ii. But even if, he says, it were in many and still the same, there is 
nothing preventing it from appearing different to them, since they 
themselves are not the same even when they are in the same state; 
for if they were in the same state, they would be one, not two. 
iii. And it seems that the same person does not perceive similar 
things at the same time, but some [things] by his hearing and other 
[things] by his vision, in a different manner now and in the past. So 
that hardly could one perceive the same thing as another. 
I have divided the argument into two sets (A, B), corresponding to 
those given in the summary at 980b18-19 (see above). (A) is the one 
concerning problems of signification and reference, and (B) is 
pertinent to material that I included under the heading of inter-
human communication. This does not of course mean that problems 
of communication are excluded from (A), for the third thesis as a 
whole basically discusses communication. My point is that (A) is a 
discussion of communication from the perspective of problems of 
signification, to the extent that here logos is examined as a medium 
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expected to enable men to refer to the world, whereas (B) moves to 
a discussion which is marked by the elevation of the participants to 
a detenninant factor, by examining the role of personal differences 
in the transmission of a message and the possibilities for it to be 
decoded by the receiver in a way that will secure its identity with the 
message as it was originally encoded by the sender. The same 
division is made, basically, by Mourelatos (1982, p.223), who labels 
our (A) as 'KUT1l'YOPLK~ e~a'Tj' and (B) as 'e~O"'T] LOeUTllS TUUT6T'TjTUS'. 
The two groups of arguments should now be examined separately. 
The first part (i) merely says that the object of vision (which a 
subject has perceived, and is about to communicate to someone else) 
cannot be rendered in words, because vision does not perceive 
cp86yyous and in the same manner hearing does not perceive colours, 
but cp86yyous. It is important to discern that this first argument 
focuses primarily on the sender, the person who encodes a message 
linguistically. This is shown by the phrase 'and the speaker does 
speak (KUt. My€~ a Mywv), but he does not speak a colour or a 
thing'. So, at this point the issue at stake is the impossibility of the 
receiver's understanding of what he/she is told because of the 
inherent problems of logos as a medium; because, although vocal 
utterances are sounds (and G. does not rule out the possibility of 
perception of sounds through hearing: ry dK07} ... d'\'\d. cp86yyous 
980b2), they differ from other types of sounds in the respect that 
they purport to carry meaning, which entails that their role is to refer 
to objects (and properties such as xpwfLU) of our world. But language 
is not the things that it denotes, the objects of the real world. The 
names of things do not bring out the reality of the objects they 
signify, names and objects are onto logically different. A word is not 
its referent. 
The second argument (ii) extends the problematic of the first one 
(though Mansfeld 1990, p.123 n.40 thinks that it repeats what has 
already been said; contra Newiger 1973, pp.153-4, followed by 
Kerferd 1982, p.219). The point made now is that one cannot 
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perceive in one's mind what one is told by someone else, unless one 
has personal experience of it. If it is a colour one must see the 
colour, if it is a sound one must hear the sound. This means that if 
one should at any cost try to communicate something to anyone 
else, one should not do it by using a representational system such as 
language. One should rather present colours and reproduce sounds 
(so that we might think that G. did not have any difficulties with 
onomatopoeic words). From this point it is inferred that it is 
impossible to think of a colour or of a sound; the only alternative is 
to see or hear them respectively. Now, it is interesting that the 
perceptions of hearing (notice that the word for the object of hearing 
is no longer cf;eoyyos, but ifiocf;os, that is a mere, non-verbal sound, 
which can include a noise; for further literature see Mansfeld 1990, 
p.123 n. 40, who does not accept the distinction; recently Wardy 
1996 p.19) and seeing are substituted here for both language (AOYCP 
7} <rTJ/Le£cp TLVI. ETepcp) and thought (DLUVOELaBUL). Why is that? 
Because language and thought are interwoven, in the respect that 
when communicating an experience (or information) through words, 
the receiver's mind should necessarily receive it in a form of a 
representation which clearly is not equivalent to the experience or 
the object itself What lies behind this combination is, I think, the 
refutation of a conceptual theory of meaning. Mourelatos 1982, 
p.228, saw traces of this theory in 980bl5-6; he is using the term 
"ideational theory of meaning", but I follow Lyons' linguistic 
terminology (Lyons 1977, pp.109-144). Probably, what G. has in 
mind is the idea that when one is referring to a colour, say blue, then 
it may be assumed that the listener 'visualises' in his mind this 
colour (the idea expressed by the word DWVOELaBUL). But G. answers 
that this is not feasible, because colours and sounds cannot be the 
objects of concept, but the objects of vision and hearing respectively 
(Kerferd saw in DwvOELaBUL the introduction of a "gulf. .. between 
sense experiences and words" 1982, p.220). 
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The next set of arguments presents a model of communication; 
that G. is moving from an examination of .:toyos as a medium to a 
system which implies speech is shown in the very beginning of this 
part (980b8), where it is conceded that one may be able to utter a 
verbal message (My€~v). For argument's sake what has been refuted 
is tentatively accepted as a possibility. The type of communication 
which G. has in mind is one in which a sender encodes a message in 
logof and a receiver decodes it so as to perceive exactly the same 
(notice the repetition of Tal.}'-o, TO aUTO) message (so correctly 
Wardy 1996, pp.19-20; Mourelatos (1982 p.223) names G.'s thesis 
as one of "Loe.anl TaUTO'T1"\Ta", see supra). One may see more clearly 
what G. conceives of as human communication (I do not necessarily 
imply that he commits himself to this conception) if one compares 
the words of one of the most important connoisseurs of semantics of 
our days: "Under a fairly standard idealization of the process of 
communication, what the sender communicates ... and the 
information derived from the signal by the receiver. .. are assumed to 
be identical. But there are, in practice, frequent instances of 
misunderstanding; and we must allow for this theoretically" (Lyons 
1977, p.33). G.'s idealized demands of communication form the 
keystone of his refutation of it. 
The first argument (i) poses the problem that the hearer of a 
statement will not be able to have in mind exactly what the speaker 
has uttered. For in that case what he is saying will not be one thing 
any more, but two, which implies that what the hearer will perceive 
will necessarily be something different. The thought pattern of the 
one becoming two has been used at 979b24, in a different (anti-
Eleatic) context, and it is likely that it is here picked up (see 
Newiger 1973, p.156 and Kerferd 1982, p.220). The reverse of this 
argument is used in the following one. 
A point should be made here; in order to denote the message sent 
by the sender (or speaker) to the receiver I have already used the 
rather vague term 'statement'. What kind of meaning does this 
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'statement' carry? Does it refer to (a) an external object, let as say to 
a 'tree', or should we assume that it denotes (b) the 'concept' of a 
tree, existing in the mind of the speaker, who in that case hopes to 
impart it to the hearer's mind, so that the latter will have the same 
'concept' in his mind. This is a crucial point, and it has been 
answered by Mourelatos (1982, pp.224-5), who says that if we had 
(a) then 'the one' would not have been 'two' (as it is in the text) but 
three. This disclaimer entails that G. is here conceding a 
'conceptual' theory of meaning as well (since a theory of this type 
has - in my view - been refuted at Aii). 
In the second argument (ii), it is suggested that even if two 
people, as a result of their communication, had the same concept in 
their minds (that is if by any chance the two were one; Mourelatos 
1982, pp.225-6 is talking about "a.pL8!-LllTLK-T] Ta.UTOTllTa."), nothing 
stops us from assuming that this would not appear similar to them. 
This is explained by the fact that two different persons are not in 
every respect similar. Emotive parameters and the different 
backgrounds of the participants evidently creep into the 
argumentation, as these parameters have the property of maximizing 
the sUbjectivism of perception in virtue of a tactic based on the 
matter of the degree of similarity. 
The third (iii) argument reinforces the feasibility of the preceding 
one; in an informal way it may be reformulated: "if one man 
perceives at the same time different things through different senses, 
and in a different way now and in the past, imagine what happens 
with two different persons!" In this argument two phases are 
discernible (see Mourelatos 1982, p.226): a synchronic (EV r4) a.vr4) 
)(povq;) and a diachronic one (vvv r€ Ka.~ 7TaA.a.L OLa.</>opw~). 
In the first phase we are told that a man at the same time 
perceIves different things through different senses; this is an 
obvious observation, for a man who sees and hears a car passing by 
perceives the image of the car through his vision and the sound of 
the machine of the car through his hearing, so that the same person 
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is in a way necessarily divided, as far as the object of perception is 
concerned. Given that all this argument is employed so as to 
strengthen the difference between two persons, it can be interpreted 
very simply if we admit honestly that what is said at this point is a 
question that we put numerous times to ourselves, in the following 
manner: "How am I to believe that the way 1 see an object is 
exactly the same as the way the person standing beside me sees it?" 
Moreover, it may be a question of contradictions reSUlting from 
perceptions through different senses; my hearing makes me believe 
that a car is coming, though I cannot see it, because I am standing 
on a blind hill. Or it may be that a car according to my hearing is 
closer to me than my vision makes me believe. 
The diachronic phase poses the problem of interpretation 
resulting from the development of an individual. Because I perceive 
something now in a particular way, this does not mean that I always 
perceived it in the same way. And what is more I am not always 
able to remember how I perceived a particular thing in the past, 
because my memory (according to G.'s He/. 11) is a notoriously 
weak adviser of my soul. If one person is so divided, divided in the 
present and in the past, then two different (aAAqJ 980b 16) people are 
two people further divided, and the more the people are, the more 
the subdivisions will be. The overall result of this argumentation is 
clear: a subjectivism which excludes the identity of perceptions with 
objects of perception. 
The third and final major thesis of G. 's ONB is extremely 
interesting for two main reasons: a) it is one of the deplorably few 
sources of information on the Sophistical investigation of language. 
In his article on the ideas of the Sophists about language Classen 
(1959) concluded that G.' s (and the other philosophers ') interest in 
language was above all practical. Under the same prism, the interest 
in the theses put forward in this last part of ONB has been reduced 
simply to their pertinence to rhetorical practices. But it seems that 
G. had developed a more theoretically oriented speculation. 
However weak or even unattractive one may find his argumentation, 
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his remarks about the relation between words and objects, between 
words and concepts of objects are striking (one may compare 
Cratylus here). It is interesting that the archaic idea that names bring 
out the reality of the object they signify has been removed. One may 
compare here Heraclitus' frA8, where the name of the bow is taken 
to bring out the reality "of the unity between death and life" (Kahn 
1979, p.270 with more examples). The same feature can be found in 
Aiskhylos' Agamemnon 680ff., where the name of Helen brings out 
the reality of her notorious character (cp. Supp1.584ff. for L1l.Kll as 
L1L-OS K6-Pll). 
The same holds for G.'s remarks about human communication. 
The analysis of AOyoS" in ONB (along with the information that we 
possess about Protagoras and Prodicus) evinces that those involved 
in the Sophistic movement took a profound interest in language; and 
it is inappropriate to deny this interest on the basis that G. was 
obsessed with formulating dazzling arguments to meet the practical 
demands of persuasion. And the fact that these linguistic 
observations are integrated in an argumentation that supports 
"paradoxical" theses does not imply that they did not contribute to 
the development of the linguistic investigation. 
b) Some of the remarks that occur in the third part of ONB are 
amazingly pertinent to modem theories of language (see 
Mourelatos, 1982); several ideas used by G. have been issues of 
dispute both for ancient and modem philosophers, and it is for this 
reason that forthcoming histories of linguistic theory should, I think, 
reconsider the rationality of placing the origins of linguistic 
investigation with Plato and Aristotle. ONB clearly shows that 
language had been a pivotal philosophical subject before Plato; we 
shall hardly have a comprehensive history of linguistic 
investigation, unless we realize that Presocratic philosophy and 




€t 8E KUL..Ci.AA<t>; it announces the passage to the third and final part 
of ONB; knowledge is conceded and it is argued that it cannot be 
made clear through words to another. 
Wo-n-Ep 'Yo.p ••• aAAo. <\>86yyous: It has been suggested that the idea put 
here should be interpreted in accordance with Empedocles' theory 
of a-rroppoui (Gigon 1972, p. 110). Mourelatos has challenged this 
view on the basis that G.'s ideas are extremely paradoxical, so that 
if they are to be understood, they must be expressed in a plain 
manner, without reference to complicated ideas (Mourelatos 1982, 
p.224). It is possible that G. employs the common idea among some 
of the Presocratic philosophers (Empedocles is one of them) of the 
perception of the like from the like, without necessarily committing 
himdelf to the theory of a-rroppoaL 
UU'i6: for the Mss aiTEc., which does not seem to make any sense; it 
refers to the preceding sentence. 
<TT)\.I.€L<t>: "It is interesting to notice that language is probably now 
being widened to include its written form as well as its spoken 
form" (Kerferd 1982, p.219). Perhaps this is true, but it is even more 
interesting if G. refutes every possible available representational 
system of communication, where a sign stands for a meaning (see 
also Mansfeld 1990, p.123 n.34). 
<tJs6<\>ov aKoo>o-uS: with Diels; Cook-Wilson o/6<po~; it is difficult to 
decide because of the obscure neuter (xpwf-La); but the acc. provides 
the object of the participles. 
ou <tJs6<\>ov> AE.'Y€L <0 M>-ywv ou8E xpw\.I.u: oD MYEL 0 Mywv y' 0 
ElSE xpwf-La Newiger, Kerferd; the text is lacunose; the addition by 
Wilson (followed by Buchheim) is the counterpart of xpwf-La with 
which it appears in the final sentence of this argument. The reading 
proposed by Newiger 1973, p.153, oD MYEL 0 Mywv y' 0 ElSE 
xpwf-Lu fails to include the object of hearing as well, though it is 
closer to the obscure reading ofR. 
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ouo 'Yap av eL'll 'TO ev: An argument which reminds us of the one 
employed against the possibility of 70 OV being ungenerated 
(979b24). According to Kerferd (1982), it is an Eleatic argument 
applied to a non-Eleatic field. It may be safer to say that a thought 
pattern is here picked up, for the reverse of it can be traced in the 
fo llowing argument. 
Et 'Yap €V 'T0 a.tl'f'(~ ••• EtEV: A combination of the emendations by 
Cook-Wilson (El ya.p €V np ati70) and Apelt (Els av dAA), made by 
Newiger, followed by Buchheim. 
vUV 'TE Ka.1. 1Ta.Aa.L oLa.cj>6pws: cpo PI. Tht. 154a6-8 7L OE; aAAqJ 
dVepW1TqJ dp' OP.OLDV Ka.1. aOL cjJa.LVE7a.L onovv; EXELS 70V70 laxupws, 
7] 1TOAV p.aAAov on ouoE aol. aunp 7aU70V OLa. 70 P.7]O€1T07E oP.o£ws 
aU70V aEavnp EXELV. 
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Sextus Adv.Math.65-87 
Introduction and the first division (65-76) 
Sextus begins his account of ONB by presenting the three major 
theses (65); however, the 'doxographical' summary including main 
ideas of early philosophers is not traced here. On the contrary, 
Sextus passes straight away to the demonstration of the first thesis, 
namely that 'nothing is' (ovoev eunv 66). The arguments 
supporting this first thesis are further summarised and divided into 
the following: either a) being is, or b) not-being, or c) both being 
and not being. But neither being is, nor not-being, nor both being 
and not-being. It is clear that Sextus offers a tripartite division of the 
argumentation supporting the first thesis. But when we turn to the 
detailed discussion of the arguments Sextus does not follow the 
same order; instead of starting with the discussion of 'being', as it is 
announced in his brief summary, he starts with 'not-being', that is 
with (b), so that the order which we actually get in the body of the 
first part in Sextus is (b), (a) and (c). 
Another obvious point is that (c), that is 'both being and not-
being', forms a separate argument; but in Anonymous' account, this 
argument is embedded within the 'original proof, which seeks to 
establish that it is not either for 'being' or for 'not being'. In Sextus 
this argument is dealt with separately in 75-76, after the discussion 
of (a), which as Anonymous confirms followed the 'original proof 
of G .. The discussion of 'being' in Sextus is based solely on the 
antithetical pairs generated I ungenerated, one I many, so that the 
pair in motion I at rest tracked down in MXG is missing. Moreover, 
Sextus' version does not indicate the intertexts on which G. has 
based his criticism; the names of Zenon and Melissos are absent 
here. It should also be mentioned that the arguments supporting (b) 
in 67 are suppressed in Sextus, and although there are no serious 
textual problems here, Anonymous' textually problematic account 
in the 'original proof brings out the equivocal usage of 'being' on 
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the part ofG. more effectively (for a comparison of the two versions 
see Inroduction). 
We may now pass to a closer examination of the arguments of 
the first thesis. The argument against 'not-being' is twofold: in the 
first instance it is shown that 'not-being' is not to the degree that it 
is conceived of as 'not-being', and that it is to the degree that it is 
'not-being'. But it is absurd for something both to be and not to be. 
Conclusion: 'not-being' is not. This is a reformulation of the first 
argument of the 'original proof in MXG. The being of 'not-being' is 
taken again from the predicative use of the verb 'to be', as is shown 
by the phrase 7] O€ €un j-LTJ OV. The second proof runs as follows: if 
'not-being' is, 'being' is not, for these two are opposite to each 
other, and ifit is the case that 'not-being' is, the case for 'being' will 
be that it is not. But saying that 'being' is not is absurd, so that 'not-
being' is not. The point of this second argument is that if we 
concede existence to 'not-being', then we should accept the absurd 
consequence that 'being' is not, because of the fact that 'being' and 
'not-being' are mutually exclusive. The demonstration is again 
analogous with the one in MXG. 
In both arguments therefore the argumentation has as its starting 
point 'not-being' (see Kerferd 1955, p.18), that is the marked 
element of the antithetical pair consisting of the positive 'being' and 
the negative 'not-being' (see the introductory notes on the 'original 
proof). On the whole, the purpose of these two arguments is the 
denial of 'not-being'. 
After this very short discussion of 'not-being', Sextus passes to 
the demonstration of the arguments refuting the possibility of 
'being' . That the argumentation proceeds with contradictory 
properties attributed to OVTa is clear, and generally the structure of 
the arguments is similar to that in MXG 979b20-980a8. Sextus 
summarises the argumentation of the first pair: "if 'being' is, it must 
be either eternal (69-70), or generated (71) or both eternal and 
generated (72)"; but each one of these possibilities is invalid, so that 
'being' is not. Let us follow the thread of the arguments. 
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If 'being' is eternal (a£oLOv), it does not have a start (apX77v) 
which entails that it is infinite. But if it is infinite it is nowhere; for 
if it is anywhere it must be different from that which contains it, and 
in that case being would not be infinite, for it would be located in a 
container which is bigger than the contained. But there is nothing 
bigger than the infinite so that the infinite is nowhere. On the other 
hand it cannot be contained in itself, because that in which it is and 
that which is in it would be the same, so that 'being' would be two 
things: the location (767TOS) and body (awJLa). This is absurd, so that 
'being' is not self-contained. These two. sets of arguments support 
the view that 'being' is not eternal (notice that Mansfeld 1990, 
p.llS, claims that these two arguments, as they are represented in 
Sextus "correspond to both of Plato's arguments" at Parmenides 
138a-b; see above The antinomies). 
The second member of the pair is now examined (71): "'being' 
cannot be generated". Two alternatives are put forward: if 'being' 
has come into being, it is either from 'being' or from 'not-being'. 
Both possibilities are unfeasible: if it came into being from 'being', 
it has not come into being at all, but it existed before. That it has 
come into being from 'not-being' is impossible too, because nothing 
generates from 'not-being', as the latter does not partake of 
existence at all. In both cases 'being' is not generated. 
The possibility that 'being' is both eternal and generated is 
refuted on the basis that these notions are mutually exclusive, so that 
"if 'being' is eternal, it has not come into being, and if it has come 
into being, it is not eternal" (it is an argument from antinomies 
whose structure may be compared to the one in Pal. 26; see 
Introduction). 
The second pair is now introduced (Kat. (l,\AWS' 73): if it is it must 
be either one or many. The first alternative is divided further into 
four possibilities: if it is one it is a) either a quantity, or b) a 
continuum or c) a size or d) a body. But if it is one of those it is not 
one, for if it is (a), it will be divisible, if it is (b) it will be divisible, 
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if it is (c) it will not be indivisible, and if it is (d), it will have length 
and breadth and depth. Since it is absurd to claim that 'being' is 
none of those alternatives, being is not one. 
The second part of this argument concerning the possibility a 
plurality of beings is based on the assumption that many is created 
by putting together (aVveEa~s) single entities, so that if one of the 
constituent entities is destroyed the possibility of a plurality is 
destroyed as well. 
Up to this point Sextus has discussed the refutations of the 
possibility of either 'being' or 'not-being'; what follows is the 
refutation of both 'being' and 'not-being' (dJL4>07"Epa 75). Again we 
have two arguments, the first of which corresponds to the third one 
in the 'original proof in MXG (see Kerferd 1955, p.19, Migliori 
1973, p.59). It runs: If 'not-being' and 'being' are, in so far as their 
existence is concerned, 'not-being' will be identical with 'being'. 
For this reason neither of them is: for it has been agreed that 'not-
being' is not and it has been shown that 'being' is the same as 'not-
being'. 
A second argument (76) is put forward, which in Kerferd's 
(1955, p.19) words "rounds off' the first one; if 'being' is the same 
as 'not-being', it follows that it is impossible for both of them to be. 
If both are, they are not identical, and if they are identical, the 
possibility that both are is not feasible. This is another argument 
from antinomy. 
The reasoning in support of the first major thesis is summed up 
with a repetition of the three sets of arguments: if neither 'being', 
nor 'not-being' nor both of them are, then nothing is (OVSEV eanv), 
for no other alternative beyond those three can be conceived of. 
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The second division (77-82) 
The second thesis concedes the first; 'if anything is unknowable and 
unconceivable by human mind'. Sextus' representation of the 
second major thesis is twofold. In 77-80 Sextus formalises G.'s 
arguments in relation to the consequences of two hypotheses: a) 77-
78 objects of thought are not (or are not the case), b) 79-80 objects 
of thought are (or are the case). In 81-82 sense-perception is brought 
in, though this second part is conspicuously the product of drastic 
reformulation and embellishment on behalf of Sextus (in Loenen's 
words, the most fervent supporter of Sextus' version "he [sc. 
Sextus] must have been completely at a loss as to G.'s real 
meaning", p.194). 
The first hypothesis runs as follows: if objects of thought are not 
the case, then what is the case is not an object of thought (this is 
directly attributed to G., cp7]alv 0 Topy[as, and repeated in 78). This 
seems reasonable to Sextus (Kal Karel. A6yov), who is ready to 
embolden it with an example: exactly as, if objects of thought are 
white, it follows that white things are objects of thought, 
analogously, if it happens that objects of thought [are things that] 
are not the case, it is necessary that what is the case is not thought 
of. This passage is difficult to translate; more particularly, the 
phrase 'it follows that white things are objects of thought' (Kav 
UVf-L{3€{3f]K€L rotS A€VKOLS cppovEia8aL) has been taken to mean that 
'thought is a property of white things'. Kennedy (1972), for 
instance, translates "'being considered' would also have been a 
possible attribute of what is white", and Barnes "being thought of 
belongs to what is white" (Untersteiner 1954, p.l55 is even more 
explicit in using the word 'predicate'). But if my reading is correct, 
what is at stake here is not the possibility of predicating of 'thought' 
to 'whiteness'. What is at stake is the following analogy (I reverse it 
for clarity): 
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IF objects of thought are not the case: IF objects ofthought are 
white 
What is not the case is not thought of: White(s) are thought of 
If this, or something similar, is what Sextus means, Skouteropoulos' 
rendering (1991, p.190) is more attractive: ''rw:rL O'ITWS d.KPL~WS, UV 
IQ '" ~ '1 "\ I e 1 '''' I ~ CTUV€!-'ULV€ UU'I"U 'ITOU VOOU[.L€ VU €LVUL I\€UKU, U 1'J'I"UV LOLO'l"1'J'I"U 'l"WV 
Now, according to Sextus the argument 'if objects of thought are 
not the case, what is the case is not thought of is a valid and 
cohesive syllogism, on the basis that objects of thought are not 
[necessarily and always] the case, so that what is the case is not 
thought of. With the phrase 'it is clear that objects of thought are not 
the case' he announces and immediately passes to the second 
hypothesis. 
If obj ects of thought are the case, whatever is thought of is [true] 
- in whatsoever manner one conceives it. But this does not make 
sense. For, if one conceives of a man flying or chariots racing on the 
sea, this does not entail that it is the case that a man is flying or that 
chariots are racing on the sea. The hypothesis as it stands affords 
two readings: a) whatever is thought of (since it is thought of) is 
true, hence the impossibility of falsehood, or b) whatever is thought 
of is not true (since it is not validated by reality). Sextus (like some 
modem scholars, e.g. Kerferd 1981, p.97: "Gorgias is not accepting 
the view ... that it is not possible to say what is false"; see also my 
comments on MXG) obviously adopts the second reading: both the 
phrase O'IT€P €a'T~V d7TEfL<pULVOV and the examples which are here 
corroborating it point to this direction (especially if compared to the 
neutral and unbiased phrasing in MXG 980all). From this string it 
is thus inferred that objects of thought are not the case. 
Sextus establishes now a fresh argument (7Tpor; 'TOV'TOl.s), which is 
an argument from antinomy. The argument proceeds with the 
assumption that if obj ects of thought are [true] (in passing I should 
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mention that in Sextus' account of the second part of ONB OV is 
chiefly 'veridical'), what is not [true] cannot be thought of. But what 
is and what is not [true] contradict each other, so that if what is 
[true] is thought of, what is not [true] will not be thought of. The 
argument from antinomy brings about, according to Sextus, an 
absurdity: a score of things which are not [true] are conceived of 
(for instance the mythical monsters Skylla and Khimaira; if this 
example is originally Gorgianic or not has divided scholars: 
Calogero 1932, p.207, Gigon 1936, p.204 believe it is not; contra 
Untersteiner 1954, p.172 n.77). Accordingly, what is [true] is not 
conceived. 
The following argument (81) is - as I have already held - far 
from what G. must have maintained. Unfortunately, any accurate 
reading of the relation of sense-perceptions to the acquisition of 
knowledge should rely on the too lacunose MXG. Since the 
unreliability of Sextus' account of this issue should be demonstrated 
in comparison with Anonymous' one, in this context I shall confine 
myself to presenting it as it stands. Sextus proceeds with an analogy: 
exactly as things seen are called visible because we perceive them 
through vision and things heard bear this name because they are 
perceived through hearing, so that we do not rule out visible things 
because we do not hear them and things heard because we do not 
see them (each one of them should be distinguished on the basis of 
the same sense, and not of any other), in the same manner, even if 
objects of thought are not perceived through vision and heard 
through hearing, they are, for they are perceived through the 
appropriate criterion. So, if one thinks of chariots racing on the sea, 
even if one does not see them, one should accept that there are 
chariots racing on the sea. This is absurd. Consequently, what is 
[true] is not thought of nor perceived. That Sextus has missed the 
point is clear from the fact that his conclusion applies to OV (see 
Loenen p.195). What had to be shown was that if anything is it is 
unknowable (on O€ Kav ~ n 76). 
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The Third Division (83-86) 
The third major thesis concerning the incommunicability of an 
allegedly possessed knowledge is now introduced. As Kerferd has 
observed (1982, p.217) it is divided into two sets of arguments: the 
first (83-85 1.1) is a criticism of the one-to-one relation between 
thingsand their signifier, namely A-0Y0s-. The second set consists of 
two arguments, which in Kerferd's words: "are ... answers to 
possible objections to the main argument" (1982, p.217). 
The starting point of the first argument picks up what has already 
been said in connection with the second major thesis (81): objects of 
the external world are perceived through a sense which pertains to 
their nature. Visible things are perceived through vision, audible 
things are perceived through hearing. A wider spectrum of senses is 
now opened (Kat. KO~VWS- aLa87]Ta) , which goes beyond the 
paradigmatic use of hearing and, mainly, vision. If this is the case, 
how is it possible to communicate objects perceived through senses 
to others? The answer is given at the first line of 85, and it is a 
negative one: It is not possible. Why is that? Because A-oyos-, the 
medium through which we signify, is different from objects of the 
external world. And as it is impossible to hear something visible (or 
to see something heard), in the same way we cannot transform 
objects into words, for they are not words. In other words, the 
problem that emerges here is one of ontological order. Objects and 
A-0Y0s- are two distinct things, so that A-0Y0s- cannot represent. 
We may now consider the implications of this argument, which 
IS encapsulated in the formula OUK apa 'Tel OV'Ta J-L7]VVOf.LEV 'TO£S 
')TEA-as- dA-A-el A-oyov, os- €-repos- €an 'TWV tJ'1TOKE~f.L€VWV. If logos is 
different from objects, as it is, then would it be more efficient to use 
objects themselves? "I observed a cow passing by, whereupon I 
pointed to her, and expressed a desire to let me go and milk her. 
This had its effect; for he led me back into the house ... She gave me 
a large bowl full, of which I drank very heartily, and found myself 
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well refreshed" (J. Swift, Gullivers' Travels, Penguin, p.277). The 
hero is in the land of the Houyhnhnms and he does not speak their 
language. He observes a cow (in other words, a V7TOKE[/-LEVOV) and he 
expresses a desire (with body-language presumably) to milk her. 
The native understands his desire and he arranges for him to receive 
a large bowl of mille The hero who was desperate for a refreshment 
has now fulfilled his desire. Why then does the hero, in the 
following chapter, endeavour to learn their language, so as to relate 
his adventures to his master? If his adventures consist in a string of 
itemized perceptions which have never been experienced by the 
master, will the latter be able to follow the story? With some 
difficulty he does (in English!). 
Was G. unaware of the fact that elevated communication, or 
simply written language, unavoidably involves a degree of 
representation? It is unlikely. First, because the argument, as it 
stands, seeks to establish the incommunicability of knowledge, and 
so it is embedded in a negative, critical discourse; in short, there is 
not a positive theory of ,16yoS' to be tracked down in this context. 
Secondly, from a historical point of view what matters is mainly the 
valuable observation that there is no such a thing as a one-to-one 
relation between objects and words (see Introductory notes on 
MXG). 
There are two consequent arguments. The first one explores the 
relation of words with objects, and it defends the idea that external 
objects produce speech, and not vice versa. It is maintained that the 
external objects - those perceived by humans - lend '\6yoS' its 
substance, and Sextus exemplifies that by saying that it is the fact 
that we taste a soup that brings about a '\6yoS' corresponding to its 
quality, and the fact that we see a colour that produces an utterance 
concerning this particular colour. Conclusion: it is not '\6yoS' that 
indicates external objects, but external objects that give meaning to 
'\6yoS'. 
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In modem terms this is a pseudo-dilemma (any discussion 
concerning the origins of language falls outwith the scope of 
modem linguistic theory); the question "is it objects that validate 
the meaning of words or words that give meaning to obj ects" is a 
chicken-and-egg one. It is perhaps more interesting to see what lies 
behind this argument (if it is originally Gorgianic; see Untersteiner 
1954, p.174 n.98 with further literature). Kerferd (1982, p.218) 
holds: "Exactly what theory this implies about the origin of 
language for Gorgias we are not told". Nevertheless, it may be 
possible to construe its meaning if we consider its affinities (see 
Untersteiner 1954, p.174 n. 98, though I disagree with his 
conclusions) with the discussion of the fourth possible reason that 
made Helen follow Paris to Troy in the Encomium. In that context 
(15), we have a stimuli-response pattern. Objects of the external 
world - for the external appearance of which men should not be 
held responsible - invoke emotions within the soul, and lead to 
action. We may assume, though it cannot be proved, that in this 
context G. has the same pattern in mind. External objects stimulate 
men who produce a logos dependent on the nature of the stimulus. 
At any rate the priority goes to the stimuli, not to .\oyos. 
The following argument (86) runs: admittedly '\'oyos - like visible 
and audible things - has its own substance, which entails that it can 
signify objects of the external world. That this disclaimer is put 
forward as "a possible objection" (in Kerferd's words, 1982 p.218) 
is shown by the fact that it is followed by an argument objecting to 
it. This argument concedes (El yap KU£) that even if '\'oyos has its 
own substance (cp. Hei. 8, where '\'oyos is defined as an omnipotent 
ruler with a minute and invisible body), it differs from other objects 
perceived through different senses. So, even if we allow for an 
ontological independence of logos, the fact that it is perceived 
through a different channel infers that it fails to denote a score of 
objects (in the way that audible things cannot be grasped through 
vision and so on - Wa-rrEP oUDe €KELVa rTJv d'\''\'1j'\'wv 3t..aD7],\,o'i q;vULV). 
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The argument as it stands can be reformulated as follows: 
articulated (oral) .:\oyoS" makes use of sounds (cp. #Joyyor. MXG 
980b2). But speech is perceived through one opyavov and visible 
things through another. Consequently, most existing things cannot 
be conveyed through speech. 
This argument has an interesting implication. In He!. .:\oyoS" is 
presented to enter human beings in a mechanistic way; in Sextus' 
account .:\oyOf. are perceived through an unidentified opyavov. Are we 
to suppose that this opyavov is simply the sense of hearing, which 
allows men to perceive articulated speech? Is it possible that mental 
and cognitive processes of perceiving speech are hinted at as well? 
To what extent is this a Gorgianic argument? If the answer to the 
last question is to be positive, the lack of any grounds to give any 
positive answers to the other two questions does not much improve 
our knowledge of G. 's ideas on speech-perception, if they existed at 
all. It may merely be said that prima jacie the argument can be 
supported from a clear-cut distinction between hearing and the rest 
of the senses. But it is tempting to suppose that an exegesis of the 
differences in perception between sounds and articulated utterances 
was included as well. Nevertheless, for lack of conclusive evidence 




The passage provides us with an approach to colour which is 
ascribed by Plato to G. Still, it is hard to see how much of what is 
said here can safely be considered as a quotation from G., but we 
will not be far from truth if we claim that Meno is haunted by G. 's 
shadow. At the very beginning of the dialogue, Meno is presented as 
G.'s student, and when he later goes on to define 'virtue' (ciPE'T7]) he 
gives a definition which is explicitly said to be the fruit of both G.'s 
and Meno's knowledge about it (see fr.19). In that context, instead 
of defining 'virtue' in an absolute manner, Meno presents a 
relativistic definition of it: different attributes are ciPErr] for different 
kinds of people. It is vital, now, to realize that the present passage is 
the concomitant of Sokrates' dissatisfaction with this definition, 
because the consecutive definitions of shape and colour are an 
attempt to exemplify what a (or rather any) valid definition should 
look like. 
The present exemplification through colour has already been 
announced in what precedes it; at 74b Meno accepts that he is 
unable to locate one virtue which can be applied to everything (p.£av 
ciPEriJV Aa{3ELv Karel. 1Tavrwv) and at this Sokrates undertakes to ease 
the progress of the discussion by developing the definition of shape 
which has already been used as an example in passing (73e). At 75e 
Sokrates gives the first definition of colour: 'shape is that and only 
that among beings which is always followed by colour'. This Meno 
finds naive, because it is a definition which defines the unknown 
through the unknown (evidently, colour has not yet been defined). 
Sokrates then gives a second definition (76e): 'shape is the end 
(1T€pa~) of a solid thing (G"TEPEOV)'. No comment is made by Meno; 
he now urges Sokrates to do away with some unfinished business 
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and he thus asks him for a definition of colour: this brings us to the 
beginning of our fragment. 
Some explanation should be gIven now about the portion of 
Meno cited here. So far, editors of G. omit aM' E7TE~oav JLOL a-V 
rour' EL1T7JS ..• 1TC1.VV JL€V oJv xcipwm; I take the view that such an 
omission is unjustified for two main reasons. The first one is that it 
is closely related to the pivotal characterisation of Meno as 
uf3p~a-r-TJs-; Bluck comments: "Meno is not really arrogant, and 
Sokrates does not mean this seriously" (1961 note ad loc.). This 
may be so; the following lines, however,invite us to determine why 
Sokrates calls Meno an uf3PI-a-r-TJs-. This characterisation is partly 
justified by Sokrates by stressing that Meno demands from an old 
man a definition of a.PEn]; Meno promises to give his definition, but 
not before Sokrates gives his own one about colour. Sokrates is now 
introducing an explicitly erotic vocabulary; every effort is made to 
present Meno as a blaclanailer, who founds his tyrannical activity 
on his beauty. This decisively completes the presentation of Meno 
as uf3p!.a-r-TJs-. His attitude is hybristic exactly because he takes 
advantage of his beauty which, in a way, victimises Sokrates who is 
now compelled to indulge (see Dover 1989, pp.34ff., esp. p. 36). 
The second reason brings us closer to G. himself; Sokrates, 
according to the words that Plato puts in his mouth, seems to allude 
to the despotic nature of speech as it is presented by G. in He!., 
something which is perhaps cqrroborated by the love-wording of the 
speech (,101'05' and love are intenvoven in He!.). I would defend this 
thesis on the basis of the following arguments: a) rvpavvEuovrES' 
could be taken as an allusion to the definition of speech as ovvciaTTJS' 
in He!. 8 (the possibility that €V '101.S' ,1Oyo!.S', apart from 'in the 
discussions', can also take on the meaning 'through your speeches', 
cannot be excluded, and such a possibility further stresses a general 
reference to speech) and to the compelling power of love, to which 
attention is drawn here in an explicit manner. Moreover, the 
emphasis on speech is manifestly strengthened when Sokrates 
376 
alleges that Meno' s beauty would have been obvious even if 
someone had his face covered. Meno is literally becoming speech. 
b) The expression on E1/-Lt flrrwv TWV Ka.AWV may be a (sarcastic) 
reiteration of the discussion of the first reason in He!. 6 (see also 
19), where the word 1JO"O"wv and its opposite are dazzlingly repeated. 
c) It cannot be mere coincidence that what follows is a reply Ka.'T(1 
Topyia.v; the proposed reading of the lines preceding it - as an 
implied allusion to G.'s own theses - serves thus as a prelude to the 
definition of colour. 
OUK k8EAEI.S: a somewhat 'hypocritical' anxiety of Sokrates to hear 
the Gorgian definition of 'virtue'(cp. PI. Ion 541e OUO€ a.'T'Ta. €O"'TL 
~ , '?' ~ , 1"'6/) '-) Ta.UTa. 7TEpL wv OELlIOS' EL E €/\ELS' EL7TELV •••• 
Ka:..tt. r oP'YLa:v: a fa maniere de; Sokrates assumes that Meno, being 
familiar with G.'s tropes, will be in a position to comprehend more 
easily (and accept) the definition of colour. 
AE.'YE'T'E: G. and his followers, the representative of whom in this 
dialogue is Meno. 
d.'rroppoa.s ••• Ka:'T'a. 'EIL1rEOOKAEa:: 'effluences of beings ... following 
Empedocles'; Empedocles' theory about the function of the senses 
cannot fully be discussed here. As the next two questions uttered by 
Sokrates show, sense-perception was the result of the combined 
function of both the sense-organ and the object of perception. He 
accepted that some 7TOPOL existed through which the d7TOpp0a.£ 
(' effluences ') passed, and that for this reason a symmetry between 
them was necessary (cp. 31A86-89, B3, 84,89 DK; see Diels 1884, 
Wright 1981, pp.229-30). 
«a"UVES 0 'T'l. AE.'YW}}: Pindar 10Sa Snell-Mahler (= 94 Bowra, 121 
Turyn) addressed to Hiero; cpo PI. Phdr. 236d, Ar. Birds 945. 
EO"'T'LV 'Ya.p xpoa: ••• a.taB1,'T'os: at last Sokrates' gives the definition of 
colour; whether or not this is Empedocles' own definition as it was 
quoted by G. we cannot tell, especially due to the absence of direct 
evidence from G.'s own preserved texts. It is possible that although 
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he accurately conveys its content, at the same time he gives to it the 
form that would make it seem KaTeL Topyf.av. OX'TlIJ-0:rwv: in the 
margin of T XfYTliLa.TWV, accepted by Diels-Kranz and Unterseiner; 
Richards prefers aWf-La.TWV (cp. Alexander Aphrodosias comments on 
Aristotle's de sensu 24,9 Wendland). I accept most editors' reading 
because "possibly Plato wrote d7TOpp0-r, XPTJf-La.TWV, or possibly 
Empedodes talked about d7Toppoa£ of things, but Plato chose to 
speak of effluences ofaxTIf-LaTa because axfjiLa has been defined 
whereas XPfjiLa and aWiLa have not" (Bluck 1961, note ad loc.). Note 
the interesting coexistence of all the proposed readings at He!. 18. 
-rpa.')'I.K-T): much has been said about the meaning of this attribute and 
it seems to me that no definitive answer has or can be given (see 
Untersteiner 1961, p.75 with further literature; Bluck (1961a), 289-
95 summarises more views; see also Buchheim 1989, p.188-89). It 
seems to me that Bluck (1961a) is right in concluding that "-rpa.')'I.K" 
in our present context alludes ... to its [sc. the definition's] high-
flown language and to what Sokrates chooses to treat as its grandeur 
or profundity. These are the qualities that make it Gorgian, and at 
the same time cause Meno to admire it" (p.295). 
S 
For an interpretation of the fragment see Diels 1884, pp.361ff, 
where he puts forward the view that it comes from an unpreserved 
writing of G. on natural philosophy (see also Untersteiner 1961, 
p.76). 
Sa 
All the three passages offer examples of what is considered an 
unjustifiably grandiloquent style, which is explicitly pointed at by 
Hennogenes' r/roXP€UOVTaL (for r/roxpov see fr.15). The description of 
beasts as 'living tombs' is an image which regularly recurs both in 
ancient and modern literature. An interesting example is traced in 
Hdt. 1. 216: E7T€eLV De: yepwv yElI1]TaL. Ka.pTa, o[ 7TpOO'7]KEOVT€5 0' 
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I '8 I e I I < ,f, I ~ , " 'e 1TUVr€S" O'VV€I\ Ovr€S" UOU<TL fl-l.v .•• €'t'7]<TuvreS" oe ru Kpeu Ka.reUswvra.l.. 
I VOU<T<fJ 
T€A€v-n]O'-u.vra. OU Ka.Ta.<TLreovra.L llid y7j KPU1T1"OU<TL (cp. also 3. 38, 
99; the custom of the Massagetai is also described in Dissoi Logoi 
2.14). Latin literature provides us with some depictions of this 
undoubtedly macabre image; in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura 5. 993 
we read viva videns vivo sepelieri viscera busto (more instances in 
Meurig Davies 1949, p.73). It is also interesting that this image is a 
reversal of the image presented in the final words of the Epitaphios, 
. ~\ \. '8 I "'e I I r-' r I F l.e. (1.1\1\ a. uva.roS" OUK €V a. uva.rOLS" <TWfl-Q;<TL .,,1) OU ."wvrwv. or a 
similar image (birds eating bodies) in Greek literature Cpo Aiskh. 
Septem 1020-1, Soph. Antigone 1081 and Electra 1487f., and Eur. 
Ion 933. 
The characterisation of Xerxes as the 'Zeus of the Persians', 
which is attested by Longinus, is related by Russell (1964 note ad 
loc.) to Herodotos 7.56 where an Hellespontean man says: Jj Zeu, TL 
07] avopL elOOfl-€voS" IIep<T7J Kat. oVvof.La avrl. LiLOS" Sepg7]v eEfl-evoS" 
aVa<TTUTOV rr,v'EMaoa. 8eAeLS" 1TOL7]<TUL. But it can also be seen in the 
light of Isokrates' Panegyricus 151, where we are told that 
monarchy led the Persians to cowardice, and that they thus called 
their ruler oU£fl-wv, although he was a mortal man (cp. also Aiskh. 
Persae 80: l<To8eoS" cpliY;, of Xerxes, and OU£f.Lova. 642, ee0f.L7]<TTWP 654, 
We; edS" 711, l<To8eoS" 856, of Darius). 
(fr.6=Epitaphios) 
7 
The date of the speech remains uncertain (for some suggestions see 
Untersteiner 1961, p.85). According to Aristotle (who in this part of 
his Rhetoric presents an exemplified classification of the proems of 
epideictic speeches), G. in the prologue praised those who founded 
the 1TuvwUpeLS" (Lysias 33.1 praises Herakles for establishing the 
Olympic games), whereas Isokrates (Panegyricus 1) blames them 
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because they do not honour wisdom (a view which goes back to 
Xenophanes). An indication of its content is given in 8a (for an 
expanded version of the fragment see Buchheim 1989 with notes). 
For the ideal of Panhellenism in the fifth century see Flower 2000, 
esp.92-93. 
8 
The first to identify these two sentences with G.'s 'Oil.ufJ-1nK(k was 
Bemays (1853), and this identification made the word aL.VLYfJ-a 
('riddle') appear inappropriate; Bernays himself proposed aL.aLfJ-a, 
Diels 1TAiYfJ-a. Ferguson (1921), now, thought that aLvLYfJ-u gave 
good meaning, because he thought that G. intended to compare his 
ability to expand publicly on any sublect with Oedipus who was 
bold enough to face the Sphinx, and he also maintained that KaAEL 
fJ-EV ... ouvafJ-EVOv did not necessarily belong to G.'s oration. In my 
view the only part of the fragment that could safely be attributed to 
G. is this: ro dywvLap.a ~p.Wv .•. oLrrwv oe dpErwv oELraL, roA.p.7JS Kat. 
ao<p£a~. Clemens brings in G. at a point where he criticises 
philosophical investigation (especially that of the Epicureans and 
the Stoics), and TJJ.LWV, which probably existed in the quotation of 
G. ' s speech that Clemens had before him, is meant to distinguish 
this kind of (hedonistic as Clemens himself calls it) philosophical 
investigation from the one dictated by Christian faith, which reveals 
itself with alviYl-LaaL Kat. aufJ-f30AOL~ dAA:T]yop£aL~ rE aD Kat. 
fJ-EracPopaL~ (Stra.5. 4,21). 
Similarly, I think that Clemens's allusion to the herald at the 
Olympic games does not prove that the second sentence is a 
quotation from G.' s oration. This sentence has several Gorgian 
overtones, the most remarkabe one being the {3ouAOfJ-EVOV / 
ouvap.Evov antithesis. But the subject of the verb Ka/l.EL, speech 
(AOYOS) is not the Gorgian speech; Clemens's Stromateis is devoted 
to the Christian AOyOS. Buchheim (1989, p.l94) cites a parallel that 
clearly shows how superficial similarities may lead to 
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misinterpretation: Wa-rr€p Ka.~ Ell rOlS' Oi\V/k7TLa.KOLS dy&n Ka.AEL /kElI 
o K7Jpvg rov f30VA,6/k€1I0V, CI7"E<jJa.1I0L DE rov VLK-r7ua.vra.· rovrCfJ r41 
rp07TCfJ Ka.~ E7TL rijs aYVELa.s. 
It is possible that G. used dyWVLU/ka. to refer to his own speech, by 
bringing it closer to the situational context in which he delivered it. 
-rOA,/k7! and uo<jJLa. are both required for success in both his and the 
athletes' activities (note that YVW/k7! and PW/k7! are presented 
antithetically in the Epitaphios). By bringing himself close to the 
athletes, G. is probably the first to use the antagonistic enviroment 
of the games as a metaphor for rhetoric. 
8a 
The passage is cited only because it refers to the contents of G.' s 
speech, for Isokrates suggests that G. never got married (see 
Test. 18). The important information is that G.'s demand was for 
O/kOVOLa. between the Greek cities, not solely within them, and it 
should of course be associated with what is put forward in 5b; the 
Olympic games was an appropriate occasion for someone to 
propound the Panhellenic ideal, because it was a Panhellenic 
festival, which also entailed the suspension of any existing 
hostilities. 
9 
Nothing is mown about G.'s Pythian speech; Philostratos gives us 
the vague information that it was delivered at the altar of the temple 
of Apollo (d7TO rou {3W/kou 7JXTJU€lI, Test.I). 
10 
Again the content of the speech IS unknown; nevertheless, we 
should distinguish this speech from the Pythian and the Olympic in 
view of its locality. It is unclear if EYKW/kWlI Eis' HAeLovs is the title 
of the work, or a specific reference to the preamble of G.'s speech 
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(see Buchheim 1989, pp.195-6). It is likely, however, that his 
speech was a praise of the city of Elis. The possibility that G. 
delivered this speech before or after a visit to Olympia is feasible 
(see Untersteiner 1961, p. 87). The phrase 1TOI\LS €Uoa£J.Lwv is a 
recurring formula, for which see Ar. Birds 36. 
(frs.11,lla= Encomium of Helen, The Defence of Pal me des) 
12 
The symmetrical antithesis is typically Gorgian, so that there can be 
little doubt that Aristotle quotes G.'s own words; judging from the 
existing evidence he must have been the first to observe the 
importance of laughter in public speaking. The wording of the 
fragment does not make it clear whether yel\wn, as a weapon against 
the threatening seriousness of the opponent, means a) 'by laughing', 
or b) 'by arousing laughter in the audience'. Halliwell (1991), p.293 
accepts (b), and he contends that "the formulation strongly points to 
the use of rhetorically induced laughter not so much for a direct 
expression of animosity, as in order to win one's audience's amused 
approval and thus to manipUlate the mood of a public gathering in 
one's own favour". But (a) is no less plausible, especially in view of 
the Platonic passage (cp. infra), and perhaps more importantly, in 
view of the fact that laughter is so frequently an expression of 
enmity, a gesture which in some cases, as Greek literature 
abundantly brings out, can cause irrecoverable damage to the 
honour and the social status of a person. 
In Grg. 473e, a passage whose relevance to the Gorgian 
contention about the function of laughter has been accepted by 
Dodds (1959, note ad lac.), Sokrates delays his conclusion that 'the 
more miserable person is the one who escapes the danger and 
becomes a tyrant' to ask: 'What's up now, Polus? Do you laugh? Is 
this another kind of scrutiny [Jl\€yxov], that is laughing when one 
says something, instead of scrutinizing one's own words?' The 
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theatricality of the passage is overt; Plato invites us to imagine a 
smile on Polus' mouth which is enough to cut off Sokrates, who at 
this point in the dialogue says nothing hilarious. The emphasis 
placed on Polus' laughter, expressed with two staccato questions, 
elevates what could otherwise be an unimportant smile to a 
philosophical method of examination. There can be little doubt then 
that Plato, by drawing his readers' attention to Polus' laughter, 
intends them to construe it as a practice of his circle, and more 
particularly that of G. himself, whose view about the function of 
'laughter' must have been known to Plato. 
This passage acquires added significance in the light of what 
follows; Polus' reply to Sokrates is another question: "Do not you 
think that the falsity of your view has already been proved, when 
you maintain views that no one else maintains? You may ask 
anyone of those who are now present". Polus seems to wish to ripen 
the grapes of his 'laughter'; we may imagine that while he was 
laughing his head was turned to the members of the rest of the 
company and we may infer that it was with the intention of winning 
over his audience that Polus resorted to yeA.ws-. It is needless to say 
that Sokrates turns Polus down on the basis of his political 
inexperience, which, as he says, the year before, when he was 
elected a j30VA.€.vrys, provoked laughter in numerous people. 
The Platonic passage thus 'stages' the Gorgian theoretical advice, 
and it brings out the duality of its character: the laughter of G. 's 
'student' aspires to arouse his audience's laughter and in this way to 
predispose it against Sokrates who, of course, does not fail not to be 
victimized. This brings us to (b): we have seen that in Grg. 473e it is 
laughter itself that preponderates with further implications 
pertaining to the importance of the audience's laughter. But 
unfortunately (b) cannot be defended in connection to direct or 
indirect evidence about G .. Nevertheless, it is hard to see any reason 
why this dimension of the Gorgian dictum should be excluded; for 
the importance of arousing laughter in audiences clearly emerges 
from later oratorical practice (actually the plethora of evidence 
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makes any attempt towards a full presentation of the theme 
impossible in this context), which in a way draws back to G.'s 
contention. 
Despite the different approaches, it has amply been shown that 
G. paid tribute to pleasure ('i€p!j;LS") as a means of attaining 
persuasiveness (explicitly in He!. 5, 13), so that his prescription 
about the usage of laughter cannot be seen independently of this 
parameter. The role of pleasure and laughter in persuasion is attested 
in Aristophanes' Wasps 567; in that context Phi10kleon explains to 
his son the privileges of being a juror by referring to defendants' 
striving for acquittaL Among other means of persuasion, they also 
"narrate myths to us [jurors], others comic stories from Aisopos; 
others make jokes, so as to make me laugh and thus to appease me. 
And if we do not change our minds ... ". This comic exploitation of 
the function of laughter points to its power to win over audiences in 
courtrooms, and thus to its contribution to the acquittal of those 
involved. In fourth-century rhetoric things are rather different; 
without intending to systematize evidence (this has been done by 
Halliwell) it seems feasible to maintain that pleasure through 
laughter is there inextricably interwoven with 'slander' (AoLoopLa), 
an element which is undeveloped in G.'s preserved texts. This is 
eloquently expressed in Demosthenes 18.3 (0 <pvaEL -rriiaLV 
dv8pumOLS" Vm:1.pXEL, 'iWV J-L€V AOLOOPLWV KaL 'iWV Ka'i7])'0pLwV dKOVELV 
-ryO€WS"), and later at 138 (cp. also Philip.3.54, 19.23; Aiskhines 1.35). 
Laughter in oratory is thus chiefly integrated within the 
characterisation of the opponent in which even false evidence about 
his life can be employed (a good example is the presentation of 
Aiskhines' parentage by Demosthenes; for false evidence and the 
identity of litigants see Halliwell 1991, p.288; see also Harding 
1994, who investigates the impact of Old Comedy upon rhetoric). 
So far I have been stressing the role of laughter; we may now see 
the role of stubborn seriousness as opposed to 'playful' laughter. In 
Demosthenes' Against Conon, Ariston, the plaintiff, in anticipating 
his opponent's arguments claims that among other things he will say 
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that his (and his company's) misbehaviour was due to a 'playful' 
mood (ElS" YEAWTa Kal. aKW/L/LaT' e/Lf3aAEZv 7TELpaaaa8aL 13); he then 
says that Conon will claim falsely that he (Ariston) and his brothers 
are heavy drinkers, uf3pLaTai., ayvw/LOvES" and 7TLKpOf.. Much has been 
said about hybris in the context of this speech; it will suffice here to 
say that Ariston himself claims that he did not prosecute his 
opponents for hybris, because, as he explains, he was told by his 
relatives not to do so. But how are we to interpret the words 
ayvw/LovaS" and 7TLKpOVS" in contradistinction to the 'playfulness' of 
his opponents? 
Both attributes gIve the impression of a stubborn, inflexible 
person, a character with no sense of humour; Ariston, in short, 
alleges that Conon will present him as a person with no 
understanding, and it seems that he cannot feel confident enough 
that even the judges will abstain from laughter at the representation 
of the facts by Conon (20). It is for this reason that he there 
dramatises his sufferings and invites the judges to visualise them. 
This short presentation clearly brings out the dangers involved in 
seriousness; Ariston may justifiably claim that no one would laugh, 
if it happened to be an eye-witness of the incident, but at the same 
time he is anxious not to present himself as prejudiced against 
playful activity. Demosthenes in defending him is aware of the 
possibility that the judges will perhaps be more influenced by the 
'staging' of slapstick comedy with the prosecutor playing the role of 
the foolishly touchy protagonist than by the actual sufferings of a 
complainer who is overdoing it (for brief comments on this 
fragment see Untersteiner, 1961, p.134, and Buchheim 1989, p.196). 
13 
Dionysios' information about G.'s writing on KaLpos IS clearly 
marked by a sceptical, if not polemical, tone which is founded on 
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the axiom that KULp6~ is an elusive subject of investigation due to its 
inherent association with D6~u. I take it that this tone can potentially 
be useful in relation to the nature of G.'s own writing because it 
points to a general, 'theoretical' analysis of this important parameter 
of eloquence. 
KULp6~ is a fundamental notion in the circle of the Sophists which 
could simply be defined as the consideration of the right time at 
which one should act; both the words 'time' and 'act' should be read 
in the wider possible way: time should necessarily include a 
'spatial' meaning, that is the pragmatic constraints imposed on a 
speaker by the context in which he delivers his speech, the audience 
and the horizon of its expectations, which unavoidably entails their 
political, religious or other dispositions etc. In short, KULp6~, as a 
technical term, results from the observation that communicating a 
view effectively does not merely depend on the clarity of a message, 
but on the speakers' timing as welL 
According to Diogenes Laertios (IX. 52=Al,52DK), Protagoras 
(not G. as Dionysios says) was the first to display KULPOfJ DUVUIl-LV. 
The doxographical divergence about who was the first to discuss 
KULp6~ cannot be discussed here; in Diogenes it is presented as one 
among other Protagorean novelties. Skouteropoulos is too ready to 
accept the doxographers in claiming that '''Ev4J 0 ITPW'TuyoPU$ ~'TUV 
o 1TPW'TO$ 0 01TOLO$ E1TLo-TJIkUVE. TIJ O"'T1IkUCTLU 1TOU EXE.L ~ u'LaB'llO"'T1 TIi$ 
KU'TMA'llA'll$ 1TE.pLCT'TUO"'T1$ ••• 1TpW'TO$ 0 lOPYLU$, 01TW$ O"'T1IkE.L('~lVE.L EOW 0 
~LOVUCTLO$ 0 • AALKUPVUCTCTE.U$, E'ITLXE.LP'llCTE. vCr. 1TPOCTOLOpLCTE.L KUt. 'TOU$ 
TEXVLKOU$ KUVOVE.$ YLCr. TIJv Eq,UPIkOY-rl uuTIi$ TIi$ a.pXll$ CTTIJ 
P'llTOPLK-rl" 1991, p.261; see also Gomperz 1912, p.165ff.) A number 
of other Sophistic works also mention KULp6~; in Dissoi Logoi quite 
a good deal is said about it. At 2.20 we read: 1TIJ.VTa. KULpqi iJ-€V KaAcl 
EVTL, EV dKULpLq. 0' ULaxpcl (see also 5,9) which shows that KULp6~ is 
not here viewed on the level of its oratorical implications (although 
this does not justify Schiappa's (1999, p.74) conclusion that "the 
absence of any rhetorical treatment of them in the Dialexeis implies 
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that the disciplinary matrix connecting these concepts to persuasive 
speecbmaking either had not emerged or was not yet fixed in Greek 
language or thought"). Allddamas, probably one of G.'s students 
and a fervent supporter of oral speech, also contended TqJ KUl.plfJ TWV 
7TpUYP.UTWV KuL TU'iS €7Tl.evp.iul.s TWV aveparrrwv €VO"T0xWS" 
aKoAovefjaul. KuL TOV 7TpOaTJKOVTU Aoyov €l7T€'iV (On the Sophists, 3; 
see also Isokrates 2.33). 
KULPOS is traced in G. 's preserved texts expressed with the word 
TO D€OV (for this term as a synonym of KULPOS see Vollgraff 1952, 
p.20-27); in the Epitaphios those honoured are praised for doing and 
saying the right thing at the right time; similarly in the opening of 
He!. the rhetor defines his task as an expression of that which oUght 
to be said (TO D€OV), a statement which has widely been explained as 
an allusion to KULPOS (see notes ad lac.). The phrase €<PL€£S TlfJ KULplfJ 
in Test. 1a is rightly taken by Guthrie (1971, p.272 n.4 with further 
literature) to refer "to his gift of improvisation" as in that context it 
is the practice of public display that it is discussed. 
It is possible now to return to the nature of G.'s writing about 
KULPOS; I have already suggested that it is likely that it was a 
'theoretical' work where general rules were put forward; Dionysios' 
objection is that KULPOS is something that cannot be studied 
systematically, and accordingly no universal rules can be set about 
it, because it depends decisively upon personal, SUbjective 
considerations (this is said in what follows the passage cited by 
Diels-Kranz; Kerferd 1981, p.81 almost invited future editors to 
include this part, hence Buchheim 1989, p.82 and Skouteropoulos 
1991, p.260); in short KULPOS cannot be judged independently of a 
given occasion. That this is accepted by him as an axiom, is shown 
by his all-encompassing contempt towardst philosophers and 
rhetoricians expressed at the beginning of the passage cited. All this 
suggests a 'theoretical' discussion of KULPOS to the extent that 
Dionysios finds it unpractical. What such a dissertation on KULPOS 
may have included is mere speculation; probably suggestions about 
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its importance (this, according to Diogenes Laertios, was the content 
of Protagoras' work on Ka.,p6~) or about the modification of 
arguments dictated by the expectations of the audience. These 
prescriptions could have been supported by the analysis of examples 
of real speeches. 
(For Ka.l..p6~ see, SUss 1910, pp.iii and 17ff, Gomperz 1912, 
pp.165ff, Untersteiner 1961, p. 134-136, Kennedy 1963, p.66-68, 
Wilson 1981,418-420, Consigny 1992, Noel, 1998, Schiappa 1999, 
p.73-74) 
14 
Aristotle scorn.:fully presents G. 's method of teaching through an 
analogy; he compares the learning of model speeches by heart as a 
teaching-method of rhetoric to a hypothetical teaching of shoe-
making, which solely consists in the presentation of many different 
kinds of shoes. According to Aristotle this is a process which 
involves learning from the products of art (d7TO rijs T€XVTJ~) and 
which unavoidably fails to lead to the acquisition of the art itself. 
This passage has frequently been discussed by modem scholarship, 
which, it should be added, in recent years tends to find in it support 
for the contention that rhetorical meta-language is absent throughout 
the fifth century. The feasibility of this statement is also partly 
connected to the explanation of what Aristotle means by A6yov~; 
other scholars take it to refer to whole speeches, others to parts of 
speeches or recurnng themes labelled loci communes 
( commonp laces). 
Wilcox (1942, p.153) takes the VIew that ''we should accept 
Aristotle's testimony in the Sophistici Elenchi that the theory was 
extensively developed and unlike the communes loci of G.". Kerferd 
(1981, p.31) also maintains that Aristotle has in mind the loci 
communes of the kind Cicero describes in Brutus 46-47 (= Test.25), 
and he concludes that: "It can hardly be in doubt that it is 
commonplaces of this kind which the pupils of G. were required to 
388 
learn by heart ... rather than whole speeches as is sometimes 
asserted" (the same view is taken by Natali 1986, p.106). Kennedy 
(1994, p.35, and 1959), in discussing the rhetorical handbooks, 
discerns two traditions: "the theoretical ... including Tisias and 
Theodorus, and the tradition of the exemplar or collection of 
commonplaces ... including G." (1959, p.172). Cole (1991, p.92), 
who offers a detailed discussion of TEXT!'q, holds that "sample speech 
parts, like sample shoe parts, can be constructed in such a way as to 
minimise idiosyncrasy and so point more clearly than would a 
random selection of such objects to the general principles on which 
their construction is based" and he encapsulates his view of fifth-
century rhetoric as follows: "The analytical metalanguage 
characteristic of fourth-century treatises may have had purely oral 
antecedents of which all reports have disappeared. Yet the 
completeness of the disappearance ... suggests otherwise." Similarly 
Schiappa (1999, p.45) concludes that 'The 'Arts' attributed to G., 
Thrasymachus, and Antiphon are probably the result of the 
publication of exemplary speeches ... there were no theoretical 'Arts 
of Rhetoric' written in the fifth century B.C.E.". 
There is thus a consensus about the 'practical' and markedly 
exemplary character ofG.'s teaching, the divergence of views being 
chiefly located in the examination of G.' s tools. Moreover, it is clear 
that, as far as G. is concerned, scholarly work tends to take 
Aristotle's testimony for granted, and thus to found its conclusions 
upon it. However, both the statements that G. had not developed any 
theoretical meta-language and that his teaching proceeded solely 
with the memorization of model-speeches cannot be true. 
Firstly, it should be pointed out that Aristotle is not acting as an 
impartial historiographer of rhetoric; his contempt for the display of 
model-speeches, or parts of them, can only be considered soberly if 
one is ready to see it in comparison to his own elevated analysis of 
rhetoric. As he says G.' s practice falls short because it employs TO. 
0:1T0 ri'js TEXVTJS and by the same token because it fails to present the 
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TEXV7J itself Retrojecting this term almost one century before 
Aristotle's time and thus reaching conclusions concerning the 
teaching of rhetoric is unsafe. TEXV7J in Aristotle's time has already a 
long history in which Plato's philosophy plays the most important 
role, particularly with the distinction between TEXV7J and e:rncrrr]J-L7J. 
In Aristotle's philosophy TEXV7J takes on a specific meaning, for he 
places it between EJ-L1TEl..p£a and E1TLcrrr]J-L7J, and more particularly he 
relates it to the third of the three kinds of E1TLcrrr]J-L7J, that is 1TOL7]TLKTJ 
(cp. Meta. 981b25-982al, l025b21, 26, l046b3; Eth.Nic.1139b14-
1141b8). The emphasis is thus placed on the process, not on the 
finished work for that belongs to the realm of TVxaLov and TEXV7J 
tends (as E1TLa-rr,J-L7J does) to the Ka86Aov, the difference between 
them being that TeXV7J is 1TEPI. yev7JCFLv (namely the passage from a 
shapeless material to a form). It is with such a philosophical 
background that Aristotle criticises G.' s teaching; apart from that, 
we should point out that if Tel. a1TO Tfjs TeXV7JS are either loci 
communes or parts of speeches, as most scholars agree, composed 
for memorization, their obvious raison d' etre was to provide people 
with generally applicable arguments (or possibly cliches for other 
parts of a speech), and they were thus concerned with what one says 
rather than with the way in which one says it, there is even one more 
reason why we should not be surprised by Aristotle's criticism. For 
it cannot be accidental that the subject-matter of speeches is 
excluded by Aristotle in his study of rhetoric, on the basis that it is 
related to other disciplines (ethics, politics etc). 
It is thus not the absence of 'theory' in the way we construe the 
term that Aristotle locates in G. 's teaching method, nor does he say 
that the latter proceeded solely by display. But is it feasible to 
contend that rhetorical metalanguage was unavailable in G. 's 
teaching? First of all, no one can seriously put forward the view that 
any teaching is possible without conveying the principles that 
underline the discipline taught, at least in the way that the instructor 
has them in his / her mind. Common experience shows that queries 
390 
cannot always be answered by the means of paradigms, and some 
generalization is always involved. It is equally true that teaching is 
by nature a kind of communication where oral speech is primarily 
employed (electronic technology has certainly facilitated distance-
learning in our days), and insofar as antiquity is concerned, 
difficulties related to the publication and distribution of books 
would make teachers of successful public speaking prefer to write 
down what they considered appropriate to meet the practical and 
immediate needs of their audience. Moreover, relentless mobility is 
a common characteristic of the representatives of the Sophistic 
movement, and certainly of G. himself. This is tantamount to the 
fact that such a thing as a school like Plato's Academy or Aristotle's 
Lykeion is something unattested in G.'s days; for this reason it is 
legitimate to speculate once more that written composition of 
paradigms was of more general applicability, and thus preferable to 
'theoretical' discussion of the function of rhetoric, especially in 
view of the fact that this teaching was addressed to people 
unacquainted with a developing genre. All this suggests, I think, that 
the non-theoretical orientation of the fifth-century 'rhetorical' 
writings does not necessarily entail the absence of a metarhetorical 
language. 
Absence of theoretical perspective in the study of rhetoric in the 
fifth century has convincingly been refuted by Gagarin (1994), who 
rightly places his interest chiefly in the writings of this period, and 
not in fourth-century assessments of them. For our purposes it will 
suffice to present briefly some aspects of metalanguage in G. To 
start with indirect evidence, we know that he had composed a 
treatise on Ka.Lp6~, which is criticised by Dionysios as unsuccessful 
(see fr.13). Regardless of the quality of this work, its existence is a 
first indication that G. had actually discussed an aspect of rhetoric 
which undoubtedly has a diachronic value. Segments of meta-
rheroricallanguage can be traced in G.'s extant texts. He!. 8-14 
includes a discussion of '\6yoS", which undoubtedly establishes a 
metarhetoricallanguage, to the extent that it deals with matters such 
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as persuasion, acceptability of arguments, emotional appeal, 
pleasure and its relation to effectiveness etc. The same mutatis 
mutandis holds for the third part of ONE, which paves the way for 
serious philosophical approach to language and which has 
frequently been underrated by scholars who connect it with G.'s 
practical ends. Independently of the context in which these 
discussions appear, they certainly suggest an increasing interest in 
discussing speech both in its endogenous characteristics and in its 
role in social discourse (one may also mention G.'s advice about the 
importance of laughter in one's argumentation). There is no doubt 
that this evidence is highly random and that it does not amount to a 
systematic, theoretical approach to rhetoric; but this is rather 
different from saying that metarhetoric is unattested in G.' s writings. 
It would be more accurate to contend that G.'s teaching is a hybrid, 
where practice and theory have a complementary function. To a 
certain degree, metalanguage can be traced even in what could be 
seen as a sample of purely paradigmatic rhetoric of general 
applicability, that is Pal. The typology of motives leading to 
criminal action at 19, to mention one example, is a remark of great 
significance (for more such remarks, see my commentary on the 
text). 
In conclusion, Aristotle's view about teaching a.7TO ri]s T€XV7]S is 
a criticism which is based on a syncresis with what he himself 
defines as T€XV7]; thus Buchheim is certainly right in printing OUTOS 
yap {3€{30f]87]K€ ..• 1Tap€OWK€V, because this portion of the text 
illustrates Aristotle's own criterion, to which, in his view, G.'s end 
is opposed. Similarly modern suggestions that metarhetoric is absent 
in G.'s teaching (and time) fail to give a clear meaning to the term 
metarhetoric, as they almost invite us to construe it in the terms of 
fourth-century philosophising. On the contrary, examination of G.'s 
own texts suggests an unprecedented (in existing evidence) amount 
of language which is designed to explain language, and which 
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allows us to infer that much more theoretical language was 
employed in everyday contact with students of eloquence. 
15 
Aristotle exanunes what ifroxpov style anses from; there are four 
main causes: a) compound words, b) obscure and difficult 
expressions (-1"0 xpf]afJUI. yIl.WrrUI.~, c) the use of epithets which are 
either J1-UKpoIS or dKU£pOI.~ or 7TVK1IOIS, and d) inappropriate 
metaphors. This technical term frequently recurs in Greek criticism 
and it is variously defined (for an examination of it see VanHook 
1917, pp.68-76). In this fragment we have examples of compound 
words, which are unattested elsewhere in G.'s preserved writings; he 
is certainly fond of compound words (see Introduction), but nothing 
similar to 1T'TWXOJ1-0V(jOKOII.UKU~ can be tracked down in his extant 
work. 
1T"iW)(0f.L0uO'oK6t..aKas: 'wanting-in-wisdom flatterers'; the MSS have 
1TTWXOJ1-0V(jo~ KOII.Ug, but Vahlen' s suggestion has justifiably been 
accepted by most scholars. 
k1Tl.0PK-TJO'UV1US KaT' euopK-TJO'UV'iOS: I prefer Ross's reading to the 
MSS' EmopKTj(jU1ITU~ KUL KUT€VOPKTj(jU1ITa~, because it brings 
together in an antithetical structure what is otherwise an example 
which consists in two separate words. 
16 
These are examples of rjJvxpov arising from metaphors; for a full 
discussion of the textual difficulties see Solmsen 1987, pp.SOO-2, 
who rightly suggests that we should "separate the second sentence 
aV ... Ee€pL(jU~ from the preceding one, for these two 
quotations ... have no connection with one another" (p.SOO); see also 
Buchheim 1989, pp. 197-8. 
17 
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Skouteropoulos (1991, p.265) rightly relates this passage to Plato's 
Phaidros 267a, where we learn that G. along with Tisias had 
invented a technique by which they could both prolong their 
speeches. In the same connection, it is useful to remember that 
according to Aristotle (Soph. El. 174b 32), when Lykophron found 
it hard to praise the lyre as he was asked, he praised a star bearing 
the same name with this instrument. 
Nestle (1940, pp.313-14) takes it for granted that G. composed a 
speech for Achilles, but it is equally possible that Aristotle uses 
Achilles' name exempli gratia, in order to illustrate how G. 
developed his praises by referring to partly relevant material. That 
Aristotle did not perhaps have a specific speech in mind is a 
hypothesis corroborated by the reasoning employed in Hel., and by 
the wording in with which he introduces his explanation (el yap 
'AXLl\l\€a I\€ywv ... ). If we wish to find an extant speech that develops 
exactly in the manner that Aristotle describes in this part of his 
Rhetoric, we should turn to Isokrates' Helen, where eventually the 
hero praised is Theseus, not Helen. 
18,19 
The passage from Plato's Meno IS usually taken as an 
exemplification of the type of definitions that Aristotle ascribes to 
G. in naming him as the representative of those who 'enumerate' 
(egapLef.LoiJvTES) virtues (in including Aristotle's reference to 
Sokrates I follow Buchheim, because Aristotle does not merely 
record G.' s method of definition, but he opposes it to Sokrates' 
own). It is thus generally taken for granted that Aristotle's 
information is correct and that it is in accordance with the first 
definition of virtue in Meno 71e (e.g. Guthrie 1971, p.254 claims 
that "But he [sc. Meno] is introduced as an admirer of G., and we 
know from Aristotle that G. did not approve of attempting a general 
definition of arete'''; B1uck 1961, note ad loc., claims that 
"Aristotle .. .is probably thinking of the present passage, and 
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attributing the views expressed by Meno to his master G."). An 
interesting implication of the comparative reading of these passages 
is that some scholars take the view that 'enumerating' was the only 
practice employed by G. in giving definitions; this view is explained 
variously: Guthrie (1971, p.254) associates it with the Protagorean 
relativism and Untersteiner (1961, p.140) with Ka~p6~. However, 
G. 's repugnance to absolute definitions IS refutable and 
consequently Aristotle's accuracy should be scrutinised. 
Levi (1966, p.201-2) remarks that Aristotle's evidence IS 
disputable by observing that ''vari passi del Menone riconoscono 0 
implicano che Gorgia aveva definito la virtU. in generale (71c; 73c-d; 
76a-b)". None of the passages referred to by Levi proves that G. had 
put forward a general definition of 'virtue' (the more telling instance 
is 73c-d, where, once more, the definition given is said to belong 
both to G. and Meno), but this scholar's contribution consists 
chiefly in his questioning the validity of Aristotle's information. 
Unlike Levi, several scholars (Guthrie 1971, p.254, Buchheim 
1989, p.198, Skouteropoulos 1991, p.266) see in G.'s preserved 
texts (He!. 1, Epitaphios; for the function of this type of definition in 
Hel. 1 see comments ad lac.) a verification of what Aristotle says 
here, which undoubtedly entails that they take his statement as a 
general reference to G.'s unique way of defining things. However, 
whereas the passage from Aristotle affords this reading, it is 
necessary to make it clear that Plato's student is either selective or 
that he systematises evidence from G.' s texts. Even if "practical" 
and "rhetorical" aspects of definition are brought in (this is implied 
by Guthrie 1971, p.254, when he alleges that "G. would no doubt 
have claimed that Sokrates was trying to extend a method 
appropriate to natural science beyond its proper sphere") a 
monolithic insistence on relativistic definitions (x is y for a, p is q 
for b ... ) is not always helpful. The argument from antinomy at Pal. 
25 furnishes us with a good example for the necessity of absolute 
definitions: Palamedes is there describing madness through an 
enumeration of the acts that it leads to; this method he employs 
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there is 'absolute' enough to apply to any individual situation (other 
absolute definitions: He!': of speech 8, of poetry 9; of human 
motives PaL 19). Consequently, neither Aristotle nor modem 
scholars who take his account for granted are right in maintaining 
that 'enumerating' attributes was G.'s only method of defining 
things. 
We may now examine the definition of 'virtue' as it is given by 
Plato; once again the parentage of the definition is a hybrid: at 71d it 
is clearly said that the definition that follows is an exclusive 
privilege of the knowledge of G. and Meno. Two levels are 
discernible in it: on the first one Meno displays what is dpeT"!J for a 
man and for a woman and on the second one it is merely expressed 
that different things are virtues for different groups of people. These 
groups of people can further be divided into two categories on the 
basis of two criteria: age and sex. But when we turn to 73c, where 
Meno offers the second Gorgian definition of virtue, we find out 
that he gives an 'absolute' definition (er7Tep EV ye n '7]Te!s KUTa. 
7TavTwv) which is reminiscent of theses held by G.' s pupils in 
Gorgias: T£ a-Uo y' 7] apxeLv olav T' elvuL nov dVepW7TWV; It has 
already been said that Levi, in showing that Aristotle's view is 
inaccurate, suggests that this is an example of an absolute definition 
attributable to G. Bluck 1961 (note ad lac.) is more cautious in 
explaining that, "here again, Gorgias himself may have said 
something of this sort, though it is an ideal that was not confined to 
a few", and he goes on to compare it to similar views expressed in 
Gorgias and in the Republic. We may now see why neither the first 
nor the second definition can safely be ascribed to G. 
As Bluck observes, the distinction between age and sex as a 
determinant factor of what 'virtue' is for groups of people is not 
necessarily an invention of any of the Sophists; on the contrary, it 
involves characteristics which are recognizable in what should be 
considered as mainstream morality. In short, it is hard to see why 
efficiency in civic life and compliance with its rules for males and 
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devotion to males by women should be attributed specifically to 
G.'s definition of virtue. In the same connection, the teaching of 
efficiency in public affairs is not peculiar to G.; in a number of 
passages it appears as a common Sophistic ideal (see Kerferd 1981, 
p.38). Plato does not thus seem to be concerned with the actual 
content of "Gorgias'" definition, but with its 'relativistic' nature. 
The particularly Gorgian style of the last phrases of the definition 
should not make us feel unconfident; Plato is always ready to dress 
what is presented as Sophistic in the appropriate gown. 
One is even more alert when one examines the second "Gorgian" 
definition of virtue; once again, the ability to aPXELv is a basic 
Sophistic ideal (see Bluck note ad loco with references to Gorgias) , 
and it is unnecessary to accept that G. was either the first or the only 
person to have held such a view. In the same way that by the first 
definition Plato intends to stress its relativism, so the second one 
paves the way for Sokrates to bring in the theme of oLKaLOaVv7] and 
then to ask him if this is a virtue or the virtue, so as to catch him 
again in the web of a multitude of other virtues. 
It is unsafe then to suggest that in Meno Plato quotes G.' s 
definitions of virtue. These should preferably be considered in the 
context of the dialogue; their function within Meno and the way in 
which they contribute to the progress of the discussion there cannot 
be discussed in the context of this thesis. The general conclusion is, 
once more, that our approach to the Sophists through Plato's 
writings should be extremely careful. 
Kal. 1Tpa.TrOV'iO.: if we read 'in so doing' we are close to G.'s views 
about friends (see fro 21), because this would suggest that helping 
friends and harming enemies is more important than being a good 
citizen. Still, this is not enough to say that the definition is Gorgian, 
since helping friends and harming enemies is too common in Greek 
ethics to be purely Gorgian. 
€UAa~€LaeaL: cpo Pal. 34, with note ad loco 
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Ka.e' eccJ.<M""I1V ••• EO'"T'I.V: Meno provides the parameters which 
determine apEn]; the polyptoton with the repetition of the word 
EKU070S is Gorgian. What is presented as Gorgian in content is also 
expressed in the appropriate style. 
Wo-a.UTWS SE ... KCLKI.a.: KUK£U is presumably offered as the antonym of 
apEn]; the construction is reminiscent of the opening lines of HeI. 
As in that text G. first defines what is Koap.os and then explains that 
the opposite is aKoap.£u, in the same way here Meno first defines 
what is virtue and he then explains that the (absence of the) same 
characteristics (waa.vTWS) are KUK£U. 
20 
For similar views see Antiphon B53, 54 and Anon. Iambl. 7, 1-3; a 
detailed interpretation is developed by Musti 1984, pp.129-153. 
21 
G.'s view of CPLA£a. depicted in this passage from Ploutarkhos is in 
accordance with Pal. 18; in that context it is both helping friends 
and harming enemies that motivate a wrong-doing. Further evidence 
is offered by a passage from Xenophon's Cyrop.1.6.31 (OWJPL{E oe 
/ n \ , \ .J../\ /, (\ , ' .. A' , TOVTWV U TE 7TpOS TOVS 'f'LI\OVS 7TOL7lTEOV KUL U 7TpOS E)(vpOVS .•• KUL 
TOUS CPLAOVS O£KULOV Er7] Egu7TuTav E7T£ yE ayue4J KuL KA€7TTELV Ta. 
nlJlI CP£AWII E7TL yE ayue4J), if one accepts that the oLSciaKuAos referred 
to there is G. (see Nestle 1939, pp.36ff.; For acting justly/unjustly 
and its bearing on CPLA£U, see Blundell 1989, p.50-1; cpo also the 
interesting example of an excuse for transgressing an oath in Dissoi 
Logoi 3.6-7). Public offices and failing to favour friends is a matter 
posed by Thrasyrnakhos in Pl.Rep. 343e). 
22 
We do not know the context in which G. claimed that a woman 
should rather be known for her good reputation than for her beauty. 
Scholars have accepted that there must be a certain relevance of this 
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view with the one put by Thucydides in Perikles' mouth: rij~ TE yap 
inTaPXouO'7]S <pUUEW'; {J.TJ XEr.pOU~ YEvEa8U~ u{J.Lv {J.eycL)VT] i] oo~u. KUI. 
~~ E7T' EA.cLX~UTOV UPErij~ 7TEP~ 1} rj;oyov EV TOLS a.pUEU~ KA.EO~ ~ (2. 
45, 2). Kerferd (1981, p.160) claims that Pericles' advice "was 
inserted by way of reply to G. (DK82B22) who had said ... ". This 
assumption (Untersteiner 1961, p.142) is weakened if we consider 
that Pericles is there referring to widows (see Lacey 1964, pp.47-49; 
Schaps 1977, pp.323-330 is also interesting), not to women in 
general, as Ploutarkhos' s wording shows. 
23 
This fragment (along with fr.24, and He!. 9) convincingly shows 
that G. took a serious interest in poetry, and tragedy in particular. 
Nevertheless, the exact meaning ofG.'s contention remains obscure, 
and none of the interpretations proposed so far seems to me to be 
conclusive. The main problems that bar our way to an efficient 
appreciation ofG.'s contention are the following: a) we do not know 
how much of what Ploutarkhos says belongs to G., b) we are 
unaware of the context in which G. expressed this view, and c) the 
dictum is elliptical to such an extent that it is hard to see the exact 
meaning that the words U7TUTIjUUS / U7Turrfje£s, O~KULOTEPOS. 
ao<pWTEpoS take on. 
In my view, it is safe to ascribe to G. only that portion of the text 
which is purely antithetical, because what precedes W~ Topyius 
<P7Jaiv is certainly meant to introduce a new subject in Ploutarkhos' 
own text. The sentence starting with 0 {J.€V yap u7TuT~aus 
O~KUL6TEpOS ... is, I believe, Ploutarkhos' attempt to explain G.'s 
view, and it may possible that he himself did not possess a more 
extensive portion of the context in which G.'s contention appeared 
than the one he preserves (for further literature see Dosi 1968, pp. 
36ff.). 
Much has been said about the role of U7TcLT7J in G.; Verdenius 
(1981) elevated deception to a Gorgian doctrine, and concluded that 
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"Gorgias' idea of tragic deception was his own idea and that it was 
based on a transference from rhetorical to poetical speech"; 
Rosenmeyer (1955, p.232) contends that "a pate bacame prominent 
in the vocabulary of G. because he placed a positive accent upon 
what prior to him had been regarded as a negative situation: the 
frequent discrepancy between words and things", and Kerferd 
(1981, p.79) maintains that "deceit is only possible in relation to 
what is actually true". Dosi (1968, p.83) contends that "la 
definizione risulta infatti assolutamente conforme a tutto il sistema 
filosofico gorgiano". All these views are discernibly influenced by 
theses held in ONE, and especially by the distinction that G. draws 
between words and things. In fact, apate is not "prominent" in G.'s 
vocabulary, as it is commonly assumed: it appears in Hel. 8, 10, and 
Pal. 33. 
My line of inquiry is that G.' s contention about tragic deception 
should be addressed autonomously, without drawing general 
conclusions about the role of deception in his thought. What G. says 
in this fragment is very close to his examination of poetry in Hel. 9. 
Almost anticipating Platonic poetics, he there explicitly contends 
that E1T' dX\orpLwv TE 1TpaYfLaTWV Kat. O'wfLarwv EV'TUXLaIS Kat. 
OV(J1TapaYLaLS LOLOV TL 1Ta8TJfLa Odt. TWV AOYWV €1Ta8EV i] tjJvx!J (one 
may compare the Athenians' response to Phrynikhos' MLA7}TOV 
"AAWO'LS"; cpo Hdt. 6.21: Kat. 07J Kat 1TOL7}O'aVTL CPPVVLXCfJ opafLa 
MLAfrrOV aAWO'LV Kat OLO~aVTL €s oa.Kpva TE €1TEO'E TO 8E'T]7"pOV Kat 
€~ TJfLLWO'av fLLV wS" dvafLV7}O'aVTa OlK7}La KaKeJ. XLAL 7JO'L OpaXfLfjO'L). In 
this context G. refers to poetry generally, not to tragedy, but we 
have reasons to believe that in general, he tended to see in the 
products of arts the potential to make their recipients identify 
themselves with them. This hypothesis is further strengthened on the 
basis of the analogy that G. draws between the effects of the 
products of sculpture and painting and the way in which love and 
desire are inflamed within the human soul. In Hel. 18, G. makes it 
plain that humans can fall in love with soulless products of art 
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(1Tpayp.a:rwv Kat. awp.chwv). It is possible then that when G. contends 
that the deceived is wiser than the undeceived, he refers to the 
wisdom of those spectators who go to the theatre ready to be 
deceived, those, in other words, who are ready to concede that what 
happens on the stage concerns them personally. The dissimilarity 
between this fragment and the function of poetry and arts as it is 
presented in Hel. is that in the latter the recipients of art are doomed 
to experience emotions, whereas in the former being wise is a matter 
of some of the spectators' wisdom, as aorpWrEpo~ shows. 
If this is the case with the spectators, what does G. mean by 
saying that the poet who deceives is OLKa.LOTEPO~ than the poet who 
does not? Rosenmeyer (1955, p.227, and n.7,8) interprets it by 
saying "he plays the literary game more correctly than the one who 
does not", and Verdenius (1981, pp.1l7-18) maintains that "in 
ordinary circumstances a deceiver is considered to be unjust, but 
that deception is so essential to tragedy that the poet who puts it into 
practice is to be called just". Both these views are worth attention 
because they correctly assume that there is a distinction to be drawn 
between immoral apate, and morally neutral tragic apate. In this 
connection, Ploutarkhos' explanation that the poet who deceives is 
more 'just' because Tov8' tJ1Tocrxop.€VO~ 1TE1TO[7jKEV gains ground if it 
is seen in the light of the overtones of apate in G.' s two preserved 
speeches; in Pal., a distinctly forensic speech, deception is presented 
as an inappropriate tool of persuasion, because the judges need to 
hear the truth concerning the acts (see 33). The logical 
argumentation is at work to free the defendant from the groundless 
accusations. In Hel. though, G. is certainly more open to apate 
because he intends his work to be a 1Ta[yvwv, and thus much closer 
to the purposes of poetical work. G. not only proceeds to produce an 
apate of the kind that good playwrights do, but he is confident 
enough to say that he does so: he brings his speech to an end by 
saying that €Vep.ELva TqJ vop.tp 0V €8ep.7jv €V dpxfj TOV il.oyov; this 
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brings him very close to the 8'KU'Mepos tragic poet, whose role is to 
deceive people who know that they are being deceived. 
This fragment is valuable because independently of the manner 
in which one decides to interpret it, it certainly brings out that G. 
saw tragedy (and poetry in general, as He!. 9 makes us believe) 
disconnected from its moral implications. In a good deal of texts, 
poets appear as the procurers of lies who deserve punishment (more 
distinctly in Heralclitus' fragments); .Aristophanes, a contemporary 
of G., appears in his Frogs very concerned with the morality of the 
messages that the tragedy conveys (cp. for instance Frogs 909, 
where Euripides imputes to Aiskhylos· that ha was dl\u~wv KUL 
<PEJlU~ oro,s Te TaUS 8eunJS / efrpr6.Tu). 
24 
It is unknown who was the first to describe Aiskhylos' Septem as 
'full of Ares'; Ploutarkhos clearly attributes it to G., and this may be 
related to his source (according to Pfeiffer 1968, p. 281 "These 
polemics against G. stressing the point that all the plays of 
Aeschylus are 'full of Dionysus' are derived from a Peripatetic 
source, probably Chamaeleo llepL Alax6AOU"). Nothing can be said 
with certainty about the parentage of the saying; Frogs was staged 
in the year 405, and this makes it possible that it is G. who quotes 
.Aristophanes. However, in the absence of other evidence (for 
references to further possible relations between .Aristophanes' 
criticism and Sophistic theses see Pfeiffer 1968, p. 47 n.1) we 
depend much on Ploutarkhos' information; at any rate, G. 's attested 
interest in poetry makes it possible that he expressed this view. 
Immisch (1927, p.29) was a strong supporter of the view that it was 
G. who took it from Aristophanes, whereas most scholars take the 
opposite view (pohlenz 1920, p.452, Untersteiner 1961, p.l44, 
Pfeiffer, 1968, pp. 46 and 281, Buchheim 1989, note ad lac., Dover 
1993, note ad lac.). 
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v ApEws: 'full of war', a common metonymy; cpo EjLCPVTOV" ApEos- in 
the Epitaphios. 
25 
Hellanikos , Damastes, Pherekudes = frs. 4F 5b, 5F llF, 3F 167 in 
the FGrHist. respectively. See also Untersteiner 1961, p.145. 
26 
We do not know in what context G. expressed the saying that 
Proklos attributes to him, but its content is not unparalleled in G.'s 
preserved work. In He!. 4 we find the formula 0 jLev SLa TO ET.vaL 
eSogev referring to Helen's divine father (Zeus), and in Pal. S6ga as 
opposed to what is true plays an important role (most prominently in 
24; cpo also TOLS- 7Tpc!rrOLS- OUO"L TWv'E>..AT]VWV Kat. SOKOVO"L 33). This 
Protean motto seems to introduce the relation between ElvaL and 
cpaLv€(Jf)aL, which undoubtedly prevailed in the Sophistic circles; 
Protagoras IS the intellectual whose contribution to this 
philosophical issue was particularly felt, as Plato's Theaetetus 
l66dff shows. In that context, also known as the 'defence of 
Protagoras', the Sophist explicitly says that jLETPOV yap EKaO"'TOV 
-ryjLWV ElllaL TWV TE OVTWV Kat. jLT], jLVPLOV JLEVTOL ()LacpEpELV €TEPOV 
ETEPOV aVT4J TOVTqJ, on T4J jLev aAAa €O"'TL TE Kat. cpaLVe'TUL, T4J Se 
MAa. 
It seems that G.' s saying puts forward a complementary relation 
between elvaL and SOKELV (so I think that Mazzara 1999, pp.16-19, 
is right in observing an objective and a subjective level in this 
fragment) as elvaL is obscure or invisible if it cannot be conceived, 
and SOKELII is weak, if it does not correspond to reality (notice that 
G. uses the second leg of this antithetical construction in He!. 13, 
when he says that the astronomers SOgav dVT~ S6frys- rryv jLev 
dCPEA6jLEVOL rryv S' EVEpyaO"cljLEvoL Ta a7TLO"'Ta Kat. aS7]A.a cpaLIIEa8aL 
TOLS- ri]s- sog7]S- OjLjLaO"Lv E7ToL7]O"av). It is difficult, if not impossible, 
to fathom whether G. himself accepted dependence of either of these 
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qualities on the other, because the only other context which includes 
similar observations, MXG 980a9-13, bringing in the example of 
chariots racing on the surface of the sea. does not make it clear 
whether or not G. commits himself to the view that whatever is 
thought is true. If what he means there is that not all thoughts are 
true, then Proklos does justice to him by ascribing to him the view 
that OOKELV is weak if it does not correspond to reality. But if on the 
other hand, what he means is that, due to subjectivism, such a thing 
as a falsestatement does not exist, then Proklos misrepresents G. 
27 
G. uses a Homeric antithesis (II. 4.450: EVea 0' af.L' olf.Lwyr] TE Kat. 
EVXWlb} 7T€AEV dvopwv) as a basis to create a stylistically pompous 
expression, by adding to it another one AI.Tai:s / d7TEI./l.af.. He thus 
forms a chiasm, and the antithesis becomes symmetrical, with the 
use of two words denoting almost the same thing: AI.TaLS, Evxak 
AI.Tai also appears in Pal. 31 (see comments ad loc.). It is perhaps 
worth noting that G.' s modification of the Homeric antithesis 
achieves more intense pathos by the passage from d7TEL/l.a£ to 
olf.Lwyaf., as the former implies the still existing power to threaten, 
whereas the latter expresses the results of a defeat. 
ADDENDUM 
Kerferd (1981, p.45) rightly claims that "there is no reason to doubt 
the attribution to him [sc.Gorgias] of the Onomastikon mentioned by 
Pollux". What the content of this book was we cannot tell with 
certainty, but we know that Demokritos worte a book under this 
title. Pollux says that, unlike other similar books, G.' s onomastikon 
404 
was arranged in a fashion that made its reading pleasant, and he 
cocnludes his short description of it with a homoeoteleuton which 
makes us wonder whether he borrowed it from G. or not. Perhaps all 
he wanted to do was to to colour his account with a touch of 
Gorgian expression. 
What is perhaps more important is that Pollux's information 
makes our knowledge about G.' s interest in language more palpable. 
It is possible that in his Onomastikon G. collected and explained 
words and phrases which could be used by his students, or that 
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